JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. In the Constitution of India, particularly as far as the Defence, is concerned, the same is contained in Schedule VII List 1 Entry 1, which reads as under: “1. Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination of effective demobilisation.” 2. The activities covered therein it also includes the activities which involves any act for the preparation for the defence, and all such acts, which would be necessary for the purposes of protecting the sovereignty of the country, for which defence plays a predominant role. Similarly, as per entry 3 of the VIIth schedule of the Constitution of India, it deals with the rights of the Central Government pertaining to the delimitation of the cantonment areas, which may be treated as to be a local self Government for the purposes of managing the affairs of the property which is lying with the defence Estate Officer under his management and control. It includes the power given to the cantonment authorities to regulate the rights which are accruing over the property, which is vested with Board under the Cantonment Act, which has been divested by it in pursuance to of any indenture or a lease executed by the Board in favour of the lessee. Schedule VII List 1 Entry 3, reads as under : “3. Delimitation of cantonment areas, local self-government in such areas, the constitution and powers within such areas of cantonment authorities and the regulation of house accommodation (including the control of rents) in such areas.” 3. This Court considers it essential that the controversy as involved in the instant case would be centering around the interpretation of lease deed, which has been executed in favour of the predecessors of the petitioner as back as on 09.01.1913, whereby, an indenture or a lease was executed in favour of the predecessors of the petitioner for the period of ninety nine years with a right conferred in it to raise the construction of the residential building and also with the right reserevd to get it renewed for a further term. The lease has been defined and its purpose of execution and the mode of its utilization has been covered and defined by Section 105 as contained in Chapter 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads as under: “105. Lease defined.—A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined.—The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.” 4. On a simplicitor interpretation of the term lease as defined therein, it is only limited to a transfer of a right to enjoy a property momentarily for a specified time frame, and that too under the specific terms and conditions contained in the lease, which has been agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee at the time of the execution of indenture and their inter se relationship would be governed by the terms and conditions of the lease itself. 5. At this stage it also becomes relevant to consider the implications of Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act also which provides for the provisions regulating the rights and liabilities of the lessor and lessee, in particular clause ‘B’ of Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act, which is quoted hereunder: “108. 5. At this stage it also becomes relevant to consider the implications of Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act also which provides for the provisions regulating the rights and liabilities of the lessor and lessee, in particular clause ‘B’ of Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act, which is quoted hereunder: “108. Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee.—In the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, the lessor and the lessee of immoveable property, as against one another, respectively, possess the rights and are subject to the liabilities mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property leased:— (B) Rights and Liabilities of the Lessee (d) If during the continuance of the lease any accession is made to the property, such accession (subject to the law relating to alluvion for the time being in force) shall be deemed to be comprised in the lease; (e) if by fire, tempest or flood, or violence of an army or of a mob, or other irresistible force, any material part of the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purposes for which it was let, the lease shall, at the option of the lessee, be void: Provided that, if the injury be occasioned by the wrongful act or default of the lessee, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of the benefit of this provision; (f) if the lessor neglects to make, within a reasonable time after notice, any repairs which he is bound to make to the property, the lessee may make the same himself, and deduct the expense of such repairs with interest from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor; (g) if the lessor neglects to make any payment which he is bound to make, and which, if not made by him, is recoverable from the lessee or against the property, the lessee may make such payment himself, and deduct it with interest from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor; (h) the lessee may [even after the determination of the lease] remove, at any time [whilst he is in possession of the property leased but not afterwards] all things which he has attached to the earth; provided he leaves the property in the state in which he received it; (i) when a lease of uncertain duration determines by any means except the fault of the lessee, he or his legal representative is entitled to all the crops planted or sown by the lessee and growing upon the property when the lease determines, and to free ingress and egress to gather and carry them; (j) the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it. The lessee shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities attaching to the lease; Nothing in this clause shall be deemed to authorise a tenant having an untransferable right of occupancy, the farmer of an estate in respect of which default has been made in paying revenue, or the lessee of an estate under the management of a Court of Wards, to assign his interest as such tenant, farmer or lessee; (k) the lessee is bound to disclose to the lessor any fact as to the nature or extent of the interest which the lessee is about to take, of which the lessee is, and the lessor is not, aware, and which materially increases the value of such interest; (l) the lessee is bound to pay or tender, at the proper time and place, the premium or rent to the lessor or his agent in this behalf; (m) the lessee is bound to keep, and on the termination of the lease to restore, the property in as good condition as it was in at the time when he was put in possession, subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force, and