ORDER 1. This miscellaneous appeal under section 173 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been preferred on behalf of the appellant/Insurance Company, assailing the award dated 31st March, 2011 passed by Additional Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Datia in Claim Case No. 05/2011; whereby, an amount of Rs. 2,52,500/- has been awarded to respondents No. 1 to 5/Claimants for death of their mother, who died in road accident dated 24.8.2010. 2. Precisely stated facts of the case are that on the fateful date of 24.8.2010 at about 3 pm, Fundibai (deceased mother of Claimants) was going on by the side of road. Suddenly, at Janshi-Kanpur, near village Baretha, the driver of offending truck bearing registration No. UP-93-T4544,driving the same in rash and negligent manner dashed the deceased,due to which she died on spot. Therefore, claimants filed a claim case before the Claims Tribunal under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 claiming Rs. 7,35,000/- as compensation for the death of their mother. 3. Claims Tribunal after framing issues, recorded evidence and after appreciation of the same, by impugned award, awarded a compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,52,500/- to the claimants for death of their mother. 4. As per the learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company, deceased was aged about 55 years and the claim case was moved on behalf of her major sons and daughter and in light of decision of this Court in the matter of Champabai and ors v. Bajpai Road Lines and others, 2005 ACJ 65 , major sons and daughter are not dependents upon her and therefore, they are not entitled to receive the compensation and therefore, Claims Tribunal erred in awarding the compensation. It is further submitted that in light of decision of Hon'ble apex Court in the matter of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Keshav Bahadur and ors., 2004 ACJ 648 , penal interest cannot be levied in default of payment of compensation within a specific period as held by Claims Tribunal that in lieu of default of making payment of compensation within specified period the penal interest @ 9% would be applicable in place of 7.5%. It is further submitted that if a married daughter filed a claim case as legal representative she cannot be termed as not dependent on deceased and she is only entitled to ex gratia payment of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. 5. It is further submitted that if a married daughter filed a claim case as legal representative she cannot be termed as not dependent on deceased and she is only entitled to ex gratia payment of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the claimants submits that as far as the income of the deceased is concerned, there is ample evidence on record that deceased Fundibai was engaged in the business of making wooden articles like Sup, Daliya etc and by doing so used to earn Rs. 3-4 thousand per month. Therefore, Claims Tribunal did not err in assessing the income of the deceased to Rs. 3,000/- per month. It is also amply proved that the deceased used to live with the claimants and used to share her income with them. Learned counsel for the claimants also prayed for enhancement of compensation as according to him, no amount has been awarded by the Claims Tribunal under the head future prospects. 6. Heard. 7. The main thrust of the arguments as raised by learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company is that since claimants-sons daughter of the deceased are major, they are not entitled for any compensation. 8. From perusal of appeal memo it is clear there are five claimants out of which four are major sons and one is daughter. Daughter is married. Claimant No. 5 is a boy of 20 years. 9. The evidence of Chandrashekhar (PW/1) is unrebutted. It is amply proved that the deceased used to live with the claimants and used to share her income with them. It is not uncommon that deceased and claimants were living together and therefore, she must have been spending some amount on claimants also and therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of this witness. In this respect, reference can be made to Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr., AIR 1987 SC 1690 . It is not uncommon that deceased and claimants were living together and therefore, she must have been spending some amount on claimants also and therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of this witness. In this respect, reference can be made to Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr., AIR 1987 SC 1690 . In which in para 9 it was held as under : "Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the Act. section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines 'legal representative' as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the state devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of deceased person or a person on whom the state devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and clause (c) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. section 110-A(1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in section 110-A of the Act. This section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of section 1A of the Fatal Accident Act, 1855 which provides that "every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased. "While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased, section 110-A(1) of the Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from section 110-E of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. A legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from section 110-E of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This provisions takes the place of the third paragraph of section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in every such action, the Court may give such damages as it may think pro-portioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whose benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by section 110-A and section 110-B of the Act and to that extent the provisions of the Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in so far as motor vehicles accidents are concerned. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was "new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new" the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers re-quire new strategies and new remedies." 10. Further, While confirming the decision of Gujarat High Court in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabha, reported in 1977 ACJ 253 (Guj.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Paragraph 12, held that, "We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by sections 110A to 110F of the Act. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by sections 110A to 110F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in section 11B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by section 110B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under section 110A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers, children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents." 11. In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., v. Naresh Chandra Agarwal and others, reported in 2000 ACJ 931 , the parents of the deceased were not alive and therefore, the brother of the deceased in the capacity of a legal representative, preferred a claim. The award passed by the Tribunal, following the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation's case, was confirmed by the Allahabad High Court, holding that the Legal Representatives including the brother of the deceased is entitled to claim compensation. 12. The award passed by the Tribunal, following the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation's case, was confirmed by the Allahabad High Court, holding that the Legal Representatives including the brother of the deceased is entitled to claim compensation. 