JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. 1. In all these appeals from order more or less identically worded orders dated 16th March, 2019, except in Appeal from Order No.104 of 2019 wherein the order is dated 22nd March, 2019, are subject matter of challenge and the facts and contentions are also similar and hence, the same were taken up for hearing together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The respondent-original plaintiff instituted suits being Commercial Trade Mark Suits No.12 of 2019, 13 of 2019, 14 of 2019 and 16 of 2019 respectively, before the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad praying that the defendant, their successor, servants, agents, dealers, stockists and distributors be restrained permanently and perpetually from manufacturing, marketing, advertising and selling products/goods under the Trade Marks in label Bablu Chini Noodles, Bablu Popcorn, Bablu Jeera Papad and Bablu Tarzan Snacks respectively, and other ancillary reliefs. In the above suits, the plaintiff had also filed applications for ad-interim injunction at Exhibit 7. The applications for injunction in case of the first three suits came to be heard on 16th March, 2019 and in case of Commercial Trade Mark Suit No.16 of 2019 on 22nd March, 2019, on which dates, the Commercial Court by the impugned orders passed below Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 1 in the respective cases, granted ex-parte ad-interim injunction, restraining the defendant, its successors servants, agents, dealers, stockists and distributors from committing any act of passing off the goods by selling under the Trade Mark Bablu Chini Noodles, Bablu Popcorn, Bablu Jeera Papad and Bablu Tarzan Snacks, respectively, which are ditto to ditto, identical and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiffs registered well known trade mark Bablu Chini Noodles, Bablu Popcorn, Bablu Jeera Papad and Bablu Tarzan Snacks, respectively, till the next date of hearing. The court further directed the plaintiff to comply with the provisions of Order XXXlX rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and directed that the matter be listed on 20th March, 2019. The Court also clarified that the defendant would be at liberty to move before the appropriate forum under the provisions of Order XXXIX rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court also clarified that the defendant would be at liberty to move before the appropriate forum under the provisions of Order XXXIX rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Being aggrieved the appellants (original defendants) have filed the present appeals from order under Order XLIII rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) read with section 13 of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015. 3. Mr. Harshit Tolia, learned advocate for the appellants, assailed the impugned order submitting with vehemence, that the same has been passed in breach of the provisions of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code. Referring to rule 3 of Order XXXIX, it was submitted that the same mandates that if the court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. It was submitted that in the impugned order, the Commercial Court, except for referring to the language of the statute, has not given any reasons as to why delay would defeat the cause. In support of his submissions, the learned advocate placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225 , wherein the court has adumbrated the facts which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex-parte injunction. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161 , wherein the court has held thus :- “34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the Proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said "the Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party". Before the Proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said "the Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party". The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where Court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the Court "shall record the reasons" why an ex-parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex-parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the Court about the gravity of the situation and Court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parts order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the Court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance there of will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex-parteorders have far reaching effect, as such a conditions has been imposed that Court must record reasons before passing such order. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex-parteorders have far reaching effect, as such a conditions has been imposed that Court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance of the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be 541 a surplusage for all practical purpose. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor. (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426, Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 . This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramachandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, AIR 1975 SC 915 . 35. As such whenever a Court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side. It must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex-parteorder is not passed. ..” 3.1 It was submitted that in the light of the principles enunciated in the above decision, whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex-parte order is not passed. It was submitted that for the purpose of exercising the judicial discretion while granting ex-parte ad-interim injunction, over and above the three basic ingredients, namely, (i) prima facie case, (ii) irreparable loss and (iii) balance of convenience, the court must form an opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay and must also record its reasons for its opinion. It was contended that the impugned order fails on both the counts. Firstly, there is no subjective opinion that the object of granting interim injunction would be defeated by delay; and secondly, no finding has been given as to how the factors of balance of convenience and irreparable loss are in favour of the plaintiff. It was contended that there is no proper finding as regards the existence of all the three basic ingredients necessary to grant interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff nor is there any compliance of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code. 3.2 It was urged that the Commercial Court has completely ignored the precedents laid down time and again by the Supreme Court as well as the High Court in respect of grant of ex-parte ad-interim injunction. It was submitted that ex-parte ad-interim injunction can be granted only under exceptional circumstances, whereas in the impugned order there is no finding to the effect that there are any such exceptional circumstances. It was further submitted that