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2019 DIGILAW 38 (MAD)

Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Tuticorin Port Trust

2019-01-02

AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

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JUDGMENT Subramonium Prasad, J. 1. The only issue which arises in this appeal is as to whether the appellant/Regional Provident Fund Commissioner is liable to pay interest towards delayed transfer of the provident fund amount to the Tuticorin Port Trust or not. The facts on record discloses that there was a delay about 7 years in payment of the amount to the Tuticorin Port Trust. The amount of Rs. 18,98,91,289 which was standing to the credit of the Port Trust as on 31.3.2003 was transferred in three instalments and the full amount was paid in the year 2004. 2. The respondent has filed the instant writ petition for a writ of Mandamus directing the appellant to return the pension fund deposit towards the employer share from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.2002 along with interest for a period of 01.01.2002 to 30.11.2009. The learned single Judge held that there was a delay in payment of the amount from the Provident Fund Commissioner to the Tuticorin Port Trust. It went on to hold that even though there is no provision under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, interest was liable to be paid by the Provident Fund Commissioner on the simple principle that since the E.P.F. Court takes charges interest for the delayed contribution, it is equally liable to pay interest on their delayed disbursement. 3. Heard the learned counsel for both sides. 4. It is well settled that any amount due and payable is liable to be paid along with interest. While dealing with the issue as to whether the interest is liable to be paid on delayed payment of retiremental benefits, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Dua v. State of Haryana and another reported in (2008) 3 SCC 44 , has observed that even in the absence of any Rule directing the payment of interest, the Government is liable to pay interest on the delayed payment. Paragraph Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: "14. In the circumstances, prima facie, we are of the view that the grievance voiced by the appellant appears to be well founded that he would be entitled to interest on such benefits. If there are statutory rules occupying the field, the appellant could claim payment of interest relying on such rules. In the circumstances, prima facie, we are of the view that the grievance voiced by the appellant appears to be well founded that he would be entitled to interest on such benefits. If there are statutory rules occupying the field, the appellant could claim payment of interest relying on such rules. If there are administrative instructions, guidelines or norms prescribed for the purpose, the appellant may claim benefit of interest on that basis. But even in absence of statutory rules, administrative instructions or guidelines, an employee can claim interest under Part III of the Constitution relying on Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that retiral benefits are not in the nature of "bounty" is, in our opinion, well founded and needs no authority in support thereof. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not right in dismissing the petition in limine even without issuing notice to the respondents. 15. To us, the plea of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court ought to have entered into the merits of the matter which is based on documentary evidence is well taken. In our considered view, the writ petition ought to have been admitted by issuing rule nisi and ought to have been decided on merits. The High Court, however, dismissed the petition by a cryptic order which reads thus: 'The petitioner seeks only payment of interest on the delayed payment of retiral benefits. We, however, relegate the petitioner to avail of his remedies before the civil Court, if so advised. Dismissed with the above observations." 16. The order passed by the High court, therefore, must be quashed and set aside." 5. Applying the same principle, the order of the learned single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity and therefore, the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.