ORDER : Sudhir Agarwal, J. 1. Heard Sri R.P.Tewari, learned counsel for appellant, Sri Ganesh Datt Mishra, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record. 2. This is defendant's appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure arising from judgment and decree dated 11.9.1980 passed by Sri Jay Prakash Narayan, Civil Judge, Etawah in Civil Appeal No.479 of 1976 whereby appeal has been allowed and judgment and decree dated 19.04.1976 passed by Sri Shyam Lal Gapna, Vth Additional Munsiff, Etawah, has been set aside. 3. Sole plaintiff Shyam, son of Khushal Lodhee, instituted original suit in the Court of Munsiff, Etawah stating that he is resident of Gram Bulakeepur, Luhanna, Pargana and District Etawah. Land measuring area 0.09 decimal, adjacent to his residential house situated on Arazi No.311, was purchased by him vide receipt dated 28.2.1965 for consideration of Rs.300/-and since then he is in possession of said land. Plaintiff is tying his cattle and has also raised a hut besides standing trees of Neem etc. It is surrounded by barbed wire. The other part of plot no.311 was in the use of Mullu son of Chakori, Kanhai and Ram Sanehi, sons of Chotte Lal, who have taken the same from Suraj Sahai, defendant 2 and being used for their residence and Sahan. Defendant 2 has sole Arazi no.311 (M) area 0.45 decimal. Area of plot 311 M, in the use of plaintiff is, 68 Haath x 23 Haath. Defendants have no connection with aforesaid land of plaintiff. About a month back, defendants, who have organized gang, with intention to forcibly occupy land, in possession of plaintiff, threatened him. Hence the suit seeking injunction restraining defendant from interfering in possession of plaintiff in respect of land shown as 'A' 'B' 'C' 'D' at the bottom of the plaint, vide plaint dated 26.9.1974 was instituted. 4. Defendant 1 filed written statement stating that plaintiff owns no part of Arazi no.311 as there is no sale by erstwhile owner of said land. Defendant 2, who earlier owned entire land in Arazi no.311, had not sold any part of land to plaintiff and receipt relied by plaintiff is forged and fictitious. Plaintiff has no possession over any part of Arazi no. 311 and neither there is any construction nor plaintiff tied his cattle nor there is Neem tree or hut thereon, as pleaded in the plaint. Plaintiff has no possession over any part of Arazi no. 311 and neither there is any construction nor plaintiff tied his cattle nor there is Neem tree or hut thereon, as pleaded in the plaint. Defendant 2, vide registered sale deed dated 24.8.1974 has sold one-sixth part of arazi no.311 and had given possession to defendant 1. Plaintiff is a mischievous person, set on fire his house and falsely lodged prosecution against defendant. In additional pleas, it was also pleaded that suit is barred by limitation, estoppel, acquiescence etc. 5. Trial Court formulated eight issues as under : “1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the land in suit? 2. Whether the alleged receipt confer any title to the plaintiff? 3. Whether Suraj Sahai transferred any land or boundary to plaintiff, if so its effect? 4. Whether suit is barred by Section 34 of the S.R. Act? 5. Whether the suit is time barred? 6. Whether defendant No.2 has perfected his title by adverse possession? 7. Whether the suit is undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient? 8. To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled?” 6. Issue 1 relating to alleged ownership of plaintiff over land in dispute was answered against him. Issue 2 relates to receipt on which plaintiff founded its case and it was answered holding that aforesaid receipt is not an instrument having effect of transferring title from erstwhile owner to plaintiff. It only shows receipt of Rs.300/-by the person issuing receipt but has no legal consequence so far as title of disputed land is concerned. Issue 3 was also answered against plaintiff holding that transfer of any part of land to plaintiff by defendant 2 is not proved. Issues 4 and 5 were answered in favour of plaintiff. Issue 6 relating to adverse possession was answered against plaintiff. Consequently, Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.11.1976 dismissed the suit. 7. Lower Appellate Court (hereinafter referred to as “LAC”) has held that receipt, even if, not registered can be read for collateral purpose. Further, sale deed relied by defendant did not specify as to which part of Arazi no.311 was sold and aforesaid sale deed only show that defendant was owner of some part of land but in absence of any specific identification of land in respect whereto the said sale deed was issued, it could not be read against plaintiff. Further, sale deed relied by defendant did not specify as to which part of Arazi no.311 was sold and aforesaid sale deed only show that defendant was owner of some part of land but in absence of any specific identification of land in respect whereto the said sale deed was issued, it could not be read against plaintiff. LAC also held that possession of plaintiff, in the light of oral evidence, is continuing for last more than 20 years. There existed Neem tree, barbed wire etc. over disputed land showing that plaintiff was in possession of disputed land. He was also a co-tenure holder with Suraj Sahai on disputed land and in fact there was an exchange of land between plaintiff and defendant no.2. It found that erstwhile owner Suraj Sahai was not produced in Court by either side but due to non specification of land in sale deed, identity was not clear and no decision, therefore, could have been taken in favour of defendants. Consequently, holding that plaintiff was in possession of disputed land, and, on the basis of sale deed, defendant could not have been held to be owner of disputed land, LAC allowed appeal, set aside judgment of Trial Court, and granted injunction in favour of plaintiff-respondent restraining defendants from interfering in the possession of plaintiff over disputed land. 8. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law : "Whether the finding of the lower appellate court is vitiated by reliance placed on receipt dated 28th January, 1965 and that too on reference to the alleged sale deed in favour of the defendant -appellant." 9. From the record it is admitted that there was a document i.e. receipt dated 28.2.1965 on which plaintiff-respondent relied and it was marked as Exhibit 2. Another is sale deed dated 28.1.1964 Exhibit 4, which was relied by defendants. 10. Before entering into the question of admissibility of receipt dated 28.2.1965 (Exhibit 2) as an evidence in favour of plaintiff-respondent, I have gone through the receipt and did not find any mention of Arazi number therein. It only mentions area of land i.e. 68 Haath x 24 Haath and the factum of sale of said land by Suraj Sahai son of Lal Ram to Shyam Lal son of Khushal. It only mentions area of land i.e. 68 Haath x 24 Haath and the factum of sale of said land by Suraj Sahai son of Lal Ram to Shyam Lal son of Khushal. It would be appropriate to notice entire contents of receipt as under : ^^esa fd lwjt lgk; oYn ykykjke lkfdu ekStk cqykdhiqj yqgUuk rglhy o ft0 bVkok dk jgus okyk gWawA ,fdrk uEcj 300@ rhu lkS #i; esa f';keyky oYn [kqlky dkSe yks/kh jktiwr lkfdu ekStk cqykdhiqj] yqgUuk okys dks oSapk ftldk ltjk bl Ádkj gSA ftldh yEckbZ iwjc ls if'pe dh rjQ 68 gkFk gSA vkSj pkSM+kbZ nf{k.k ls mRrj dh rjQ pkSfcl gkFk gSA vkSj if'pe dh lk;g ij pkSMkbZ 23 rsbl gkFk gSA iwjc dh rjQ xzke gSA vkSj ifNu dh rjQ yVwjh oYn [qklky dk uEcj gSA vkSj nf{k.k dh rjQ dUgh yky oYn NksVs yky txg gSA mRrj dh rjQ rsaflag oYn ekuiky dk edku gSA vkt rk0 26-2-65 bZ0 dks fy[kk ftldh eSus jlhn fy[knhA le; ij dke vkosA** “That I, Suraj Sahai s/o Lalaram am a resident of Mauja -Bulakipur Luhanna, Tehsil and District – Etawah. I sold a plot for consideration of Rs. 300/-to Shyamlal s/o Khushal, Caste -Lodhi Rajput, r/o Mauja-Bulakipur Luhanna, the specifications of which are as follows:- The length thereof is 68 haath from east to west; the breadth, 24 haath from north to south; and the length along the western side is 23 haath. The village is towards the east; and towards west is situated the plot of Latoori s/o Khushal; towards south is the land of Kanhilal s/o Chhotelal; and towards north is situated the house of Manpal. I have executed the registry on this 26.02.65, the true copy of which I have written; which may come handy if need be.” (English Translation by Court) 11. A receipt is not an 'Instrument' for transfer of title from one person to another. It cannot said to be a sale deed. Moreover, it does not mention Arazi number at all. 12. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1882”) define “Sale”, “Sale how made” and what is “Contract for sale”, and read as under : “Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Moreover, it does not mention Arazi number at all. 12. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1882”) define “Sale”, “Sale how made” and what is “Contract for sale”, and read as under : “Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.-Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.- A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.” 13. It shows that sale of immoveable property of value of Rs.100/-and more can be made only by a registered instrument. The term “Instrument” has been defined in Section 3 of Act, 1882, which reads as under : “Instrument” means a non-testamentary instrument;” 14. A receipt showing some payment can neither, said to be, an instrument constituting sale deed nor a document which may confer title since it is not in accordance with Section 54 of Act, 1882. A receipt making certain payment can be executed at different stages for different purposes at the time of execution of contract for sale but even a contract for sale does not result in transfer of title from Contractor to Contractee. The aforesaid document i.e. receipt, therefore, cannot be considered, a document, whereby plaintiff can be said to have acquired title over property in dispute. 15. It is argued that unregistered document though may not be admissible in evidence but can be relied for collateral purpose and receipt can be taken into consideration to show that contract for sale was entered between plaintiff and the then owner of land in lieu of consideration of Rs.300/-, which was paid through the said receipt. 15. It is argued that unregistered document though may not be admissible in evidence but can be relied for collateral purpose and receipt can be taken into consideration to show that contract for sale was entered between plaintiff and the then owner of land in lieu of consideration of Rs.300/-, which was paid through the said receipt. In my view, a receipt cannot treated to be an evidence of transfer of title and reading the said document for the purpose of transfer of title will not come within the realm of “collateral purposes”. 16. At this stage, it becomes necessary to find out what a “collateral purpose” is? A collateral purpose is such which is not required to be evidenced or affected by a registered document. 17. In M. Chelamayya Vs. M. Venkataratnam AIR 1972 SC 1121 , Court held that under proviso to Section 49, Court can admit any unregistered document as evidence of a collateral transaction. 18. In Padma Vithoba Chakkayya Vs. Mohd. Multani AIR 1963 SC 70 , Court said that if the document was not registered, it is not admissible in evidence except to show the character of possession of vendee. The unregistered document, thus, can be taken into consideration for a limited purpose and not otherwise. 19. What a "collateral purpose" is not defined in Act, 1908. In Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, expression 'collateral', has been given meaning as "accompanying as secondary or subordinate". To the same effect is the meaning given in Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition. The meaning according to this Dictionary is "supplementary; accompanying, but secondary and subordinate". The Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, published by Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1977, Second Edition defines 'collateral' as something which is by the side of or distinct from, a certain thing. In brief, it can be said that collateral purpose is only a "secondary purpose". 20. What a "collateral purpose" is explained in Rani Laxmi Ranchhodlal Vs. Bank of Baroda Ltd., AIR 1953 Bom.50. Court held that expression 'collateral transaction' in Section 49 is used not in the sense of an ancillary transaction to the principal transaction or a subsidiary transaction to a main transaction. 20. What a "collateral purpose" is explained in Rani Laxmi Ranchhodlal Vs. Bank of Baroda Ltd., AIR 1953 Bom.50. Court held that expression 'collateral transaction' in Section 49 is used not in the sense of an ancillary transaction to the principal transaction or a subsidiary transaction to a main transaction. The transaction recorded would be a particular or specific transaction but it would be possible to read in that transaction what may be called the purpose of transaction and what may be called a collateral purpose; the fulfillment of collateral purpose would bring into existence a collateral transaction which may be said to be a part and parcel of the transaction but nonetheless a transaction which runs together with or on parallel lines with the same. In the context of a partition dispute, Court in para 14 of judgment, further said: "A partition which requires to be effected by a registered instrument may be inadmissible but the severance of "joint status which is not required to be effected by a registered instrument would be collateral transaction evidence of which would certainly be admissible under the proviso to the section". An antecedent title, the nature and character of possession, an admission or an acknowledgment, relationship of parties and their state of mind may be some of the instances of collateral purpose for which a document requiring registration may be looked into even though it is unregistered." (emphasis added) 21. In Zarif Ahmad and another Vs. Satish Kumar and another AIR 1983 All 164 , this Court in para 10 of judgment said : "10. Section 49 of the Registration Act, therefore, puts a complete bar to the admission of a document evidencing the terms of contract for which registration is compulsorily required by Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act or Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. As to the duration for which a lease is given or about the rate of rent, a document unregistered cannot be taken into evidence inasmuch as relying upon an unregistered document for these purposes would result in nullifying the prohibition or the bar imposed by Section 37. Section 49 prohibits the reception into evidence of any document affecting any immovable property. Section 49 prohibits the reception into evidence of any document affecting any immovable property. Under the Proviso to the said Section 49, only so long as an unregistered document does not purport or operate to do anything said in Section 107, the same may be considered by a Court. But, the terms and conditions on which an immovable property is leased out and which is an integral part of the same, the law does not permit such a document to be admitted for those purposes." (emphasis added) 22. This Court clearly said that an unregistered lease-deed cannot be admitted to prove the terms and conditions of lease. It cannot be seen either for the purpose of tenure of lease or the rate of rent at which the premises had been let out. A “collateral purpose” is any purpose other than of creating, assigning or extinguishing a right to the immovable property. 