JUDGMENT : KAUSHAL JAYENDRA THAKER, J. 1. Heard Sri S.K. Kakkar, learned counsel for appellant, Sri R.O.V.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and award dated 29.01.2005 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Etawah (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') awarding a sum of Rs. 5,11,108/- along with interest @ 6% per annum as compensation to the claimant. 3. The brief facts leading to filing of this litigation is that the original claimants instituted a claim petition claiming Rs. 10,93,000/- with interest jointly and severally from the owner of the vehicle as well as the insurer. Yogendra Pratap Singh was injured in the vehicle accident dated 2.03.2001 at about 4:30 p.m. The petitioner was standing outside his house and Eicher Canter bearing No. DL-1L/1258 came from the side of Bidhuna. The petitioner was rushed to Primary Health Centre, Bidhuna wherefrom he was sent to Kanpur for further treatment. He was an indoor patient from 3.03.2001 to 17.03.2001 and his right upper limb was amputated from his left elbow. There were to operation, one in 3.03.2001, the petitioner had its own self business and claim to be earning Rs. 7,500 per month. Due to the said injuries, he had to stop his business. The criminal case came to be lodged against Sriprakash, who was the owner of the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle filed his written submission, he has denied the accident altogether. The Canter, according to the owner of the vehicle was insured with Oriental Insurance Company Ltd and, therefore, they would be liable to pay the compensation. The insurance company denied the contentions' of petitioner. The vehicle being insured by them was negatived and in the alternative they have raised the defence that the driver of the said vehicle did not possess proper driving licence and, therefore, there was breach of policy condition. The Tribunal after calculating the loss holding that as there was no breach of policy and that the driver of transport vehicle had proper driving licence, assessed the disability of injured as 75%. 4. Sri R.O.V.S. Chauhan has submitted that the claim awarded is on the lower side. Sri S.K. Kakkar appearing for insurance company has said that the cross appeal and cross objection is filed belatedly and, therefore, they are barred by limitation and be dismissed. 4. Sri R.O.V.S. Chauhan has submitted that the claim awarded is on the lower side. Sri S.K. Kakkar appearing for insurance company has said that the cross appeal and cross objection is filed belatedly and, therefore, they are barred by limitation and be dismissed. As far as appeal is concerned, learned counsel for appellant, Sri Kakkar has submitted that Tribunal has committed grave error in holding insurance company liable, as the driver of the truck did not have valid effective driving licence at the time of accident and, therefore, as he was driving a vehicle for which he was not licenced, the insurance company cannot be held liable. It is further submitted that the Tribunal has not appreciated the concept of negligence as the same is not proved and there is contradiction in the version of the eyewitness. It is further submitted by learned counsel for appellant that the assessment of 75% of disability is bad in the eyes of law, as it has not been proved that the claimant had stopped his business and/or had suffered permanent disability. It is further submitted by Sri Kakkar that driving licence of Kanhaiya Lal was valid from 5.12.1996 to 14.10.2015 for light motor vehicle and at the time of accident the driver was driving a transport vehicle, namely, truck which according to Registration Certificate is a light motor transport vehicle and, therefore, there is breach of policy condition and the insurance company be exonerated as it is a valid defence proved before the Tribunal. It is submitted that as per Motor Vehicles Act, Section 2(21) light motor vehicle means, a transport vehicle or Omni Bus and the gross weight of vehicle does not exceed 7500 kgs. It is next submitted that finding of the Claims Tribunal that the vehicle in question was light motor vehicle and the licence of driver Kanhaiya Lal has also been issued to him for light motor vehicle is quiet wrong and erroneous and is against the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as well as against the Insurance Policy. It is lastly submitted by learned counsel for appellant that driving licence of Kanhaiaya Lal was issued to him to drive only his personal vehicle i.e. light motor vehicle and not as paid employee which is breach of policy condition. 5. It is lastly submitted by learned counsel for appellant that driving licence of Kanhaiaya Lal was issued to him to drive only his personal vehicle i.e. light motor vehicle and not as paid employee which is breach of policy condition. 5. Sri R.O.V.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for respondents submitted that the driver has driving licence to drive light motor vehicle and, therefore, the submission of Sri S.K. Kakkar, learned counsel for appellant raised that evidence on record shows that the driver of the vehicle in question had no valid and effective driving licence to drive the transport vehicle on the date of accident i.e. 2.03.2001. Learned counsel for claimant-respondent submitted that issue of breach of policy condition is covered by the judgment of Mukund Dewangan Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2017) AIR SC 3668 holding that endorsement is not necessary and it is not a fundamental breach of policy conditions hence this ground is rejected. A similar view is taken by the Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Kumar Sood Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, (2018) 3 SCC 697 holding that the driving licence to drive light motor vehicle even in absence of specific authorization to drive a transport vehicle such driver can drive light goods/transport vehicle liability has to be fastened on the insurer and, therefore, the insurer cannot be absolved. Therefore, recovery right also cannot be granted in light of the aforesaid decisions. The laden weight even according to the appellant was 5950 kgs., it is a light motor vehicle and, therefore, also the said submission is rejected. 