JUDGMENT : Kh. Nobin Singh, J. 1. Heard Shri Serto T. Kom, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Shri A. Bimol, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents No. 2 & 3 assisted by Shri Sashi, learned advocate and Shri Vashum, the learned Government Advocate for the respondent No. 1. By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ to direct the respondents No. 2 & 3 to release/pay all amounts already sanctioned by the respondent No. 3 within a specified time. 2.1. Facts and circumstances as narrated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner is the proprietor of a firm called "M/s. Manipur Medical Equipment Traders, Imphal" having its head office at Kangabam Leikai, Imphal and is registered under the Manipur Value Added Tax Rule, 2005 and the Central Sales Tax (Registration & Turnover) Rules, 1957. 2.2. As the petitioner was selected from amongst the various bidders to supply of Multi Parameter Patient Monitors Model No. A3 Aspen (NIBP, SPO2, ECG & ETCO2) which is a higher version of the Bedside Monitors vide Resolution No. 5 of the Purchase Advisory Board, JNEVIS (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") in its meeting held on 04.12.2013 and also being satisfied with the firm's supply of products in time with quality, the petitioner's firm was informed to submit/quote the price of the Bedside Monitors of Aspen Company [NIBP, SPO2 & ECG] for supplying the same to JNIMS. The petitioner's firm quoted the price of the said Bedside Monitors at the rate of Rs. 2,49,500/- (Rupees two lakhs forty nine thousand five hundred) per set exclusive of taxes for the supply of 40 in number. A meeting of the Board, JNIMS along with the Director, JNIMS and other members/special invitees, was held on 24.04.2014 and by the resolution of agenda No. 1 of the said meeting, the Board resolved to purchase 40 (forty) numbers of Bedside Monitors @ Rs. 2,49,500/- (Rupees two lakhs forty nine thousand five hundred) from the petitioner's firm which is higher version of the bedside monitors vide Resolution No. 5 of the Board's Meeting held on 04.12.2013. 2.3. 2,49,500/- (Rupees two lakhs forty nine thousand five hundred) from the petitioner's firm which is higher version of the bedside monitors vide Resolution No. 5 of the Board's Meeting held on 04.12.2013. 2.3. The respondent No. 2 in his capacity as the Director, JNIMS issued supply order dated 09.06.2014, along with the terms and conditions, in favour of the petitioner's firm and the amount indicated in respect of 20 Bedside Monitors was Rs. 56,63,560/-. Similarly, the respondent No. 2 issued another supply order dated nil July 2014 in favour of the petitioner's firm for the supply of additional 20 Bedside Monitors for which total amount was Rs. 56,63,560/-. In execution of the said supply orders, the petitioner's firm supplied 20 Bedside Monitors to the JNIMS on 28.6.2014 and 1.7.2014 which were checked and received by the officials of JNIMS on 7.8.2014. After the said 40 (forty) Bedside Monitors having been delivered, the petitioner with the help of experts and technicians imparted training to the Nurses, Doctors and other related staffs of the JNIMS for proper and effective operation of the said Bedside Monitors. Since the respondents were fully satisfied with the supplied goods, there was no any complaint or report of malfunction of the said supplied Bedside Monitors and accordingly, the respondent No. 3 issued 5 sanction orders in respect of 20 numbers of supplied Bedside Monitors amounting to Rs. 56,63,650/-. Although the respondent No. 3 had already sanctioned a total amount of Rs. 56,63,650/- in the month of July & August, 2014, he without any valid reason, refused to release the same amount which prompted the petitioner to issue a demand notice dated 20.11.2014 requesting the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 for making payment but no payment was made to the petitioner's firm. Being aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondents, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition on the inter-alia grounds that the acts of the respondents are arbitrary and illegal, because of which the petitioner's firm had suffered financial loss. 3. On 17.04.2015 when the writ petition was listed before this Court for motion, the notice was issued to the respondents but despite several opportunities being granted to the respondents thereafter, no counter was filed and on 29.02.2016, 3(three) weeks' time as last opportunity was granted to the respondents, in the interest of justice, for filing counter subject to payment of Rs. 2000/- (Rupees two thousand) as costs to be paid to the petitioner. While the writ petition was pending, the respondents issued an order cancelling the said sanction orders. Accordingly, the petitioner moved an application being MC (W.P (C)) No. 88 of 2016 and after the same being allowed, the petitioner was directed to file a recast petition which was duly filed as directed by this Court. On 13.7.2016 when the last opportunity was granted for filing counter in the recast petition, it was filed on behalf of respondents No. 2 & 3. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents No. 2 & 3, the receipt of the said Bedside Monitors was not denied but it has been submitted that the sanctioned orders have been cancelled vide order dated 16.03.2016 stating that the petitioner's firm vide its letter dated 18.02.2014 submitted a price quotation quoting his best price @ Rs. 2,49,500/- (rupees two lakh forty-nine thousand five hundred) and without floating any open tender, the Board of the JNIMS in its meeting held on 24.05.2014 recommended to purchase the said 40 (forty) Bedside Monitors from the petitioner's firm. The supplied orders were subject to the terms and conditions of which one being that the JNIMS authorities reserve the sole right of a final decision in case any dispute whatsoever arises. Shri P. Shanti Kumar Singh who claims to be the partner of the petitioner's firm, submitted two letters dated 2.9.2014 and 17.12.2014 to the Director, JNIMS informing that the actual price per one Bedside Monitor was Rs. 39,000/- (rupees thirty nine thousand) only. He submitted the original invoice