from the record of the case, it is apparent that the appellant was in the business since the year 2000, and hence, the suit was filed after a delay of almost nineteen years, which factor has also not been taken into consideration by the Commercial Court. It was submitted that the Commercial Court was required to consider as to whether irreparable or serious mischief would ensue to the plaintiff; however no reasons have been recorded in this regard and that the Commercial Court has merely reproduced the phrases of the relevant statutory provision. It was further submitted that the Commercial Court was also required to consider whether the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it; however, no such finding has been recorded by the Commercial Court. It was further submitted that the Commercial Court was also required to consider whether the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it; however, no such finding has been recorded by the Commercial Court. It was further submitted that the court was required to consider the time at which the plaintiff has first noticed the act complained of so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented. It was submitted that the appellant has been doing business since January 2000; however, these facts have not been considered by the Commercial Court. It was submitted that another factor which was required to be taken into consideration was whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for some time in which case, the court would not grant ex-parte injunction; whereas in the facts of the present case, the plaintiff had acquiesced since the year 2000. 3.3 Strong reliance was placed upon an unreported decision dated 14.1.2019 of this court in the case of Kinjal Lalitbhai Dave v. Red Ribbon Entertainment Pvt. Ltd, rendered in Appeal from Order No.18 of 2019, wherein the court placing reliance upon the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court and considering the facts of the case had allowed the appeal and set aside the order which was subject matter of challenge therein. It was submitted that the present case is squarely covered by the said decision. 3.4 It was submitted that the Commercial Court has failed to consider the documents produced on record by the plaintiff which clearly show that the appellant herein is carrying on business since the year 2000 and that the plaintiff despite being aware of the same has not instituted proceedings at the relevant time and now after nineteen years, when the plaintiff has come to the court, there was no question of grant of adinterim injunction. It was submitted that having regard to the facts of the case there was no imminent necessity to grant ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff. 3.5 Reliance was placed upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of 3 1 lnfotech Consumer Services Ltd v. Gujarat Narmada valley Fertilizers Co. It was submitted that having regard to the facts of the case there was no imminent necessity to grant ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff. 3.5 Reliance was placed upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of 3 1 lnfotech Consumer Services Ltd v. Gujarat Narmada valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd, 2009 (3) GLH 49 , wherein it has been held that the trial court while exercising powers of granting ex-parte ad-interim injunction without notice or hearing to the party who is to be affected by the order so passed is not only obliged to record the reasons for doing so while passing an order of injunction , it should take into consideration all the relevant factors including the factor as to how the object of grant of injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex-parte order is not passed. The court was of the view that at that stage, mere forming an opinion and observing that the entire object of the suit shall stand defeated if the ex-parte ad interim injunction is not granted, would not be sufficient, but the learned Judge has to record reasons for forming the said opinion. 3.6 It was, accordingly, urged that the impugned order passed by the Commercial Court is illegal, unjust and improper and bad in law and is, therefore, required to be quashed and set aside and the ex-parte injunction granted in favour of the respondent is required to be vacated. 3.7 As to why the appellant has chosen to prefer these appeals from order, instead of appearing before the Commercial Court and seeking vacation of the ad interim injunction, the learned advocate invited the attention of the court to the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 , wherein it has been held thus: 20. What would happen if a court does not do either of the courses? We have to bear in mind that in such a case the court would have bypassed the three protective humps which the legislature has provided for the safety of the person against whom the order was passed without affording him an opportunity to have a say in the matter. First is that the court is obliged to give him notice before passing the order. First is that the court is obliged to give him notice before passing the order. It is only by way of a very exceptional contingency that the court is empowered to bypass the said protective measure. Second is the statutory obligation cast on the court to pass final orders on the application within the period of thirty days. Here also it is only in very exceptional cases that the court can bypass such a rule in which cases the legislature mandates on the court to have adequate reasons for such bypassing and to record those reasons in writing. If that hump is also bypassed by the court it is difficult to hold that the party affected by the order should necessarily be the sole sufferer. 21. It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the court or its omissions to act according to the procedure established by law. Under the normal circumstances the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party which does not get justice due to the inaction of the court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3-A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. In such appeal, if preferred, the appellate court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate court in complying with the provisions of Rule 3-A. In appropriate cases the appellate court, apart from granting or vacating or modifying the order of such injunction, may suggest suitable action against the erring judicial officer, including recommendation to take steps for making adverse entry in his ACRs. Failure to decide the application or vacate the ex-parte temporary injunction shall, for the purposes of the appeal, be deemed to be the final order passed on the application for temporary injunction, on the date of expiry of thirty days mentioned in the Rule. 3.8 In conclusion it was submitted that the impugned orders do not satisfy the requirements of rule 3 of Order XXXIX and as such deserve to be quashed and set aside. 