to allow the lessor and his agents, at all reasonable times during the term, to enter upon the property and inspect the condition thereof and give or leave notice of any defect in such condition; and, when such defect has been caused by any act or default on the part of the lessee, his servants or agents, he is bound to make it good within three months after such notice has been given or left; (n) if the lessee becomes aware of any proceeding to recover the property or any part thereof, or of any encroachment made upon, or any interference with, the lessor’s rights concerning such property, he is bound to give, with reasonable diligence, notice thereof to the lessor; (o) the lessee may use the property and its products (if any) as a person of ordinary prudence would use them if they were his own; but he must not use, or permit another to use, the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or fell 3[or sell] timber, pull down or damage buildings [belonging to the lessor, or] work mines or quarries not open when the lease was granted, or commit any other act which is destructive or permanently injurious thereto; (p) he must not, without the lessor’s consent, erect on the property any permanent structure, except for agricultural purposes; (q) on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property.” 6. At this stage itself, it would be appropriate to refer that the power of determination of lease apart from the fact that it is self contained under the terms of the indenture of 09.01.1913, it would also include applicability of the conditions of its termination as provided under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, where under the conditions mentioned therein the lease thus executed and falling within the definition of the, ‘lease’ as defined under Section 105 as to how it could be determined and under what conditions the same can be done. 7. In the case at hand, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition, wherein, he has questioned the propriety of the orders dated 20.09.2017 issued by the Deputy Director Q & C, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, whereby, the petitioner has been called upon to quit the occupancy of the property in question, which was the subject matter of the indenture dated 09.01.2013, and to deliver its vacant and peaceful possession of land and the super structure to the Defence Estate Officer, Meerut Circle, Meerut, and as a consequence thereto, in continuation to the letter of the Government of India dated 20.09.2017 the Defence Estate Officer of the Meerut Circle under whose control and management the property in question falls to be had issued a consequential impugned order dated 24.10.2017, whereby, the lease as executed in favour of the petitioner was terminated/determined. As per the case of the petitioner, he contends that the lease thus executed on 09.01.1913 was executed between the Secretary of the State of India in counsel along with one Mr. Alfred Henry Parson, the worshipful master lodge. According to the petitioner by virtue of the lease as referred above the property more particularly defined as Bunglow No. 18, Beacher Road, Dehradun, constituted to be the part of the indenture dated 09.01.1913 by which the lease hold rights was granted to the second party to the indenture dated 09.01.1913 to be used and enjoyed as per its terms of the indenture. 8. It is the case of the petitioner that in continuation thereto another indenture was executed on 18.08.1914, whereby, by the convenants of the said deed the lessee was granted right to raise construction over the property as described in the above lease on 09.01.1913 for its enjoyment. 8. It is the case of the petitioner that in continuation thereto another indenture was executed on 18.08.1914, whereby, by the convenants of the said deed the lessee was granted right to raise construction over the property as described in the above lease on 09.01.1913 for its enjoyment. The contention of the petitioner is that from the property in question which was leased in favour of Mr. Alfred Henry Parson, from the said property he operates a Lodge, which according to the petitioner is a voluntary and charitable organization, which is secular in nature, which is working for the upliftment of the poor and the needy persons by providing them assistances as claimed and pleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition. Consequently, he submits that as far as the lodge, which is being operated from the property in question, thus leased on 09.01.1913, it constituted to be the part of the northern India as the masonary, which according to the petitioner is a world wide association, which operates in the country by dividing it into four regions north, south, western and eastern regions and so far as the Lodge, which was being operated from the property as described herein above, which constituted to be the part of the lease of 09.01.1913 the petitioners contend that they operated a Lodge called as “Lodge Shivalik Dr. Durga Prasad No. 62”, and as per the claim of the petitioner he contends that he is a worshipful master and the head of the said Lodge. 9. In support of his contention the petitioner has submitted that in terms of the indenture and the lease, which was later on executed on 18.08.1914 he had complied with all the covenants of the said lease and is in a continuous and unterrupted peaceful possession of the property from the date of the execution of the indenture and it is being exclusively utilized for the purposes for which it was leased out to the Lodge. He submits that apart from operating of the Lodge, which is a secular form of organization for the benefit of the public at large, it also undertakes various other welfare activities from the said place, which has been referred in paragraph 13 of the writ petition. He submits that apart from operating of the Lodge, which is a secular form of organization for the benefit of the public at large, it also undertakes various other welfare activities from the said place, which has been referred in paragraph 13 of the writ petition. But be that as it may, the petitioner admittedly contends that the terms of the said lease stood expired as back as in 2012 and its terms was not extended thereafter though he had moved an application on 29.11.2011, before the Defence Estate Officer, Meerut Circle, seeking for the renewal of the lease as executed in his favour. 