Research › Search › Judgment

Tripura High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 4 (TRI)

Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik v. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited

2019-01-03

S. TALAPATRA

body2019
JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This action under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks the judicial review of the judgment and award dated 31.07.2013 delivered in Reference Case No.12 of 2006 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Guwahati, Assam. The industrial dispute, within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 herein after referred to as the Act, as raised by the petitioner herein against the respondent, the Ministry of Labour and Employment by their order No. L-30015/4/2006-IR(M) dated 20.02.2006 referred the said dispute to the Tribunal. The reference as made reads as under: “Whether the claim of the workman Shri Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik that he had worked continuously for more than 240 days with the management of ONGC correct? Whether the settlement arrived at on 27/28-1-2001 is biding on the workman? If so, to what relief the workman is entitled?” 2. The Tribunal after recording the evidence as advanced by the petitioner and the respondent to support their respective claims has observed in order to answer the reference as under: 22. From my discussion on the Issue No.1 it is clear that the workman has not been able to prove that he has worked for 240 days in 12 consecutive months in any year. As such, it can safely be held that the workman was within the category of 180 days of works at the relevant time of settlement and he has failed to substantiate his plea that he was not one of the members of 180 days category workers and that he was not present at the time of conciliation held in presence of the Unions, Management and the Conciliation Officer. In view of my above discussion and having regard to the submission of learned Advocates for both the parties as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as mentioned to above. I am of the opinion that the workman Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik is bound by the Tripartite Settlement arrived at on 27/28-01-2001 held between the Management, Unions and the Conciliation Officer. 23. Accordingly, this issue is decided in affirmative against the workman. Under the above circumstances it is held that the workman Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik is not entitled to any relief as claimed. 3. This finding as reproduced has been challenged by this action. This case has a chequered history. 23. Accordingly, this issue is decided in affirmative against the workman. Under the above circumstances it is held that the workman Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik is not entitled to any relief as claimed. 3. This finding as reproduced has been challenged by this action. This case has a chequered history. Before the reference, the petitioner approached the Gauhati High Court for a direction to absorb him in the vacant post subject to qualification, eligibility etc. as prescribed by the recruitment rules, by filing a writ petition being Civil Rule No.144 of 1992. By the judgment and order dated 06.09.2001, Gauhati High Court had directed to absorb the petitioner in the vacant post subject to qualification and eligibility etc in terms of the recruitment rule as the petitioner had completed 240 days serving as the contingent worker under the respondent, the ONGC. The said judgment and order dated 06.09.2001 was challenged by the ONGC by filing an intra court appeal being Writ Appeal No. 26 of 2002. By the judgment and order dated 06.10.2004, the appeal filed by the ONGC was dismissed having observed that in view of the materials placed in the record, the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the Writ petitioner was one of the workmen who had put in 240 days of continuous service in a given year and hence his case was not covered by the Industrial settlement that was arrived between the recognized trade union and the management of ONGC in respect of retrenchment on a package of compensation will not bind the petitioner. The settlement that was arrived in the year 2001 is in the memorandum of the settlement which was duly singed by the participating parties. The said settlement was for the workmen who had put in service for 180 days and below 240 days. Even though the petitioner had admittedly put more than 180 days in a year but he did not give in to the said settlement and challenged the same. The petitioner had further urged for his regularization in view of his service of more than 240 days in the 12 consecutive months. To have the perspective abundantly clear it would be apposite to extract the following observation as made in the judgment dated 06.10.2004: 24. The petitioner had further urged for his regularization in view of his service of more than 240 days in the 12 consecutive months. To have the perspective abundantly clear it would be apposite to extract the following observation as made in the judgment dated 06.10.2004: 24. By referring to a common judgment dated 31.07.2000, passed by the Division Bench of this Court, in a bench of cases, viz., Civil Rule Nos. 7 of 1993, 31 of 1993, 240 of 1993 and 163 of 1995, the learned Single Judge, in the present Civil Rule, observed and held as follows:- “11. In the aforesaid decided cased, this court directed the respondent ONGC to make an exercise for absorbing the petitioners of those cases subject to availability of sanctioned vacancies, of course, having regard to the qualification and other eligibility required under the related service rules and it was further ordered in those cases that till the services of the petitioners of those cases are regularized, their contingent/casual employment should be allowed to continue and no fresh recruitment should be made against any sanctioned vacancy for which one or other of the petitioners of those cases are found to be eligible. 