23. This Court has also considered Section 49 in Writ Petition No.12809 of 2003 (Mishri Lal Karak Vs. Sri Dinesh Chandra Agarwal & Ors.) decided on 01.10.2013 and in para 30 of the judgment, it has been said: "This Court finds that permitting document to be received in evidence for limited purpose as such would not have the effect of influencing the rights of the parties vis a vis the immovable property concerned. The general legislative policy under Section 49 of Act, 1908 is contained in three clauses i.e. (a), (b) and (c) and proviso carves out an exception in respect to clause (c) only and not (a) and (b) thereof. The inevitable conclusion vis a vis the immovable property concerned is that, an unregistered document shall not result in affecting the right etc. over the immovable property in any manner and also shall not confer any power to adopt it. To the extent the proviso operates, it permits that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be given in evidence i.e. where a document remains unregistered and title does not pass, the agreement between the parties which preceded the ineffective document shall remains and may be received in evidence to look into the terms thereof. This by itself would not confer any right since no such right has been conferred under the substantive law. Receiving in evidence does not mean conferment of substantive right. The rule of evidence cannot enlarge or alter the provisions of substantive law. This by itself would not confer any right since no such right has been conferred under the substantive law. Receiving in evidence does not mean conferment of substantive right. The rule of evidence cannot enlarge or alter the provisions of substantive law. It cannot confer rights, if there are none under the substantive law. In other words, such a document could be used only for the purpose permissible under proviso to Section 49 of Act, 1908 so as to establish part-performance under Section 53A of Act, 1882 but cannot be admitted in evidence to show nature of possession, if the possession was continuing from some date prior to the execution of unregistered deed. Here I find support from Apex Court decision in Kripal Kaur Vs. Bachan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 199 ." (emphasis added) 24. In Mst. Nasiban Vs. Mohammad Sayed AIR 1936 Nag. 174, Court held that an unregistered deed or lease cannot be used for the purpose of proving period of lease. Vivian Bose, J., said: "But the only purpose for which the appellant wants to use it here is to prove her agreement. She sues for possession on the ground that the lease has terminated, and so wants to show the period for which the lease was granted. She also sues for the rent payable under it. Therefore, the document is not receivable in evidence for these purposes." 25. In Sardar Amar Singh v. Surendar Kaur AIR 1975 MP 230 , a Full Bench said that the period of lease and terms of lease cannot be proved by admitting a lease-deed which is unregistered. 26. Section 49 proviso, has also come for consideration before Apex Court in K.B. Saha and sons Private Limited Vs. Development Consultant Limited (2008) 8 SCC 564 and Court said: "1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. 2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. 3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration. 4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. 3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration. 4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. 5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose." (emphasis added) 27. A similar question was considered by this Court in Civil Revision No. 214 of 2005: Sushil Kumar Soni (Sarraf) Vs. Smt. Sheela and decided on 30.10.2015. Therein, Court in para 31, has said as under : "In the present case, the Court below has found that the unregistered agreement is not admissible in evidence being unregistered document but having said so, for the purpose of tenure of lease, it has relied thereon. As already said, an unregistered lease cannot be relied for the purpose of rent or the terms of lease mentioned therein since it amounts to taking unregistered document in evidence for extinguishing right to immovable property, which is not permissible." (emphasis added) 28. In view of above discussion, in my view, when title in property in dispute could not have been transferred to plaintiff in absence of a registered instrument of sale, such transfer cannot be said proved by treating it to be collateral purpose, relying on above receipt and LAC in relying upon aforesaid receipt for this purpose has erred in law. 29. Now coming to sale deed dated 28.01.1964, Exhibit 4, I find that thereby one fifth share of Arazi was transferred by sale by Suraj Sahai in favour of defendant-appellant. The aforesaid sale deed, therefore, did not result in transfer of any particular part of land in favour of defendant-appellant but he become a co-tenure holder to the extent of one-fifth share. 30. The approach of LAC therefore, in holding that sale deed has not clearly mention as to what land was transferred therein has failed to consider that aforesaid sale deed had the effect of transferring one-fifth share in disputed land in favour of defendant-appellant. 30. The approach of LAC therefore, in holding that sale deed has not clearly mention as to what land was transferred therein has failed to consider that aforesaid sale deed had the effect of transferring one-fifth share in disputed land in favour of defendant-appellant. Moreso, Arazi number was not disclosed even in the document relied by plaintiff. 31. Moreover, it is not the defendant-appellant who has to prove its case or relief can be granted to the plaintiff due to weakness in defence but plaintiff, in order to seek relief, has to stand on its own and prove its case. The document, Exhibit 2, a receipt dated 28.2.1965, is not an instrument of title and that too not a registered document admissible in evidence and could not have been relied for the purpose of anything, which may reflect upon the title. At the best, document shows that a particular amount was given by 'A' to 'B' but in respect of title and possession of immovable property, document was inadmissible in evidence. On the contrary, defendant-appellant relied on a sale deed duly registered hence claim of defendant-appellant was founded on a valid piece of document, duly admissible in evidence. 32. Further if both the documents failed to show any particular property and plaintiff failed to prove its title or valid possession over property in dispute, no injunction could have been granted and that too against a person who is claiming joint ownership over the same arazi in which plaintiff was claiming his right. The land, referred to in sale deed, was the same in which even plaintiff had some right earlier is duly mentioned in the sale deed itself and this fact has been relied by LAC, still it has held that defendant-appellant failed to show identity of land in respect whereto sale deed was executed. 33. Submission was also made that plaintiff being in possession of disputed property for more than twenty years, hence, he matured his title by 'adverse possession'. 34. This submission is thoroughly misconceived. It is true that plaintiff was in possession of disputed land since long and in oral evidence it is said that it was continuing for last more than twenty years but above pleading does not satisfy condition precedent to attract principles of adverse possession. 35. 34. This submission is thoroughly misconceived. It is true that plaintiff was in possession of disputed land since long and in oral evidence it is said that it was continuing for last more than twenty years but above pleading does not satisfy condition precedent to attract principles of adverse possession. 35. Plea of 'adverse possession' is a plea of defence and not to seek a declaration of title in suit. 36. The principle of adverse possession though had been recognized in India since the time ancient, but for the purpose of present case it would be appropriate to go in the past only since when the codified law has been enacted, i.e., in British India, by the then Rulers and the statute, which is now operating the field, enacted, after enforcement and adoption of Constitution, by people of India i.e. after independence. 37. The principle of adverse possession and its consequences wherever attracted, has been recognized in the statute dealing with limitation. The first codified statute dealing with limitation came to be enacted in 1840. The Act 14 of 1840 in fact was an enactment applicable in England but it was extended to the territory of Indian continent which was under the reign of East India Company, by an authority of Privy Council in The East India Company Vs. Oditchurn Paul 1849 (Cases in the Privy Council on Appeal from the East Indies) 43. 38. For British Indian Territory the first codified statute dealing with limitation was Act No. 14 of 1959. It however provided limitation of suits only. It did not contain any recognition of a right of immoveable property by prescription. It was, however, modified by Act 9 of 1871 and, for the first time, gave some recognition to the doctrine of prescription, i.e., the doctrine of extinctive prescription as to land and hereditary offices and of positive prescription as to easement. It lived short and was replaced by Act 15 of 1877 which extended principle of extinctive prescription to moveable property and the principle of positive or acquisitive prescription to profits a prendre. 39. The Law of Prescription prescribes the period at the expiry of which not only the judicial remedy is barred but a substantive right is acquired or extinguished. A prescription, by which a right is acquired, is called an "acquisitive prescription". A prescription by which a right is extinguished is called "extinctive prescription". 39. The Law of Prescription prescribes the period at the expiry of which not only the judicial remedy is barred but a substantive right is acquired or extinguished. A prescription, by which a right is acquired, is called an "acquisitive prescription". A prescription by which a right is extinguished is called "extinctive prescription". The distinction between the two is not of much practical importance or substance. The extinction of right of one party is often the mode of acquiring it by another. The right extinguished is virtually transferred to the person who claims it by prescription. Prescription implies with the thing prescribed for is the property of another and that it is enjoyed adversely to that other. In this respect it must be distinguished from acquisition by mere occupation as in the case of res nullius. The acquisition in such cases does not depend upon occupation for any particular length of time. 40. Doctrine of limitation and prescription is based upon two broad considerations. The first, there is a presumption that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Where a person has not been in possession of a particular property for a long time, the presumption is that he is not the owner thereof. The reason is that owners are usually possessors and possessors are usually owners. Possession being normally evidence of ownership, the longer the possession has continued the greater is its evidentiary value. The legislature, it appears, therefore, thought it proper to confer upon such evidence of possession for a particular time, a conclusive force. Lapse of time is recognised as creative and destructive of right instead of merely an evidence for and against their existence. The other consideration on which the doctrine of limitation and prescription may be said to be based is that title to property and matters of right in general should not be in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt and suspense. It would not be in the interest of public at large. The object of the statute of limitation is preventive and not creative but in a matter covered by the principle of “adverse possession” it also creates. It interposes a statutory bar after a certain period and gives a quietus to suits to enforce an existing right. 41. It would not be in the interest of public at large. The object of the statute of limitation is preventive and not creative but in a matter covered by the principle of “adverse possession” it also creates. It interposes a statutory bar after a certain period and gives a quietus to suits to enforce an existing right. 41. Act 15 of 1877 was replaced by Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “LA 1908”) and ultimately the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “LA 1963”) is holding the field repealing all earlier enactments. The provision dealing with extinction of title after expiry of a particular period due to hostile possession of another and transfer of title to such persons in possession is recognized in Section 28 of LA 1908 and similar provision is contained in Section 27 of LA 1963. 42. The doctrine of limitation is founded on considerations of public policy and expediency. It does not give a right where there exist none, but to impose a bar after a certain period to the remedy for enforcing an existing right. The object is to compel litigants to be diligent for seeking remedies in Courts of law if there is any infringement of their right and to prevent and prohibit stale claims. It fixes a life span for remedy for redressal of the legal injury, if suffered, but not to continue such remedy for an immemorial length of time. Rules of limitation do not destroy rights of the parties and do not create substantive rights if none existed already. However, there is one exception i.e. Section 28 of L.A. 1908 (Section 27 of LA 1963), which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed for instituting suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall stand extinguished and the person in possession, after expiry of the such period, will stand conferred title. The law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is for the general welfare that a period be part to litigation). 