ORDER : 1. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking following reliefs : “8. A) Your lordship may be pleased to admit this petition. (B) Your lordship may be pleased to quash and set aside the an order dated 18.04.2018 passed in Special Regular Civil Suit No.1400 of 2016 by the Hon'ble Chamber Judge City Civil Court, Court No.26 Ahmedabad, below Chamber Summons Exh-24 and Exh-25. (C) Your lordship may be pleased to stay the order dated 18.04.2018 passed in Special Regular Civil Suit No.1400 of 2016 by the Hon'ble Chamber Judge City Civil Court, Court No.26 Ahmedabad, below Chamber Summons Exh-24 and Exh-25. (D) Your lordship may be pleased to grant interim relief and stay further proceeding of the Regular Civil Suit No.1400 of 2016 pending before by the Hon'ble Chamber Judge, City Civil Court at Ahmedabad. (E) Your lordship may be pleased to pass such orders as thought fit in the interest of justice.” 2. Learned advocate Mr.Bhavik P.Shah appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that while passing the impugned order, learned Judge has not examined the documentary material which has been laid before him and arrived at a different conclusion which is not in consonance with the record. It has further been submitted that while relying upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Ors. versus Erasmo Jack de Sequeria(Dead) through L.Rs. reported in AIR 2012 SC 1727 stated hereinafter that the learned Judge has not assigned any cogent reason as to why the same has a specific bearing upon the case on hand. It has further been submitted that while using the premises not a single penny of rent is paid and the said conclusion is also not properly appreciated and as such the relief prayed for be granted in the interest of justice. Even otherwise, the order passed by the Court below does not reflect any proper application of mind, and hence, the order under challenge deserves to be corrected. 3. Even otherwise, the order passed by the Court below does not reflect any proper application of mind, and hence, the order under challenge deserves to be corrected. 3. When the matter is taken up for hearing, it has been observed by the Court that the defendant is using the suit property without paying a single amount of rent and that has been considered at length by the Court below, and while observing the impugned order, the Court has categorically noted down that from 01.04.2015 to 30.06.2017, an amount of outstanding rent is Rs.4,59,000/-. After considering at length the relevant material on record and after considering the reply as well, the Court has categorically come to the conclusion that it would be in the interest of justice if the defendant pays regularly the rent as decided in the rent agreement of Rs.16,000/- per month, and accordingly, the discretion is exercised. The learned Court below has considered at length the relevant observations contained in decision of the Apex Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Ors. versus Erasmo Jack de Sequeria(Dead) through L.Rs. reported in AIR 2012 SC 1727 and has formulated an opinion which contained in paragraph No.4, the same is reproduced hereinafter: “4. The present Chamber Summons filed below Exhibit 24 along with the application Exhibit 25 wherein plaintiff has specifically demanded the rent amount from the defendant and the Chamber summons served through R.P.Ad. To the defendant. Considering the reply given by the defendant vide Exhibit 27, prima facie it appears that the defendant is residing in the suit property and as per admission of the defendant which himself admitted by the defendant. Further, as per the Rent Agreement produced on record by the plaintiff, wherein it has been decided that the defendant has to pay regularly the rent of Rs.16,500/- per month to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff has also produced termination of rent agreement to the defendant and served to the defendant. Furthermore, the plaintiff and the defendant have executed another rent agreement wherein rent of Rs.17,000/- per month was decided. Upon perusal of the report of the Court Commissioner, the defendant is in the possession of the suit property. The defendant has not produced any single documents to show that the rent is waived against his damage nor produced any document to show that he has regularly paid the rent to the plaintiff. Upon perusal of the report of the Court Commissioner, the defendant is in the possession of the suit property. The defendant has not produced any single documents to show that the rent is waived against his damage nor produced any document to show that he has regularly paid the rent to the plaintiff. Since, the defendant is in the possession of the suit property and the objection raised by the defendant that he suffered damage due to collapse of wall due to fault of the plaintiff, the said contention raised only at the time of present chamber summons however, he not bring home the said damage on record by by producing any documentary evidence. In this premise, the plaintiff has filed the present chamber summons for recovery of rent from the defendant against which the defendant has raised his objection that the