4. Opposing the appeals from order, Mr. S.N. Soparkar, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Ms. Pooja Acharya learned advocate for the respondent (original plaintiff), submitted that the power to grant injunction flows from section 135 of the Trade Marks Act and not Order XXXIX of the Code. Referring to the provisions of section 135 of the Trade Marks Act, it was submitted that section 135(1) read with sub-section (2) thereof entitles the court to grant injunction under that very Act and, therefore, recourse to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code may not be necessary. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 , wherein the court has held thus: “5. This Court does not normally entertain appeals against interlocutory orders. In the case of trade marks, however, keeping in perspective the endemic delay in concluding cases/suits in India because of the exponentially increasing docket explosion, temporary ad interim injunctions are of far-reaching consequences, oftentimes effectively deciding the lis and the disputes themselves. Possibly for this reason “leave” has already been granted in the present appeal. However, it is now well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that the appellate court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. We shall restrict ourselves to reference in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SC 727, wherein it has been adumbrated that the appellate court ought not to “reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion”. We shall be careful not to transgress these frontiers. 6. Before granting an ad interim injunction, the court in seisin of the litigation has to address its attention to the existence or otherwise of three aspects-(a) whether a prima facie case in favour of the applicant has been established; (b) whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the applicant; and (c) whether irreparable loss or damage will visit the applicant in the event injunctory relief is declined. We shall cogitate on the first factor first—is the law favourable to the applicant.” 4.1 It was submitted that the test is not whether the trial court elaborately discussed the relevant factors or not, the test would be whether the Commercial Court was alive to the above three aspects of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss or damage. It was submitted that the question is whether the Commercial Court has passed the order keeping in view the above principles. It was contended that the Commercial Court was conscious of its obligations and has duly considered the relevant factors and that there is no parrot like reproduction of the statutory provision in the impugned order as alleged. It was submitted that conscious about the fact that it was granting ex-parte interim relief, the Commercial Court, while passing the impugned order on 16.3.2019, had given a short date till 20.3.2019 so as to give an opportunity to the defendant at the earliest. It was submitted that on 20.3.2019, while the defendant requested that the interim injunction be vacated, they were not ready to conduct the matter. It was pointed out that even as late as on 30.3.2019, the defendant did not show willingness to conduct the matter, and hence, the Commercial Court was constrained to adjourn the matter. It was submitted that on 20.3.2019, while the defendant requested that the interim injunction be vacated, they were not ready to conduct the matter. It was pointed out that even as late as on 30.3.2019, the defendant did not show willingness to conduct the matter, and hence, the Commercial Court was constrained to adjourn the matter. It was submitted that the conduct of the appellant is required to be seen, namely that, on the one hand the present appeals from order came to be filed on 28.3.2019; whereas before the Commercial Court on 30.3.2018, the appellant had filed an application at Exhibit-18 stating that they had to obtain the necessary documents and were not in a position to file their reply and prayed for a reasonable time, and in the same application they said that they had strong objection to the interim injunction being extended. It was submitted that, therefore, on two occasions before the Commercial Court, the appellant chose not to proceed with the matter nor did it show willingness to argue the matter. It was submitted that insofar as the respondent-plaintiff is concerned, it is ready and willing to proceed with the hearing of the injunction application at the earliest, on a day to day basis. 4.2 Next it was submitted that if the order passed by the Commercial Court is a possible one, merely because another view may be possible, would not be sufficient ground for entertaining the appeal. In support of such submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of this court in the case of Patel Jasmat Sangaji v. The Gujarat Electricity Board, 1982 GLH 463, wherein the court held thus: “9. It was rightly apprehended that this view, if taken, would open gates for flooding the appellate courts with appeals and more often than not the original defendants would rush to the appellate court and would not allow the normal procedure laid down by Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code to be complied with. On careful consideration of this argument, we find that it is untenable. It proceeds on the assumption that the appellate court will readily entertain and admit such appeals and with equal readiness suspend the operation of injunctions. On careful consideration of this argument, we find that it is untenable. It proceeds on the assumption that the appellate court will readily entertain and admit such appeals and with equal readiness suspend the operation of injunctions. We, on the contrary, find that the appellate authorities would be loath to entertain and admit such appeals and they may, in normal cases, summarily reject such appeals for want of any material placed before them to challenge the ex-parte tentative decision of the trial Judge. They would be still more unwilling to suspend the judicial order of injunction passed by the judicial authority below. In other words, in the rarest of rare cases they would admit such appeals and still more in the rarest of rare cases, they would ex-parte suspend the operation of the ex-parte tentative injunctions. This power of the appellate court, therefore, is a sufficient safeguard against the possible danger ventilated in respect of the outcome of this decision of ours. This means that as per our judgment, such an appeal is technically competent, but the appellate court will exercise it cautiously by viewing all the relevant factors at the time of admission of such appeals.” 4.3 It was submitted that once the Commercial Court is conscious of the relevant factors, merely because it has not given elaborate reasons in support of its conclusion, the impugned order would not stand vitiated. 