43. Mere expiry of limitation could have extinguished remedy but the principle embodied in Section 28 of LA 1908 (Section 27 of LA 1963), extinguishes the right also and thereby makes the said general principle inapplicable. 43. Mere expiry of limitation could have extinguished remedy but the principle embodied in Section 28 of LA 1908 (Section 27 of LA 1963), extinguishes the right also and thereby makes the said general principle inapplicable. Once the right of getting possession extinguished it cannot be revived by entering into possession again [See Salamat Raj Vs. Nur Mohamed Khan (1934) ILR 9 Lucknow 475; Ram Murti Vs. Puran Singh AIR 1963 Punjab 393; Nanhekhan Vs. Sanpat AIR 1954 Hyd 45 (FB) and Bailochan Karan Vs. Bansat Kumari Naik 1999 (2) SCC 310 ]. 44. Privy Council in Sundar Vs. Parbati, (1889) 12 All 51 agreed with the view of this court that possession is a good title against all the world except the person who can show a better title. By reason of his possession such person has an interest which can be sold or devised. 45. The limitation prescribed for adverse possession is not the limitation for maintainability of suit. The former matures a right in a person on happening of certain events continued for a period prescribed in Act, 1963. It is a consequence of principle of prescription. The later is the period whereafter the remedy for redressal of a grievance is lost to a person. I would elaborate both these aspects to make the two aspects beyond any possible confusion and misunderstanding. 46. To understand the concept of “adverse possession” it would be necessary to have a clear idea about the concept of “possession” and “ownership” in respect of immovable property. 47. In Muslim law, a man in possession of property although by wrongful means has obvious advantages over the possessor. The possessor is entitled to protection against the whole world except the true owner. [The Principles of Mohammedan Jurisprudence (1911)]. 48. In 'Ancient Indian Law' possession was nothing but a legal contrivance based on the considerations of dharma. Use and enjoyment of property was restricted and controlled by the holy scriptures. In old Hindu law possession was of two kinds. (a) with title; and (b) without title where possession continued for three generations. Enough importance, however, was given to title (agama) to prove possession. Katyayana said, “there can be no branches without root, and possession is the branch”. 49. In Modern era, various jurists have dealt with the term “possession” being an important aspect of individual's rights. 50. (a) with title; and (b) without title where possession continued for three generations. Enough importance, however, was given to title (agama) to prove possession. Katyayana said, “there can be no branches without root, and possession is the branch”. 49. In Modern era, various jurists have dealt with the term “possession” being an important aspect of individual's rights. 50. “Ihering” defines possession, “whenever a person looks like an owner in relation to a thing he has possession, unless possession is denied to him by rules of law based on convenience”. Apparently this definition does not give any explicit idea on the subject. It only states that the concept of possession is an ever changing concept having different meaning for different purposes and different frames of law. 51. “Pollock” says, “In common speech a man is said to be in possession of anything of which he has the apparent control or from the use of which he has the apparent powers of excluding others”. The stress laid by Pollock on possession is not on animus but on de facto control. 52. “Savigny” defines possession, “intention coupled with physical power to exclude others from the use of material object.” Apparently this definition involves both the elements namely, corpus possesssion is and animus domini. 53. The German Jurist ‘Savigny’ laid down that all property is founded on adverse possession ripened by prescription. The concept of ownership accordingly as observed by him involve three elements-Possession, Adverseness of Possession, (that is a holding not permissive or subordinate, but exclusive against the world), and Prescription, or a period of time during which the Adverse Possession has uninterruptedly continued. 54. “Holmes” opined that possession is a conception which is only less important than contract. 55. According to Salmond on “Jurisprudence”, 12th Edition (1966) (First Edition published in 1902) by P.J. Fitzgerald, Indian Economy Reprint 2006 published by Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “Salmond's Jurisprudence”), page 51, it says, the concept of “possession” is as difficult to define as it is essential to protect. It is an abstract notion and is not purely a legal concept. It is both a legal and a non-legal or a pre-legal concept. He tried to explain the concept of possession with reference to different factual and legal concepts. 56. The first one is “possession in fact”. It is a relationship between a person and a thing. It is an abstract notion and is not purely a legal concept. It is both a legal and a non-legal or a pre-legal concept. He tried to explain the concept of possession with reference to different factual and legal concepts. 56. The first one is “possession in fact”. It is a relationship between a person and a thing. The things one possesses in his hand or which one has in his control like clothes he is wearing, objects he is keeping in his pocket etc. For such things it can be said that he is in possession of the things in fact. To possess one would have to have a thing under his physical control. If one captures a wild animal, he gets possession of it but if the animal escapes from his control, he looses possession. It implies that things not amenable in any manner to human control cannot form the subject matter of possession like one cannot possess sun, moon or the stars etc. Extending the above concept, “Salmond” says that one can have a thing in his control without actually holding or using it at every given moment of time like possession of a coat even if one has taken it off and put down or kept in the cupboard. Even if one falls asleep, the possession of the coat would remain with him. If one is in such a position, has to be able in the normal course of events to resume actual control when one desires, the possession in fact of the thing is there. Another factor relevant to the assessment of control is the power of excluding other people. The amount of power that is necessary varies according to the nature of the object. 57. The possession consisted of a “corpus possessionis” and “animus possidendi”. The former comprised both, the power to use the thing possessed and the existence of grounds for the expectation that the possessor's use will not be interfered with. The latter consisted of an intent to appropriate to oneself the exclusive use of the thing possessed. 58. Then comes “possession in law”. A man, in law, would possess only those things which in ordinary language he would be said to possess. But then the possessor can be given certain legal rights such as a right to continue in possession free from interference by others. 58. Then comes “possession in law”. A man, in law, would possess only those things which in ordinary language he would be said to possess. But then the possessor can be given certain legal rights such as a right to continue in possession free from interference by others. This primary right in rem can be supported by various sanctioning rights in personam against those who violates the possessor's primary right; can be given a right for compensation for interference and a dispossession and the right to have his possession restored from the encroacher. 59. Another facet of possession is “immediate” or “mediate possession”. The possession held by one through another is termed “mediate” while that acquired or retained directly or personally can be said to be “immediate or direct”. There is a maxim of civil law that two persons could not be in possession of the same thing at the same time. (Plures eandem rem in solidum possidere non possunt). As a general proposition exclusiveness is of the essence of possession. Two adverse claims of exclusive use cannot both be effectually realised at the same time. There are, however, certain exceptions, namely, in the case of mediate possession two persons are in possession of the same thing at the same time. Every mediate possessor stands in relation to a direct possessor through whom he holds. Two or more persons may possess the same thing in common just as they may own it in common. 60. Next is “incorporeal possession”. It is commonly called the possession of a right and is distinct from the “corporeal possession” which is a possession of the thing. 61. In “The Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence” by G.W. Keeton, II Edition (1949) published by Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd. London (First published in 1930), “possession” has been dealt in Chapter XV. It says: “'Possession,' says an old proverb, “is nine points of law.” Put in another way, this implies that he who has conscious control of an object need only surrender his control to one who can establish a superior claim in law.” 62. Thus the essentials of possession in the first instance include a fact to be established like any other fact. Whether it exists in a particular case or not will depend on the degree of control exercised by the person designated as possessor. Thus the essentials of possession in the first instance include a fact to be established like any other fact. Whether it exists in a particular case or not will depend on the degree of control exercised by the person designated as possessor. If his control is such that he effectively excludes interference by others then he has possession. Thus the possession in order to show its existences must show “corpus possessionis” and an “animus possidendi”. 63. Corpus possessionis means that there exists such physical contact of the thing by the possessor as to give rise to the reasonable assumption that other persons will not interfere with it. Existence of corpus broadly depends on (1) upon the nature of the thing itself, and the probability that others will refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of it; (2) possession of real property, i.e., when a man sets foot over the threshold of a house, or crosses the boundary line of his estate, provided that there exist no factors negativing his control, for example the continuance in occupation of one who denies his right; and (3) acquisition of physical control over the objects it encloses. Corpus, therefore, depends more upon the general expectations that others will not interfere with an individual control over a thing, then upon the physical capacity of an individual to exclude others. 64. The animus possidendi is the conscious intention of an individual to exclude others from the control of an object. 65. Possession confers on the possessor all the rights of the owner except as against the owner and prior possessors. “Possession in law” has the advantage of being a root of title. 66. There is also a concept of “constructive possession” which is depicted by a symbolic act. It has been narrated with an illustration that delivery of keys of a building may give right to constructive possession of all the contents, to the transferee of the key. 67. There is a distinction between the terms “possession”, “occupation” and “control”. The distinction between “possession” and “occupation” was considered in Seth Narainbhai Ichharam Kurmi and another Vs. Narbada Prasad Sheosahai Pande and others, AIR 1941 Nagpur 357 and Court held: “Bare occupation and possession are two different things. The concept of possession, at any rate as it is understood in legal terminology, is a complex one which need not include actual occupation. Narbada Prasad Sheosahai Pande and others, AIR 1941 Nagpur 357 and Court held: “Bare occupation and possession are two different things. The concept of possession, at any rate as it is understood in legal terminology, is a complex one which need not include actual occupation. It comprises rather the right to possess, and the right and ability to exclude others from possession and control coupled with a mental element, namely, the animus possidendi, that is to say, knowledge of these rights and the desire and intention of exercising them if need be. The adverse possession of which the law speaks does not necessarily denote actual physical ouster from occupation but an ouster from all those rights which constitute possession in law. It is true that physical occupation is ordinarily the best and the most conclusive proof of possession in this sense but the two are not the same. It is also true that there must always be physical ouster from these rights but that does not necessarily import physical ouster from occupation especially when this is of just a small room or two in a house and when this occupation is shared with others. The nature of the ouster and the quantum necessary naturally varies in each case.” 68. The distinction between “possession”, “occupation” or “control” was also considered in Sumatibai Wasudeo Bachuwar Vs. Emperor, AIR (31) 1944 Bom. 125 and Court held: “Some documents containing perjudicial reports were found in a box in the house occupied by the applicant and her husband. When the house was raided by the police, the husband was out and the applicant (wife) produced the keys with one of which the box could be opened. In addition to perjudicial reports, there were some letters in the box addressed to the applicant. Held,. When the house was raided by the police, the husband was out and the applicant (wife) produced the keys with one of which the box could be opened. In addition to perjudicial reports, there were some letters in the box addressed to the applicant. Held,. (1) that, prima facie, the box containing the documents would be in the possession of the husband and the mere fact that in his absence he had left the keys with the applicant (wife) would not make her in joint possession with himself; nor did the fact that there were letters in the box addressed to the wife mean that she was in joint possession of all the contents of the box; (2) that the wife was in the circumstances in possession of the box within the meaning of R. 39(1) of the Defence of India Rules; (3) that occupation in R. 39 (2) of the Defence of India Rules meant legal occupation, and the applicant could not be held to be in occupation or control of the house so as to render her guilty under R. 39 of the Defence of India Rules.” 