10. He further submitted that while his occupancy was subsisting and the application for renewal was pending and not being considered, he has submitted various reminders to the Defence Estate Officer, seeking renewal of the lease and one of the reminders being that of 03.10.2016. The Ministry of Defence, Government of India, had issued an order being Order No. 11013/2/2016/D(lands) dated 10.03.2017. The shelter of which is taken by the petitioner in order to contend that the lease thus granted in his favour on 09.01.1913, it ought to be extended automatically in pursuance to the said directives of the Ministry of Defence as contained in the letter dated 10.03.2017 and the lease would be deemed to continue till it expires on 31.12.2018, which was the date fixed under the Government Order dated 10.03.2017. He submits that despite of the fact that his application for extension of the lease as per its covenants and also as per the terms of the Government Order dated 10.03.2017, remained pending before the Defence Estate Officer, the respondents had proceeded to pass the order impugned in the writ petition by virtue of which the petitioner was directed to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the property, which was leased out to them as per the terms of paragraph 3 and 4 of the letter of Government of India dated 20.09.2017, which are quoted hereunder: “3. Now in exercise of the power hereinbefore mentioned, the Government hereby give you this NOTICE to quit and deliver possession of the aforesaid land together with structures, if any standing thereon, to the Defence Estates Officer, Meerut Circle, Meerut Cantt. Now in exercise of the power hereinbefore mentioned, the Government hereby give you this NOTICE to quit and deliver possession of the aforesaid land together with structures, if any standing thereon, to the Defence Estates Officer, Meerut Circle, Meerut Cantt. Or his authorized representative on or after expiry of one month from the date of receipt of this notice failing which the Government will, under all lawful powers enabling them in that behalf, assume the possession of the aforesaid property, and your occupancy rights and any other rights, easements and interests that you may have in said land/dilapidated structure/building, if any, standing thereon, shall cease as from that date. 4. Take further notice that the Government are prepared to pay, in due course, full compensation to entitled person(s) for the authorized structure(s) standing on the land, if any, as per Ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India vs. Harish ChandAnand in CA No. 1868 of 1979 (1995) (4) Supp SCC 113. The quantum of compensation for the authorized superstructures, if any, will be determined after resuming the property and taking over possession thereof and, for this purpose a committee under the chairmanship of Station Commander, Dehradun will be constituted which shall include your representative also.” 11. In support of which contention, the petitioner has submitted that as per the covenants of the lease of 18.08.1914, which was an indenture executed in extension of the principal indenture of 09.01.1913, the petitioner contends that in terms of lease dated 18.08.2014 the lease thus executed in his favour becomes irrevocable and it cannot be revoked except without resorting to the due process as provided under the terms of the lease itself. On a decipher as made in the impugned order dated 24.10.2017 as issued by the Defence Estate Officer he submitted that the property, i.e. the property covered under the indenture of 09.01.1913, has been directed to be resumed in pursuance to the letter written by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence being Letter No. A-01328/309/Pole(cantts)/124/F/D (Q&C)/16 dated 20.09.2017, whereby, it was directed that the occupant of the said lease property to handover the possession in terms of para 4 of the said letter of Government of India dated 20.09.2017. 12. 12. At this stage it becomes necessary to deal with the foundation of the letter dated 24.10.2017, which has been put to challenge in the instant writ petition, it was based on the letter of the Government of India dated 20.09.2017, wherein, it provided that the property in question which is lying in Survey No. 166 Bunglow No. 18, Beacher Road, Dehradun, it showed that it constituted to be having an area of 2.415 acres with the boundaries as described therein. Even as per the terms of the said letter No. A-01328/309/Pole(cantts)/124/F/D (Q&C)/16 dated 20.09.2017 written by the Deputy Director Q & C had directed the petitioner to quit the premises within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the said notice as the property in question, which belonged to President of India, was required to be utilized for the defence purposes. However, as per the terms of the said letter, it provided that the petitioner’s interest pertaining to the super structure, which is said to have been raised by him in pursuance to the indenture dated 18.08.1914 his rights would be safeguarded in pursuance to the directives issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case reported in 1995 (4) Supplementary supreme court 113 ‘Union of India vs. Harish Chand Anand’, wherein it provided that as a consequence of eviction from the property, which has been leased out, the petitioner would be entitled for the compensation of the authorized structure, which has been existing on the property in question, which was permitted to be constructed by the cantonment Board in pursuance to the indenture dated 18.08.1914. Paragraph 1 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder: “1 This is an appeal by Certificate granted by the High Court by order dated December 14, 1978 with a question as under : "Whether the only right of the grantee is to claim compensation and whether the Government can take possession at any time after expiry of one month in view of Governor General's Order No.179 dated 12th September, 1836?".” 13. At this stage it becomes necessary to deal with the terms of the indenture and the extent of its creation of rights, which would be conferred to the petitioner the lessee in view of the provisions contained under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. At this stage it becomes necessary to deal with the terms of the indenture and the extent of its creation of rights, which would be conferred to the petitioner the lessee in view of the provisions contained under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. It should not be treated that the lease once granted its determination of the lease executed in favour of the petitioner attains an immunity from the same being determined, despite the fact that it is being required for the defence purposes, because a right of enjoyment conferred under the lease though it may be containing a clause of its renewal but that does not mean or it cannot be inferred that the same cannot be restored back or revive by the Government of India, when it is required for the defence purposes as that would be evident in view of Entry 1 of List 1 of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India becomes a pre dominant consideration when the property thus leased which admittedly belongs to the President of India is being required by the respondents for the purposes of the defence of the country, which happens to be the supreme factor, which is to be taken into consideration and where individual rights will not dominate over the right of defence for the country, which is supreme. 