after verifying the same with the authorities of the Aspen Diagnostic Private Limited, Delhi. After having received the said information, the JNIMS authorities verified it at the higher level and after due consideration, the authorities of JNIMS were of the view that the price quoted by the petitioner's firm was six times more than the actual price and that if the payment was made, it would not only be wastage of public money but it would also set a very bad precedent in future. Accordingly, a show cause notice dated 03.03.2016 was issued to the petitioner's firm for which no reply was given on the ground that the matter was pending before this Court. Accordingly, a show cause notice dated 03.03.2016 was issued to the petitioner's firm for which no reply was given on the ground that the matter was pending before this Court. The sanctioned orders were cancelled vide order dated 16.03.2016 and after the same being cancelled, the JNIMS authorities issued another order dated 04.04.2016 sanctioning an amount of Rs. 18,01,800/- (rupees eighteen lakh one thousand eight hundred) for payment of the said 40 Bedside Monitors supplied by the petitioner's firm. 5. It has been submitted by Shri Serto T. Kom, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner is a businessman and the transaction involved herein is a commercial transaction. The Bedside Monitors were supplied by the petitioner's firm on the bass of supplied orders issued by the JNIMS and that too, after the rate quoted by the petitioner's firm being approved by the Board of the JNIMS. After the Bedside Monitors being received, since there was no complaint from any quarter and being satisfied with them, the sanction orders were issued by the respondent No. 3 on various dates in the months of July and August, 2014. Despite demand notice dated 20.11.2014 being issued by the petitioner's firm, no payment was made which prompted the petitioner to approach this Court by way of the instant writ petition. While the writ petition was pending and after about a year and half, the respondent No. 3 issued a show cause notice dated 03.03.2016 as to why the sanction orders should not cancelled, to which a reply was given by his firm stating that this court was seized with the matter. The said sanction orders were cancelled vide order dated 16.03.2016 on the ground that the rate of the Bedside Monitor was found to be exorbitantly higher than the MRP thereof. A recast petition was filed questioning the order of cancellation dated 16.3.2014 which, according to the counsel appearing for the petitioner, is bad in law as it amounted to interfering with the administration of Justice; that the cancellation of sanction orders was unreasonable and arbitrary for the reason that the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 had accepted the supply of 12 Bedside Monitors by M/S Sangai Enterprises, Imphal at the rate of Rs. 12,85,500/- per Bedside Monitor; that on account of the failure on the part of the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 had accepted the supply of 12 Bedside Monitors by M/S Sangai Enterprises, Imphal at the rate of Rs. 12,85,500/- per Bedside Monitor; that on account of the failure on the part of the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in releasing the amount, the petitioner had suffered huge financial loss and that the sanction orders were cancelled without cancelling the resolution of the Board and the supply orders issued by the JNIMS. In support of his contention, he has relied upon some of the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Firstly, in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function as regards the applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, observed as under: "10. .....The net effect of these and other decisions was that the duty to act judicially need not be super-added, but it may be spelt out from the nature of the powered conferred, the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights of the person affected and where it is found to exist, the rules of natural justice would be attracted." In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. Vs. State of UP & Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 212 , wherein the question was as to whether the impugned circular was amenable to judicial review and if yes, was it liable to be quashed as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India being arbitrary, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "21. The Preamble of the Constitution of India resolves to secure to all its citizens Justice, social, economic and political; and Equality of status and opportunity. Every State action must be aimed at achieving this goal. Part IV of the Constitution contains Directives Principles of State Policy' which are fundamental in the governance of the country and are aimed at securing social and economic freedoms by appropriate State action which is complementary to individual fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III for protection against excesses of State action, to realise the vision in the Preamble. Part IV of the Constitution contains Directives Principles of State Policy' which are fundamental in the governance of the country and are aimed at securing social and economic freedoms by appropriate State action which is complementary to individual fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III for protection against excesses of State action, to realise the vision in the Preamble. This being the philosophy of the Constitution, can it be said that it contemplates exclusion of Article 14 - non-arbitrariness which is basic to rule of law - from State actions in contractual field when all actions of the State are meant for public good and expected to be fair and just? We have no doubt that the Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the Preamble. In our opinion, it would be alien to the constitutional scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of (sic) matters. The scope and permission grounds of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be available are different matters but that does not justify the view of its total exclusion. This is more so when the modern trend is also to examine the unreasonableness of a term in such contracts where the bargaining power is unequal so that these are not negotiated contracts but standard form contracts between unequals. 