69. A person other than owner, if continued to have possession of immoveable property for a period as prescribed in a Statute providing limitation, openly, without any interruption and interference from the owner, though he has knowledge of such possession, would crystallise in ownership after the expiry of the prescribed period or limitation, if the real owner has not taken any action for re-entry and he shall be denuded of his title to the property in law. 'Permissible possession' shall not mature a title since it cannot be treated to be an 'adverse possession'. Such possession, for however length of time be continued, shall not either be converted into adverse possession or a title. It is only the hostile possession which is one of the condition for adverse possession. 70. Ordinarily an owner of property is presumed to be in possession and such presumption is in his favour where there is nothing to the contrary. But where a plaintiff himself admits that he has been dispossessed by the defendant and no longer in proprietary possession of the property in suit at the time of institution of the suit, Court shall not start with the presumption in his favour that the possession of property was with him. But where a plaintiff himself admits that he has been dispossessed by the defendant and no longer in proprietary possession of the property in suit at the time of institution of the suit, Court shall not start with the presumption in his favour that the possession of property was with him. Mere adverse entry in revenue papers is not relevant for proof of adverse possession. Possession is prima facie evidence of title and has to be pleaded specifically with all its necessary ingredients namely, hostile, open, actual and continuous. 71. The consequences and conditions precedent as also the requirement of law in an action founded on the plea of adverse possession have been discussed by Courts time and again and a retrospect of some of the important decisions which provides binding guidelines on the aforesaid aspects may be referred to hereinbelow. 72. In Gunga Gobind Mundul Vs. Collector of the 24-pergunnahs 11 Moore's I.A., 345 it was observed by Privy Council that continuous possession for more than twelve years not only bars the remedy, but practically extinguishes the title of the true owner in favour of the possessor. This was followed by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Gossain Das Chunder Vs. Issur Chunder Nath 1877 III ILR 3 (Cal.) 224. 73. In Gossain Das Chunder (supra), High Court held that 12 years continuous possession of land by wrong doer not only bars the remedy but also extinguishes the title of the rightful owner. It confers a good title upon the wrong doer. 74. In Bhupendra Narayan Sinha Vs. Rajeswar Prosad Bhakat & Ors. AIR 1931 Privy Council 162, Privy Council held where a person without any colour of right wrongfully takes possession as a trespasser of a property of another, any title which he may require by adverse possession will be strictly limited to what he has actually so possessed. That was an interesting case of dispute of ownership in respect to subsoil. It was held that there can be separate ownership of different strata of subsoil, at all events where minerals are involved. If a grant of surface right was given by the owner and the licensee is given possession to carry out the said right, by quarrying stones etc. It was held that there can be separate ownership of different strata of subsoil, at all events where minerals are involved. If a grant of surface right was given by the owner and the licensee is given possession to carry out the said right, by quarrying stones etc. possession of subsoil in the eyes of law remain with the owner though it is only a constructive possession but in the absence of anything to show that with the knowledge of the owner the licensee held possession of subsoil and minerals therein and continued with that possession for statutory period of limitation to continue its ownership such plea of adverse possession in respect to subsoil cannot be accepted. 75. In Basant Kumar Roy Vs. Secretary of State for India & others AIR 1917 PC 18 , it was held: “An exclusive adverse possession for a sufficient period may be made out, in spite of occasional acts done by the former owner on the ground for a specific purpose from time to time. Conversely; acts which prima facie are acts of dispossession may under particular circumstances fall short of evidencing any kind of ouster. They may be susceptible of another explanation, bear some other characters or have some other object. ... If, as their Lordships think, no dispossession occurred, except possibly within twelve years before the commencement of this suit, article 144 is the article applicable, and not article 142.” 76. In Board Nageshwar Bux Roy Vs. Bengal Coal Co. AIR 1931 PC 18 the observation in respect of adverse possession similar to what has been noted above were made and the said judgment was followed in Bhupendra Narayan Sinha (supra). 77. The law in respect of adverse possession, therefore, is now well settled. It should be nec vi nec clam nec precario. (Secretary of State for India Vs. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR 1934 PC 23 , page 25). This decision has been referred and followed by the Apex Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy Vs. L.Lakshmi Reddy AIR 1957 SC 314 (para 4). Court further says that the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. [Radhamoni Debi Vs. Collector of Khulna, 27 Ind App. 136 at p. 140 (PC)]. L.Lakshmi Reddy AIR 1957 SC 314 (para 4). Court further says that the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. [Radhamoni Debi Vs. Collector of Khulna, 27 Ind App. 136 at p. 140 (PC)]. The case in P. Lakshmi Reddy (supra) was that of co-heirs where plea of adverse possession was set up. In this regard it was held: “But it is well settled in order, to establish adverse possession of one-co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits, of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one coheir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of the joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir, not in possession, merely by any secret hostile animus of his own part in derogation of the other co-heir title. It is settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster.” 78. In Thakur Kishan Singh Vs. Arvind Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 73 Court said: “A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession.” 79. In Sheo Raj Chamar & another Vs. Mudeer Khan & others AIR 1934 All. 868 , it was held: "If, indeed it did, the defendants have acquired a right by sheer adverse possession held and maintained for more than 12 years. The adverse possession to be effective need not be for the full proprietary right." 80. In Saroop Singh Vs. Banto and others, 2005(8) SCC 330 Court held in para 30: “30. 868 , it was held: "If, indeed it did, the defendants have acquired a right by sheer adverse possession held and maintained for more than 12 years. The adverse possession to be effective need not be for the full proprietary right." 80. In Saroop Singh Vs. Banto and others, 2005(8) SCC 330 Court held in para 30: “30. Animus possidendi is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. . . . .” 81. In T. Anjanappa and others Vs. Somalingappa and another 2006 (7) SCC 570 the pre-conditions for taking plea of adverse possession has been summarised as under: “It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverese possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner's title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action.” 82. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy & Ors. Vs. Revamma & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1753 it was held: "It is important to appreciate the question of intention as it would have appeared to the paper-owner. The issue is that intention of the adverse user gets communicated to the paper-owner of the property. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner." 83. This is where the law gives importance to hostility and openness as pertinent qualities of manner of possession. It follows that the possession of the adverse possessor must be hostile enough to give rise to a reasonable notice and opportunity to the paper-owner." 83. In the above case Supreme Court discussed the law in detail and observed: "Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile." (Para 5) "Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through effluxion of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title."(Para 6) "Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two pronged enquiry is required: 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially "willful neglect" element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property" (Para 9) 84. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property" (Para 9) 84. In para 12 of the judgment, referring to its earlier decision in T. Anjanappa (supra), Court held that if the defendants are not sure who is the true owner, the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not arise. It also referred on this aspect its earlier decision in Des Raj and others vs. Bhagat Ram(Dead) by LRs. And others 2007(3) SCALE 371 and Govindammal v. R. Perumal Chettiar and others JT 2006(1) SC 121. 85. In Annakili Vs. A. Vedanayagam and others, AIR 2008 SC 346 , Court pointed out that a claim of adverse possession has two elements (i) the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff; and (ii) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi is held to be a requisite ingredient of adverse possession well known in law. Court held: “It is now a well settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessor title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more do not ripen into a title.” 86. In Secretary of State Vs. Debendra Lal Khan (supra) it was held that the period of possession of a series of independent trespassers cannot be added together and utilized by the last possessor to make up the statutory total period of adverse possession. 87. In (Sm.) Bibhabati Devi Vs. In Secretary of State Vs. Debendra Lal Khan (supra) it was held that the period of possession of a series of independent trespassers cannot be added together and utilized by the last possessor to make up the statutory total period of adverse possession. 87. In (Sm.) Bibhabati Devi Vs. Ramendra Narayan Roy & others AIR 1947 Privy Council 19 it was observed that in order to claim a right of ownership applying the principle of adverse possession it is a condition precedent that the possession must be adverse to a living person. Herein the appellant was possessing the property under a mosque after the death of the defendant, it was held that the possession cannot be said to be adverse. 88. In Chhote Khan & others Vs. Mal Khan & others AIR 1954 SC 575 , Court observed that no question of adverse possession arises where the possession is held under an arrangement between the co-sharers. 89. Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy (supra) quoted with approval Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures on Limitation and Prescription (6th Edition) Vol. I, Lecture VI, at page 159, quoting from Angell on Limitation: “An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive appropriation of land commenced and continued under a claim of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a constructive claim (arising from the acts and circumstances attending the appropriation), to hold the land against him (sic) who was in possession. (Angell, sections 390 and 398). It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession.” 90. It further held: “Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession, in favour of a person, implies that that person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until site animus.” 91. In Karbalai Begum Vs. Mohd. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his adverse possession cannot commence until site animus.” 91. In Karbalai Begum Vs. Mohd. Sayeed (1980) 4 SCC 396 in the context of a co-sharer, it was held: "...It is well settled that mere non-participation in the rent and profits of the land of a co-sharer does not amount to an ouster so as to give title by adverse possession to the other co-sharer in possession." 92. In Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil Vs. Balwant (1995) 2 SCC 543 , Court, in para 15, said: "15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all." 93. In Vidya Devi Vs. Prem Prakash (1995) 4 SCC 496 , Court in paras 27 and 28 held: "27...it will be seen that in order that the possession of co-owner may be adverse to others, it is necessary that there should be ouster or something equivalent to it. This was also the observation of the Supreme Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy case which has since been followed in Mohd. Zainulabudeen v. Sayed Ahmed Mohideen. 28. 'Ouster' does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are (i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster, and (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owner. Thus, a co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law." 94. Thus, a co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law." 94. In making above observations, Court also relied on its earlier decisions in P. Lakshmi Reddy (supra) and Mohd. Zainulabudeen Vs. Sayed Ahmad Mohideen (1990) 1 SCC 345 . 95. In Roop Singh Vs. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 it was held that if defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession, it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. Court relied on its earlier decisions in Thakur Kishan Singh (supra). 96. In Darshan Singh Vs. Gujjar Singh (2002) 2 SCC 62 in para 7 and 9, Court held: "...It is well settled that if a co-sharer is in possession of the entire property, his possession cannot be deemed to be adverse for other co-sharers unless there has been an ouster of other co-sharers." "9. In our view, the correct legal position is that possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that title of the other co-sharers was denied." 