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2019 DIGILAW 373 (MAD)

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M. Vanitha

2019-02-04

V.M.VELUMANI

body2019
JUDGMENT : V.M. Velumani, J. 1. This civil miscellaneous appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 27.9.2011 made in MCOP No. 555 of 2009, on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Additional District Court, Krishnagiri. 2. Appellant insurance company is respondent No. 2 in MCOP No. 555 of 2009, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Additional District Court, Krishnagiri. The respondent Nos. 1 to 6 filed the said claim petition, claiming a sum of Rs. 5,25,000 as compensation for the death of one Murugan, who died in the accident that took place on 2.6.2008. The Tribunal, considering the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, held that the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 filed the said claim petition under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Considering the fact the Tribunal framed issue whether the deceased died in the road accident or not and held that the deceased died in the road accident and awarded compensation. Challenging the said award dated 27.9.2011 made in MCOP No. 555 of 2009 granting compensation to the respondent Nos. 1 to 6-claimants, the appellant insurance company has come out with the present appeal. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant insurance company contended that the deceased Murugan died due to his own fault and due to his negligence. In such circumstances, the claim petition filed under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is not maintainable and the Tribunal ought to have dismissed the claim petition. The Tribunal failed to note that the deceased borrowed the motor cycle from the respondent No. 7, owner of the vehicle, and the deceased had no valid driving licence at the time of accident and as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009 ACJ 2020 (SC) and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sinitha, 2012 ACJ 1 (SC), held that the claimants are not entitled to compensation for the death of victim when the deceased died due to his own negligence. 4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as respondents and perused the materials available on record. 5. From the materials available on record, it is seen that the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 filed the said claim petition under section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act. 4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as respondents and perused the materials available on record. 5. From the materials available on record, it is seen that the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 filed the said claim petition under section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009 ACJ 2020 (SC), referred above, held that tortfeasor is not entitled to claim compensation. It is also held that only when the owner of the vehicle is vicariously liable, the victim or legal heirs of the deceased can claim compensation from the insurance company. Subsequent to the above judgment this issue was considered by the three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar, 2018 ACJ 1 (SC) and Shivaji v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2018 ACJ 2161 (SC) and it is held that insurance company is not entitled to raise objection on negligence when the claim petition is filed under section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act. The relevant portions of the said judgments are extracted herein: (i) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar, 2018 ACJ 1 (SC): "(7) ...Section 163-A, on the other hand, was introduced in the new Act for the first time to remedy the situation where determination of final compensation on fault basis under section 163-A of the Act was progressively getting protracted. The legislative intent and purpose was to provide for payment of final compensation to a class of claimants (whose income was below Rs. 40,000 per annum) on the basis of a structured formula without any reference to fault liability. In fact, in Hansrajbhai V. Kodala (supra), the Bench had occasion to observe that: 'Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever increasing motor vehicle accidents in a fast moving society. Further, the law before insertion of section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking a long time. Further, the law before insertion of section 163-A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under section 140 for no fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking a long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing section 163-A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis. Further, if the question of determining compensation on fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles.' (8) From the above discussion, it is clear that grant of compensation under section 163-A of the Act on the basis of the structured formula is in the nature of a final award and the adjudication thereunder is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by section 163-A(2). Though the aforesaid section of the Act does not specifically exclude a possible defence of the insurer based on the negligence of the claimant as contemplated by section 140(4), to permit such defence to be introduced by the insurer and/or to understand the provisions of section 163-A of the Act to be contemplating any such situation would go contrary to the very legislative object behind introduction of section 163-A of the Act, namely, final compensation within a limited timeframe on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability were taking an unduly long time. In fact, to understand section 163-A of the Act to permit the insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under section 163-A of the Act at par with the proceeding under section 166 of the Act, which would not only be self-contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention. (9) For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question arising by holding that in a proceeding under section 163-A of the Act it is not open for the insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim." (Emphasis added) (ii) Shivaji v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. (9) For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question arising by holding that in a proceeding under section 163-A of the Act it is not open for the insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim." (Emphasis added) (ii) Shivaji v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2018 ACJ 2161 (SC): "(5) The issue which arises before us is no longer res Integra and is covered by a recent judgment of three Judges of this court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar, 2018 ACJ 1 (SC), wherein it was held that to permit a defence of negligence of the claimant by the insurer and/or to understand section 163-A of the Act as contemplating such a situation, would be inconsistent with the legislative object behind introduction of this provision, which is 'final compensation within a limited timeframe on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability were taking an unduly long time'. The court observed that if an insurer was permitted to raise a defence of negligence under section 163-A of the Act, it would 'bring a proceeding under section 163-A of the Act at par with the proceeding under section 166 of the Act which would not only be self-contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention'. Consequently, it was held that in a proceeding under section 163-A of the Act, the insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim to counter a claim for compensation." From the ratios in the above two judgments, it is clear that the victim or legal heirs of the deceased in the claim petition filed under section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act need not plead and prove negligence. The insurer is not entitled to raise the plea of negligence on the part of victim or deceased. In view of the above, the contention of the appellant is without merits. There is no error in the award of the Tribunal warranting interference by this court. 6. In the result, this civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed and a sum of Rs. 4,62,000 awarded by the Tribunal as compensation to the respondent Nos. 1 to 6, along with interest and costs, is confirmed. There is no error in the award of the Tribunal warranting interference by this court. 6. In the result, this civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed and a sum of Rs. 4,62,000 awarded by the Tribunal as compensation to the respondent Nos. 1 to 6, along with interest and costs, is confirmed. Both respondent No. 7 as well as the appellant insurance company are directed to deposit the award amount jointly and severally along with interest and costs, less the amount already deposited, if any, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment to the credit of MCOP No. 555 of 2009. On such deposit, the respondent Nos. 1, 5 and 6-claimants are permitted to withdraw their respective award amount on the basis of the apportionment fixed by the Tribunal along with interest and costs, after adjusting the amount already withdrawn, if any, by making necessary applications before the Tribunal. The shares of the minor respondent Nos. 2 to 4-claimant Nos. 2 to 4 are directed to be deposited in any of the nationalised banks, till the minor respondent Nos. 2 to 4-claimant Nos. 2 to 4 attain majority. The respondent No. 1-mother of the minor respondent Nos. 2 to 4 is permitted to withdraw the accrued interest once in three months for the welfare of the minor respondent Nos. 2 to 4. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.