Akhilesh Kumar v. Collector/District Deputy Director of Consolidation
2019-02-14
PANKAJ MITHAL, SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The cause for a day's delay in filing the appeal is sufficient and is accordingly condoned. 2. Office to proceed and allot regular number to the appeal. 3. Delay Condonation Application No.3 of 2019 is allowed. 4. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State authorities. Sri Shivakant has appeared for respondents No.5, 6 and 7. 5. The respondents Kedar and others preferred a writ petition against the order dated 12.9.2018 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowing the revision and setting aside the order dated 3.8.2018 passed by the Consolidation Officer. The Writ Court dismissed the writ petition but directed the Deputy Director of Consolidation to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Consolidation Officer for blatant exercise of his powers in violation of the jurisdiction conferred upon him. The aforesaid offending part of the order of the Writ Court dated 8.1.2019 is quoted below: "Therefore, the writ petition is found to be without merit and is liable to be dismissed. However, such an illegality cannot be allowed to be committed by persons discharging judicial functions. The Deputy Director of Consolidation is therefore, directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Consolidation Officer for such blatant violation of the powers conferred upon him by the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Such proceedings be initiated within a period of four weeks from today after conducting a preliminary enquiry. Learned Standing Counsel is directed to ensure that the copy of this order is send to the respondent no.1 (Deputy Director of Consolidation, Farenda at Maharajganj) for necessary compliance, forthwith." 6. The appellant here in this appeal is the Consolidation Officer. He has filed appeal aggrieved by the aforesaid remark as the same condemns him and casts stigma on his career. 7. The argument is that in dismissing the petition such remarks were not warranted, particularly when the appellant was not before the Court. The said remarks condemns the appellants unheard. 8. The private respondents have nothing to say on the merits of the above remark as the expunging of the same would in no way affect their rights. 9. Learned Standing Counsel is unable to defend the said remarks and accepts that they have been recorded in the absence of the Officer concerned. 10. In A.M. Mathur Vs.
8. The private respondents have nothing to say on the merits of the above remark as the expunging of the same would in no way affect their rights. 9. Learned Standing Counsel is unable to defend the said remarks and accepts that they have been recorded in the absence of the Officer concerned. 10. In A.M. Mathur Vs. Pramood Kumar Gupta, (1990) 2 SCC 533 the Supreme Court has sounded a note of caution that as a general principle for the proper administration of justice "derogatory remarks ought not to be made against the persons or the authorities whose conduct come into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case". 11. In the matter of K a judicial officer, (2001) 3 SCC 54 it has been pointed out that any criticism and observation by a superior court in a judicial pronouncement touching on the character of a judicial officer have its own mischievous infirmities. In the first place, it condemns the officer unheard with no opportunity to shield himself. Secondly, it is a criticism in public. Thirdly, it gives the litigating party not only the sense of victory over his opponent but also over the judge. Lastly, it demoralises the officer and places him in the category of a litigant for seeking expunction of the remarks. Therefore, whenever the conduct of a judicial officer, unworthy of him, comes to the notice of the higher court on the judicial side, the better and safer course admissible is to dispose of the lis on merits thereof avoiding criticism of the officer and to draw proceedings separately on the administrative side, if necessary. 12. A Consolidation Officer in discharge of his duties functions as a quasi-judicial Officer. 13. In Arvind Kumar - II Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and another, (2014) 4 ADJ 172 it was observed by one of us (Justice Pankaj Mithal) as under: "15. A judge functioning at any level discharges his functions independently and judicially. He has his own dignity and credibility. The same has to be maintained and preserved by all specially the superior court that acts as locoparentis by avoiding unwarranted comments on the reputation of the officer as it creates a dent in the image of the entire judicial system. Instead, if necessary the Court should adopt a reformative method on administrative side." 18.
The same has to be maintained and preserved by all specially the superior court that acts as locoparentis by avoiding unwarranted comments on the reputation of the officer as it creates a dent in the image of the entire judicial system. Instead, if necessary the Court should adopt a reformative method on administrative side." 18. One should also not loose sight of a well recognised legal maxim that 'the honesty and integrity of a judge can not be questioned, but his decision may be impugned for error either of law or fact'. It is in view of the above principle that it has been settled that errors in the judgment and order may be corrected by appellate tribunals in cases where the law allows for an appeal but not the honesty and the character. 19. A superior court is only an appellate or revisional authority of the judgment and order of the court below to test its correctness and soundness but is not expected to sit in judgment over the conduct of the judicial or quasi judicial authority whose decisions are in issue before it and to indulge in criticising the conduct of that sub-ordinate functionary. The superior court does not act as a disciplinary authority while dealing with the judgment or order of the lower authority in appeal or revision." 14. In view of above legal position, we are of the opinion that the remarks and the direction as contained in the impugned order against the Consolidation Officer could not have been passed without notice to him to submit his explanation, as the same tantamounts to lower his prestige and dignity. 15. In view of the above, coupled with the fact that the petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, we are of the opinion that there was no occasion for learned Single Judge to direct for initiating disciplinary proceedings and ought to left it upon the departmental authorities to take action at their own end in accordance with law. 16. Accordingly, last four paragraphs of the order dated 8.1.2019 commending from 'However' till 'forthwith' are directed to be expunged and the Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to keep a vigil upon the working of the Officer. 17. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.