97. In Amarendra Pratap Singh Vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, AIR 2004 SC 3782 = (2004) 10 SCC 65 considering as to what is adverse possession, Court in para 22 observed : “What is adverse possession? Every possession is not, in law, adverse possession. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title can be instituted within a period of 12 years calculated from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Every possession is not, in law, adverse possession. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title can be instituted within a period of 12 years calculated from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. By virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, at the determination of the period limited by the Act to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property stands extinguished. The process of acquisition of title by adverse possession springs into action essentially by default or inaction of the owner. A person, though having no right to enter into possession of the property of someone else, does so and continues in possession setting up title in himself and adversely to the title of the owner, commences prescribing title into himself and such prescription having continued for a period of 12 years, he acquires title not on his own but on account of the default or inaction on part of the real owner, which stretched over a period of 12 years results into extinguishing of the latter's title. It is that extinguished title of the real owner which comes to vest in the wrongdoer. The law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrong doing of a person in wrongful possession; it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the wrong doer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of 12 years, which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. Inaction for a period of 12 years is treated by the Doctrine of Adverse Possession as evidence of the loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession.” 98. However, Court further observed that if property, by virtue of some statutory provisions or otherwise, is alienable, the plea of adverse possession may not be available and held. : “23. The nature of the property, the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the kind of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising, are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for attracting applicability of the Doctrine of Adverse Possession. : “23. The nature of the property, the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the kind of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising, are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for attracting applicability of the Doctrine of Adverse Possession. The right in the property ought to be one which is alienable and is capable of being acquired by the competitor. Adverse possession operates on an alienable right. The right stands alienated by operation of law, for it was capable of being alienated voluntarily and is sought to be recognized by doctrine of adverse possession as having been alienated involuntarily, by default and inaction on the part of the rightful claimant, who knows actually or constructively of the wrongful acts of the competitor and yet sits idle. Such inaction or default in taking care of one's own rights over property is also capable of being called a manner of 'dealing' with one's property which results in extinguishing one's title in property and vesting the same in the wrong doer in possession of property and thus amounts to 'transfer of immovable property' in the wider sense assignable in the context of social welfare legislation enacted with the object of protecting a weaker section.” 99. From the above discussion what boils down is that the concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession, i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's right and in fact deny the same. A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. In order to determine whether the act of a person constitutes adverse possession is 'animus in doing that act' and it is most crucial factor. Adverse possession commences in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner and tends to extinguish that person's title. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner and tends to extinguish that person's title. Possession is not held to be adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. The persons setting up adverse possession may have been holding under the rightful owner's title, i.e., trustees, guardians, bailiffs or agents, such person cannot set up adverse possession. Burden is on the defendant to prove affirmatively. 100. An occupation of reality is inconsistent with the right of the true owner. Where a person possesses property in a manner in which he is not entitled to possess it, and without anything to show that he possesses it otherwise than an owner, i.e., with the intention of excluding all persons from it, including the rightful owner, he is in adverse possession of it. Where possession could be referred to a lawful title it shall not be considered to be adverse. The reason is that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another does not by mere denial of other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. A person who enters into possession having a lawful title cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all. 101. Adverse possession is of two kinds. (A) Adverse from the beginning or (B) that become so subsequently. If a mere trespasser takes possession of A's property, and retains it against him, his possession is adverse ab initio. But if A grants a lease of land to B, or B obtains possession of the land as A's bailiff, or guardian, or trustee, his possession can only become adverse by some change in his position. If a mere trespasser takes possession of A's property, and retains it against him, his possession is adverse ab initio. But if A grants a lease of land to B, or B obtains possession of the land as A's bailiff, or guardian, or trustee, his possession can only become adverse by some change in his position. Adverse possession not only entitles the adverse possessor, like every other possessor, to be protected in his possession against all who cannot show a better title, but also, if the adverse possessor remains in possession for a certain period of time produces the effect either of barring the right of the true owner, and thus converting the possessor into the owner, or of depriving the true owner of his right of action to recover his property although the true owner is ignorant of the adverse possessor being in occupation. 102. In Hari Chand Vs. Daulat Ram, AIR 1987 SC 94 , Court held if the encroachment was not new one but the structure was in existence prior to acquiring title over the property, the decree on the basis of adverse possession cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiff. Paras 10 and 11 of the judgment read as under: "10. On a consideration of these evidences it is quite clear that the disputed kachha wall and the khaprail over it is not a new construction, but existed for over 28 years and the defendant has been living therein as has been deposed to by Ramji Lal vendor of the plaintiff who admitted in his evidence that the land in dispute and the adjoining kachha walls had been affected by salt and the chhappar over the portion shown in red was tiled roof constructed about 28 years back. This is also supported by the evidence of the defendant, D.W. 1, that the wall in dispute was in existence when the partition was effected i.e., 28 years before. On a consideration of these evidences the Trial Court rightly held that the defendant had not trespassed over the land in question nor he had constructed a new wall or khaprail. The trial court also considered the report 57C by the court Amin and held that the wall in question was not a recent construction but it appeared 2530 years old in its present condition as (is) evident from the said report. The suit was therefore dismissed. The trial court also considered the report 57C by the court Amin and held that the wall in question was not a recent construction but it appeared 2530 years old in its present condition as (is) evident from the said report. The suit was therefore dismissed. The lower appellate court merely considered the partition deed and map Exts. 3/1 and 3/2 respectively and held that the disputed property fell to the share of the plaintiff's vendor and the correctness of the partition map was not challenged in the written statement. The court of appeal below also referred to Amin's map 47 A which showed the encroached portion in red colour as falling within the share of plaintiff's vendor, and held that the defendant encroached on this portion of land marked in red colour, without at all considering the clear evidence of the defendant himself that the wall and the khaprail in question existed for the last 28 years and the defendant has been living there all along. P.W. 1 Ramji Lal himself also admitted that the wall existed for about 28 years as stated by the defendant and the kachha walls and the khaprail has been effected by salt. The lower appellate court though held that P.W. 1 Ramji Lal admitted in cross-examination that towards the north of the land in dispute was the khaprail covered room of Daulat Ram in which Daulat Ram lived, but this does not mean that the wall in dispute exists for the last any certain number of years, although it can be said that it is not a recent construction. Without considering the deposition of defendant No. 1 as well as the report of the Amin 57 C the IInd Addl. Civil Judge, Agra wrongly held that the defendant failed to prove that the wall in dispute and the khaprail existed for the last more than 12 years before the suit. The Civil Judge further held on surmises as "may be that the wall and khaprail have not been raised in May, 1961 as is the plaintiff's case, but they are recent constructions." This decision of the court of appeal below is wholly incorrect being contrary to the evidences on record." "11. The Civil Judge further held on surmises as "may be that the wall and khaprail have not been raised in May, 1961 as is the plaintiff's case, but they are recent constructions." This decision of the court of appeal below is wholly incorrect being contrary to the evidences on record." "11. On a consideration of all the evidences on record it is clearly established that the alleged encroachment by construction of kuchha wall and khaprail over it are not a recent construction as alleged to have been made in May 1961. On the other hand, it is crystal clear from the evidences of Ramji Lal P.W. 1 and Daulat Ram D.W. 1 that the disputed wall with khaprail existed there in the disputed site for a long time, that is 28 years before and the wall and the khaprail have been affected by salt as deposed to by these two witnesses. Moreover the court Amin's report 57 C also shows the said walls and khaprail to be 25-30 years old in its present condition. The High Court has clearly came to the finding that though the partition deed was executed by the parties yet there was no partition by metes and bounds. Moreover there is no whisper in the plaint about the partition of the property in question between the co-sharers by metes and bounds nor there is any averment that the suit property fell to the share of plaintiff's vendor Ramji Lal and Ramji Lal was ever in possession of the disputed property since the date of partition till the date of sale to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has singularly failed to prove his case as pleaded in the plaint." 103. In Maharaja Sir Kesho Prasad Singh Bahadur Vs. Bahuria Mt. Bhagjogna Kuer and others AIR 1937 Privy Council 69, it was held that mere receipt of rent by persons claiming adversely is not sufficient to warrant finding of adverse possession. The possession of persons or their predecessors-in-title claiming by adverse possession must have "all the qualities of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness" necessary to displace the title of the persons, against whom, they claim. Relevant extracts from page 78 of the said judgment reads as follows: "the mere fact that many years after the sale the Gangbarar maliks or persons depriving title from them are obtaining rent for the land is in itself very significant. Relevant extracts from page 78 of the said judgment reads as follows: "the mere fact that many years after the sale the Gangbarar maliks or persons depriving title from them are obtaining rent for the land is in itself very significant. Even in a locality exposed to dilution by the action of the river this circumstance alone might be given considerable weight. But without sufficient proof to cover the intervening years it was most reasonably held by the learned Subordinate Judge to be insufficient. The circumstance that the Maharaja was not in possession or in receipt of rent is, it need hardly be said, insufficient under Art. 144 to warrant a finding of adverse possession on behalf of the respondents or their predecessors-in-title. Their Lordships are of opinion that on the materials produced it cannot be contended that the learned Subordinate Judge was obliged in law to find that the possession of the principal respondents had "all the qualities of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness" (per Lord Shaw 126 CWN 66610 at p. 673) necessary to displace the title of the Maharaja, and they think that no reason in law exists why his finding of fact in this respect should not be final." 104. Pleadings are necessary. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat Vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Others AIR 2009 SC 103 , Court has considered in detail the various authorities on the question of adverse possession and in para 18 observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show : (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 105. Court also referred to its earlier decision in D. N. Venkatarayappa & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 105. Court also referred to its earlier decision in D. N. Venkatarayappa & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. 1997 (7) SCC 567 observing : “Therefore, in the absence of crucial pleadings, which constitute adverse possession and evidence to show that the petitioners have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lands in question claiming right, title and interest in the lands in question hostile to the right, title and interest of the original grantees, the petitioners cannot claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession.” 