4.4 Reliance was placed upon an unreported decision dated 7/9.4.2015 of this court in the case of Nimeshchandra K. Agrawal v. Dipal Agro Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd. rendered in Civil Application No.4059 of 2015 in Special Civil Application No.5016 of 2015. Reliance was also placed upon an unreported decision dated 23.12.2015 of a learned Single Judge in the case of Angur Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Patel Chaturbhai Ranchodbhai and Co. in Appeal from Order No.373 of 2015. Reliance was also placed upon yet another unreported decision dated 23.3.2012 of this court in the case of Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Troikaa Pharmaceuticals rendered in Appeal from Order No.95 of 2012. Reference was also made to an unreported decision dated 26.10.2005 rendered in the case of M/s.Techfat India v. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd in. Appeal from Order No.350 of 2005. Reference was also made to an unreported decision dated 26.10.2005 rendered in the case of M/s.Techfat India v. Garware Wall Ropes Ltd in. Appeal from Order No.350 of 2005. 4.5 It was submitted that it is not a sequitur that merely because the trial court does not record satisfaction, there has to be an automatic reversal of the order passed by it. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd., (2011) 4 SCC 85 , wherein the court observed thus:- “92. On consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, we clearly arrive at the following findings and conclusions: (a) The respondent company's mark ‘Eenadu’ has acquired extraordinary reputation and goodwill in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The respondent company's products and services are correlated, identified and associated with the word ‘Eenadu’ in the entire State of Andhra Pradesh. ‘Eenadu’ means literally the products or services provided by the respondent company in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In this background the appellant cannot be referred or termed as an honest concurrent user of the mark `Eenadu'; (b) The adoption of the words ‘Eenadu’ is ex facie fraudulent and mala fide from the very inception. By adopting the mark ‘Eenadu’ in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the appellant clearly wanted to ride on the reputation and goodwill of the respondent company; (c) Permitting the appellant to carry on his business would in fact be putting a seal of approval of the court on the dishonest, illegal and clandestine conduct of the appellant; (d) Permitting the appellant to sell his product with the mark ‘Eenadu’ in the State of Andhra Pradesh would definitely create confusion in the minds of the consumers because the appellant is selling Agarbathies marked ‘Eenadu’ as to be designed or calculated to lead purchasers to believe that its product Agarbathies are in fact the products of the respondent company. In other words, the appellant wants to ride on the reputation and goodwill of the respondent company. In other words, the appellant wants to ride on the reputation and goodwill of the respondent company. In such a situation, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the court not only to protect the goodwill and reputation of the respondent company but also to protect the interest of the consumers; (e) Permitting the appellant to sell its product in the State of Andhra Pradesh would amount to encouraging the appellant to practise fraud on the consumers; (f) Permitting the appellant to carry on his business in the name of ‘Eenadu’ in the State of Andhra Pradesh would lead to eroding extra-ordinary reputation and goodwill acquired by the respondent company over a passage of time; (g) Appellant's deliberate misrepresentation has the potentiality of creating serious confusion and deception for the public at large and the consumers have to be saved from such fraudulent and deceitful conduct of the appellant. (h) Permitting the appellant to sell his product with the mark ‘Eenadu’ would be encroaching on the reputation and goodwill of the respondent company and this would constitute invasion of proprietary rights vested with the respondent company. (i) Honesty and fair play ought to be the basis of the policies in the world of trade and business.” 4.6 It was submitted the appellant herein wants to ride on the reputation and goodwill of the respondent. In such a situation, it was the bounden duty and obligation of the court not only to protect the goodwill and reputation of the respondent company but also to protect the interest of the consumers, and hence, the Commercial Court did not commit any error in granting ex-parte injunction. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, in matters of trademark, as a matter of course, injunction would be asked for. 4.7 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65 , wherein the court held thus: “13. In an action for passing-off it is usual, rather essential, to seek an injunction, temporary or ad interim. The principles for the grant of such injunction are the same as in the case of any other action against injury complained of. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in his favour and his suffering an irreparable injury in the absence of grant of injunction. The principles for the grant of such injunction are the same as in the case of any other action against injury complained of. The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in his favour and his suffering an irreparable injury in the absence of grant of injunction. According to Kerly (ibid, para 16.16) passing-off cases are often cases of deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, but it is well settled that fraud is not a necessary element of the right of action, and the absence of an intention to deceive is not a defence, though proof of fraudulent intention may materially assist a plaintiff in establishing probability of deception. Christopher Wadlow in Law of Passing-Off (1995 Edn., at p. 3.06) states that the plaintiff does not have to prove actual damage in order to succeed in an action for passing-off. Likelihood of damage is sufficient. The same learned author states that the defendant’s state of mind is wholly irrelevant to the existence of the cause of action for passing-off (ibid, paras 4.20 and 7.15). As to how the injunction granted by the court would shape depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where a defendant has imitated or adopted the plaintiff’s distinctive trade mark or business name, the order may be an absolute injunction that he would not use or carry on business under that name (Kerly, ibid, para 16.97). 4.8 It was submitted that thus, on the facts of the case as a matter of fact injunction ought to have been granted and has rightly been granted. 4.9 Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. Venkatsubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned advocate for the appellant and more particularly to paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20 thereof which read thus: “13. It cannot be contended that the power to pass interim ex-parte orders of injunction does not emanate from the said Rule. In fact, the said rule is the repository of the power to grant orders of temporary injunction with or without notice, interim or temporary, or till further orders or till the disposal of the suit. Hence, any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers in Rule 1 would be applicable as indicated in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. Hence, any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers in Rule 1 would be applicable as indicated in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate court or to approach the same court which passed the ex-parte order for any relief. 