JUDGMENT : Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. Heard on the question of admission. 2. This Second Appeal under section 100 of CPC has been filed against the Judgment and Decree dated 4-11-2015 passed by 2nd Additional District Judge, Shivpuri in RCA No. 31-A/2014, thereby affirming the judgment and decree dated 24-4-2014 passed by 2nd Civil Judge Class II, Shivpuri in Civil Suit No. 81-A/2012. 3. The necessary facts for the disposal of the present appeal in short are that the respondent had filed a civil suit for eviction on the ground of 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(e) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 4. It is the case of the respondent that She had purchased the house in question from Govind Das on 8-1-2010 and the appellant was a tenant in the said house at the rate of Rs.300/- per month. The suit was filed that the appellant has not paid the rent, and secondly, the plaintiff requires the suit property for her bona-fide need for residential purposes. 5. The appellant denied the plaint averments by filing the written statement. It was pleaded by him that he was inducted by Govind Das, as a tenant at the monthly rent of Rs.22/-. He is not in arrears of rent. In fact, the plaintiff-respondent, after the death of her husband, has filed the present suit in connivance with Govind Das. The appellant had tried to pay the rent to the plaintiff, but she had refused to accept the same. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff is residing in the ancestral property of her husband and, therefore, she has alternative accommodation. 6. The Trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence, decreed the suit on the ground of bona-fide need for residential purposes. 7. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the appellant filed an appeal, which too has suffered dismissal by judgment and decree dated 4-11-2015 passed in RCA No. 31-A/2014. 8. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the plaintiff herself has admitted that She is residing in the house belonging to her father-in-law and her brothers-in-law have constructed their separate houses, and thus, it is pleaded that there is an alternative accommodation available with the plaintiff. 8. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the plaintiff herself has admitted that She is residing in the house belonging to her father-in-law and her brothers-in-law have constructed their separate houses, and thus, it is pleaded that there is an alternative accommodation available with the plaintiff. Further, it is submitted that under Section 23-J of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, "Specified Landlord" has been defined and since the plaintiff falls within the definition of "Specified Landlord' ' therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff before the Civil Court was not maintainable. 9. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. 10. So far as the question of alternative accommodation is concerned, the plaintiff has admitted that She is residing in a house belonging to her father-in-law. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff does not have any house of her own. Thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had alternative accommodation, thereby dis-entitling her from seeking decree for eviction on the ground of bona-fide requirement. 11. Further, it is well-established principle of law that this Court while exercising power under section 100 of C.P.C., cannot interfere with even if the findings of facts are erroneous. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi and others reported in (2016) 3 SCC 78 has held as under: "8. "Perversity" has been the subject-matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam, (2007) 12 SCC 190 it has been held at para 11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under section 96 CPC. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram, (2010) 15 SCC 530 at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 13. The Supreme Court in the case of Pakeerappa Rai v. Seethamma Hengsu Dead by L.Rs. and others reported in (2001) 9 SCC 521 has held as under:- "2. ......... But the High Court in exercise of power under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the erroneous finding of fact howsoever gross the error seems to be......." 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur and Others v. Kaki and Others, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 has held as under:- "46. In Bholaram v. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414 a three-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 47. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held: (a) that the High Court should be satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law and not mere question of law; (b) reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded; (c) it has the duty to formulate the substantial questions of law and to put the opposite party on notice and give fair and proper opportunity to meet the point. The Court also held that it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage. 48. This Court had occasion to determine the same issue in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, (1999) 2 SCC 471 . The Court stated that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. 49. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 6 SCC 683 that the judgment rendered by the High Court under section 100 CPC without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. On this short ground alone, this appeal is required to be allowed. 50. In Kanai Lal Garari v. Murari Ganguly, (1999) 6 SCC 35 this Court has observed that it is mandatory to formulate the substantial question of law while entertaining the appeal in absence of which the judgment is to be set aside. In Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997) 4 SCC 713 and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 the Court reiterated the statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law. These judgments have been referred to in the later judgment of K. Raj v. Muthamma. A statement of law has been reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the Court in second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly delineated the scope of section 100 CPC. The Court observed that an obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the Court. In the said judgment, it was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code and Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. 52. In Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram, (2001) 5 SCC 311 the Court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. 53. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil, (2004) 5 SCC 762 this Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 54. In the same case, this Court observed that in a case where special leave petition was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with findings of fact of the lower appellate court. This Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. This Court again reminded the High Court in Commr., HRCE v. P. Shanmugama, (2005) 9 SCC 232 that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. 56. Again, this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi (2005) 10 SCC 139 has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 57. Again, in Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai (2005) 10 SCC 553 this Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 58. Again, in Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 270 this Court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. In this case, the findings of the trial court and the lower appellate court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC. This Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. 59. In H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa, (2006) 2 SCC 496 delivered on 6-2-2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. 59. In H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa, (2006) 2 SCC 496 delivered on 6-2-2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes re-appreciation of evidence. This Court found that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and needed to be set aside." 