106. In D.N. Venkatarayappa (Supra), Court emphasized the importance of pleading as also the pre requisites of plea of adverse possession and said : “3. ...What requires to be pleaded and proved is that the purchaser disclaimed his title under which he came into possession, set up adverse possession with necessary animus of asserting open and hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner and the later allowed the former, without any let or hindrance, to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property adverse to the interest of the true owner until the expiry of the prescribed period. The classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario.” “... ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario and the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor.” “apart from the actual and continuous possession which are among other ingredients of adverse possession, there should be necessary animus on the part of the person who intends to perfect his title by adverse possession.” “A person who under the bona fide belief thinks that the property belongs to him and as such he has been in possession, such possession cannot at all be adverse possession because it lacks necessary animus for perfecting title by adverse possession." “... one of the important ingredients to claim adverse possession is that the person who claims adverse possession must have set up title hostile to the title of the true owner.” “...there is not even a whisper in the evidence of the first petitioner with regard to the claim of adverse possession set up by the petitioners. It is not stated by the petitioners that they have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lands in question.” “But, the crucial facts to constitute adverse possession have not been pleaded. Admittedly, the appellant came into possession by a derivative title from the original grantee. It is seen that the original grantee has no right to alienate the land. Therefore, having come into possession under colour of title from original grantee, if the appellant intends to plead adverse possession as against the State, he must disclaim his title and plead his hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and that the State had not taken any action thereon within the prescribed period. Thereby, the appellant's possession would become adverse. No such stand was taken nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The counsel in fairness, despite his research, is unable to bring to our notice any such plea having been taken by the appellant." “Therefore, in the absence of crucial pleadings, which constitute adverse possession and evidence to show that the petitioners have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lands in question claiming right, title and interest in the lands in question hostile to the right, title and interest of the original grantees, the petitioners cannot claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession” “...person, who comes into possession under colour of title from the original grantee if he intends to claim adverse possession as against the State, must disclaim his title and plead his hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and the State had not taken any action thereon within the prescribed period.” “5. ... ... in claiming adverse possession certain pleas have to be made such as when there is a derivative title as in the present case, if the appellants intend to plead adverse possession as against the State, they must disclaim their title and plead this hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and that the State had not taken any action within the prescribed period, it is only in those circumstances the appellants' possession would become adverse. There is no material to that effect in the present case. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no substance in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants." 107. In Mahesh Chand Sharma Vs. Raj Kumari Sharma AIR 1996 SC 869 , the necessity of pleading was emphasized and Court in para 36 said : “In this connection, we may emphasise that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. For all the above reasons, the plea of limitation put forward by the appellant, or by Defendants Nos. 2 to 5 as the case may, be is rejected.” 108. In Prabhu Narain Singh Vs. Ram Niranjan & Ors. AIR 1983 All 223 , in para 6 Court observed : “A person claiming title to any land by adverse possession has to be very specific about the area of the land and the period over which he has been in possession.” 109. In Ramzan & Ors. Vs. Smt. Gafooran Ors. AIR 2008 All 37 , Court observed : “27. It is, therefore, explicit that unless there is specific plea and proof that adverse possessor has disclaimed his right and asserted title and possession to the knowledge of the true owner within a statutory period and the true owner has acquiesced to it, the adverse possessor cannot succeed to have it established that he has perfected his right by prescription.” “29. As pointed out above, where the defendants are not sure who is the true owner and question of their being in hostile possession then the question of denying title of true owner does not arise. As pointed out above, where the defendants are not sure who is the true owner and question of their being in hostile possession then the question of denying title of true owner does not arise. At the most, the defendants have claimed and which is found to be correct by the trial court that they have been in possession of the disputed property since the inception of the sale deeds in their favour. They came in possession, according to their showing, as owner of the property in question. It follows that they exercised their right over the disputed property as owner and exercise of such right, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that they claimed their title adverse to the true owner.” 110. The pleading must be specific to the date when possession become adverse. In Ram Charan Das Vs. Naurangi Lal & Ors. AIR 1933 Privy Council 75, property of a Mutt was alienated by Mahant by executing a Mukararri (permanent lease) in favour of one Munshi Naurangi Lal. The sale deed of the land in dispute was also executed to another one and both the documents contain a stipulation that they were executed to meet expenses and necessities of Mutt. After the death of Mahant, a suit was filed by successor in office against the lessee and purchaser etc. claiming possession of property in dispute to Mutt. The defendants besides others, took the plea of adverse possession also. The question was, did possession of the concerned defendant became adverse to Mutt or Mahant representing the Mutt on the date of relevant assurance or date of death of the concerned Mahant. Trial Court held latter date to be correct while High Court took a contrary view and upheld the former date. Privy Council held: "In other words a mahant has power (apart from any question of necessity) to create an interest in property appertaining to the Mutt which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps more accurately, which will continue during his tenure of office of mahant of the mutt, with the result that adverse possession of the particular property will only commence when the mahant who had disposed of it ceases to be mahant by death or otherwise. If this be right as it must be taken to be, where the disposition by the mahant purports to be a grant of a permanent lease, their Lordships are unable to see why the position is not the same where the disposition purports to be an absolute grant of the property nor was any logical reason suggested in argument why there should be any difference between the two cases. In each case the operation of the purported grant is effective and endures only for the period during which the mahant had power to create an interest in the property of the mutt." (emphasis added) 111. The pleading is necessary since burden also lies on the person who claims adverse possession. In Smt. Bitola Kuer Vs. Sri Ram Charan & Ors. AIR 1978 All 555 in para 16, Court said: “It is well settled that title ordinarily carries with it the presumption of possession and that when the question arises is to who was in possession of land, the presumption is that the true owner was in such possession. In other word” possession follows title. The inevitable Corollary from this principle is that the burden lies on the person who claims to have acquired title by adverse possession to prove his case.” 112. In T. Anjanappa and others Vs. Somalingappa and another 2006 (7) SCC 570 , pre-conditions for taking plea of adverse possession has been summarised as under: “It is well-recognised proposition in law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverese possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner's title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action.” 113. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action.” 113. In order to defeat title of a plaintiff on the ground of adverse possession it is obligatory on the part of the respondent to specifically plead and prove as to since when their possession came adverse. If it was permissive or obtained pursuant to some sort of arrangement, the plea of adverse possession would fail. In Md. Mohammad Ali Vs. Jagadish Kalita & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 271 with reference to a case dealing with such an issue amongst co-sharers it was observed that “Long and continuous possession by itself, it is trite, would not constitute adverse possession. Even non-participation in the rent and profits of the land to a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to give title by prescription. 114. It was also observed in para 21 that for the purpose of proving adverse possession/ouster, the defendant must also prove animus possidendi. 115. In L.N. Aswathama & another Vs. V.P. Prakash JT 2009 (9) 527 Court, in para 17 and 18 said: “17. The legal position is no doubt well settled. To establish a claim of title by prescription, that is adverse possession for 12 years or more, the possession of the claimant must be physical/actual, exclusive, open, uninterrupted, notorious and hostile to the true owner for a period exceeding twelve years. It is also well settled that long and continuous possession by itself would not constitute adverse possession if it was either permissive possession or possession without animus possidendi. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Unless the person possessing the property has the requisite animus to possess the property hostile to the title of the true owner, the period for prescription will not commence.” “18. ...When a person is in possession asserting to be the owner, even if he fails to establish his title, his possession would still be adverse to the true owner. Therefore, the two pleas put forth by the defendant in this case are not inconsistent pleas but alternative pleas available on the same facts. ...When a person is in possession asserting to be the owner, even if he fails to establish his title, his possession would still be adverse to the true owner. Therefore, the two pleas put forth by the defendant in this case are not inconsistent pleas but alternative pleas available on the same facts. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiffs that the plea of adverse possession is not available to defendant is rejected.” 116. Where a plea of adverse possession is taken, the pleadings are of utmost importance and anything, if found missing in pleadings, it may be fatal to such plea of adverse possession. Since mere long possession cannot satisfy the requirement of adverse possession, the person claiming it, must prove as to how and when the adverse possession commenced and whether fact of adverse possession was known to real owner. (R.N. Dawar Vs. Ganga Saran Dhama AIR 1993 Del. 19 ). 117. In Parwatabai Vs. Sona Bai 1996 (10) SCC 266 , it was stressed upon by Court that to establish the claim of adverse possession, one has to establish the exact date from which adverse possession started. The claim based on adverse possession has to be proved affirmatively by cogent evidence and presumptions and probabilities cannot be substituted for evidence. The plea of adverse possession is not always a legal plea. It is always based on facts which must be asserted, pleaded and proved. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour since he is trying to defeat the right of the true owner and, therefore, he has to specifically plead with sufficient clarity when his possession became adverse and the nature of such possession. [See Mahesh Chand Sharma (supra)]. 118. In Parsinnin Vs. Sukhi (1993) 4 SCC 375 , it said that burden of proof lies on the party who claims adverse possession. He has to plead and prove that his possession is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario i.e., peaceful, open and continuous. 119. Besides, alternative plea may be permissible, but mutually destructive pleas are not permissible. The defendants may raise inconsistent pleas so long as they are not mutually destructive as held in Biswanath Agarwalla Vs. Sabitri Bera & others JT 2009 (10) SC 538. 120. In Gautam Sarup Vs. 119. Besides, alternative plea may be permissible, but mutually destructive pleas are not permissible. The defendants may raise inconsistent pleas so long as they are not mutually destructive as held in Biswanath Agarwalla Vs. Sabitri Bera & others JT 2009 (10) SC 538. 120. In Gautam Sarup Vs. Leela Jetly & others (2008) 7 SCC 85 , Court said that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea but such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other. 