15. What would be the position if a court which passed the order granting interim ex-parte injunction did not record reasons thereof or did not require the applicant to perform the duties enumerated in clauses (a) & (b) of Rule 3 of Order 39. In our view such an Order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. But if a party, in whose favour an order was passed ex parte, fails to comply with the duties which he has to perform as required by the proviso quoted above, he must take the risk. Non-compliance with such requisites on his part cannot be allowed to go without any consequence and to enable him to have only the advantage of it. The consequence of the party (who secured the order) for not complying with the duties he is required to perform is that he cannot be allowed to take advantage of such order if the order is not obeyed by the other party. A disobedient beneficiary of an order cannot be heard to complain against any disobedience alleged against another party. 16. Learned Single Judge stated that the trial court ought not to have granted ex-parte injunction beyond thirty days to be in force. The said observation is based on the language contained in Order 39 Rule 3-A of the Code which reads thus: “3-A. Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite-party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability.” 17. The Rule does not say that the period of the injunction order should be restricted by the Court to thirty days at the first instance, but the Court should pass final order on it within thirty days from the day on which the injunction was granted. The Rule does not say that the period of the injunction order should be restricted by the Court to thirty days at the first instance, but the Court should pass final order on it within thirty days from the day on which the injunction was granted. Hence, the order does not ipso facto become illegal merely because it was not restricted to a period of thirty days or less. 19. The aforesaid Rule casts a three-pronged protection to the party against whom the ex-parte injunction order was passed. First is the legal obligation that the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application of injunction within the period of thirty days. Second is, the legal obligation that if for any valid reasons the Court could not finally dispose of the application within the aforesaid time the Court has to record the reasons thereof in writing. 20. What would happen if a Court does not do either of the courses? We have to bear in mind that in such a case the Court would have by-passed the three protective humps which the legislature has provided for the safety of the person against whom the order was passed without affording him an opportunity to have a say in the matter. First is that the Court is obliged to give him notice before passing the order. It is only by way of a very exceptional contingency that the Court is empowered to by-pass the said protective measure. Second is the statutory obligation cast on the Court to pass final orders on the application within the period of thirty days. Here also it is only in very exceptional cases that the Court can by-pass such a rule in which cases the legislature mandates on the court to have adequate reasons for such bypassing and to record those reasons in writing. If that hump is also bypassed by the Court it is difficult to hold that the party affected by the order should necessarily be the sole sufferer.” 4.10 It was submitted that before the Commercial Court on behalf of the plaintiff, it has been demonstrated that the documents which show that the defendant was in business in the year 2000 are fraudulent. It is in these circumstances that the Commercial Court has passed the order granting ex-parte injunction. It is in these circumstances that the Commercial Court has passed the order granting ex-parte injunction. It was submitted that while considering as to whether the requirements of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code are met with, it is the entire order which has to be looked into. Referring to the impugned order, it was submitted that the Commercial Court has referred to the submissions and the pleadings and it is on the basis thereof that the order has been passed. It was submitted that the impugned order cannot be said to be an unreasoned order and merely because on the same facts and circumstances another view may be possible, would not be sufficient reason for this court to interfere. It was urged that appeal from order being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. It was reiterated that the respondent is ready and willing to conduct the matter as and when directed by this court and that the impugned order being just, legal and proper does not warrant interference. 5. In rejoinder, Mr. Harshit Tolia, learned advocate for the appellant, invited the attention of the court to the decision of learned Single Judge of this court in the case of M/s. WIM Plast Ltd. v. M/s. Symphony Ltd. rendered on 26.4.2016 in Appeal from Order No.125 of 2016 and allied matters, wherein reliance had been placed by the appellant therein on the decision of this court in the case of Jasmat Sangaji v. Gujarat Electricity Board (supra), to submit that in the rarest of rare cases, the appeal against the ex-parte orders should be entertained and still more in the rarest of rare case, the operation of the ex-parte order should be suspended. It was pointed out that after considering all the decisions cited before it, the court was of the opinion that the trial court having committed jurisdictional error and having failed to comply with the provisions or rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code, the order made therein deserves to be set aside. 5.1 Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, wherein it has been held thus: “9. 5.1 Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, wherein it has been held thus: “9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated “is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience lies". The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.” 5.2 It was submitted that the appellant has started the enterprise and, therefore, the parameters for grant of injunction would be different and that by granting the ex-parte interim injunction, the business of the appellant has been abruptly disrupted. 5.3 Insofar as reliance placed on behalf of the respondent on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in Angur Foods Private Limited (supra) is concerned, wherein the court had refused to set aside the order granting ex-parte injunction because the affected party had come to the court on or before the returnable date, it was pointed out that the Division Bench in the case of Kinjal Lalitbhai Dave (supra) has considered the said decision and opined that having regard to the mandatory nature of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to therein, namely, that the requirement of recording the reasons for grant of ex-parte injunction cannot be held to be a mere formality and that when the statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner or not at all, the court was not inclined to non suit the appellant only on the ground that she had approached this court on the date on which the notice was made returnable. 