14. As per the terms of indenture itself it provided that in an event of any dispute arises between the lessor and the lessee, the same ought to be decided by the Cantonment Magistrate, before whom the controversy pertaining to the rights claimed by the petitioner in terms of the indenture could be raised and taken into consideration. 15. The contention of the petitioner is that when the indenture was executed on 09.01.1913, it was as per the terms of Section 201 and 202 of the Cantonment Code of 1899. The indenture thus has given a liberty to the licensee/the lessee of the property in question to grant the liberty of the utilization of the property strictly as per the terms of the lease after the payment of the lease rent as referred in clause 1 of the indenture, which was settled to be an annual rent of Rs.12. The indenture thus has given a liberty to the licensee/the lessee of the property in question to grant the liberty of the utilization of the property strictly as per the terms of the lease after the payment of the lease rent as referred in clause 1 of the indenture, which was settled to be an annual rent of Rs.12. According to the petitioner as per condition 4 of the said indenture if at all the lessee had any intent to transfer, gift or mortgage or exchange of the property thus covered by the indenture, the lessee was required to execute Form ‘D’ but only after giving one month’s prior notice to the Commanding Officer. 16. At this stage itself a reference is essentially required to be made to clause 10 of the indenture, wherein, the lessor had reserved his rights in terms of clause 10 of the covenants of the lease, whereby, the cantonment authorities had reserved their rights with the previous sanction of the competent authority in accordance with the condition 10, the lessor has reserved its rights that it may at any time with the previous sanction of the officer commanding of the division may revoke the deed without the concurrence of the local Government. This fact of reservation of the right of revocation has had to be read along with the covenants of clause 4 of the indenture, which provides that the Secretary of the State has a right to appropriate it at any time any part of the building or a property, which was leased out to the lessee and that is why the condition 6 has also been incorporated therein, which reads as under: “Condition VI- The Secretary of State reserves a right subject to the condition hereinafter contained to appropriate the house at any time for occupation by any military officer or civil office.” 17. According to it, the Secretary of the State has also reserved his rights with regards to the condition contained therein to appropriate the house constructed on the land thus leased at any time for occupation by the Military Officer or by any Civil Officer. 18. According to it, the Secretary of the State has also reserved his rights with regards to the condition contained therein to appropriate the house constructed on the land thus leased at any time for occupation by the Military Officer or by any Civil Officer. 18. The contention of the petitioner was that since the lease was executed in their favour on 09.01.1913 and it was with a right to raise construction in terms of the indenture of 18.08.1914 according to the petitioner he interprets as if the lease as executed becomes irrevocable and it could not have been revoked by the impugned order in the writ petition. 19. It will not be out of place to mention at this stage that the petitioner in his writ petition has heavily placed reliance on the Government Order dated 10.03.2017 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, which provided that according to the petitioner an automatic extension of the leases which had expired or which would be expiring upto 31.12.2018 and since the petitioner has already applied for the renewal of the lease and the decision on the same is awaited no action in pursuance to the impugned order dated 20.10.2017 ought to be taken against the petition of resumption of the land. 20. The petitioner has not denied the fact about the expiry of the term of the lease in 2012, and it is admitted by the petitioner that it was not renewed on the application submitted by him for its renewal. The inference which has been drawn by the petitioner is that since the indenture contained a clause of renewal, which is to be read with the provisions of the Government Order dated 10.03.2017, it would rather make the application for renewal as to be mandatorily granted to him in his favour. The inference which has been drawn by the petitioner is that since the indenture contained a clause of renewal, which is to be read with the provisions of the Government Order dated 10.03.2017, it would rather make the application for renewal as to be mandatorily granted to him in his favour. Another limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is from the view point that since it is the property which is vested with the Government of India with the Cantonment Board if any action was required to be taken, it ought to have been taken in accordance with the provisions contained under the provisions of The Public Premises Eviction of Unauhorized Occupant Act, 1971, which according to the petitioner it contains a complete mechanism by which the property, which is vested with the Government of India could be taken back and he infers that under these circumstances the action taken by the impugned order dated 20.09.2017 and 24.10.2017 cannot be sustained as the renewal would be mandatorily granted and would be automatic and its non-extension would be arbitrary and would violate the provisions of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants Act of 1971. The writ petition was contested by the respondent by filing a counter affidavit, wherein, the stand taken by the Cantonment Board was to the effect that the challenge as given by the petitioner to the impugned orders under the garb of the policy of 10.03.2017 in relation to the cessation of lease of the Bunglow No. 18 known as Masonic Lodge, Dehradun Cant, is untenable for the reason: (i) that the lease has already expired on 18.01.2012 after the expiry of its term as contained in condition no. 27(1) of the indenture, and it is the case of the Cantonment Board that as soon as its term expires and the same is not renewed for the further period the occupant is bound to deliver the possession of the