JUDGMENT : B. AMIT STHALEKAR, J. 1. Supplementary affidavit filed today by the petitioner is taken on record. 2. Civil Misc. Application No. 201102 of 2012 dated 15.7.2012 is taken up. 3. The prayer in the application is to permit the petitioner to change the name of the petitioner in the array of parties from M/s Duncans Industries Limited to M/s Kanpur Fertilizers and Cement Limited. 4. Learned standing counsel has no objection if the application is allowed. 5. Accordingly the application is allowed. Let necessary amendment be carried out during the course of the day. 6. The petitioner in the writ petition is seeking quashing of the amended award dated 30.4.1997 published on 5.11.1998 as well as the original award dated 2.4.1991 published on 10.4.1992 passed in Adjudication Case No. 182 of 1984. 7. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent no. 2 claimed to be working under the petitioner and initiated proceedings before the Labour Court on the contention that his services have been dispensed with w.e.f. 5.1.1984. A reference was made to the Labour Court on which the case was registered as Adjudication Case No. 182 of 1984. The parties led evidence and thereafter an award was given by the Labour Court on 2.4.1991 holding that the services of the respondent no. 2 had been illegally dispensed with w.e.f. 5.1.1984 and thereafter the workman remained out of service and could not get any job anywhere, therefore, the Labour Court directed that for this period he would be entitled to full salary. Subsequently an application was filed under section 6(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1947) seeking correction in the award and the Labour Court allowed the application and thereafter passed an amended award on 30.4.1997 amending the previous award and directed that the respondent no. 2 workman shall be reinstated in service on his original post with full benefits and also salary for the entire period for which he has remained out of service. 8. I have heard Shri Naveen Sinha, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri S.Chatterji for the petitioner and Shri Akhilesh Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 2 workman. 9. 2 workman shall be reinstated in service on his original post with full benefits and also salary for the entire period for which he has remained out of service. 8. I have heard Shri Naveen Sinha, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri S.Chatterji for the petitioner and Shri Akhilesh Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 2 workman. 9. The first submission made by Shri Naveen Sinha, learned senior counsel is that the application under section 6(6) of the Act, 1947 was itself not maintainable as there was no clerical or arithmetical error in the award nor was any error arising from any accidental slip or omission and it is only on anyone of these conditions being satisfied the Labour Court on the application of any party to the dispute could have corrected the previous award. His submission further is that the first award was given on 2.4.1991 and was published in the gazette on 10.4.1992. Referring to the provisions of Section 6-A of the Act, 1947, he submitted that the award would become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days on the date of its publication under section 6 of the Act, 1947. He further referred to the provisions of Section 6-D of the Act, 1947 and submitted that the proceedings before the Labour Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of reference of a dispute and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award become enforceable under section 6-A of the Act, 1947. Section 6(6), 6-A and 6-D of the Act, 1947 read as under: "6 (6) A Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may either of its own motion or on the application of any party to the dispute, correct any clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the award, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission; whenever any correction is made as aforesaid, a copy of the order shall be sent to the State Government and the provision of this Act; relating to the publication of an award mutatis mutandis apply thereto. 6-A Commencement of the award. 6-A Commencement of the award. - (1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 6 : Provided that if the State Government is of the opinion that it will be inexpedient] [on public grounds affecting national or State economy or social justice] to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days : Provided further that an arbitration award shall not become enforceable where the State Government after such enquiry as it considers necessary, is satisfied that the same has been given or obtained through collusion, fraud or misrepresentation. (2) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award under the first proviso to sub-section (1), the State Government may within ninety days from the date of publication of the award under Section 6, make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with a copy of tire order before tire Legislature of the State. (3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under sub-section (2) is laid before the Legislature of the State, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid and where no order under sub-section (1) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the first proviso to sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in subsection (2). (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) of sub-section (3) as the case may be. 6-D. Commencement and conclusion of proceeding. - Proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of reference of a dispute to adjudication, and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 6-A." 10. 