5.4 Reference was made to the decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of 3 I Infotech Consumer Services Ltd. (supra) wherein the court had placed reliance upon an earlier decision wherein it had been observed that except bald assertion in the order to the effect that if the urgent and immediate reliefs are refused at this stage, the entire object of the suit shall stand defeated, the learned Judge has not given any reasons as to how and in which manner the object of filing the suit was going to be defeated by refusal of mandatory ad-interim injunction without issuing notice to the other side. It was submitted that in this case the Commercial Court has merely reproduced the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code, but no reasons have been assigned. As regards the other three parameters, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it was submitted that sufficient reasons have not been given by the Commercial Court in support of its conclusions. As regards the other three parameters, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it was submitted that sufficient reasons have not been given by the Commercial Court in support of its conclusions. 5.5 Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225 , wherein it has been held thus: “36. As a principle, ex-parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex-parte injunction are- (a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve; (c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented; (d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex-parte injunction; (e) the court would expect a party applying for ex-parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application. (f) even if granted, the ex-parte injunction would be for a limited period of time. (g) General principles like prima facie case balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court. “ 5.6 It was urged that the Commercial Court, in the impugned order, has reproduced the phrases of the statute without assigning any reasons therefor, without complying with the requirements of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code, and hence, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside and all the appeals from order deserve to be allowed. 6. The main controversy involved in the present case is whether the impugned order meets with the requirements of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code which have been held to be of a mandatory nature in a catena of decisions. 7. Before adverting to the merits of the case, reference may be made to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code, which reads thus: "3. 7. Before adverting to the merits of the case, reference may be made to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code, which reads thus: "3. Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party.--The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party : Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant- (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with - (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day Immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent." 8. Thus, rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code mandates that in the ordinary course, the court would direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party before granting any relief to the plaintiff. It, however, carves out an exception in case where it appears to the court that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay. However, at the same time while granting an ex-parte injunction, an obligation is cast upon the court by virtue of the proviso thereto to the effect that where the court proposes to grant an injunction without notice of the application to the opposite party, it shall record reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. 9. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the requirements of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX have not been satisfied, while on behalf of the respondent it has been contended that on reading the impugned order as a whole, it is clear that the requirements have been satisfied. On behalf of the respondent it has further been submitted that the grant of interim injunction in a trade mark case would be governed by the provisions of section 135 of the Trade Marks Act, as the said Act itself has made provisions in this regard. 10. In the backdrop of the facts and contentions noted hereinabove, the question that arises for consideration is whether the grant of ad-interim injunction would be governed by the provisions of section 135 of the Trade Mark Act or rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code? The impugned order has been assailed mainly on the ground that it does not meet with the requirements of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code. Therefore, the impugned order may be examined to ascertain as to whether or not it meets with the requirements of rule 3 of Order XXXIX. If the answer is in the affirmative, it would not be necessary to enter into the merits of the larger question as to whether the grant of interim injunction would be governed by the provisions of section 135 of the Trade Marks Act or rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code. 11. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Commercial Court has referred to the submissions of the learned advocate for the plaintiff and has further recorded that in support of its case the plaintiff has shown the status of its various applications and its period of user for its various products in paragraph 9 of the application. 11. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Commercial Court has referred to the submissions of the learned advocate for the plaintiff and has further recorded that in support of its case the plaintiff has shown the status of its various applications and its period of user for its various products in paragraph 9 of the application. The plaintiff has also produced a comparison chart of the products of the plaintiff as well as the products of the defendant and has contended that the trademark labels were adopted and were being used by the plaintiff prior to the defendant and that the defendant has dishonestly adopted and is using an identical and/or deceptively similar mark along with the same colour combination and artistic work with the intention of harassing the plaintiff and destroying its reputation and creating confusion amongst the consumers, dealers and customers of the plaintiff so as to create a belief that the products sold by the defendant belonged to the plaintiff. The Commercial Court has further recorded that on behalf of the plaintiff various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts were relied upon on the basis of which the learned counsel for the plaintiff requested that an ex-parte ad-interim injunction be granted in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, while recording its findings, the Commercial Court has recorded that it has considered the averments, pleadings and statements made in the plaint and the application as well as the documents on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. After considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, the Commercial Court has found that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case; if the defendant is not restrained, the plaintiff would be likely to suffer huge economic loss; and that the balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, all the three ingredients for claiming of ad-interim injunction are in favour of the plaintiff. 