121. In Ejas Ali Qidwai & Ors. Vs. Special Manager, Court of Wards, Balrampur Estate & Ors. AIR 1935 Privy Council 53 certain interesting questions cropped up which also attracted certain consequences flowing from annexation of province of Oudh in 1857 by the British Government. It appears that one Asghar Ali and his cousin Muzaffar Ali granted a mortgage by conditional sale of the entire estate of Ambhapur (commonly known as the Taluka of Gandara) and certain villages to the then Maharaja of Balrampur. The mortgaged property situated in District Bahraich, which was in the Province of Oudh. The mortgagee brought an action to enforce his right, got a decree in his favour and ultimately possession of the property in 1922. The sons of Asghar Ali thereafter brought an action in civil court for recovery of their share of the mortgaged property on the ground that it was the absolute property of their father and on his death devolved on all the persons who were his heirs under the Mahomedan Law. They challenged Iqbal Ali's right to mortgage the whole of estate and impeached the mortgaged transaction on various grounds. The claim was resisted on the ground that succession to the estate was governed by the rule of primogeniture according to which the whole of the estate descended first to Asghar Ali and after his death to his eldest son Iqbal Ali. The defence having been upheld the claim was negatived by the trial court as well as Court of appeal. Before the Privy Council the only question raised was whether the succession to the property was regulated by the rule of primogeniture or by Mahomedan Law. 122. The defence having been upheld the claim was negatived by the trial court as well as Court of appeal. Before the Privy Council the only question raised was whether the succession to the property was regulated by the rule of primogeniture or by Mahomedan Law. 122. The Privy Council while considering the above question observed that the Province of Oudh was annexed by the East India Company in 1856 but in 1857 during the first war of independence by native Indians much of its part was declared independent. Soon after it was conquered by the British Government and it got reoccupation of the entire province of Oudh. Thereafter in March 1858 the British Government issued a proclamation confiscating, with certain exceptions "the proprietary right in the soil of the Province" and reserved to itself the power to dispose of that right in such manner as to it may seem fit. On 10th October 1859 the British Government (the then Government of India) declared that every talukdar with whom a summary settlement has been made since the reoccupation of the Province has thereby acquired a permanent, hereditary and transferable proprietary right, namely in the taluka for which he has engaged, including the perpetual privilege of engaging with the Government for the revenue of the taluka. Pursuant to that declaration, Wazir Ali with whom a summary settlement of Taluka has already been made was granted a Sanad which conferred upon him full proprietary right, title and possession of the estate or Ambhapur. In the said grant, there contained a stipulation that in the event of dying intestate or anyone of his successor dies intestate, the estate shall descend to the nearest male heir according to rule of primogeniture. Subsequently, in order to avoid any further doubt in the matter, Oudh Estates Act I of 1869 was enacted wherein Wazir Ali was shown as a Tallukdar whose estate according to the custom of the family on or before 13.2.1856 ordinarily devolved upon a single heir. However, having noticed this state of affairs, the Privy Council further observed that this rule was not followed after the death of Wazir Ali and the Taluka was mutated in favour of his cousin Nawazish Ali. He was recorded as owner of Taluka. However, having noticed this state of affairs, the Privy Council further observed that this rule was not followed after the death of Wazir Ali and the Taluka was mutated in favour of his cousin Nawazish Ali. He was recorded as owner of Taluka. Thereafter in 1892 Samsam Ali entered the joint possession with Nawazish Ali and after death of Nawazish Ali, Samsam Ali was recorded as the sole owner. The system of devolution of the property was explained being in accordance with the usage of the family and when the name of Asghar Ali was recorded, he also made a similar declaration. Faced with the situation the appellant sought to explain the possession of Nawazish Ali as adverse possession but the same was discarded by the Privy Council observing: "The principle of law is firmly established that a person, who bases his title on adverse possession, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed." (emphasis added) 123. In S.M. Karim Vs. Mst. Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 SC 1254 , Court has held that the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved, adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point on limitation against the party affected can be found. A mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "a possible title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. Relevant paras 3 to 5 of the said judgment read as follows: "3. In this appeal, it has been stressed by the appellant that the findings clearly establish the benami nature of the transaction of 1914. This is, perhaps, true but the appellant cannot avail himself of it. The appellant's claim based upon the benami nature of the transaction cannot stand because S. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars it. In this appeal, it has been stressed by the appellant that the findings clearly establish the benami nature of the transaction of 1914. This is, perhaps, true but the appellant cannot avail himself of it. The appellant's claim based upon the benami nature of the transaction cannot stand because S. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars it. That section provides that no suit shall be maintained against any person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf of someone through whom the plaintiff claims. Formerly, the opening words were, no suit shall be maintained against a certified purchaser and the change was made to protect not only the certified purchaser but any person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court. The protection is thus available not only against the real purchaser but also against anyone claiming through him. In the present case, the appellant as plaintiff was hit by the section and the defendants were protected by it." "4. It is contended that the case falls within the second subsection under which a suit is possible at the instance of a third person who wishes to proceed against the property, though ostensibly sold to the certified purchaser, on tie ground that it is liable to satisfy a claim of such third person against the real owner. Reliance is placed upon the transfer by Syed Aulad Ali in favour of the appellant which is described as a claim by the transferee against the real owner. The words of the second subsection refer to the claim of creditors and not to the claims of transferees. The latter are dealt with in first sub-section, and if the meaning sought to be placed on the second sub-section by the appellant were to be accepted, the entire policy of the law would be defeated by the real purchaser making a transfer to another and the first sub-section would become almost a dead letter. In our opinion, such a construction cannot be accepted and the plaintiff's suit must be held to be barred under S. 66 of the Code." "5. As an alternative, it was contended before us that the title of Hakir Alam was extinguished by long and uninterrupted adverse possession of Syed Aulad Ali and after him of the plaintiff. In our opinion, such a construction cannot be accepted and the plaintiff's suit must be held to be barred under S. 66 of the Code." "5. As an alternative, it was contended before us that the title of Hakir Alam was extinguished by long and uninterrupted adverse possession of Syed Aulad Ali and after him of the plaintiff. The High Court did not accept this case. Such a case is, of course, open to a plaintiff to make if his possession is disturbed. If the possession of the real owner ripens into title under the Limitation Act and he is dispossessed, he can sue to obtain possession, for he does not then rely on the benami nature of the transaction. But the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved. The High Court held that the plea of adverse possession was not raised in the suit and reversed the decision of the two courts below. The plea of adverse possession is raised here. Reliance is placed before us on Sukan v. Krishanand, ILR 32 Pat 353 and Sri Bhagwan Singh and others v. Ram Basi Kuer and others, AIR 1957 Pat 157 to submit that such a plea is not necessary and alternatively, that if a plea is required, what can be considered a proper plea. But these two cases can hardly help the appellant. No doubt, the plaint sets out the fact that after the purchase by Syed Aulad Ali, benami in the name of his son-in-law Hakir Alam Ali continued in possession of the property but it does not say that this possession was at any time adverse to that of the certified purchaser. Hakir Alam was the son-in-law of Syed Aulad Ali and was living with him. There is no suggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever asserted any hostile title against him or that a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen. Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered, because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in that case. It is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad, A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 202 the Judicial Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase without a proper plea." 124. In B. Leelavathi Vs. Honnamma and another, (2005) 11 SCC 115 , Court has held that the adverse possession is a question of fact which has to be specifically pleaded and proved and in the absence of any plea of adverse possession, framing of an issue and adducing evidence it would not be held that the plaintiffs had perfected towards the title by way of adverse possession. Para 11 of the judgment read as follows: "11. Plea of adverse possession had been taken vaguely in the plaint. No categorical stand on this point was taken in the plaint. No issue had been framed and seemingly the same was not insisted upon by the plaintiff-respondent. Adverse possession is a question of fact which has to be specifically pleaded and proved. No evidence was adduced by the plaintiff-respondent with regard to adverse possession. Honnamma, the plaintiff in her own statement did not say that she is in adverse possession of the suit property. We fail to understand as to how the High Court, in the absence of any plea of adverse possession, framing of an issue and evidence led on the point, could hold that the plaintiff-respondent had perfected her title by way of adverse possession." 125. In Dharamarajan & Ors. Vs. We fail to understand as to how the High Court, in the absence of any plea of adverse possession, framing of an issue and evidence led on the point, could hold that the plaintiff-respondent had perfected her title by way of adverse possession." 125. In Dharamarajan & Ors. Vs. Valliammal & Ors., 2008 (2) SCC 741 , Court has held that in a claim of adverse possession openness and adverse nature of the possession has to be proved against the owner of the property in question. Relevant para 11 of the said judgment reads as follows: "11. In our opinion none of these questions could be said to be either question of law or a substantial question of law arising out of the pleadings of the parties. The first referred question of law could not and did not arise for the simple reason that the plea of adverse possession has been rightly found against the plaintiff. Karupayee Ammal's possession, even if presumed to be in a valid possession in law, could not be said to be adverse possession as throughout it was the case of the appellant Dharmarajan that it was a permissive possession and that she was permitted to stay on the land belonging to the members of the Iyer family. Secondly it has nowhere come as to against whom was her possession adverse. Was it adverse against the Government or against the Iyer family? In order to substantiate the plea of adverse possession, the possession has to be open and adverse to the owner of the property in question. The evidence did not show this openness and adverse nature because it is not even certain as to against whom the adverse possession was pleaded on the part of Karupayee Ammal. Further even the legal relationship of Doraiswamy and Karupayee Ammal is not pleaded or proved. All that is pleaded is that after Karupayee Ammal's demise Doraiswamy as her foster son continued in the thatched shed allegedly constructed by Karupayee Ammal. There was no question of the tacking of possession as there is ample evidence on record to suggest that Doraiswamy also was in the service of Iyer family and that he was permitted to stay after Karupayee Ammal. Further his legal heir ship was also not decisively proved. We do not, therefore, see as to how the first substantial question of law came to be framed. Further his legal heir ship was also not decisively proved. We do not, therefore, see as to how the first substantial question of law came to be framed. This is apart from the fact that ultimately High Court has not granted the relief to the respondents on the basis of the finding of this question. On the other hand the High Court has gone into entirely different consideration based on re-appreciation of evidence. The second and third questions are not the questions of law at all. They are regarding appreciation of evidence. The fourth question is regarding the admissibility of Exhibit A-8. In our opinion there is no question of admissibility as the High Court has found that Exhibit A-8 was not admissible in evidence since the Tehsildar who had issued that certificate was not examined. Therefore, there will be no question of admissibility since the document itself was not proved. Again the finding of the High Court goes against the respondent herein. Even the fifth question was a clear cut question of fact and was, therefore, impermissible in the Second Appeal." 