12. Under the aforesaid factual and legal position, I am of the considered opinion to hold that the petitioner acquired a right not to be terminated without following the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in case of availability of sanctioned vacancy the petitioners absorption must be considered against the said vacant post, of course, subject to qualification eligibility as prescribed by the related service law/Recruitment Rules.” 4. To be precise, the petitioner sought similar direction and protection in the premise of his serving 240 days in the consecutive 12 months. But the Tribunal by the impugned judgment has clearly observed that the petitioner has not been able to establish that he had worked for more than 240 days in the consecutive 12 months under the management of ONGC. That apart having regard the decision of the apex Court in National Industry Ltd. vs State of Rajasthan reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371 , the Tribunal has observed that the settlement arrived at, in the course of conciliation proceeding with a recognized majority union will be binding on all the workmen, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the settlement. It has been further held that no distinction can be made for an individual employee or the workman from the minority union for scuttling the settlement. When a settlement is arrived in the conciliation proceeding it is binding on the workers irrespective of their belonging to different trade unions or their individual status, as laid down in Section 18(3)(d) of the Act. Thus, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take a stand that he was not bound by the settlement arrived between the recognized union and the ONGC. 5. Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for petitioner has submitted that there was no appreciation of evidence as led by the petitioner even the law relating to withholding of documents which have been called for, has been wrongly appreciated by the tribunal. Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for petitioner has submitted that Gauhati High Court has clearly held that the petitioner had put in 240 days service in the 12 consecutive months and that finding was derived from the documents placed in the writ petition. More so for non production of the attendance register for the year 1991, Mr. D.K. Biswas learned counsel appearing for petitioner has contended that in the year 1988-89, 1989-90 and 1990-91 the petitioner had put in service of 236 days, 237 days and 235 days respectively as per the Bio-data form filled up by the petitioner as a contingent worker on 30.01.2001. But it has been further asserted by that he had put more additional days before the beginning of the season but those days ranging from7 to 8 days were not allowed to be included in the said Bio-data form. The form was signed by the petitioner under duress and in the proceeding before the tribunal, the petitioner has clearly stated in his cross examination carried out for the management of the ONGC on 15.09.2010 as under: “Later on, the witness volunteers that the Management compelled me to put my signature on that documents. I did not file any complain before the Police on the ground that I was threatened by the Management. I informed this matter to the Management in writing by that was damaged in my presence. I did not send it by Post. It is not a fact that I was compelled by the Management to fill up Ext. 1 and my protest letter was damaged by the Management. I informed this matter to the Management in writing by that was damaged in my presence. I did not send it by Post. It is not a fact that I was compelled by the Management to fill up Ext. 1 and my protest letter was damaged by the Management. I used to get bonus from the Management. I have not produced any certificate from any Govt. Institution to show that I am a Motor Mechanics. I have not submitted any certificate to show that I a skilled mechanic. I have not submitted any document to show that there is sanctioned Post namely Motor Mechanics in ONGC. I do not know whether out of 339 numbers of Geo Science party working in the field, 227 persons have taken away the benefit and left the job in view of Ext.2. I used to work in a Project namely Geo Science Party. It is not a fact that I never worked for 240 days in a preceding 12 months. It is not a fact that I failed to produce any document to show that worked more than 240 days in a preceding year.” 6. It is necessary to clarify that Ext.1 is the Bio-data form filled by the contingent/casual workers meaning the petitioner and Ext.2 is the Memorandum of Settlement arrived under Section 12(c) of the Act on 21.01.2001 for re-engagement for the field season 2000-01 only and to pay them Rs.3,500/- per