property in question as per Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 27(1) of the indenture, and it is the case of the Cantonment Board that as soon as its term expires and the same is not renewed for the further period the occupant is bound to deliver the possession of the property in question as per Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (ii) As per paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit the Cantonment Board has come up with the case which goes to in accordance with the Schedule 7 list 1 entry 1 of the Constitution of India, where it has been expressed that in terms of an approval granted by the Government of India vide its letter dated 08.06.2016 Government intends to resume the site in question for the purposes of the defence and for the use by the military authorities, who requires the land for the security purposes. This fact has not been specifically denied in the rejoinder affidavit except the guiding factors laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment reported in 1995(4)Supp-SCC-113 ‘Union of India vs. Harish Chand Anand’. 21. This Court is of the view that as soon as the country requires its property, which is vested with the President of India to be reverted back after the expiry of the term for which the right to enjoy was created and that too in the light of its requirement to meet the purpose of defence of the country and for its security purposes, the petitioner cannot contend that his purported right of renewal will have precedence over the requirement of defence of the country, to be considered under the policy of 10.03.2017. This argument is also supported from the terms of the deed itself where the Cantonment Board has reserved its right to resume the property in accordance with its condition, which is quoted hereunder: “Condition X (1) The Cantonment Authority may at any time with appropriation of a house for civil commanding the division given with the concurrence of the local Government set apart the house for occupation by civil officer. 2. If while the house is so set apart the Cantonment Authority at any time considers that the right reserved by condition VI should be exercised in behalf of any Civil Officer it may if the house is not already occupied by a civil officer by notice in writing. 2. If while the house is so set apart the Cantonment Authority at any time considers that the right reserved by condition VI should be exercised in behalf of any Civil Officer it may if the house is not already occupied by a civil officer by notice in writing. (a) require the Lessee to let the house to the Civil Officer named in the notice.” 22. The only condition enshrined in clause 10 was the previous sanction of the Government of India, which is apparently pleaded in their counter affidavit filed by the respondent, wherein, a reference has been made to the directives issued by the Government on 08.06.2016 for resuming the land, and as a consequence thereto, the impugned order dated 20.09.2017 and 24.10.2017 had been passed, which cannot be said or termed to be arbitrary or in violation of the terms of the lease. 23. A reference which has been consistently made by the petitioner with regards to the automatic renewal of the expired lease in terms of the Government order dated 10.03.2017, that cannot be read in isolation because as per the terms of the agreement of lease executed in favour of the petitioner on 09.01.1913, particularly as per conditions in its sub-clause (2) of clause XXV, which is quoted hereinbelow: “Condition XXV- Forfeiture for breach of any other condition the words in brackets to be omitted if the land is rent free. (I) So long as the lessee shall duly pay the said rent of Rs. 12/- and observe the conditions hereinbefore specified and on his part to be observed he may subject to condition XXVIII hold the land for the term of 99 days or without interruption by the secretary of State. 2. To be struck out in cases where it is intended that the lease shall not be removable. At the expiry of the said term of 99 years the lessee may be granted a renewal and the period thereof to be the discretion of the Officer Commanding the Division.” 24. 2. To be struck out in cases where it is intended that the lease shall not be removable. At the expiry of the said term of 99 years the lessee may be granted a renewal and the period thereof to be the discretion of the Officer Commanding the Division.” 24. It has provided that a renewal is not a right it is absolutely a discretion which has been reserved to be taken by the officer commanding the division, and in such an eventuality, the petitioner cannot read the terms of the deed by bifurcating it according to his suitability to continue to occupy the property, which was leased to him, the term of which has otherwise expired with efflux of time. Even if logically it is taken into consideration where the right of renewal has been conditioned it is with a discretion of the Commanding Officer and it is not a mandatory renewal in such a circumstances after the expiry of the term of the lease the Officer in Command of the division may in the exercise of his powers under the lease deed get vacated the possession delivered even without paying any compensation whatsoever. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention had relied upon a judgment as reported in 2006(0) Supreme (DEL) 213 ‘Indian Oil Corporation vs. Union of India’ as decided by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, which may have persuasive value only because it was a case where a lease was granted in favour of the lessee on a defence land and by the action impugned in the said writ petition dated 07.10.1992 and 05.10.1992, the prohibition was being imposed on the lessee to whom the land was allotted for operating the petrol pump under the scheme of facilitating the handicapped defence personnel’s, who were required to be rehabilitated under a welfare scheme floated by the Ministry of Defence. Having gone through the said judgment, this Court is of the view that, in that case too, the Court has only considered the circumstances under which the lease has been granted and also the condition that for the purposes of eviction or for handing over of the possession even if the principle of sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants Act of 1971, is made applicable then too, the lessee was only held to be entitled for 30 days’ notice prior to passing of order of eviction, hence, the sealing of the petrol pump as it was involved in the said case under sub-section (5) (c) of the Public Premises Act 1971, without a prior notice was held to be untenable. The said case was altogether distinct to the conditions which are prevailing in the present case where the property belonging and vested with the President of India is being sought to be resumed by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence for the purposes of its utilization for the defence purposes and that too if the impugned order in the writ petition are read in precision it was a simplicitor notice only which was given to the petitioner based on a decision of the Government of India, whereby, 30 days’ notice was given to the petitioner by the impugned order for vacating the premises. Hence, the judgment on which the reliance has been placed in the light of the provisions contained under sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Public Premises Act of 1971, to be read in accordance with the terms of the present lease of 09.01.1913 the said ratio will not be applicable in the given set of circumstances. 