35. It is now too well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basic to the rule of law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind." In R.N. Gosain Vs. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind." In R.N. Gosain Vs. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage". [See: Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd., Scrutton, L.J.] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 16, "after taking an advantage under an order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside", (para 1508)." In Sushila Chemicals (P) Ltd. Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 388 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held; "20. It is settled by a series of decisions of this Court starting from Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. that even in the domain of contractual matters, the High Court can entertain a writ petition on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution when the impugned act of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable or in breach of obligations under public law." 6. On the other hand, it has been submitted by Shri A. Bimol, Senior Advocate appearing for the JNIMS that the offer dated 18.02.2014 was made by the petitioner's firm submitting price quotation without any tender being floated by the JNIMS. The supplied orders were issued subject to the terms and conditions, one of which being that the JNIMS authorities reserve the sole right of a final decision in case any dispute whatsoever arises. When the JNIMS came to know from the information furnished by Shri P. Shanti Kumar Singh who claims to be the partner of the petitioner's firm that the actual price per one Bedside Monitor was Rs. When the JNIMS came to know from the information furnished by Shri P. Shanti Kumar Singh who claims to be the partner of the petitioner's firm that the actual price per one Bedside Monitor was Rs. 39,000/- (rupees thirty nine thousand), the JNIMS authorities verified the same at the higher level and after due consideration, the authorities of the JNIMS were of the view that the price quoted by the petitioner's firm was six times more than the actual price and that if such payment was made, it would not only be wastage of public money but it would also set a very bad precedent in future. Therefore, after a show cause notice dated 03.03.2016 being issued, the sanctioned orders were cancelled vide order dated 16.03.2016 and after the same being cancelled, the JNIMS authorities issued another order dated 04.04.2016 sanctioning an amount of Rs. 18,01,800/- (rupees eighteen lakh one thousand eight hundred) for payment of the said 40 Bedside Monitors supplied by the petitioner's firm. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Rajasthan Housing Board & Anr. Vs G.S. Investments & Anr. (2007) 1 SCC 477 , the Rajasthan Housing Board published an auction notice for auction of 50 commercial plots, the highest bid was Rs. 5750/- per square meter. A news item was published in the newspaper that a large scale bungling had been done in the auction. The State Government intervened in the matter by summoning the records and issued a direction that the officers who were responsible, be placed under suspension. After a detailed consideration, the State Government issued an order disapproving the auction and accordingly, the auction was cancelled which came to be challenged in the high Court which, while disposing of the petition, directed that the representation of the petitioner be considered and disposed of. The appeal preferred against it was rejected by the Division Bench of the High Court. While allowing the appeal arising out of it, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "11. The sale of plots by the Rajasthan Housing Board by means of an auction is essentially a commercial transaction. The appeal preferred against it was rejected by the Division Bench of the High Court. While allowing the appeal arising out of it, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "11. The sale of plots by the Rajasthan Housing Board by means of an auction is essentially a commercial transaction. Even if some defect was found in the ultimate decision resulting in cancellation of the auction, the Court should exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution with great care and caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether it should interfere with the decision of the authority. In the present case, there was enough material before the State Government to show that in the past plots in the area had fetched a price of Rs. 10,000 per square metre and the highest bid made by the respondent in the present case was nearly half i.e. Rs. 5750 per square metre, which clearly indicated that the auction had not been conducted in a fair manner. If in such a case the State Government took a decision to disapprove the auction held and issued a direction for holding of a fresh auction, obviously the said decision was taken in larger public interest. In these circumstances there was absolutely no occasion for the High Court to entertain the writ petition and issue any direction in favour of the contesting respondent. The orders passed by the learned Single Judge on 4.8.2004 and the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 23.9.2004 are clearly erroneous in law and are liable to be set aside." In Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 517 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made "lawfully" and not to check whether choice or decision is "sound". When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: "the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached"; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action." In Siemens Aktiengeselischaft and Siemens Ltd. Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 288 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "23. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 288 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "23. There is no gainsaying that in any challenge to the award of contract before the High Court and so also before this Court what is to be examined is the legality and regularity of the process leading to award of contract. What the Court has to constantly keep in mind is that it does not sit in appeal over the soundness of the decision. The Court can only examine whether the decision-making process was fair. reasonable and transparent. In cases involving award of contracts, the Court ought to exercise judicial restraint where the decision is bona fide with no perceptible injury to public interest." In Sri Ram Builders Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (2014) 14 SCC 102 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "58. In the ultimate analysis, the whole controversy boils down to a breach of contract by M.P. RTC entered into with the appellant. The scope of judicial review is very limited in contractual matters even where one of the contracting parties is the State or an instrumentality of the State. The parameters within which power of judicial review can be exercised, has been authoritatively laid down by this Court in a number of cases. 59. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India this Court upon detailed consideration of the parameters within which judicial review could be exercised, has culled out the following principles: (SCC pp. 675 & 677, paras 70 & 77) "70. It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. 77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be: (1) whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? (2) committed an error of law, (3) committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, (4) reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached, or (5) abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time." 60. In our opinion, the case put forward by the appellant would not be covered by the aforesaid ratio of law laid down by this Court. The High Court, in our opinion, has rightly observed that the appellant can seek the appropriate relief by way of a civil suit. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not normally grant the relief of specific performance of a contract. This view is supported by Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra. This Court relying upon the earlier decision in Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa held as under: (Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad case, SCC p. 607, paras 50-51) "50. ... this Court would not enforce specific performance of contract where damages would be adequate remedy. This view is supported by Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra. This Court relying upon the earlier decision in Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa held as under: (Ramchandra Murarilal Bhattad case, SCC p. 607, paras 50-51) "50. ... this Court would not enforce specific performance of contract where damages would be adequate remedy. It was also held that conduct of the parties would also play an important role. 51. The expansive role of courts in exercising its power of judicial review is not in dispute. But as indicated hereinbefore, each case must be decided on its own facts." 7. It is well settled that the decision making process of the State should be transparent, fair and open. Reasonableness and fairness is the heart and soul of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In other words, the Government ought to act fairly and reasonably. Article 14 strikes at the root of any kind of unreasonable and arbitrary actions of the State or its instrumentalists. In a catena of decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an order passed by a public authority exercising administrative/executive or statutory powers must be judged by the reasons stated in the order or any record or file contemporaneously maintained. The State action must be supported by some valid reasons and should be upon due application of mind. It has to be examined whether the Government had given sufficient reasons for the order it passed, at the time of passing the order. The Government does not have a carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. It must be informed and impregnated with reasons. From the decisions relied upon by the counsels appearing for parties, it is seen that even in matters relating to contracts or commercial transactions, the Government ought to act fairly and reasonably and the High Court can entertain a writ petition on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution when the impugned act of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable or in breach of obligations under public law. The only exception that has been carved out, is that while exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, the larger public interest shall always be kept in view by the High Court as is evident from the decision rendered in Air India Ltd. Vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 also wherein it has been held that the law relating to award of a contract has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the relevant para 7 of which is as under: "7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., Tata Cellular v. Union of India, Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene." 8. It is not in dispute that the rate quoted by the petitioner's firm was examined and considered by the Board. JNIMS in its meeting held on 24.4.2014 and after the same being approved by it, the respondent No. 3 issued the supply orders dated 9.6.2014 and dated nil, July, 2014 along with the terms and conditions. The petitioner's firm, in execution of the supply orders, supplied the Bedside Monitors on 28.6.2014; 1.7.2014 and 7.8.2014, the delivery of which was received through chalans, after the same being checked by the Store-in-charge, JNIMS and thereafter, they were installed with the help of experts and the doctors, nurses etc. were given proper training thereof. In order to make payments for the supply of the said Bedside Monitors, the respondent No. 3 issued sanction orders but before the payments were made, the same were cancelled and a new order dated 04.04.2016 was issued sanctioning Rs. 18,01,800/- towards the payment. 