15. The Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB and Others, reported in, (2010) 13 SCC 216 has held as under:- "16. Thus, it is evident from the above that the right to appeal is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the parties or by the order of the court. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance, acquiescence, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by the legislature and conferring a court or authority with jurisdiction, is a legislative function. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with the law in force, ensuring full compliance with the conditions mentioned in the provision that creates it. Therefore, the court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provisions. A second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law, which is something distinct from a substantial question of fact. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of section 100 CPC. The existence of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of section 100 CPC. It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari; Sarjas Rai v. Bakshi Inderjit Singh; Manicka Poosali v. Anjalai Ammal; Sugani v. Rameshwar Das; Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal; P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan; Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh; V. Ramaswamy v. Ramachandran and Bhag Singh v. Jaskirat Singh.) 17. In Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529 this Court observed: "12. .... It is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in sub-section (5) of section 100 CPC. Under the proviso, the Court should be 'satisfied' that the case involves a 'substantial question of law' and not a mere 'question of law'. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be 'recorded' by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that would be alleged at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded." [Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 , pp. 445-46, para 10] 18. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 this Court observed: (AIR pp. 1637-38, para 12) "12. ... Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by Section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. 1637-38, para 12) "12. ... Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by Section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid." 19. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala, (2002) 3 SCC 634 this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 637-38, para 6) "6. ... it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible - it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection." 20. While dealing with the issue, this Court in Leela Soni v. Rajesh Goyal, (2001) 7 SCC 494 observed as under: (SCC p. 502, paras 20-22) "20. There can be no doubt that the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is confined to the framing of substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and to decide the same section 101 CPC provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in section 100 CPC. Thus it is clear that no second appeal can be entertained by the High Court on questions of fact, much less can it interfere in the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court. This is so, not only when it is possible for the High Court to take a different view of the matter but also when the High Court finds that conclusions on questions of fact recorded by the first appellate court are erroneous. 21. It will be apt to refer to section 103 CPC which enables the High Court to determine the issues of fact: * * * 22. The section, noted above, authorises the High Court to determine any issue which is necessary for the disposal of the second appeal provided the evidence on record is sufficient, in any of the following two situations: (1) when that issue has not been determined both by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court or by the lower appellate court; or (2) when both the trial court as well as the appellate court or the lower appellate court have wrongly determined any issue on a substantial question of law which can properly be the subject-matter of second appeal under section 100 CPC." 21. In Jadu Gopal Chakravarty v. Pannalal Bhowmick the question arose as to whether the compromise decree had been obtained by fraud. This Court held that though it is a question of fact, but because none of the courts below had pointedly addressed the question of whether the compromise in the case was obtained by perpetrating fraud on the court, the High Court was justified in exercising its powers under section 103 CPC to go into the question. (See also Achintya Kumar Saha v. Nanee Printers.) 22. In Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh, AIR 1993 SC 398 this Court held that in case the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under section 103 CPC, in view of the fact that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated on account of non-consideration of additional evidence of a vital nature, the Court may itself finally decide the case in accordance with section 103(b) CPC and the Court must hear the parties fully with reference to the entire evidence on record with relevance to the question after giving notice to all the parties. The Court further held as under: (Bhagwan Sharma case, SCC p. 499, para 5) "5. ... The grounds which may be available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by the court below is vitiated in law, does not by itself lead to the further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be finally arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal of the entire evidence the ultimate conclusion may go in favour of either party and it cannot be prejudged, as has been done in the impugned judgment." 23. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262 this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 278-79, para 34) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-a-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity.... The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 16. Thus, the re-appreciation of evidence and interference with the findings of fact is not permissible. This Court can interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, only when the Courts below have either ignored any material fact, nor has considered any inadmissible evidence, otherwise, this Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. 17. So far as the forum is concerned, Section 23-J of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, defines a different class of Landlords, and the plaintiff, being a widow lady, is covered by the said clause. However, Section 23-A of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, provides that the application can be filed for eviction on the ground of bona-fide requirement. No application for eviction can be filed on any other ground except the bona fide requirement, and if the landlord, may be falling within the definition of Section 23-J of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, wants to file a suit for eviction on other grounds as provided under Section 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, then the said Landlord has to file a regular suit before the Civil Court. My view is fortified by judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Sulochana v. Rajinder Singh reported in (2008) 15 SCC 538 . Thus, where a composite suit was filed on the ground of bona fide requirement as well as on the ground of default of payment of rent, then the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction filed by the "Specified Landlord". 18. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that no Substantial Question of Law arises in the present case. 19. 18. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that no Substantial Question of Law arises in the present case. 19. Resultantly, the Judgment and Decree dated 4-11-2015 passed by 2nd Additional District Judge, Shivpuri in RCA No. 31-A/2014, as well as Judgment and decree dated 24-4-2014 passed by 2nd Civil Judge Class II, Shivpuri in Civil Suit No. 81-A/2012, are hereby affirmed. The appeal fails is hereby Dismissed.