ORDER 1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. Eight (08) accused persons were convicted, inter alia, for the offence under Section 302 IPC. (Reference is being made only to the offence under Section 302 IPC as the other offences for which the accused appellants herein have been convicted would not be material as the accused appellants herein have served out the sentence in respect of those offences) 4. Out of the aforesaid Eight (08) accused persons, Saravanan (Accused No.3) and Sasikumar (Accused No.4) are in appeal. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the materials on record. 6. The prosecution case against the accused appellants herein is built on circumstantial evidence. The sum total of the circumstances relied by the prosecution against the accused appellants herein are as follows: (i) Arivu (P.W. 9), a mason by profession, had testified that at about 1.30 a.m. on the date of occurrence he had finished work and while returning he had seen two accused appellants along with Accused Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 alighting from the TATA ACE vehicle outside the house of Velu (deceased); (ii) Perumal (P.W.10) had deposited that at about 6.00 p.m. on 26th July, 2011 ( sic ) i.e. a day prior to the day of occurrence he had seen three (03) accused engaged in a conversation about terminating the life of some other person. P.W. 10 had further deposed that at about 9.00 p.m. on the same day he had seen seven (07) accused, who were identified by him for the first time in the Court. (iii). Fifteen (15) days prior to the day of occurrence, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged by the deceased that a white Ambassador Car belonging to the Sasikumar (Accused No.4) had made an attempt to run him over. The investigation of the case was pending. 7. P.W.9, the mason, is a chance witness. The defence had put a suggestion to P.W. 9 that he is a cousin of the deceased and that there was animosity between P.W. 9 and Selvi (Accused No.1). That apart, even though P.W.9 had gone to console the family of the deceased on the next day in the morning of 27th July, 2011 he did not report, what he had claimed to have seen in the previous night to any person including the Police. That apart, even though P.W.9 had gone to console the family of the deceased on the next day in the morning of 27th July, 2011 he did not report, what he had claimed to have seen in the previous night to any person including the Police. P.W. 9's testimony, that the accused appellants along with other accused were spotted outside the house of the deceased a little while before the incident, is a weak and shaky evidence given the background of facts. It is not conclusive and reliable and would require corroboration and affirmation from other evidence, which as noticed below is virtually absent and is not forthcoming. 8. So far as the evidence of P.W.10 is concerned, he is not known to the accused persons from before. His statement regarding conversation amongst the accused was recorded by the Police two months after the incident and he had purportedly identified the accused in the dock several months after the incident. He did not name any of the accused at any point of time. The evidence of P.W. 10 and his identification made by him is not safe circumstance and evidence which can be relied upon against the accused appellants. 9. The third circumstance, namely, filing of the FIR by the deceased with regard to the attempt to run over by a White Ambassador Car belonging to Sasikumar (accused No.4) is again a rather weak and tenuous circumstance that by itself or even in conjunction with unreliable version by P.W. 9 to lead to an irresistible and firm conclusion that the accused Nos. 3 and 4 (appellants herein) were involved and had committed the offence. 10. The law relating to circumstantial evidence would hardly need any reiteration, save and except, that the circumstances proved and established together must unerringly point to the guilt of the accused which, in our considered view, is conspicuously lacking in the present case. 11. We, therefore, deem it proper to allow the appeals; set aside the conviction of the accused appellants (Accused Nos. 3 and 4) under Section 302 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment imposed. The accused appellants are acquitted and we direct their release forthwith unless their custody is required in connection with any other case.