26. Another judgment on which the petitioner has placed reliance was pertaining to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in 1995 Supplement (4) SCC 113 ‘Union of India vs. Harish Chandra’. This was a case where a land, which was sought to be resumed was a land which was given under the provisions contained under the Government Grant Act. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has made reference to a judgment of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court reported in 1974 ALJ 43, wherein, yet again it was held that giving of a prior notice before resuming the property is necessary. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has made reference to a judgment of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court reported in 1974 ALJ 43, wherein, yet again it was held that giving of a prior notice before resuming the property is necessary. Apart from the fact that the said judgment was based upon a different set of provisions of law yet its basic intention was giving of a prior notice, which too stood fulfilled in the instant case if the impugned order is taken into consideration, it also intended to give a 30 days’ notice to the petitioner as per the terms of the letter of 20.09.2017 for resuming the property for the defence purposes. 27. Even otherwise also, the impugned action as taken against the petitioner is in pursuance to the notice under challenge would fall to be well within the ambit of powers which has been reserved with the Cantonment Board by the statute as contained under Section 241 of the Act, which gives the power to the President or the Vice President of the Cantonment Board to enter into any premises which falls to be within their domain of administration for any work which happens to be in the interest of the board or the country. 28. The respondents have submitted that as per the covenants of clause 27(1) of the lease dated 09.01.1913, there would be an automatic cessation of rights in relation to the property in question, i.e. 18 Beacher Road, which was leased out to the petitioner because his rights to continue to occupy the premises would only subsists as per the definition of the lease given under Section 105 of the Transfer of the Property Act, which would subsist only till the life of the lease as intended by the provisions contained under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, because as soon as the term ends it leads to a situation where the right of usage of the leased property for any purpose for which it has been given it stands terminated. Thus, as a consequence, there is no enforceable right left with the lessee after the determination of the lease in terms of lease in view of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act or as per the covenants of the lease itself and Section 241 of the Cantonment Act. Thus, as a consequence, there is no enforceable right left with the lessee after the determination of the lease in terms of lease in view of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act or as per the covenants of the lease itself and Section 241 of the Cantonment Act. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the condition under which the right to determine the lease contained in Chapter 5 of the Transfer of Property Act could be determined. Those conditions are enumerated hereinbelow: “111. Determination of lease.—A lease of immoveable property determines— (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby; (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event—by the happening of such event; (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event—by the happening of such event; (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right; (e) by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement between them; (f) by implied surrender; (g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter 1; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; [or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event]; and in [any of these cases] the lessor or his transferee [gives notice in writing to the lessee of] his intention to determine the lease; (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other.” 29. Another limb of argument which has been raised by the respondents in the counter affidavit is to the effect that apart from the fact that property is required by the army authorities for defence purpose it does not contain any provision which could lead to its automatic extension of terms of lease as per the lease which was executed in accordance with the then Cantonment Act which was prevailing, i.e. the Cantonment Act of 1899. It had been further submitted by the respondents in their counter affidavit that the policy of extension of expired lease was under consideration before the Government of India, but in the meantime, before the said policy could have been given a conclusive shape the army authorities considering various defence factors of the country had made references to the Government of India for the resumption of the lease property for the defence purposes after the expiry of its tenure and that is why according to the GLR Survey No. 166 of the premises in question, which has been described as 18 Beacher Road, which has been titled by the petitioner as Masonic Lodge, since it falls to be classified as B3 land, which is being occupied by the lessee by the rights created by Form ‘D’ of the Cantonment Code of 1912. The ownership of the land of this nature ever continues to be vested with the Government of India, Ministry of Defence and the occupancy rights which has been given would cease to exist on the expiry of its term on 08.01.2012. 30. Even as per the communication made by the Station Commander to the Defence Estate Officer of Meerut Circle, under whom the property lying in Survey No. 166 falls, under his control, too has been expressed that the defence land which is the subject matter of constitution may not be renewed and is further requested to initiate the proceedings of conversion of the classification of the land to be reclassified from the B3 defence land to A1 defence land. 31. 