6. As far as the submission relating to compensation is concerned, there is amputation of upper limb. The evidence is produced before Tribunal. The documentary evidence at Ex.41-C has been relied by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has considered his income as Rs. 3,000/- based on the decision of Lata vadwa and another Vs. State of Bihar and anothers reported in, (2001) 2 ACC 316 and has considered his income to be Rs. 36,000 per annum. He was in hospital from 3.03.2001 cannot be said to have committed any error in granting the amount in question. I am totally in agreement with the submission made by counsel for claimant. 7. The Tribunal held as follows: 8. 36,000 per annum. He was in hospital from 3.03.2001 cannot be said to have committed any error in granting the amount in question. I am totally in agreement with the submission made by counsel for claimant. 7. The Tribunal held as follows: 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner, Yogendra Pratap Singh suffered grievous injuries in this accident and his right hand was amputated from elbow joint and he suffered 75% permanent disability. He was treated at Kanpur from 3.03.2001 to 17.03.2001 and the bills of this period has been filed which are amounting to Rs. 11,108/-. So far as, income of petitioner is concerned, petitioner has claimed that he has suffered a loss of Rs. 4,000/- per month. Keeping in view the law laid down in Lata Wadhva and others Vs. State of Bihar and others,2001 ACC 316 the income of the petitioner is assessed at Rs. 3,000/- per month i.e. Rs. 36,000/- per annum. As per certified copy of his High School certificate, the age of the petitioner at the time of accident was in between 43-44 years; hence keeping in view the law as laid down (SC), U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. Trilok Chandra and others, (1996) 1 ACC 592 the multiplier of 15' will suffice. 9. Therefore, the amount of compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is assessed by Tribunal, for loss of income due to 75% permanent disability Rs. 36,000/- x 15= Rs. 5,40,000/- x 75% disability = Rs. 4,05,000/-, for pains and sufferings is Rs. 30,000/-, for loss of amenities of life and future prospects is Rs. 50,000/-, for medical expenses is Rs. 11,108/- and for nutritious food is Rs. 15,000/-. Thus the petitioner is entitled to get Rs. 5,11,108 as compensation along with interest @ 6% per annum. 10. On contrary, cross appeal is filed belatedly, however, that submission of Sri Kakkar, learned counsel for appellant cannot be countenanced, in view of judgment of the Apex Court in Wadhya Mal Vs. Prem Chand Jain and Another, (1981) ACJ 459 and, therefore, delay will not deprive the claimant from justice and cross objection will have to be decided on merits even otherwise this Court which is deciding this appeal will have to decide on the justness of compensation awarded by Tribunal. 11. It is further submitted that factum of accident with alleged vehicle is not proved. 11. It is further submitted that factum of accident with alleged vehicle is not proved. This fact is also conclusively proved against the driver of the vehicle due to filing of F.I.R. and charge-sheet and the defence taken by the owner, hence, this ground though taken in memo of appeal, fails. 12. The factum of the accident qua negligence and the compensation awarded are elaborately discussed as the insurance company has not proved that the owner has committed any breach of policy condition. The evidence recorded in the matter goes to show that the driver of truck was involved in the accident as charge-sheet is laid against him and the eyewitnesses have deposed against him. The claimant has examined an eyewitness also. It is admitted position of fact that against the oral testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 who was an eye-witnesses, the Insurance Company or the owner has not examined any witness. The F.I.R. and the Charge-sheet were before the Tribunal which has been corroborated by the evidence of the claimant himself. Thus the submission that the truck was not involved in the accident fails. 13. This take the Court to the submission that the claimant himself was negligent and/or was a contributor to the accident having taken place. The Tribunal on appreciation of evidence has held in favour of claimants. 14. In oral testimony, the petitioner has examined himself as P.W.1 and his uncle Gajendra Singh (complainant of the criminal case) as P.W.2. Both these witnesses, stated that on 2.03.2001 at 4:30 in the day, they were standing outside their residence in Ruruganj. The Canter No. DL-1L/1258 came from the side of Bidhuna. The driver was driving it rashly and negligently hitting Yogendra Pratap Singh resulting in serious injuries. These two witnesses had been cross-examined at length but nothing had come out to discredit their testimonies. 15. The concept of contributory negligence has been time and again evolved, decided and discussed by the courts. 