6-D. Commencement and conclusion of proceeding. - Proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of reference of a dispute to adjudication, and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 6-A." 10. On the merits of the case, learned senior counsel submitted that the case of the petitioner- management was that the petitioner worked only from 16.4.1982 to 30.4.1982, 1.5.1982 to 15.5.1982 and from 16.6.1982 to 30.6.1982. Thereafter he worked from 1.10.1983 to 15.10.1983, 16.12.1983 to 31.12.1983 and again from 1.1.1984 to 15.1.1984. His submission is that the total of this period comes to only about 90 days and therefore the workman has not completed 240 days of continuous service in a year. He further submitted that these figures were placed before the Labour Court as Ext. E-1 to E-4 and the facts and figures mentioned therein were also admitted by the workman during the proceedings but the Labour Court has illegally and arbitrarily ignored the documentary evidence on record and merely relied upon the oral testimony of the respondent no. 2-workman. 11. Learned senior counsel further submitted that during the period mentioned above there was no such break which could be termed as artificial break and which may be termed as unfair labour practice being adopted by the petitioner management and, therefore, when the workman has not worked for 240 days continuously, the finding of the labour court that there was unfair labour practice on the part of the management was based on a complete misreading of the overwhelming documentary evidence on record which was also admitted by the respondent workman. He further submitted that the labour court could not have awarded back wages or awarded continuity of service and reinstatement in service after amendment of the award on the facts as they stood. 12. Shri Akhilesh Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2-workman, however, referred to the findings recorded by the Labour Court where the Labour Court has relied upon the oral testimony of the workman where he says that he has worked continuously under the petitioner management. 12. Shri Akhilesh Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2-workman, however, referred to the findings recorded by the Labour Court where the Labour Court has relied upon the oral testimony of the workman where he says that he has worked continuously under the petitioner management. He further submitted that the Labour Court in paragraph 13 of the award of 2.4.1991 has observed that no reliance can be placed on the evidence put forth by the management and therefore submits that the findings recorded by the Labour Court is absolutely correct. So far as the legal objection with regard to maintainability of the application of the workman under section 6(6) of the Act, 1947 and subsequent amendment in the award after a gap of almost six years is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that the correction sought would fall within the categories enumerated in Section 6(6) of the Act, 1947 and in any case it would amount to error arising from any accidental slip or omission and, therefore, the Labour Court was within its jurisdiction to make the necessary correction in the previous award of 2.4.1991 through its subsequent award of 30.4.1997. 13. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents on record. 14. Taking the first submission of Shri Navin Sinha, learned senior counsel with regard to the amendment in the award being illegal and arbitrary, reading of sub section (6) of Section 6 of the Act, 1947 would show that the statute confers power on the Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator, as the case may be, to make any correction or on an application of any party to the dispute to correct any clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the award or error arising from any accidental slip or omission. The case of the respondent workman specifically was that his services had been dispensed with w.e.f. 5.1.1984 and that amounted to illegal termination from service but having recorded that finding the Labour Court has only awarded salary for the period after 5.1.1984 without any direction for reinstatement in service. In the award of 30.4.1997 the Labour Court while allowing the amendment has held that the petitioner's services were dispensed with on 5.9.1984 illegally and, therefore, the workman was entitled to continuity of service with all consequential benefits and has allowed the amendment accordingly. In the award of 30.4.1997 the Labour Court while allowing the amendment has held that the petitioner's services were dispensed with on 5.9.1984 illegally and, therefore, the workman was entitled to continuity of service with all consequential benefits and has allowed the amendment accordingly. However, what is noticed from the reading of the amended award is that the Labour Court has nowhere considered whether the amendment sought has constituted any clerical or arithmetical error or was an accidental slip or omission. In my opinion without recording a categorical finding to that effect the amendment could not have been allowed out rightly as the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was confined only to those condition as mentioned in sub section (6) of Section 6 of the Act, 1947. 15. From the previous award of 2.4.1991 it is quite clear that there was no arithmetical error which required correction. So also there was no clerical error or mistake in the award of 2.4.1991 which required correction but by the amended award the Labour Court has infact granted further relief to the workman without making any clerical correction. Similarly by way of the amendment in the award the direction for reinstatement of the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits cannot be said to have been an accidental slip or omission in the previous award of 2.4.1991. The words "accidental slip or omission" must refer to a glaring omission or slip with reference to the facts on record, pleadings or failure to notice the documents on record filed by the parties which may have accidentally slipped the notice of the Labour Court, which have therefore been accidentally omitted by the Labour Court. So far as the facts of the case are concerned, the Labour Court has recorded all the facts which were pleaded by the parties and he has not recorded any finding that a particular document or statement or record was accidentally omitted or slipped being noted by him. 16. There is another aspect of the matter, the award under section 6-A of the Act, 1947 becomes unenforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication. 