12. Following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gujarat State Transport Corporation's case (supra) and taking note of section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, which states that when a male Hindu dies intestate, his property has to be devolved, according to the provision of section 8: i.e., (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule; and (b) secondly, if there is no heir of Class I then upon the heirs, therefore, claimants being Class I as per the Schedule, it is held that married sons and daughters, who fall under Class-I heirs, as per Hindu Succession Act, would be entitled to maintain a claim. 13. Insofar as the contention that the claimants are not dependents of the deceased, this Court is of the considered view that when a claim petition is made by a married son or daughter, or in the absence of any other Class-I heir and if the claimants adduce evidence that they are the legal representatives and that the deceased during her lifetime, had contributed a portion of her income to them and if the said contention is disputed, it is the burden of the objector to lead strong rebuttal evidence to dislodge the claim of dependency. If the contention of contribution by the deceased to the legal representatives is not rebutted by any acceptable evidence, the inevitable conclusion of the Tribunal should be in favour of the claimants. In view of the judgments and for the reasons stated supra, the award made in favour of the married sisters and others, cannot be said to be without any legal principles and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. 14. The compensation amount is being paid to the legal representatives on account of untimely death of their ancestor. The dependency of the legal representatives is a question to be considered and does no mean only the dependents can claim compensation. 14. The compensation amount is being paid to the legal representatives on account of untimely death of their ancestor. The dependency of the legal representatives is a question to be considered and does no mean only the dependents can claim compensation. The compensation being the amount for the loss to the estate of the deceased, it has to be considered as to whether the legal representatives had been put to loss because of the death of the deceased. Wherever the deceased is an earning member, naturally her savings is an accumulation for the estate which can be divided by the legal representatives after the death of the deceased. The quantum of compensation or loss of contribution is not determined on the basis of monetary loss alone. It is also determined on the basis of invaluable and gratuitous services rendered by the mother or the wife, as the case may be. The legal representative particularly, a married daughter, may not be totally dependent on the income of the deceased mother for her survival or living, but still, there can be a monetary assistance, during the life time of the deceased. Even in the case of married daughters, a father or mother or brother, can still monetarily help a married daughter, depending upon the need or out of love and affection. A mother can continuously render her valuable service to her daughter, even if the daughter is married. Similarly, a married daughter would still continue to assist her mother, or father, in the case of need. Contribution by means of service or income, both can be taken into account to determine the quantum of compensation. As the legal representatives had been put to loss of the earning of the deceased, the married daughters and sons are also entitled for the compensation. 15. Further in this case there is absolutely no evidence to show that the married sons are living separately. When they are residing with the mother, naturally the married sons had lost not only the assistance of the deceased mother but also lost her valuable advice in family matters. The deceased, being a widow, naturally she could have lived with any one of the sons. When the legal representatives, the married sons of the deceased are entitled for compensation even though they are residing separately, the claimants herein will be entitled for compensation; especially when they are residing with the deceased. The deceased, being a widow, naturally she could have lived with any one of the sons. When the legal representatives, the married sons of the deceased are entitled for compensation even though they are residing separately, the claimants herein will be entitled for compensation; especially when they are residing with the deceased. More over, the aged parents in many a house are the watch dogs for the entire house, servants and the grand children except in a few exceptional cases. When the claimants had lost such valuable services of their mother they are entitled for compensation. The loss cannot be substituted by any other confident or responsible person either in the family or by appointing a servant, if the contention of the counsel for the appellant is accepted. 16. Further if the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the claimants are entitled only for the no fault amount is accepted, then a person who sustained some grievous injuries will be paid more than the amount that would be paid to the legal representatives i.e., married sons and daughters of the deceased and in that case it would be cheaper to kill than maim. If the claimants are to be paid the no fault amount, that may mean that the claimants are being paid some ex gratia payment out of sympathy and not for the loss of life of their ancestor. Hence the contention of the counsel for the appellant cannot be countenanced and there is absolutely no merit in the his contentions. 17. So far as contention of learned counsel for the appellant regarding penal interest is concerned,though section 171 of the Act, confers a discretion on the Tribunal to award interest, the same is meant to be exercised in cases where the claimant can claim the same as a matter of right. In the above background, it is to be judged whether a stipulation for higher rate of interest in case of default can be imposed by the Tribunal. Once the discretion has been exercised by the Tribunal to award simple interest on the amount of compensation to be awarded at a particular rate and from a particular date, there is no scope for retrospective enhancement for default in payment of compensation. No express or implied power in this regard can be culled out from section 171 of the Act. No express or implied power in this regard can be culled out from section 171 of the Act. Such a direction in the award for retrospective enhancement of interest for default in payment of the compensation together with interest payable thereon virtually amounts to imposition of penalty which is not statutorily envisaged and prescribed. It is, therefore directed that the rate of interest as awarded by the High Court shall alone be applicable till payment, without the stipulation for higher rate of interest being enforced, in the manner directed by the Tribunal. 18. In view of above discussion, in the opinion of this Court appeal so far it challenges the quantum of compensation, major sons are not entitled for compensation, major married daughter cannot get compensation except ex gratia, fails and is hereby dismissed. However, so far as it challenges the award of penal interest is concerned, same is allowed. It is held that claimants should be entitled to receive a compensation of Rs. 2,52,500/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition. Insurance Company is directed to make the payment of compensation to the claimants within a period of three months from today. Rest of the conditions as imposed by Claims Tribunal shall remain intact. 19. Appeal stands disposed of in above terms. Parties to bear their own costs.