rent is settled against the damage sustained by him and the repairing work carried out by him. So, considering the averments made in the present chamber of summons, it appears that the defendant is occupying the suit property without paying any rent to the plaintiff. Further, this Court is also relying upon the decision of Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and others Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (Deceased through legal heirs) reported in AIR (2012) SC 1727, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has elaborated the meaning of Mesne Profits in the Para Nos.90 to 93 which are read as under: “90. Experience has shown that all kinds of pleadings are introduced and even false and fabricated documents are filed in civil cases because there is an inherent profit in continuation of possession. In a large number of cases, honest litigants suffer and dishonest litigants get undue benefit by grant or refusal of an injunction because the Courts do not critically examine pleadings and documents on record. In case while granting or refusing injunction, the Court properly considers pleadings and documents and takes the pragmatic view and grants appropriate mesne profit, then the inherent interest to continue frivolous litigation by unscrupulous litigants would be reduced to a large extent. 91. The Court while granting injunction should broadly take into consideration the prevailing market rentals in the locality for similar premises. 91. The Court while granting injunction should broadly take into consideration the prevailing market rentals in the locality for similar premises. Based on that, the Court should fix adhoc amount which the person continuing in possession must pay and on such payment, the plaintiff may withdraw after furnishing an undertaking and also making it clear that should the Court pass any order for reimbursement, it will be a charge upon the property. 92. The Court can also direct payment of a particular amount and for a differential, direct furnishing of a security by the person who wishes to continue in possession. If such amount, as may be fixed by the Court, is not paid as security, the Court may remove the person and appoint a receiver of the property or strike out the claim or defence. This is a very important exercise for balancing equities. Courts must carry out this exercise with extreme care and caution while keeping pragmatic realities in mind and make a proper order of granting mesne profit. This is the requirement of equity and justice.” As discussed in above paragraphs, in the opinion of this Court, it is in the interest of justice, the defendant has to pay regularly the rent as decided in the Rent Agreement of Rs.16,000/- per month and this fact requires considering by evaluating the evidence on record however, at this stage, it prima facie defaulted by the defendant and arrears of huge amount is due and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to get relief as prayed for. Hence, I pass the following order. Order The present Chamber summons is hereby party allowed. Defendant is directed to deposit the arrears of rent amount of Rs.4,59,000/- due from 01.04.2015 to 30.06.2017 in this Court without prejudice to the rights of the parties to the suit. The payment of arrears as claimed by the plaintiff is to be made within a period of one month from the date of this order. The Chamber summons taken out by the plaintiff at Exhibit 24/25 stands disposed of accordingly.” 4. The payment of arrears as claimed by the plaintiff is to be made within a period of one month from the date of this order. The Chamber summons taken out by the plaintiff at Exhibit 24/25 stands disposed of accordingly.” 4. Having heard learned advocate at length and having gone through the material on record, it prima facie appears that the learned Judge while exercising the discretion has gone into the material on record and has also gone into the conduct of the petitioner and has categorically come to the conclusion that suit premises are being utilized by the petitioner without paying a single amount. After considering the decision and the observation of the Apex Court and the discretion is exercised after assigning cogent reasons, the Court see no perversity, nor any irregularity in exercising the same discretion. Accordingly, this being a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, no case is made out by the petitioner. Accordingly, petition does not deserve to be entertained. 5. While arrived at this conclusion, the Court has also considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta versus Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 and the relevant observations contained in paragraphs No.6 and 7 are reproduced hereinafter : “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 . After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: "(1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , and it was held: "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 6. In view of the aforesaid situation and in view of the circumstances prevailing, the petition being devoid on merit, the same stands dismissed as no case is made out with no order as to costs.