16. There is another aspect of the matter, the award under section 6-A of the Act, 1947 becomes unenforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication. The award of 2.4.1991 was published on 10.4.1991, 30 days would expire on 9/10.5.1991 and after that the Labour Court would become functious officio and therefore if any application for correction if needed to be filed it should have been filed during that period. The application seeking amendment in the previous award of 2.4.1991 was admittedly filed on 21.9.1993. No justification has been given for the delay in filing this application although sub section (6) of Section 6 of the Act, 1947 does not provide any limitation for filing of the application seeking correction, nevertheless the proposition of law that emerges from a reading of the various sections of the Act, 1947 referred to herein above would leave no doubt that the application for correction of the award under section 6 sub section (6) of the Act, 1947, if at all is required, has to be filed before the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award and before the Labour Court become functious officio. Therefore, upon an analysis of the provisions of Section 6 (6), 6-A and 6-D of the Act, 1947, it is quite clear that the application seeking amendment to the award of 2.4.1991 filed on 21.9.1993 was not maintainable and could not have been allowed by the Labour Court. 17. It is also noticed that the Labour Court while allowing the application has nowhere recorded the reasons for the same. The law is well settled that the reasons are the very foundation and life blood of any judgment, order or award. Section 6(6) of the Act, 1947 restricts a correction on the grounds mentioned specifically therein and no other. In the amended award of 30.4.1997 no reasons have been given as to whether in the previous award of 2.4.1991 there was a clerical or arithmetical error or there was any accidental slip or omission which required correction. An accidental slip or omission must corelate to the facts pleaded by the parties and it is only such a correction that can be contemplated under section 6(6) of the Act, 1947. Adding a whole new relief by the Labour Court cannot be justified as being an accidental slip or omission. An accidental slip or omission must corelate to the facts pleaded by the parties and it is only such a correction that can be contemplated under section 6(6) of the Act, 1947. Adding a whole new relief by the Labour Court cannot be justified as being an accidental slip or omission. Therefore, in my view the subsequent amendment in the previous award of 2.4.1991 was absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction and not in conformity with the provisions of sub section (6) of Section 6 of the Act, 1947. 18. So far as the factual aspects of the case are concerned, what is noticed is that the Labour Court has placed its reliance upon the oral testimony of the respondent no. 2-workman where he stated that he has been in continuous service of the management. The Labour Court has recorded its very categorical finding that from Ext. E-1 to E-4 respondent no. 2 has only worked from 164.1982 to 30.4.1982, 1.5.1982 to 155.1982 and 16.6.1982 to 30.6.1982. He also noted that these exhibits which were filed by the management were the documentary evidence which were admitted by the workman and having noted the same it is rather strange and incomprehensible as to how the Labour Court goes on to note that the evidence filed by the management cannot be relied upon. Saying so, the Labour Court has illegally and arbitrarily ignored the weight of the admitted documentarey evidence on record and has only relied upon the oral statement of the workman. 19. From exhibits filed by the workman the total number of working days comes to only 90 which clearly shows that he has not worked for 240 days. No doubt in paragraph 15 of the award of 2.4.1991 the Labour Court has held that the work was taken from the workman by the management with intermittent breaks and, therefore, it constituted unfair labour practice but the admitted documentary evidence on record is to the contrary. There is nothing to show that the workman had worked prior to 16.4.1982. Even after 30.6.1982 the next working has been shown commencing 1.10.1983 after a gap of almost one year and four months. This cannot be said to be intermittent break to categorize it as unfair labour practice. 20. There is nothing to show that the workman had worked prior to 16.4.1982. Even after 30.6.1982 the next working has been shown commencing 1.10.1983 after a gap of almost one year and four months. This cannot be said to be intermittent break to categorize it as unfair labour practice. 20. In order to show if at all there was intermittent break, the Labour Court was required to show that there was work available and that fellow workmen appointed with the respondent no. 2 were working and only the respondent no. 2 was denied work. In the absence of any such finding breaks of several months or one year and 10 months will not constitute unfair labour practice. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the respondent no. 2-workman has already been paid the arrears of back wages, which is not disputed by the learned counsel for the workman. 22. For reasons aforesaid, the awards dated 2.1.1994 and 30.4.1997 are wholly illegal and arbitrary and without jurisdiction and cannot survive and are accordingly set aside. 23. The writ petition stands allowed.