JUDGMENT : ASHA ARORA, J. 1. By the instant application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioners have approached this Court for quashing of the proceeding of Special GR No. 04/2017 (Reg. No.) 05/2017 arising out of Naxalbari P.S. Case No. 66/17 dated 24/3/2017 under section 4(1)(f)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act 2015, the charge-sheet being No. 108/17 dated 18/8/2017 submitted under Section 3(1)(f)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “The Act”) pending before the learned Judge Special Court under SC/ST (POA) Act Darjeeling. 2. The facts in brief leading to the present application may be summarized as follows: On 24/3/2017 at about 18.35 hours the complainant/opposite party no. 2 herein named Laban Xalxo of Dhandhipri Busty, District Darjeeling lodged a written complaint at Naxalbari P.S. contending that his mother deceased Lakshishwari Xalxo was the recorded owner of scheduled land being plot No. 102, 104,105, 106,107,108,111, 115, 122,127, 128, 139, 194 and 198, khatian No. 9, mouza Mirjangla J.L. No. 10within P.S. Naxalbari. After the demise of his mother, the complainant along with his brother and sister inherited the said tribal land as her legal heirs. It is further alleged that since a few months Chandra Bahadur Chettri (Mithe) and 9/10 others of the same locality are trying to encroach into the aforesaid plots of tribal land and construct new buildings unauthorized. The complainant lodged a complaint at Naxalbari P.S. on 2/1/2017 which was diaries as GDE No. 5/17 dated 2/1/2017 pursuant to which the police visited the spot and the accused persons stopped their illegal activities but they have again started the same. When the complainant asked the accused persons to stop the illegal activities, they threatened him with dire consequences and stated that he being a tribal has no power or strength so he should not do anything to save the land otherwise he will be killed and no one will come to help a tribal. On the basis of the aforesaid written complaint the above mentioned proceeding was initiated. The case was endorsed for investigation to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Rural) Darjeeling which culminated in the submission of the charge-sheet under section 3(1) (f) (r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the petitioners herein. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid written complaint the above mentioned proceeding was initiated. The case was endorsed for investigation to the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Rural) Darjeeling which culminated in the submission of the charge-sheet under section 3(1) (f) (r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the petitioners herein. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously argued that the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 came into force on 30/1/1990 but the petitioners have been in possession of the land in question for more than forty five years and are duly protected under Section 14E of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Since statutes are ordinarily prospective in operation the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has no application against the petitioners as there is no indication in the aforesaid Act that it is retrospective in operation. To buttress such submission reference has been made to the case of Panchanan Pal versus State of West Bengal, (1976) 1 ILR (Cal) 435. It is further contended that the dispute if any is civil in nature for which the appropriate civil remedy should have been availed instead of launching criminal prosecution which is not justified. Learned counsel sought to impress that the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1) (r) of the Act are not disclosed in the FIR since no one has been cited as a witness to the alleged incident of insult or intimidation so the incident in question does not fall within the meaning of “public view” which is the sine qua non for the aforesaid offence. Placing reliance on the case of Gorige Pentaiah versus State of Andhra Pradesh & others, (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446, learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that nowhere in the written complaint it is mentioned that the accused persons were not the members of the Scheduled caste or Scheduled tribe and the complainant was intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. It is contended that according to the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged in the FIR that the accused persons were not the members of the Scheduled caste or Scheduled tribe and the complainant was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused persons with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. It is contended that according to the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged in the FIR that the accused persons were not the members of the Scheduled caste or Scheduled tribe and the complainant was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused persons with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. It is argued that when the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the petitioners to face the rigmarole of criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law. It is further canvassed that in view of Rule 7 sub-rule (2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules 1995, the investigation should be completed and the charge-sheet should be filed within a period of sixty days but in the present case the FIR was lodged on 24/3/2017 and the charge-sheet dated 18/8/2017 was filed on 21/10/2017. Learned counsel argued that the proceeding should be quashed since the charge-sheet was submitted beyond the statutory period. Relying on the case of State of Madhya Pradesh versus Chunnilal alias Chunni Singh, (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 683 and State of Punjab versus Hardial Singh and Others, (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 288, learned counsel for the petitioners sought to impress that the investigation was illegal and invalid since the investigating officer was not appointed in terms of Rule 7 Sub rule (1) nor could the investigation be completed within the stipulated period as provided in Sub rule (2) of Rule 7. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1/State countered that the appointment of the investigating officer was in accordance with Rule 7 and on the basis of the prayer of the investigating officer, the period for completion of investigation and for filing the charge sheet was extended by the learned Judge of the Special Court. Learned counsel for the State invited my attention to the Case Diary which reveals the statements of several independent witnesses who were examined under section 161 Cr PC in course of investigation. The names of some of these persons cited as witnesses in the charge sheet are Santosh Haro, Tilman Thitiyo, Manoj Nag, Goshnar Kerketta and others. So it cannot be said that the incident did not take place within public view. The names of some of these persons cited as witnesses in the charge sheet are Santosh Haro, Tilman Thitiyo, Manoj Nag, Goshnar Kerketta and others. So it cannot be said that the incident did not take place within public view. The argument on behalf of the petitioners in this regard is therefore devoid of merit. Relying on the case of Ashabai Machindra Adhagale versus State of Maharashtra and others, (2009) 3 SCC 789 , learned counsel for the State rightly contended that for the offence under Section (3)(1)(r) of the Act non-mention of the caste of the accused in the FIR cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings since the basic ingredients of the offence are clearly made out. 5. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that FIR is not an encyclopedia of the entire incident. It need not contain all the details of the occurrence. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of an offence. For the purpose of the case in hand it may be beneficial to quote the relevant paragraphs 10, 12 and 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashabai Machindra case (supra): “10. It needs no reiteration that the FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant whether the accused belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe can be gone into when the matter is being investigated. It is to be noted that under Section 23(1) of the Act, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 (in short “the Rules”) have been framed. 