ORDER : 1. This order will govern disposal of W. P. No. 5456/19 and W. P. No. 5506/19 since it is jointly submitted by counsel for all the parties that both these writ petitions involve same issue in identical facts situation and only the date of impugned order is different. 2. For convenience, the facts are noted from W. P. No. 5456/19. 3. By this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 8-3-2019 Annexures P-10 and P-11 whereby petitioner’s nomination as President of respondent No. 4 Municipal council has been cancelled and respondent No. 5 has been nominated as President. 4. The case of petitioner is that he was elected as Councillor and after removal of President of respondent No. 4 Municipal Council the petitioner was nominated as President under section 37 vide order dated 4-5-2018 and was given the financial powers on 9-5-2018. Thereafter on the change of government vide order dated 25-1-2019, petitioner’s nomination as President was cancelled and respondent No. 5 was nominated as President. The petitioner had filed Writ Petition No. 2080/19 challenging the order dated 25-1-2019 and this Court vide order dated 31-1-2019 had stayed the operation of the order dated 25-1-2019. After filing reply in the writ petition, the State Government vide order dated 23-2-2019 had withdrawn the earlier order dated 25-1-2019. Hence the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous and petitioner’s nomination as President was restored vide order dated 5-3-2019 but within a short span the impugned orders have been passed cancelling the petitioner’s nomination and nominating respondent No. 5. 5. Respondents have filed their reply mainly taking the stand that no right is attached by virtue of nomination and it is the discretion of the state to choose a person for the purpose of nomination. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that entire action of the state is arbitrary and in earlier round of litigation, in order to avoid hearing of writ petition, the order impugned was recalled and after dismissal of writ petition again similar order has been passed. He further submits that even the doctrine of pleasure cannot be utilized arbitrarily and that while passing the order in W. P. No. 5506/19 state had taken the stand that within one week the instructions for conducting the elections will be issued but till now no elections have been conducted. 7. He further submits that even the doctrine of pleasure cannot be utilized arbitrarily and that while passing the order in W. P. No. 5506/19 state had taken the stand that within one week the instructions for conducting the elections will be issued but till now no elections have been conducted. 7. As against this learned counsel for respondent No. 4 has supported the impugned orders by submitting that nomination does not confer any right and no reason is required to cancel the nomination and nominate any other person and no legal right exists in favour of petitioner. He submits that since earlier order 25-1-2019 was a composite order therefore, it was withdrawn. 8. Learned counsel for respondent No. 5 has also supported the impugned order by making further submission that since earlier order dated 25-1-2019 was issued on the direction of the Chief Minister therefore, it was found to be bad in law, hence withdrawn and fresh order is issued. 9. Learned counsel for respondent/election commission has submitted that no request of the State government has been received till now for holding the election. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record it is noticed that for the purpose of temporary filling up the vacancy, the nomination of President is done under section 37 of M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 which reads as under :— “37. Filling of Casual Vacancies. — (1) As soon as the office of a President, or seat of Councillor elected from ward, becomes vacant, or is declared vacant, or the election of President or the Councillor, as the case may be, is declared void, the State Government shall forthwith inform the State Election Commission for filling up the vacancy and the person so elected shall hold office of President or Councillor, as the case may be, only for the remaining period of the Council: Provided that if the remaining period of the Council is less than six months, such vacancy shall not be filled in. (2) Until the vacancy in the Office of President is filled in under subsection (1), all the powers and duties of the President shall be performed by such elected Councillor as the State Government may nominate in this behalf : Provided that if the office of President is reserved under section 29-B the President shall be nominated from the elected Councillors belonging to such reserved category.” 11. In terms of sub-section (2) above, the President is nominated temporarily till the vacancy is filled up. No criteria has been prescribed under sub-section (2) for nominating the elected councillor as President or for cancellation of nomination once made. Hence the general principle that every action of the State Government should be fair and transparent applies and if the action is found to be arbitrary or capricious then the need for interference arises in the matter. 12. In the present case on falling the seat vacant, the elected petitioner was nominated as President vide order dated 4-5-2018. The subsequent order of respondents dated 25-1-2019 nominating the respondent No. 5 as President was passed on the basis of general order of Hon’ble Chief Minister dated 19-12-2018 for cancelling the nominations of all corporations/board/authorities/councils etc. There was no specific order to cancel the nomination order of petitioner dated 4-5-2018. 