JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. M. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, Mr. S.C Keyal, learned ASGI appearing for the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation as well as Mr. M. Phukan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bureau of Economic Offences (BIEO), Assam. 2. Both the petitioners herein were employees of the respondent Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL). At the relevant time when the alleged incident leading to this writ petition took place, the petitioner No.1 was entrusted with the duty of Loading Operator, whereas the petitioner No.2 was entrusted with the duty of Weigh Bridge Operator under the respondent IOCL. The duties entrusted to both the petitioners were to ensure that the correct volume of petroleum products are loaded on the tanker lorries at the disposal points of the IOCL. 3. According to the BIEO, Assam, certain information were received that excess petroleum products are being loaded to the tanker lorries without being duly authorized, resulting in pilferage of petroleum products from the IOCL disposal points located at Guwahati Refinery in Guwahati. Consequent thereof, a team of officials from the BIEO, Assam conducted an enquiry and on 29.12.2012, detected an unmanned tanker lorry bearing registration No.ML-01-7767 parked outside the main gate of the Guwahati Refinery at Noonmati which was loaded with petroleum products. But, when no one came forward claiming responsibility for the tanker lorry, a further enquiry was made and it was found that as per the invoice No.96159861 dated 12.12.2012, it ought to contain 20 KL of Naptha. It was revealed that the petroleum products loaded in the said tanker lorry was scheduled to have been transported to the Digboi Refinery, but instead was kept abandoned near the main gate of Guwahati Refinery. 4. Upon the tanker lorry being seized, it was detected that it actually contained Naptha in excess of 4.2 KL over the invoice stock of 20 KL. Further examination of the tanker lorry revealed that the tanker itself was tampered and remodelled to the extent that the dip pipes of the manhole were manipulated by putting in place an extra rod of about 36 cm to the bottom of the dip pipe, which resulted in preventing the actual reading of the product contained in the chambers of the tanker lorry being taken. 5.
5. In the aforesaid circumstance, the FIR dated 16.01.2013 was lodged before the Officer-in-Charge, BIEO Police Station, Assam, which resulted in BIEO PS case No.01/2013 dated 10.01.2013 under Sections 120(B)/406/407/408/409/420 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 7(1) of the Essential Commodities Act. The said FIR ultimately resulted in the charge sheet No.09 dated 31.12.2013 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati. The charge sheet was also filed under Sections 120(B)/406/407/408/409/420 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 7(1) of the Essential Commodities Act, wherein the present two petitioners were also named as accused persons. After the investigation and filing of the charge sheet, it came to the notice of the respondent authorities that similar pilferage had taken place over a period of time from January, 2011 up to December, 2012. As the investigation arising out of the BIEO PS Case No.01/2013 took place only in respect of a single incident that was detected, the matter was referred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for further investigation as regards the offence being committed over the period of time as indicated above. 6. The investigation made by the CBI resulted in FIR No. RC 0172014 A0004 dated 30.06.2014 in the Court of the Special Judge, CBI, Assam. The investigation resulting from the said FIR of the CBI culminated in the charge-sheet in Special Case No.05/2016 in the Court of the Special Judge, CBI, Assam under Sections 120(B)/420 of the India Peal Code read with Section 13(2)/13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the said charge sheet also, the present petitioners were arrayed as accused persons. In the chargesheet of the CBI, it was stated that the present petitioners had entered into a criminal conspiracy with certain private persons being the driver and owner of the tanker lorry, resulting in excess loading of Naptha at the IOCL disposal unit at Noonmati, Guwahati, which was done by manipulating the compartment system of the concerned tanker lorry.