126. In A.S. Vidyasagar Vs. S. Karunanandam 1995 Supp (4) SCC 570, Court has held that permissive possession is not adverse possession and can be terminated at any time by the rightful owner. Relevant para 5 of the judgment reads as follows: "5. Adverse possession is sought to be established on the supposition that Kanthimathi got possession of the premises as a licensee and on her death in 1948, the appellant who was 4 years of age, must be presumed to have become a trespasser. And if he had remained in trespass for 12 years, the title stood perfected and in any case, a suit to recovery of possession would by then be time-barred. We are unable to appreciate this line of reasoning for it appears to us that there is no occasion to term the possession of Kanthimathi as that of a licensee. The possession was permissive in her hands and remained permissive in the hands of the appellant on his birth, as well as in the hands of his father living then with Kanthimathi. There was no occasion for any such licence to have been terminated. For the view we are taking there was no licence at all. Permissible possession of the appellant could rightfully be terminated at any moment by the rightful owners. There was no occasion for any such licence to have been terminated. For the view we are taking there was no licence at all. Permissible possession of the appellant could rightfully be terminated at any moment by the rightful owners. The present contesting respondents thus had a right to institute the suit for possession against the appellant. No oral evidence has been referred to us which would go to support the plea of openness, hostility and notoriety which would go to establish adverse possession. On the contrary, the Municipal Tax receipts, Exts. B-39 and 40, even though suggestedly reflecting payment made by the appellant, were in the name of Kuppuswami, the rightful owner. This negates the assertion that at any stage did the appellant assert a hostile title. Even by examining the evidence, at our end, we come to the same view as that of the High Court. The plea of adverse possession thus also fails. As a result fails this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal, but without any order as to costs." 127. In Goswami Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji Vs. Shah Ranchhoddas Kalidas, AIR 1970 SC 2025 , Court held that a party cannot be allowed to set up a case wholly inconsistent with that pleaded in its written statement. Relevant para 8 of the said judgment reads as follows: "8. We may now proceed to examine the material on record for finding out 'the true character of the suit properties viz. whether they are properties of a public trust arising from their dedication of those properties in favour of the deity Shree Gokulnathji or whether the deity as well as the suit properties are the private properties of Goswami Maharaj. In her written statement as noticed, earlier, the Ist defendant took up the specific plea that the idol of Shree Gokulnathji is the private property of the Maharaj the Vallabh Cult does not permit any dedication in favour of an idol and in fact there was no dedication in favour of that idol. In her written statement as noticed, earlier, the Ist defendant took up the specific plea that the idol of Shree Gokulnathji is the private property of the Maharaj the Vallabh Cult does not permit any dedication in favour of an idol and in fact there was no dedication in favour of that idol. She emphatically denied that the suit properties were the properties of the deity Gokulnathji but in this Court evidently because of the enormity of evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, a totally new plea was taken namely that several items of the suit properties had been dedicated to Gokulnathji but the deity being the family deity of the Maharaj, the resulting trust is only a private trust. In other words the plea taken in the written statement is that the suit properties were the private properties of the Maharaj and that there was no trust, private or public. But the case argued before this Court is a wholly different one viz., the suit properties were partly the properties of a private trust and partly the private properties of the Maharaj. The Ist defendant cannot be permitted to take up a case which is wholly inconsistent with that pleaded. This belated attempt to bypass the evidence adduced appears to be more a manor than a genuine explanation of the documentary evidence adduced. It is amply proved that ever since Mathuranathji took over the management of the shrine, two sets of account books have been maintained, one relating to the income and expenses of the shrine and the other relating to that of the Maharaj. These account books and other documents show that presents and gifts used to. be made to the deity as well as to the Maharaj. The two were quite separate and distinct. Maharaj himself has been making gifts to the deity. He has been, at times utilising the funds belonging to. the deity and thereafter reimbursing the same. The account books which have been produced clearly go to show that the deity and the Maharaj were treated as two different and distinct legal entities. The evidence afforded "by the account books is tell-tale. In the trial court it was contended on behalf of the Ist defendant that none of the account books produced relate exclusively to the affairs of the temple. The evidence afforded "by the account books is tell-tale. In the trial court it was contended on behalf of the Ist defendant that none of the account books produced relate exclusively to the affairs of the temple. They all record the transactions of the Maharaj, whether pertaining to his personal dealings or dealings in connection with the deity. This is an obviously untenable contention. That contention was given up in the High Court. In the High Court it was urged that two sets of account books were kept, one relating to the income and expenditure of the deity and the other of the Maharai so that the Maharai could easily find out-his financial commitments relating to the affairs of the deity. But in this Court Mr. Narasaraju, learned Counsel for the appellant realising the untenability of the contention advanced in the courts below presented for our consideration a totally new case and that is that Gokulnathji undoubtedly is a legal personality; in the past the properties had been dedicated in favour of that deity; those properties are the properties of a private trust of which the Maharaj was the trustee. On the basis of this newly evolved theory he wanted to explain away the effect of the evidence afforded by the account books and the documents. We are unable to accept this new plea. It runs counter to the case pleaded in the written statement. This is not a purely legal contention. The Ist defendant must have known whether there was any dedication in favour of Shri Gokulnathji and whether any portion of the suit properties were the properties of a private trust. She and her adviser's must have known at all relevant times the true nature of the accounts maintained. Mr. Narasaraju is not right in his contention that the plea taken by him in this Court is a purely legal plea. It essentially relates to questions of fact. Hence we informed Mr. Narasaraju that we will not entertain the plea in question." 128. In the matter of plea of adverse possession, mutually inconsistent or mutually destructive pleas must not be taken in the plaint. It essentially relates to questions of fact. Hence we informed Mr. Narasaraju that we will not entertain the plea in question." 128. In the matter of plea of adverse possession, mutually inconsistent or mutually destructive pleas must not be taken in the plaint. Whenever the plea of adverse possession is raised, it pre supposes that owner is someone else and the person taking the plea of adverse possession is not the actual owner but has perfected his title by prescription since the real owner failed to initiate any proceeding for restoring the possession within the prescribed period under the statute. 129. In P. Periasami Vs. P.Periathambi & Ors., 1995 (6) SCC 523 it was said: “Whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else was the owner of the property.” 130. In Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1SCC 639, Court said : "As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario.” 131. In Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Government of India & others (2004) 10 SCC 779 , Court held that whenever the plea of adverse possession is projected, inherent therein is that someone else is the owner of the property. In para 12 it said: “The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.” 132. The decision in Mohan Lal (supra) has also been followed in Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra) and in para 13, Court said: “As we have already found, the respondent obtained title under the provisions of the Ancient Monuments Act. The element of the respondent's possession of the suit property to the exclusion of the appellant with the animus to possess it is not specifically pleaded and proved. So are the aspects of earlier title of the appellant or the point of time of disposition. Consequently, the alternative plea of adverse possession by the respondent is unsustainable.” 133. The element of the respondent's possession of the suit property to the exclusion of the appellant with the animus to possess it is not specifically pleaded and proved. So are the aspects of earlier title of the appellant or the point of time of disposition. Consequently, the alternative plea of adverse possession by the respondent is unsustainable.” 133. It would be useful to refer certain observations of a Single Judge of this Court in Abdul Halim Khan Vs. Raja Saadat Ali Khan and others, AIR 1928 Oudh 155, with which, I am in respectful agreement : “One of the general principles governing the law of limitation is that a person can only be considered to be barred, if he has a right to enter and does not exercise that right within the period fixed by the Limitation Act. The maxim of law is contra non valentem agree nulla currit praescriptio (prescription does not run against a party who is unable to act); vide Broom's Legal Maxims, 9th edn., p. 576. Accordingly possession cannot become adverse against a person as long as he is not entitled to claim immediate possession. Ex facie it must follow that a person who is not in existence cannot be considered to be in a position to claim whether immediate or otherwise. It is evident that in the eyes of the law the plaintiff did not come into existence as long as he was not adopted. His adoption took place on 27th July 1914. He must be deemed to have come into existence only then. It was, therefore, obviously not possible for him to claim possession of the property before that date, and if he was not in a position to claim it at all, having not been then in existence, it would be absurd to say that another person was in possession adversely to him. One might fairly ask: “Adverse against whom?” It certainly cannot be adverse against the plaintiff, who was not then in existence. It may have been adverse against any other person, but we are not concerned with such person unless the plaintiff can be shown to have derived his title from such person.” (page189-190) 134. Recently, in Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale Vs. One might fairly ask: “Adverse against whom?” It certainly cannot be adverse against the plaintiff, who was not then in existence. It may have been adverse against any other person, but we are not concerned with such person unless the plaintiff can be shown to have derived his title from such person.” (page189-190) 134. Recently, in Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale Vs. Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale and others, JT 2009(5) SC 395, Court, with respect to a claim of title, based on the pleading of adverse possession, said as under: "for claiming title by adverse possession, it was necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove animus possidendi. A peaceful, open and continuous possession being the ingredients of the principle of adverse possession as contained in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario, long possession by itself would not be sufficient to prove adverse possession." 135. What should have been pleaded and what a person claiming adverse possession has to show, has been laid down by Court, categorically in Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra): “11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. ..... Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus posdendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. ..... Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus posdendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” 136. Earlier also, a three-Judges Bench in Parsinni & another Vs. Sukhi (supra) laid down the following three requisites for satisfying the claim based on adverse possession: "5. The appellants claimed adverse possession. The burden undoubtedly lies on them to plead and prove that they remained in possession in their own right adverse to the respondents. .... Possession is prima facie evidence of title. Party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession mast be "nee vi nee clam nee precario" i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner." 137. In Maharaja Sir Kesho Prasad Singh Bahadur (supra), it was held that in order to obtain a favourable finding of adverse possession, one must have to satisfy all the qualities of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness. Reliance was placed on Kuthali Moothavur Vs. P. Kunharankutty AIR 1922 PC 181 . 138. Recently the entire law has been discussed in detail by this Court in Rama Shankar and another Vs. Om Prakash Likhdhari and others 2013 (6) ADJ 119 and this judgment in Rama Shankar Vs. Om Prakash Likhdhari (supra) has been noticed with approval in Bangalore Development Authority Vs. N. Jayamma AIR 2016 SC 1294 . 139. It is, thus, clear that in order to have advantage of doctrine of adverse possession, one has to be very specific about period when the possession became adverse, against whom it became adverse and continued uninterrupted open throughout. 140. N. Jayamma AIR 2016 SC 1294 . 139. It is, thus, clear that in order to have advantage of doctrine of adverse possession, one has to be very specific about period when the possession became adverse, against whom it became adverse and continued uninterrupted open throughout. 140. In the present case, in a very vague and cryptic manner, plea of adverse possession was taken in the plaint. Plaintiffs themselves are not aware as to against whom they or their ancestors, as claimed, were holding property in dispute allegedly in hostile possession. The exact time is also not there. It appears that the understanding of plaintiffs was that mere long period of time of possession, if pleaded, would satisfy the requirement of adverse possession, if above period is more than 12 years. This is apparently against the well established legal requirement, as discussed in detail above. 141. In my view, defendant was able to prove its title and joint ownership over land in dispute and that being so, no injunction could have been granted against owner or co-owner i.e. defendant. In the judgment of LAC findings recorded otherwise, therefore, cannot be sustained and are reversed. 142. The question, formulated above, is answered in favour of appellant. 143. The appeal is allowed. Judgment passed by LAC dated 11.09.1980 in Civil Appeal No.479 of 1976 is hereby set aside.