13. The record further reflects that on raising a challenge to order dated 25-1-2019 at the instance of petitioner in W. P. No. 2080/19 initially stay was granted on 31-1-2019 and thereafter after filing reply respondents have withdrawn the order dated 23-2-2019. Hence this Court on 27-2-2019 had passed the following order in W. P. No. 2080/19: “Shri P.M. Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner. Shri Ambar Pare, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State. Shri V. K. Jain, learned Sr. Advocate with Shri Pratyush Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. Shri Manuraj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5. In the light of the order dated 23-2-2019, withdrawing the impugned order dated 25-1-2019, nothing survives in this petition to address upon. Hence, petition has rendered infructuous. However, it is apposite to observe that petitioner shall be handed over the charge of President, concerned Municipal Council immediately. In the light of the provisions contained under section 37 of the Municipalities Act, 1961, the State Government is expected to ensure early elections of the seat so fallen vacant. Hence, petition has rendered infructuous. However, it is apposite to observe that petitioner shall be handed over the charge of President, concerned Municipal Council immediately. In the light of the provisions contained under section 37 of the Municipalities Act, 1961, the State Government is expected to ensure early elections of the seat so fallen vacant. This Court hope and trust that expeditious action in that behalf shall be taken by the State Government as well as by the Election Commission. With the aforesaid observations, petition stands dismissed as having rendered infructuous.” 14. In pursuance to the aforesaid order the order dated 1-3-2019 was passed restoring the nomination of petitioner as President but within a period of 7 days, the impugned orders have been passed again cancelling the nomination of petitioner and nominating respondent No. 5 as President. 15. The above chain of events clearly reflect that respondents on the earlier occasion had passed the order dated 23-2-2019 withdrawing the order impugned dated 25-1-2019 in the earlier writ petition only with a view to overreach this Court and avoid the decision of the petition on merit and immediately after dismissal of petition as infructuous they have again within no time passed the impugned order to the same effect. 16. The aforesaid chain of events clearly reveal that the state government has not acted in a fair manner but its action suffers from arbitrariness in withdrawing the orders impugned in the writ petition just before hearing of the writ petition and passing order to the same effect after dismissal of petition. 17. Considering the aforesaid circumstances this Court in the present case, while issuing notice on 14-3-2019, had stayed the operation of the impugned orders dated 8-3-2019, therefore, these orders have not given effect to. 18. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of B. P. Singhal vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 331 wherein while examining the issue in reference to Article 156 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed that even the doctrine of pleasure does not mean a licence to act arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically and further that the discretionary power conferred in absolute and unfettered terms on any public authority is necessarily and obviously required to be exercised reasonably and for the public good. In the present case also the respondents have acted arbitrarily and have failed to justify their action. 19. The record reflects that there is substance in submission of counsel for petitioner that merely on account of change in the government the petitioner’s nomination has been cancelled. 20. Counsel for State has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Hari Singh Sider vs. State of M. P. and others, reported in 2000(2) M.P.L.J. 123 wherein the similar order was challenged on the ground inter alia of having been passed in violation of principles of natural justice and therefore, this Court had held that since the Legislature never wanted to create fiction that the person so nominated will be deemed to be the President. Hence the argument was rejected. In that case the issue of arbitrary exercise of power, as in the present case, was not involved. 21. Counsel for State has also placed reliance upon judgment in the matter of Asfak Mohammad vs. State of M. P. and others, reported in 2000 (2) MPHT 80 but in that case incharge Vice President had challenged nomination of the President made under section 37(2) of the Act. Hence this Court held that Vice President cannot claim as a matter of right to function as President. Thus that case also stands on altogether different footing. 22. That apart the record reflects that Election Commission has not taken proper steps for conducting the election for the post of President though there was already a direction in the case of Municipal Council Karnawad. 23. In the aforesaid circumstances the impugned orders dated 11-3-2019 (in W. P. No. 5456/19) and impugned orders dated 8-3-2019 (In W. P. No. 5506/19) cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside with a direction to the Election Commission to hold the election for the post of President of the concerned Municipal Council as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 10 weeks from today. 24. Writ petitions are accordingly disposed off. Signed order has been kept in the file of Writ Petition No. 5456/19 and a copy thereof has been placed in the record of connected writ petition. C. C. as per rules. Order accordingly.