In the chargesheet of the CBI, it was stated that the present petitioners had entered into a criminal conspiracy with certain private persons being the driver and owner of the tanker lorry, resulting in excess loading of Naptha at the IOCL disposal unit at Noonmati, Guwahati, which was done by manipulating the compartment system of the concerned tanker lorry. The FIR and charge-sheet of the CBI also stated that the valve of the manhole of the tanker lorry could easily be opened without the lock in the pulp box and by using a rod measuring 36 cm attached to the dip pipes, the actual reading of the liquid petroleum products contained in the chamber of the tanker lorry was manipulated and as a result, about 4 KL of Naptha was loaded in excess. It is taken note of that the procedure adopted in perpetuating the act of loading excess petroleum products over and above the amount indicated in the invoice was same in respect of both the FIRs and charge-sheets filed by the BIEO as well as by the CBI. In other words, an extra rod of about 36 cm long was attached to the dip pipe of the tanker lorry, which resulted in the excess petroleum products being loaded which was not indicated at the time of measuring the volume of petroleum products contained in the tanker lorry. 7. Mr. M. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners assails the second FIR and the second charge-sheet filed by the CBI in Special Case No.05/2016 on the ground that all the incidents included in the charge-sheet of the CBI as well as the incident included in the charge-sheet filed by the BIEO, Assam had resulted from the same conspiracy and therefore, a second FIR as well as the charge-sheet would not be maintainable. 8. According to Mr. M. Coudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the procedure adopted in loading the excess petroleum products in the tanker lorry was that an extra rod of about 36 cm was attached to the dipping rod, which resulted in the volume of petroleum products contained in the tanker lorry being manipulated to the extent that even if, there was an excess loading of 4 KL, the measuring still showed the load to be 20 KL.
According to the learned senior counsel as the entire manipulation in the measurement of the contents of the petroleum products in the tanker lorry was done by attaching the aforesaid rod of 36 cm to the dipping rod of the tanker lorry, therefore, the manipulation was a result of one conspiracy hatched by the accused persons. 9. In the aforesaid circumstance, it is the contention of Mr. M. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the incident leading to the excess loading of petroleum products being the result of one conspiracy hatched by the accused persons, the second FIR as well as charge-sheet submitted by the CBI resulting in the Special Case No.5/2016 in the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Assam is not maintainable. 10. Mr. M. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in order to substantiate that the extra loading of the petroleum products in the tanker lorry in question on various dates over the period from January 2011 to December 2012 is the result of a single conspiracy arrived at between the parties, relies upon the following propositions laid down by the Supreme Court:- (i) Paragraph 24 of Ajay Agarwal -vs- Union of India reported in (1993) 3 SCC 609 which is as under:- “24. Thus, an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal acts by illegal means is criminal conspiracy. If the agreement is not an agreement to commit an offence, it does not amount to conspiracy unless it is followed up by an overt act done by one or more persons in furtherance of the agreement. The offence is complete as soon as there is meeting of minds and unity of purpose between the conspirators to do that illegal act or legal act by illegal means. Conspiracy itself is a substantive offence and is distinct from the offence to commit which the conspiracy is entered into. It is undoubted that the general conspiracy is district from number of separate offences committed while executing the offence of conspiracy. Each act constitutes separate offence punishable, independent of the conspiracy.” (ii) Paragraph 86 and 92 of State (NCT of Delhi) –vs- Navjot Sindhu reported in (2005) 1 SCC 600 is as follows:- “86. Under section 43 of the IPC, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law.
Each act constitutes separate offence punishable, independent of the conspiracy.” (ii) Paragraph 86 and 92 of State (NCT of Delhi) –vs- Navjot Sindhu reported in (2005) 1 SCC 600 is as follows:- “86. Under section 43 of the IPC, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law. Section 120-A and 120-B were brought on the statute book by way of amendment to IPC in 1913. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the amending Act reveals that the underlying purpose was to make a mere agreement to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means punishable under law. This definition is almost similar to the definition of conspiracy, which we find in Halsbury's Laws of England. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied or in part express and in part implied.. and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be. 92. Dr. Sri Hari Singh Gour in his well known 'Commentary on Penal Law of India', (Vol.2, 11th Edn. page 1138) summed up the legal position in the following words: In order to constitute a single general conspiracy there must be a common design. Each conspirator plays his separate part in one integrated and united effort to achieve the common purpose. Each one is aware that he has a part to play in a general conspiracy though he may not know all its secrets or the means by which the common purpose is to be accomplished. The evil scheme may be promoted by a few, some may drop out and some may join at a later stage, but the conspiracy continues until it is broken up. The conspiracy may develop in successive stages. There may be general plan to accomplish the common design by such means as may from time to time be found expedient." (iii) Paragraph 15 of Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra –vs- KS Dalipsinghji & Anr.