31. The petitioner’s theory of continuance of possession over leased land, which he has tried to canvass is based on the policy of 10.03.2017, it will not have any significance and will not create any vested right of extension because of the fact that the Ministry of Defence has already taken a prior decision as already referred above on 08.06.2016 for resuming the land for the defence purpose with which no latitude or compromise can be made when the owner of the property, i.e. Government of India, intends to resume the land for the use of defence purposes, which is a prime factor and will have precedence which is to be taken into consideration as against an individual interest and that too which is in the shape of a lease hold interest and is only confined with a right of enjoyment given under the terms of the lease, the term of which already stood expired in 2012. Paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit is quoted hereunder: “7. That the local military authority requires the said land for security purposes and has requested not to renew the lease in favour of lessee. Therefore the lessor/government has resumed the site for defense purpose on the request of local military authorities on the basis of approval granted by the Government of India vide letter dated 08.06.2016.” 32. It is further the case of the respondent that the shelter taken by the petitioner is to the directives of the Government of India dated 10.03.2017 though it will not apply in the instant case as for the reasons already referred above, but even if at all if it is presumed that it could be made applicable, it requires several conditions to be satisfied, as per its terms and which obviously it does not restrict the rights of the Government, which has been reserved under the terms of the lease with the Government of India, to resume the land lying with the Cantonment Boards. Hence, at this stage the decision for the resumption of the property in question by the decision of the Ministry of Defence dated 08.06.2016 becomes relevant to be quoted hereunder: “No. PC-B/01328/Pol(Cantts)/124/F/D(Q&C)/2016 Government of India Ministry of Defence New Delhi-110011 Dated 08 June 2016 To The Chief of the Army Staff New Delhi Subject:- Resumption of Bunglow No. 18, Beacher Road and Bungalow No. 2, Mall Road, Dehradun, Cantonment Sir, I am directed to convey the sanction of the President to the resumption of following Bunglows in Dehradun Cantonment for defence use:- SI. No. Bunglow No. Survey No. Areas (in acres) 1. 18. Beacher Road, Dehradun Cantt 166 2.415 2. 2. Mall Road, Dehradun Cantt 259 3.088 2. On completion of resumption process, the land of the said Bunglows will be classified from B-3 to A-1. 3. The amount of compensation for the authorised structure, if any, standing thereon will be finalized after resuming the properties and as per ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India vs. Harish Chand Anand in CA No. 1868 of 1979 (1995) (4) Supp Scc 113. A committee consisting of Station Cdr, Defence Estates Officer, Garrison Engineer concerned, a representative each of the resumptee owners and the representative of regional CDA shall be constituted to examine the relevant record and determine the amount of compensation payable on account of the resumption of the bungalowse. 4. This issue with the concurrence of Ministry of Defence (Finance) vide their U.O. No. 490/Fin/Works-1/15 dated 16/06/2015. Sir, I am directed to convey the sanction of the President to the resumption of following Bunglows in Dehradun Cantonment for defence use:- 2. On completion of resumption process, the land of the said Bunglows will be classified from B-3 to A-1. 3. The amount of compensation for the authorised structure, if any, standing thereon will be finalized after resuming the properties and as per ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India vs. Harish Chand Anand in CA No. 1868 of 1979 (1995) (4) Supp Scc 113. A committee consisting of Station Cdr, Defence Estates Officer, Garrison Engineer concerned, a representative each of the resumptee owners and the representative of regional CDA shall be constituted to examine the relevant record and determine the amount of compensation payable on account of the resumption of the bungalowse. 4. A committee consisting of Station Cdr, Defence Estates Officer, Garrison Engineer concerned, a representative each of the resumptee owners and the representative of regional CDA shall be constituted to examine the relevant record and determine the amount of compensation payable on account of the resumption of the bungalowse. 4. This issue with the concurrence of Ministry of Defence (Finance) vide their U.O. No. 490/Fin/Works-1/15 dated 16/06/2015. Yours faithfully (S.K. Jha) Under Secretary to the Government of India” 33. Even otherwise also, under the theory of eminent domain when the property vest with the Government of India the philosophy of irrevocability of a licence will not supersede the purpose of defence and more particularly when the lease was a time bound lease and which according to the respondent did not contain a mandatory clause of renewal. Hence, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner of the same being automatically renewed is absolutely untenable and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as country and its defence is supreme above any other individual purpose. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner had placed reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 203 ‘Union of India vs. Harsh’, wherein, it provided that for the purposes of resuming the property lying under the title of the Government of India the prior notice is necessarily required to be given to the occupant. The said judgment cannot in its strict sense cover the nature of the controversy, which has been involved in the present case because here it is a land which has been leased out to the petitioner under the provisions of the Cantonment Act and it was not a lease which was covered by the provisions of the Government Grant Act and both Acts are independent and for independent purpose, with which the judgment in question related to. Even if the notice dated 20.09.2017 to vacate is taken into consideration it is quite apparent that paragraph 3 of the said letter did provide a one month notice from the date of receipt of the said letter to enable the petitioner to vacate the premises and for resuming the possession of the property in question, which reads as under: “3. NOW in exercise of the power hereinbefore mentioned, the Government hereby give you this NOTICE to quit and deliver possession of the aforesaid land together with structures, if any standing thereon, to