11.1 The Commercial Court has further recorded that considering the facts and circumstances of the case and after going through the documentary evidence produced on record, prima facie, at this stage, the interest of the plaintiff requires to be protected to a certain extent, without hearing the other side, otherwise the purpose of filing the application would be frustrated and if ex-parte ad-interim injunction to some extent is not granted, delay would defeat justice. 12. True it is that the Commercial Court while recording satisfaction regarding the three ingredients for grant of interim injunction and for the purpose of granting ex-parte injunction without notice to the opposite parties has not assigned specific reasons as to what weighed with the court for coming to such conclusion. Nonetheless, the court has recorded that such satisfaction has been arrived at based on the pleadings, submissions and the documents on record which have been referred to in the earlier part of the order. On behalf of the respondent, the learned counsel had drawn the attention of the court to the documents on record which indicate that the appellant (defendant) had commenced business in the year 2000 and on the basis of which the learned counsel for the appellant had submitted that despite such material showing prior use of the appellant, the Commercial Court was not justified in granting ex-parte ad-interim injunction. Referring to such documents, the learned counsel for the respondent also pointed out to the court as to why the plaintiff was contending that such documents were forged and fraudulent and submitted that this aspect was also brought to the notice of the Commercial Court. The learned counsel for the respondent also produced for the perusal of the court packets of the product of the plaintiff and the defendant to point out how similar they were to each other. It was submitted that it was on the basis of such material that the Commercial Court has recorded satisfaction as regards the three factors for grant of interim injunction and for the purpose of grant of ex-parte injunction. 13. At this juncture, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. Venkatsubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (supra) wherein it has been held thus: “15. What would be the position if a court which passed the order granting interim ex-parte injunction did not record reasons thereof or did not require the applicant to perform the duties enumerated in clauses (a) & (b) of Rule 3 of Order 39. In our view such an Order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. In our view such an Order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. But if a party, in whose favour an order was passed ex parte, fails to comply with the duties which he has to perform as required by the proviso quoted above, he must take the risk. Non-compliance with such requisites on his part cannot be allowed to go without any consequence and to enable him to have only the advantage of it. The consequence of the party (who secured the order) for not complying with the duties he is required to perform is that he cannot be allowed to take advantage of such order if the order is not obeyed by the other party. A disobedient beneficiary of an order cannot be heard to complain against any disobedience alleged against another party.” 14. In the opinion of this court, there is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the test is not whether the Commercial Court has elaborately discussed the reasons for grant of ex-parte order, the test is whether the court was conscious of the relevant considerations for grant of ex-parte ad-interim injunction and has considered the same while passing such order. 15. Reading the impugned order as a whole, it is clear that the Commercial Court was alive to the relevant factors which are to be taken into consideration for the purpose of grant of ex-parte ad-interim injunction and has also recorded satisfaction as regards the ingredients for grant of ex-parte injunction being satisfied. 16. Though the impugned order cannot be said to be a well reasoned order, at the same time, it cannot be said that the court has not applied its mind to the relevant factors. As noticed earlier, the court has specifically recorded that the principles for grant of ad-interim injunction, namely, prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff suffering irreparable injury and has also found that if ex-parte interim injunction will not be granted, the delay would defeat justice. As noticed earlier, the court has specifically recorded that the principles for grant of ad-interim injunction, namely, prima facie case, availability of balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff suffering irreparable injury and has also found that if ex-parte interim injunction will not be granted, the delay would defeat justice. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of A. Venkatsubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (supra), if a court passes an order granting ex-parte injunction but does not record reasons thereof, such an order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. Adverting to the impugned order, it is not possible to state that it is an absolutely non-reasoned order wherein parrot like reference is made to the statutory provisions and reading the impugned order as a whole, it is not possible to state that the requirements of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code are not met with. As discussed earlier, the Commercial Court has not assigned elaborate reasons for granting ex-parte injunction, but from the facts and contentions recorded by it, it is evident that the court has applied its mind to the same and on that basis, has found that the principles of grant of ex-parte injunction are duly complied with. 17. In Kinjal Lalitbhai Dave (supra), this court, after considering the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove, has held that it is mandatory for the court to record its reasons, howsoever briefly, as to why it proposes to grant ex-parte interim injunction without giving notice to the opposite party. Moreover, the party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of order of restraint against a party without affording an opportunity to him of being heard must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and the court has to briefly consider these factors in the ex-parte order. 