The conspiracy may develop in successive stages. There may be general plan to accomplish the common design by such means as may from time to time be found expedient." (iii) Paragraph 15 of Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra –vs- KS Dalipsinghji & Anr. reported in (1969) 3 SCC 429 which is as under:- “15.Criminal conspiracy as defined in Section 120-A of the I.P.C. is an agreement by two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which is not done by illegal means. The agreement is the gist of the offence. In order to constitute a single general conspiracy there must be a common design and a common intention of all to work in furtherance of the common design. Each conspirator plays his separate part in one integrated and united effort to achieve the common purpose. Each one is aware that he has a part to play in a general conspiracy though he may not know all its secrets or the means by which the common purpose is to be accomplished. The evil scheme may be promoted by a few, some may drop out and some may join at a later stage, but the conspiracy continues until it is broken up. The conspiracy may develop in successive stages. There may be a general plan to accomplish the common design by such means as may from time to time be found expedient. New techniques may be invented and new means may be devised for advancement of the common plan.” (iv) Paragraph 4 of Mohan Baitha and Ors., -vs- State of Bihar and Anr., reported in (2001) 4 SCC 350 which is as under:- “4….The expression "same transaction" from its very nature is incapable of an exact definition. It is not intended to be interpreted in any artificial or technical sense. Common sense and the ordinary use of language must decide whether on the facts of a particular case, it can be held to be in one transaction. It is not possible to enunciate any comprehensive formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. But the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design are the factors for deciding whether certain acts form parts of the same transaction or not.
But the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design are the factors for deciding whether certain acts form parts of the same transaction or not. Therefore a series of acts whether are so connected together as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact to be decided on the aforesaid criteria…..” (v) Paragraph-7 of S. Swaminathan –vs- State of Madras reported in AIR 1957 SC 340 which is as under:- “7. On behalf of the appellant Abu Bucker it was contended that there has been misjoinder of charges on the ground that several conspiracies, distinct from each other, had been lumped together and tried at one trial. The Advocate for Swamirathnam, however, did not put forward this submission. We have examined the charge carefully and find no ground for accepting the contention raised. The charge as framed, discloses one single conspiracy, although spread over several years. There was only one object of the conspiracy and that was to client members of the public. The fact that in the course of years others joined the conspiracy or that several incidents of cheating took place in pursuance of the conspiracy did not change the conspiracy & did not spilt up a single conspiracy into several conspiracies.” (vi) In Paragraph 25 of State of A.P. –vs- Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao reported in AIR 1963 SC 1850 which is as under:- “25. What is meant by "same transaction" is not defined anywhere in the Code. Indeed, it would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have not come across a single decision of any Court which has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction.
But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction.” 11. Per-Contra Mr. S.C. Keyal, learned ASGI in order to substantiate that the loading of the extra petroleum product in the tanker lorry in question on different dates over the aforesaid period was the result of separate conspiracies, relies upon the pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in paragraph-16, 24 and 32 of State of Jharkhand –vs- Lalu Prasad Yadav reported in (2017) 8 SCC Page 1 which is as under:- “16. ………No doubt about it that the general conspiracy had been hatched as alleged for the period 1988 to 1996 but defalcations are from different treasuries for different financial years by exceeding the amount of each year which was allocated for Animal Husbandry Department for each of the district for the purpose of animal husbandry. The amount involved is different, fake vouchers, fake allotment letters, fake supply orders had been prepared with the help of different sets of accused persons. Though there is one general conspiracy, offences are distinct for different periods…….” “24. …….This Court has laid down that separate trial is the rule and joint trial is an exception. Joint trial would be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows innumerable offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons to be under the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if each or some of the offences can be separately tried, it would be appropriate and lawful. Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the matter which might otherwise be simple, and it would confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them.
Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the matter which might otherwise be simple, and it would confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them. Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is satisfied that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant to conspiracy.” “32. There may be a conspiracy in general one and a separate one. There may be larger conspiracy and smaller conspiracy which may develop in successive stages involving different accused persons. In the instant case defalcations have been made in various years by combination of different accused persons…….” 12. Mr. S.C. Keyal, learned counsel also places reliance on the pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 & 16 of Mohd. Hussain Umar Kochra –vs K.S. Dalipsinghji reported in (1969) 3 SCC which is as under:- “15….. A general conspiracy must be distinguished from a number of separate conspiracies having a similar general purpose. Where different groups of persons co-operate towards their separate ends without any privity with each other, each combination constitutes a separate conspiracy.” “16. The main argument was that the dispatch of gold from Geneva was the result of one conspiracy and that the dispatch of gold from the Middle East was the result of another separate and unrelated conspiracy. The courts below held and in our opinion rightly, that there was a single general conspiracy embracing all the activities.” 13. Mr. M. Phukan, learned counsel appearing for the authorities in the BIEO, Assam adopts the submissions made by Mr. S.C. Keyal, learned ASGI. 14. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 15. The core contention of Mr. M. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that there was one meeting of minds between the conspirators to load the excess petroleum product in the given tanker lorry by manipulating and remodeling the structure of the chamber of the tanker lorry. According to the learned senior counsel, the excess loading of petroleum products took place on every occasion the manipulated and remodeled tanker lorry was put to use and therefore, as there was only one meeting of mind to commit the offence in the given manner, resulting in one transaction, it was one conspiracy. 16.
According to the learned senior counsel, the excess loading of petroleum products took place on every occasion the manipulated and remodeled tanker lorry was put to use and therefore, as there was only one meeting of mind to commit the offence in the given manner, resulting in one transaction, it was one conspiracy. 16. From the aforesaid proposition of law laid down in Ajay Agarwal (supra), Kandimalla Subbaiah & Anr, Navjot Sindhu (supra), KS Dalipsinghji (supra), Mohan Baitha (supra), S. Swaminathan (supra) and Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (supra) the following amongst others can be culled out :- (i) Although the event may spread over several years, but the if there is only one object of the conspiracy i.e. to cheat the authorities, the fact that in course of the years others have also joined a conspiracy or that several incidents of cheating took place in pursuance of the conspiracy does not split up a single conspiracy into several conspiracy. (ii) Although same transaction is not defined anywhere in the Code, and it would be difficult to give a precise definition to it, it would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case, but the factors like proximity of time or place, or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts may infer that it formed a part of the same transaction. At the same time, the series of acts which constitute the transaction must of necessity be connected with one another and if some of them stand out independently they would not form part of the same transaction and would constitute a different transaction or transactions. (iii) An agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or to do a legal act by illegal means is a conspiracy and the offence is completed as soon as there is a meeting of minds and unity of purpose between the conspirators and that a general conspiracy is distinct from the number separate offences committed while executing the offence of conspiracy and each act constitutes a separate offence punishable independent of the conspiracy.