the Defence Estates Officer, Meerut Circle, Meerut Cantt. or his authorized representative on or after expiry of one month from the date of receipt of this notice failing which the Government will, under all lawful powers enabling them in that behalf, assume the possession of the aforesaid property, and your occupancy rights and any other rights, easements and interests that you may have in said land/dilapidated structure/building, if any, standing thereon, shall cease as from that date.” 35. Not only this a reference to paragraph 4 of the said letter also becomes necessary at this juncture, where the interest of the petitioner in relation to the super structure raised by him too stood protected from the view point that it gave a right to the petitioner to raise a claim for grant of an appropriate compensation for the super structure in the light of directions of the Apex Court judgment referred therein for which he was directed to raise a necessary claim before the Station Commander, Dehradun. Paragraph 4 of the said notice (impugned order dated 20.09.2017 is quoted hereunder): “4. Take further notice that the Government are prepared to pay, in due course, full compensation to entitled person(s) for the authorized structure(s) standing on the land, if any, as per Ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India V/s Harish Chand Anand in CA No. 1868 of 1979 (1995) (4) Supp SCC 113. The quantum of compensation for the authorized superstructures, if any, will be determined after resuming the property and taking over possession thereof and, for this purpose a committee under eth chairmanship of Station Commander, Dehradun, will be constituted which shall include your representative also.” 36. Another argument which has also been pleaded by the petitioner is to the effect that even after the expiry of the term of the lease the rent payable towards the said property was remitted by the petitioner, it was specifically denied by the respondent in paragraph 23 of the counter affidavit, where they have referred that the rent which was paid by the petitioner after the expiry of the term of the lease deed was returned by them by the cheque no. 333/d dated 28.11.2017, which was received by petitioner, which specifically deciphers the intention of Government of India of not to renew the lease of the petitioner which stood expired much earlier in 2012. 37. The contents of paragraph 23 of the counter affidavit pertaining to the return of the cheque has not been specifically denied by the petitioner in the rejoinder affidavit that it was received by him. Though the petitioner has not pleaded but he has raised a plea with regards to the irrevocability of the lease in question in light of the provisions contained under Section 60 of the Easement Act, wherein, it provides that the leases which are granted for the purposes of construction of building of a permanent character and the license which has been granted for raising the building would render the license to be irrevocable will not apply in the instant case for the reason being that the restriction or irrevocability which has been provided by Section 60 of the Act is in relation to a licence and not in relation to a lease because as per the Easement Act the term license has been defined under Section 52 of the said Act, which is quoted hereunder “52 "License" defined. -Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license.” 38. This term has altogether a different connotation and purpose and cannot be equated with the leases under the Cantonment Act and that too of a defence land. 39. It is only a right to do or to continue to do an act over an immovable property to enjoy it during the life of the lease, which has been given by the grantor in the absence of any such right being created in their favour and it does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. It is only a right to do or to continue to do an act over an immovable property to enjoy it during the life of the lease, which has been given by the grantor in the absence of any such right being created in their favour and it does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. The petitioner has tried to complicate the issue by taking shelter to the argument of being a licensee and taking benefit of Section 60 of the Easement Act, but completely changing his status from licence under the Act to licence, which will not apply for the reason being that the indenture on which he himself has placed reliance was issued in Form ‘D’ which would fall to be a lease as already dealt with above and as defined under the Transfer of Property Act and then there happens to be a vast distinction between the rights created by a lease or a right created by way of a license. 40. The controversy has also to be taken into consideration from the view point that because the petitioner himself has raised a dispute with regards to the remittance of the rent after the expiry of the lease deed, to which there has been of specific denial by the respondent in the counter affidavit that the same was returned by them. In such an eventuality, apart from the fact that the right to continue to occupy ceases to exist, but if at all, the petitioner disputes pertaining to the fact of return of the rent or the payment of the rent made by him thereafter, it would fall to be a question to be considered by the arbitrator in view of the conditions contained under Condition No. XVIII (1) of the indenture dated 09.01.1913. Its only that, even as per condition XX the tenant of a house or a premises which has been given under the lease it has been reserved to be terminable without any notice and if at all the lessee considers him to be aggrieved by the action there of he would have a remedy to approach before the committee of arbitrator as provided under the covenants of the lease itself from which he allegedly derives his right, hence, petitioner cannot be permitted the indenture in piece meal, it has to be read as a whole. 41. 41. For the reasons as given above, this Court is of the view that the action of preferring of the writ petition for quashing of the order dated 20.09.2017 and 24.10.2017 issued by the Deputy Director Q & C Government of India and Defence Estate Officer respectively, since, it was only intending to give a notice by the resumption of the land for the defence purposes as required by the Government of India, and since, the defence falls to be under the List 1 Entry 1 of the Seventh Schedule and it happens to be the prime concern for the interest of the country, the interest of an individual will not prevail over the sovereignty of the country. 42. Hence, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petition and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 43. However, there would be no order as to cost.