18. In the opinion of this court, considering the impugned order as a whole it cannot be said that the Commercial Court has not recorded brief reasons for grant of ex-parte interim injunction. 18. In the opinion of this court, considering the impugned order as a whole it cannot be said that the Commercial Court has not recorded brief reasons for grant of ex-parte interim injunction. In the light of the fact that this court has found that the requirements of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code are substantially satisfied, it is not necessary to go into the larger question as to whether the grant of interim injunction in a trade mark case would be governed by section 135 of the Trade Marks Act, which again is a debatable issue and no proper submissions have been made in that regard. 19. While it would be an ideal situation if the trial court passes an order duly discussing the factors which weighed with it for the grant of ex-parte injunction as adumbrated by the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das (supra); however, if the order reflects due application of mind to such factors, merely because such order does not discuss such factors in detail, it would not stand vitiated on account of lack of elaborate discussion. 20. As regards the scope of interference with the impugned order which is in the nature of an interlocutory order, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 , wherein the court held thus: “5. This Court does not normally entertain appeals against interlocutory orders. In the case of trademarks, however, keeping in perspective the endemic delay in concluding cases/suits in India because of the exponentially increasing docket explosion, temporary ad interim injunctions are of far reaching consequences, oftentimes effectively deciding the lis and the disputes themselves. Possibly for this reason ‘Leave’ has already been granted in the present Appeal. However, it is now well entrenched in our jurisprudence that the Appellate Court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. However, it is now well entrenched in our jurisprudence that the Appellate Court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. We shall restrict ourselves to reference in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. 1990 Supp SCC 727, wherein it has been adumbrated that the Appellate Court ought not to “reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion”. We shall be careful not to transgress these frontiers. 6 Before granting an ad interim injunction, the Court in seisen of the litigation has to address its attention to the existence or otherwise of three aspects- (a) whether a prima facie case in favour of the applicant has been established; (b) whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the applicant; and (c) whether irreparable loss or damage will visit the applicant in the event injunctory relief is declined.” 21. The court, in the above decision, has held that the appellate court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. At the cost of reiteration, it may be stated that is not possible to state that the impugned order is palpably perverse so as to warrant interference at this stage of grant of ex-parte interim injunction when the parties are yet to be heard on the application for injunction. Besides, the impugned order is an ex-parte order granting ad interim injunction; therefore, all that the concerned court would record is a prima facie view based upon the pleadings and submissions advanced on behalf of the plaintiff and the record before it. Besides, the impugned order is an ex-parte order granting ad interim injunction; therefore, all that the concerned court would record is a prima facie view based upon the pleadings and submissions advanced on behalf of the plaintiff and the record before it. Such an order cannot be expected to contain detailed reasons as an order granting injunction after bi partite hearing. 22. Another aspect of the matter is that while by the impugned order, the matter was posted immediately that is on 20th March, 2019, on that date on account of request made on behalf of the appellant, the matter was adjourned to 30th March, 2019, on which date, the appellant once against sought reasonable time to file its reply, whereupon the Commercial Court has posted the matter on 28th June, 2019. To be fair to the appellant on both dates, namely, 20th March, 2019 and 30th March, 2019, the learned advocate appearing on its behalf did request the court to vacate the ad-interim injunction; however, from the record it appears that the learned advocate was not ready to proceed with the injunction application on merits. Under the circumstances, when the court has once granted ex-parte interim injunction, the question of vacating the same merely on the request of the defendant without the matter being argued on merits would not arise. Nonetheless, rule 3A of Order XXXIX of the Code provides thus: “3-A Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability.” 23. Having regard to the provisions of rule 3A of Order XXXIX of the First Schedule to the Code, the Commercial Court ought to have made an endeavour to finally dispose of the injunction application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted. Merely because the defendant had prayed for time was no reason to do away with the requirements of rule 3A of Order XXXIX of the Code. Merely because the defendant had prayed for time was no reason to do away with the requirements of rule 3A of Order XXXIX of the Code. However, the learned counsel for the respondent has shown willingness to proceed with the hearing of the matter at the earliest and the learned advocate for the appellant has also agreed to the matter being heard at the earliest on a day to day basis. Therefore, the requirements of rule 3A of Order XXXIX of the Code can be taken care to a certain extent. 24. In the light of the above discussion, this court does not find any infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the Commercial Court so as to warrant interference. 25. In the result, the appeals fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. The impugned orders dated 16th March, 2019 and 22nd March, 2019 passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad below applications Exhibit-7 and Exhibit-1 in Commercial Trademark Suits No.12 of 2019, 13 of 2019, 14 of 2019 and 16 of 2019 respectively, are hereby confirmed. It is, however, directed that the appellant/defendant shall file its reply within a period of three days from today. The respondent (original plaintiff) shall file its rejoinder thereto, if any, within a period of two days from the date of receipt of a copy of the reply. The Commercial Court shall thereafter endeavour to hear the application Exhibit-7 and decide the same finally as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.