(iv) In order to constitute a single general conspiracy there must be a common design and each conspirator place his separate part in one integrated and united effort to achieve the common purpose and that the conspiracy may develop in successive stages by having a general plan to accomplish the design by such means as may from time to time be found expedient. 17. From the proposition of law laid down in paragraphs- 16, 24 and 32 of Lalu Prasad Yadav (supra) as relied upon by Mr. S.C. Keyal the following can be culled out:- (i) when a question arises whether there is one general conspiracy or several conspiracies, one of the relevant considerations would be whether the acts resulting in the conspiracy was done by the same set of accused persons or it was done by different sets on different occasions. 18. The said proposition can also be noticed in paragraph 15 of Md. Hussain Kochra(supra), where it was provided that if different group of persons cooperate their separate ends without any privity with each other, each combination constitutes a separate conspiracy. 19. In the instant case, the factual matrix reveals that although the act of excess loading of petroleum products took place on different dates over a period of time, but there is nothing to indicate that different sets of persons were involved in committing the offence on the different dates resulting in a situation where they did not have any privity with each other. As the core basis for refusing a joint trial in Lalu Prasad Yadav (Supra) was on the ground of there being separate conspiracies, being based upon the factual matrix that different sets of accused persons were involved in the defalcation of the money from different treasuries on different dates over a period of time, and such factual matrix being absent in the present case, we are unable to convince ourselves that based upon the propositions laid down Lalu Prasad Yadav (supra), in the present case also a conclusion has to be arrived that the various acts of loading excess petroleum on different dates over a period of time would also have to be construed to be the result of separate conspiracies. 20.
20. But at the same time, it would also have to be given a consideration as to whether the factual matrix resulting in the offence of loading excess petroleum products on different dates over a period of time in the given tanker lorry, do constitute a single general conspiracy or it is the result of separate conspiracies. To that extent a relevant consideration would be as to whether the event took place in course of the same transaction or separate transactions were required to undertake the act of loading of the excess petroleum products on different dates. 21. As already noticed the Supreme Court in Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (Supra) in paragraph 25 had provided that it is nowhere defined in the Code as to what is meant by ‘same transaction’. Although certain indications were given that events that have taken in a close proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts can be construed to have arisen out of the same transaction, but same by itself may not always lead to a definite conclusion that merely because the events took place over a period of time therefore, it being not in a close proximity of time or place would lead to a conclusion that the events comprises of separate conspiracies. It would be more so when the series of events leading to the commission of the offence have an element of continuity in its occurrence. 22. As provided in Paragraph 25 of Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (Supra), there would also be requirement that the series of acts which constitutes the transaction must necessarily be connected with one another and if some of them stand out independently they would not form a part of the same transaction and would constitute a different transaction. The aforesaid principle of there being a necessary connection of the events with one another would also be inapplicable in the present case to the extent that the events of having an excess load of petroleum on different dates are independent events and the commission of any one event does not require the connection with the commission of the earlier event. 23.
23. But what is noticeable is that before the commission of an event on a given date there is a requirement of a further meeting of mind amongst the persons involved in the conspiracy to tamper with the tanker lorry in question by putting in place an extra rod of above 36 cm long to the bottom of the dip pipe, which would result in preventing the actual reading of the volume of the petroleum product contained in the chambers of the tanker lorry. The said view that there would be a requirement of a further meeting of mind to put in place the 36 cm long rod finds credence from the facts narrated and admitted by the rival parties that over the period of two years when the offence took place the tanker lorry in question was also used for transporting the petroleum products on many more occasions other than the occasions during which there was the act of excess loading of the products. In other words, the tanker lorry during the period under consideration was also used on many occasion without the 36 cm long rod being put in place when the act of excess loading did not take place. 24. The aforesaid factual situation leads to a conclusion that the occurrence of the offence of loading extra petroleum product took place only such occasions when the persons involved had a further meeting of mind to commit the offence on a given day and for doing so put in place the 36 cm long rod along with the dip rod in the tanker chambers of the lorry. Accordingly, whenever the offence is to be committed, there is a requirement of a meeting of mind amongst the persons involved that on the given day the 36 cm rod would be put in place alongside the dip rod and consequently, the offence of loading extra petroleum product be committed. 25. In view of the requirement of a further meeting of mind to put in place the 36 cm rod and accordingly, commit the offence of loading extra petroleum product, it can be concluded that the loading of the extra petroleum product on the various dates are not a result of the same transaction and it constitutes separate transactions undertaken from time to time. 26.
26. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the series of events that took place in loading the extra petroleum product on different dates over the period of time are a result of the same conspiracy. As in the absence of the requirement of a further meeting of mind on every given date to put in place the 36 cm rod, the rod will not be in place and consequently the loading of extra petroleum cannot be undertaken, a conclusion can be arrived that a further meeting of mind is essential for every given date on which the extra petroleum got loaded in the tanker lorry. The requirement of a further meeting of mind itself can be construed to be the basis to conclude that the events of loading extra petroleum product on the tanker lorry on the various dates over the period of time did constitute separate conspiracies. 27. A further consideration would also be that in the event a conclusion is arrived that the series of events on different dates leading to the loading of extra petroleum product is a result of a single conspiracy, the result thereof would be that the subsequent FIR and Charge- Sheet filed by the CBI in the Court of the Special Judge would be unsustainable warranting an interference. Any interference of the FIR and the Charge-Sheet would not entail the accused petitioners to avoid facing the trial in respect of the charges contained therein. The resultant situation would be that the Charge-Sheet submitted by the CBI in the Court of the Special Judge would now have to be withdrawn and be a part of a supplementary Charge-Sheet in the proceeding initiated by the BIEO in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup(M). 28. It is taken note of that the Charge-Sheet filed by the CBI resulting in Special Case No.05/2016 in the Court of the Special Judge, Assam, was under Sections 120(B)/420/471 of the IPC read with Section 13(2)/13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
28. It is taken note of that the Charge-Sheet filed by the CBI resulting in Special Case No.05/2016 in the Court of the Special Judge, Assam, was under Sections 120(B)/420/471 of the IPC read with Section 13(2)/13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Accordingly, if the Charge-Sheet No.09/2013 filed by the CBI would be required to be a supplementary Charge-Sheet in the BIEO Case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup(M), the Court of the learned CJM, Kamrup(M) would also have to decide the charges against the accused petitioners even under Sections 13(2)/13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 29. Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides that the Central or the State Government may by notification in the official gazette appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary to try, amongst others, any of the offences punishable under the said Act. Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides that any public servant who commits criminal mis-conduct as indicated in Section 13(1), shall be punishable as provided therein. In other words for committing a criminal mis-conduct as indicated in Section 13(1) a person shall be punishable under Section 13(2) and such offence punishable under Section 13(2) can be tried by a Special Judge appointed under Section 3. 30. Further Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in any other law for the time being in force, the offences speceified in Section 3(1), which includes the offences punishable under Section 13(2) in respect of the criminal mis-conduct as specified therein, amongst others, Sections 13(1)(d), can be tried by a Special Judge only. 31. Accordingly, if the Charge-Sheet in Special Case No.05/2016 filed by the CBI in the Court of the learned Special Judge, CBI Assam is now to be treated as a supplementary charge-sheet in the BIEO case before the learned CJM, Kamrup(M), the accused persons in respect of the Charge-Sheet No.09/2013 would also have to be tried by the learned CJM, Kamrup(M). Such a proposition would be unacceptable in view of the provision of Section 4(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 inasmuch as, the Charge-Sheet No.09/2013 also being under Section 13(2)/13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the same can be tried by a Special Judge only. 32.
Such a proposition would be unacceptable in view of the provision of Section 4(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 inasmuch as, the Charge-Sheet No.09/2013 also being under Section 13(2)/13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the same can be tried by a Special Judge only. 32. In view of the above even if the contention of the petitioners that the series of events of loading extra petroleum in the given tanker lorry was a result of a single general conspiracy is accepted, still the further contention for which it is made to the extent that the Charge-Sheet No.09/2013 in the Court of the Special Judege, CBI, Assam in Special Case No.5/2016 be set aside, and the same be treated as a supplementary charge-sheet in the Court of the CJM, Kamrup, Guwahati in the BIEO case, cannot be accepted. In view of both the aforesaid reason, we find the writ petition to be devoid of any merit and the same stands dismissed.