12. After ascertaining the facts during the course of investigation it is open to the investigating officer to record that the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. After final opinion is formed, it is open to the court to either accept the same or take cognizance. Even if the charge-sheet is filed at the time of consideration of the charge, it is open to the accused to bring to the notice of the court that the materials do not show that the accused does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Even if the charge-sheet is filed at the time of consideration of the charge, it is open to the accused to bring to the notice of the court that the materials do not show that the accused does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Even if charge is framed at the time of trial materials can be placed to show that the accused either belongs or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 14. Above being the position, the view taken by the Bombay High Court does not appear to be the correct view while that of the Orissa High Court is the correct view. Accordingly, we allow this appeal. Needless to say during investigation or at the time of framing of charge or at the time of trial it is open to Respondent 3 to show that he either belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe so that applicability of Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is ruled out.” In view of the aforesaid decision of the larger Bench, the case of Gorige Pentaiah (Supra) is of no help to the petitioners. 6. Rule 7 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 relating to the investigating officer provides as follows: “7. Investigating Officer.- (1) An offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of police. The investigating officer shall be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it along with right lines within the shortest possible time. [(2) The investigating officer so appointed under sub-rule (1) shall complete the investigation on top priority, submit the report to the Superintendent of Police, who in turn shall immediately forward the report to the Director General of Police or Commissioner of Police of the State Government, and the officer in-charge of the concerned police station shall file the charge sheet in the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court within a period of sixty days (the period is inclusive of investigation and filing of charge-sheet). [(2-A) The delay, if any, in investigation or filing of charge sheet in accordance with sub-rule (2) shall be explained in writing by the investigating officer.] [(3) The Secretary, Home Department and Secretary, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development Department (the name of the Department may vary from State to State) of the State Government or Union territory Administration, Director of Prosecution, the officer in-charge of Prosecution and the Director General of Police or the Commissioner of Police in-charge of the concerned State or Union territory shall review by the end of every quarter the position of all investigations done by the investigating officer.]” 7. In the case in hand, it is evident that the investigation was done by Shri Surajit Mondal, the Deputy Superintendent of Police being appointed and authorized by the Superintendent of Police Darjeeling. Therefore it cannot be said that sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 has not been complied. Chunnilal case (Supra) and Hardial case (Supra) relied upon by the petitioners are not apposite for the purpose of the case in hand being clearly distinguishable on facts. From the order dated 12/10/2017 of the learned Judge Special Court it appears that the charge-sheet was filed on the aforesaid date. The case diary reveals that on account of the delay in filing the charge-sheet, the Investigating Officer made a prayer before the learned Judge Special Court on 30/5/2017 and 30/6/2017 on the basis of which the period for completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet was extended by the Court. 8. In the context of yet another argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners, it may be useful to refer to the case of Alpic Finance Ltd. versus P. Sadasivan and another, 2001 3 SCC 531 wherein the Supreme Court held that merely because remedy by way of civil suit is available is not an impediment in maintaining a criminal complaint provided that the complaint discloses the basic ingredients of the offence alleged. Both criminal law and civil law remedy can be pursued in diverse situations. As a matter of fact they “are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. Both criminal law and civil law remedy can be pursued in diverse situations. As a matter of fact they “are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import”. (vide Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar) (SCC p. 383, para 21).” 9. A defence case is sought to be set up by the petitioners by contending that they are in possession of the land in question for more than forty-five years and are paying tax in respect thereof. Such disputed questions of fact cannot be considered by this Court while exercising power under section 482 Cr P.C. In this context it may be worthwhile to quote the relevant paragraph 16 of the judgment in Mahesh Chaudhary versus State of Rajasthan, (2009) 4 SCC 439 wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: “16. Recently in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta this Court laid down the law in the following terms: (SCC p. 523, paras 15- 16) “15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. 16. It is furthermore well known that no hard-and fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint.” 10. At this juncture, it may be useful to quote the relevant paragraph 9 of the judgment in Ashabai case (Supra) which is as follows: “9. “8. ... [Section 482] does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of [the Code]. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under [the Code], (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. The courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle of 'quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest' (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising the powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in to. 9. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in to. 9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 [of the Code], the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.” 11. Reverting to the case in hand, from the FIR and the materials collected during investigation including the statement of witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr PC as well as from the charge-sheet it is evident that the necessary factual foundation has been laid for the offence alleged. Reverting to the case in hand, from the FIR and the materials collected during investigation including the statement of witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr PC as well as from the charge-sheet it is evident that the necessary factual foundation has been laid for the offence alleged. It appears that the allegations in the FIR and the outcome of investigation as found in the charge-sheet, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety make out a prima facie case against the accused/petitioners. Controversial questions of fact raised by the petitioners are matters to be decided by the trial Court. It is clear that the present case does not fall within any of the categories enumerated hereinabove where the inherent power of this Court can be exercised to quash the proceedings. 12. For the reasons aforestated, the application being CRR No. 3868 of 2017 is dismissed. 13. No order as to cost. 14. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merit of the case. The learned Judge Special Court shall expedite the trial of the case and dispose of the same in accordance with law without being influenced by any observation made here in above. 15. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment if applied for, be given to the applicant on compliance of requisite formalities.