9. The short question that arises for consideration is as to whether the cancellation of sanction orders dated 10.7.2014, 25.7.2015, 12.8.14 and 20.8.2014 and the issuance of another order dated 4.4.16, in place thereof, sanctioning a sum of Rs. 18,01,800/- is reasonable and arbitrary. Normally, in such commercial transactions for supply of goods in which the Government is involved, an open tender is to be floated or in case of emergency, the authority concerned takes a decision to buy items from the market after examining and considering the rates of quotation of at least three firms/companies/persons etc. 18,01,800/- is reasonable and arbitrary. Normally, in such commercial transactions for supply of goods in which the Government is involved, an open tender is to be floated or in case of emergency, the authority concerned takes a decision to buy items from the market after examining and considering the rates of quotation of at least three firms/companies/persons etc. In the present case, such an exercise appears to have not been undertaken by the JNIMS for the reason best known to it and on the contrary, the petitioner's firm submitted an application quoting his rate of price which was considered and approved by the Board. After going through the proceedings of the Board in its meeting held on 24.5.2014, it is seen that it referred to its earlier resolution taken on 04.12.2013 thereby showing that some other Bedside Monitors supplied earlier by the petitioner's firm were found to be of higher version. Probably, on that basis, the rate quoted by the petitioner's firm was approved by the Board and pursuant thereto, the respondent No. 3 issued the supply orders. Although the Bedside Monitors were supplied by the petitioner's firm accordingly, the said sanction orders were cancelled by the JNIMS without cancelling or withdrawing the resolution of the Board and the supply orders. Moreover, there is no material on record to show that any action was taken by the JNIMS authorities against the Board and in particular, the officers who were its members including the Director. But one aspect which needs to be considered by this Court is that the Bedside Monitors were required in the JNIMS for public purpose for which payments were to be made from the public fund. Moreover, there is no malafide allegation against the respondents except that the action of the respondents was unreasonable. The reason assigned by the respondents for refusal of payment was that the rate quoted by the petitioner's firm was on the higher side as per the information furnished by Shri P. Shantikumar Singh to the effect that the MRP of the Bedside Monitor was Rs. 39000/- only per set. Over and above, the JNIMS authorities appear to have taken such a decision due to change of guards of the JNIMS. But in any case, there is a gulf of difference between Rs. 2,49,500/- and Rs. 39000/- only per set. Over and above, the JNIMS authorities appear to have taken such a decision due to change of guards of the JNIMS. But in any case, there is a gulf of difference between Rs. 2,49,500/- and Rs. 39000/- in respect of the same item and had the payment been made, the public would have lost a huge amount. Therefore, it cannot be said that the act of the respondents cancelling the sanction orders, was unreasonable and arbitrary. Keeping in mind the public interest for which the earlier sanction orders were cancelled by the JNIMS, the interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not called for. But the fact remains that the Bed-side Monitors were supplied by the petitioner's firm and the same are being used by the JMINS for the general public and moreover, since the JNIMS had issued an order dated 04.04.2016 sanctioning a sum of Rs. 18,01,800/- towards payment of the bills of the petitioner's firm, there is no reason as to why the same shall not be given to the petitioner's firm. As the transaction involved herein is a commercial one, the petitioner's firm cannot be denied of a reasonable profit. It is nowhere stated in the terms and conditions prescribed by the JNIMS that the Bedside Monitors shall be supplied by the petitioner's firm only at MRP thereof. It may be noted that the rate quoted by the petitioner's firm was approved by none other than the Board of the JNIMS whose resolution remains undisturbed and it is also the petitioner's firm which had earlier supplied Bedside Monitors to the JNIMS with no complaint thereof from any quarter. The contract stands performed completely by the petitioner's firm and it is only the JNIMS which has to perform its part as regards the payment of the costs of the Bedside Monitors. In the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the jurisdiction of this court is limited and cannot go beyond what has been observed hereinabove. In case the petitioner's firm is aggrieved by the said amount with a marginal profit and interest thereon, it is open to it to claim the balance or the damages in a civil Court. 10. In case the petitioner's firm is aggrieved by the said amount with a marginal profit and interest thereon, it is open to it to claim the balance or the damages in a civil Court. 10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is disposed of with the following directions: (a) The respondents and in particular, the respondent No. 3 shall pay to the petitioner's firm the sum of Rs. 18,01,800/- (Rupee eighteen lakhs one thousand and eight hundred) with 10% thereof as a profit margin making it a total of Rs. 19,81,980/- (Rupees nineteen lakhs eighty-one thousand and nine hundred eighty) only within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order; (b) The respondent No. 3 shall pay to the petitioner's firm the above amount of Rs. 19,81,980/- (Rupees nineteen lakhs eighty-one thousand and nine hundred eighty) only with interest thereon @ 9% from the date on which the Bedside Monitors were supplied by the petitioner's firm till the date of payment; (c) If the petitioner's firm is aggrieved by the directions (a) & (b) above, it is open to it to approach an appropriate forum for redressal of its further grievances in accordance with law