16. The term 'negligence' means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. 16. The term 'negligence' means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply. 17. The concept rather term contributory negligence has been discussed time and again a person who either contributes or is co-author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place. 18. Where the plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be a party to the negligence the question of joint and several liability cannot arise and the plaintiff's claim to the extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have to be severed. In such a situation the plaintiff can only be held entitled to such part of damages/compensation that is not attributable to his own negligence. The above principle has been explained in T.O. Anthony Vs. Karvarnan & Ors., (2008) 2 SCR 291 followed in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. Vs. K. Hemlatha & Ors., (2008) 8 SCR 1201 . Paras 6 and 7 of T.O. Anthony (supra) which are relevant may be extracted herein below: "6. "Composite negligence" refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is, his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of "composite negligence" will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error." 19. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 which has held as under : "16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher,1868 3 HL(LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, (2005) 0 ACJ 1840 (SC)). 22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side." 20. Recently this Court in FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 1198 of 1992 (M/S Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Aruna Agarwal And Ors) decided on 29.1.2019 has in paragraph 14 held as under: "14. The tractor driver dashed the moped from behind and it is cardinal principle that the person who drives in the rare side of a cross junction has to be very vigilant and has to be more cautious and, therefore, I do not find that this is a case of contributory negligence." 21. Similar is the situation here and in case on hand as there is deposition of an eye-witness who has been examined as PW-2 and he has withstood the cross-examination. I am even supported in my view by the decision of this Court in FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No.-534 of 1995 (Brahma Dutt Sharma Vs. Umesh Sharma And Others) wherein it has been held as under: "13. I am unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the Insurance Company that the Tribunal's finding on contributory negligence requires to be upheld. Umesh Sharma And Others) wherein it has been held as under: "13. I am unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the Insurance Company that the Tribunal's finding on contributory negligence requires to be upheld. The reasons are that (i) the driver of the other vehicle never stepped into witness box. (ii) The police authority who had scribed the FIR also stated that the driver of the Tempo was driving the vehicle at the high speed. (iii) The charge sheet was laid against the driver of the tempo. The accident occurred at 10.00 p.m. and (iv) Motorcycle was so damaged which shows that evidence of PW-1 cannot be brushed aside. 14. The finding of the Tribunal are perverse. The tempo being a bigger vehicle as no legal evidence has been produced to show that the claimant had contributed to the accident. Tribunal has not given proper reasons for holding him negligent whether he had taken permission to come Jhansi or not is of no relevance and it has not been brought on record that because he has left place of service, he was negligent. The conclusive proof of against the tempo driver, therefore, the tribunal committed manifest error in holding the appellant first contributory negligent and coupling with no proper reply for leaving the head quarter. There is no evidence about the motorcycle being driven negligently by the appellant at the time of accident. The Respondent did not produce any such evidence and there is a charge sheet against the tempo driver which prima-facie pointed towards the negligence of the appellant. Thus the finding of contributory negligence cannot be sustained. I am supported in my view in Mangla Ram Versus Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2018) 5 SCC 656 ." 22. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for insurance company, Sri Kakkar that Tribunal has failed to decide the question of negligence in proper perspective fails as none of the conditions to show that the claimant had in any way contributed to the accident having taken place and even, prima facie, has not proved that the accident occurred by any overt act of the claimant and hence this submission fails. 23. As far as issue of interest is concerned, the Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 6% which according to the learned counsel for the claimant is on the lower side. 23. As far as issue of interest is concerned, the Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 6% which according to the learned counsel for the claimant is on the lower side. The question of interest and rate of interest will have to be decided for that reference may be made to the following decisions. 24. A Division Bench of this Court in FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No.-1011 of 2012 (Ramesh Kumar Soni Vs. Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. Thr. Manager & Another) decided on 3.3.2017, while dealing with the issue of interest, has held as under: "14. Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of compensation from the date of filing of claim petition. It is contended that interest at the rate of 6 % is on much lower side and it should be 9 %. 15. We find in recent authorities, Courts have held that appropriate rate of interest should be 9%. 16. In Neeta Vs The Divisional Manager, MSRTC, (2015) 3 SCC 590 where accident took place on 22.03.2011, Court allowed 9% rate of interest and held that interest awarded by Tribunal at 8% was erroneous. Para-11 of the judgment reads as under:- "The appellants are also entitled to the interest on the compensation awarded by this Court in these appeals at the rate of 9% per annum along with the amount under the different heads as indicated above. The Courts below have erred in awarding the interest at the rate of 8 % per annum on the compensation awarded by them to the Appellants without following the decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi Vs. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association and Ors., (2011) 14 SCC 481 : MANU/SC/1255/2011 . Accordingly, we award the interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the compensation determined in these appeals from the date of filing of the application till the date of payment." 17. In Kanhsingh Vs. Tukaram, (2015) 1 Scale 366 where accident had taken place on 02.07.2006 but tribunal awarded no interest. Court held that this is erroneous and 9 % interest should have been allowed in view of the principles laid down in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, (2011) 14 SCC 481 . 18. In Kanhsingh Vs. Tukaram, (2015) 1 Scale 366 where accident had taken place on 02.07.2006 but tribunal awarded no interest. Court held that this is erroneous and 9 % interest should have been allowed in view of the principles laid down in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, (2011) 14 SCC 481 . 18. In Kalpanaraj and Others Vs Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, (2015) 2 SCC 764 where accident took place on or before 1994, High Court had awarded interest at the rate of 9 % per annum which was challenged that it is on higher side. Court upheld said rate of interest. 19. In Shashikala and Others Vs Gangalakshmamma and Another, (2015) 9 SCC 150 , where accident had taken place on 14.12.2006, Court allowed 9 % rate of interest from the date of claim petition till the date of realization. 20. In Asha Verman and Ors Vs Maharaj Singh & Ors, (2015) 4 Scale 329 , High Court awarded interest at the rate of 8%. Accident took place on 27.11.2016. It was held that 8 % interest is on lower side and it should be 9 %. 21. In Surit Gupta Vs United India Insurance Company, (2015) 11 SCC 457 , accident took place in July, 1990. Punjab and Haryana High Court had awarded interest at the rate of 6 %. Court held that it is on lower side and it should be 9 %. 22. In Chanderi Devi and another Vs Jaspal Singh and others, (2015) 11 SCC 703 , date of accident is September 2006 and the incumbent died on 04.10.2006. Court awarded 9 % interest. 23. In Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi Vs Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others, (2015) 4 SCC 237 , incident was on 21.09.1990. Tribunal awarded 15 % interest which was reduced to 12% by Gujrat High Court. Court held that it is on higher side and awarded 9 % interest following its decisions in Amresh Kumari Vs Niranjan Lal Jagdish Parshad Jain, (2010) ACJ 551 (SC) and Mohinder Kaur Vs Hira Nand Sindhi, (2007) ACJ 2123 (SC). 24. In view of above, the rate of interest in the present case, 6 % awarded by Tribunal also cannot be justified and in our view interest should be paid at 9 % per annum." 25. 24. In view of above, the rate of interest in the present case, 6 % awarded by Tribunal also cannot be justified and in our view interest should be paid at 9 % per annum." 25. Hence, the rate of interest would be 9% but as the cross-objections are delayed by 12 years, the interest shall be computed at the rate of 9% from the date of filing of claim petitions till the judgment of the Tribunal and no interest shall be paid on the enhanced amount till the cross-objections were filed. 26. As the appeal was pending. Though the counsel has appeared in the year 2011, he had not filed the enhancement appeal. Be that as it may, going by the calculation, I do not feel that except the rate of interest and amount under pains and suffering for amputation of hand no other heads requires to be interfered with additional sum of Rs. 70,000/- for pains and sufferings, there would be no change in the compensation awarded. 27. The appeal of insurance company is dismissed. The cross-objection is partly allowed. The amount awarded by the Tribunal plus Rs. 70,000 would fetch 9% rate of interest from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of award as the cross objection is filed belatedly the interest for that period will not be granted but will be considered from the date the cross objection was filed along with stay vacation application. 28. The interim relief is vacated. The 50% amount was ordered to be deposited. Insurance company to recalculate the amount and deposit the same in Tribunal within 12 weeks from today. The Tribunal shall disburse the entire amount to the claimant. 29. Sri R.O.V.S. Chauhand, learned counsel for respondents had already appeared in the matter on 22.11.2005 and also had filed application for vacating of stay but preferred the cross objection belatedly. Hence up to 2011 interest shall not be paid thereafter the interest shall be calculated at 9% till the amount is deposited. 30. This Court is thankful to both the parties for getting very old matter disposed of.