head per field season against the continuous past service of the 180 days category contingent workers. Mr. D.K Biswas learned counsel appearing for petitioner has submitted that by not producing the attendance register for the period from 07.11.1989 till 01.07.1990, the respondent has suppressed the material documents from the Tribunal but the Tribunal has wrongly interpreted the relevant law and has not accepted that failure to produce the attendance register as called for to be a case of non production to avoid proof. Thus, Mr. D.K Biswas learned counsel appearing for petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has established that he had worked for more than 240 days at least in a one year. Thus, Mr. D.K Biswas learned counsel appearing for petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has established that he had worked for more than 240 days at least in a one year. That analogy was accepted by Gauhati High Court but when the management approached the apex court by filing an appeal from the judgment dated 06.10.2004, the apex court by the judgment dated 23.11.2005 delivered in Civil Appeal No.1909 of 2005 set aside the judgment of Gauhati High Court and the judgment delivered in the intra court appeal. However, it was directed that the appropriate Government would refer the matter to the concerned tribunal for adjudication within the time frame of two months from the date of receiving the reference. The apex court has clearly observed as follows while making the said observation and issuing the direction. When examined with reference to the principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the approach of the High Court i.e. the learned Single Judge as endorsed by the Division Bench, is not correct. The relevant issue was not considered in its proper perspective. The respective stand was to be examined in the light of law laid down by this court in the decisions referred to above. The question of shifting of onus assumes relevance only when evidence is led. Almost all the decisions referred to above related to matters which came to the High Court after evidence was led before the Tribunal by the contesting parties. High Courts should not entertain writ petitions directly when claim of service of more than 240 days in a year is raised. Whether a person has worked for more than 240 days or not is a disputed question of fact which is not be examined by the High Court. Proper remedy for the person making such a claim is to raise an industrial dispute under the Act so that the evidence can be analysed and conclusion can be arrived at. As in the instant case the legal position has not been analysed in the proper perspective, it would be appropriate if the matter is decided by the forum provided under the Act. [Emphasis added] 7. Mr. D.K Biswas learned counsel appearing for petitioner has submitted that acceding eclipse of his consolidated right, the petitioner was not supposed to accept the right created by the said memorandum (Ext.2). [Emphasis added] 7. Mr. D.K Biswas learned counsel appearing for petitioner has submitted that acceding eclipse of his consolidated right, the petitioner was not supposed to accept the right created by the said memorandum (Ext.2). If it is established from the record that the petitioner has completed 240 days in the consecutive 12 months, the petitioner is entitled for regularization and protection under Section 25 F of the Act. The Tribunal has therefore, miscomprehended the fact and landed up in the quagmire. 8. Mr. S. Deb, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. B. Debnath learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that this action for the judicial review is unsustainable in asmuchas there is no infirmity in the finding of the Tribunal. It is also been submitted by the respondents that there are two types of contingent workers as per the Certified Standing Orders for Contingent Employees of the ONGC. The contingent employee has been classified under the Standing Order No.2 as (a) temporary and (b) casual. For the status of temporary worker, the Standing Order No.2 (ii) provides as follows: (ii) A workman who has been on the rolls of the Commission and has put in not less than 180 days of attendance in any period of 12 consecutive months shall be temporary workman, provided that a temporary workman who has put in not less than 240 days of attendance in any period of 12 consecutive months and who possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by Commission may be considered for conversion as regular employee. 9. Mr. S. Deb learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner has failed to discharge his obligation to prove by documentary evidence that he had worked for 240 days in terms of the Standing Order No.2 (ii) for having the benefit of Section 25F of the Act or for claiming regularization in terms of the scheme. 10. Mr. Deb learned senior counsel has further submitted that the petitioner is estopped to raise any question in respect of the number of days he worked in the field season 1989-90 (from 07.11.1989 to 01.07.1990) as in the Bio date form submitted by him as a contingent worker (Ext.1). he has made a solemn undertaking by stating that the all the particulars as stated in the said Bio date form was correct and true and he had not concealed any matter. he has made a solemn undertaking by stating that the all the particulars as stated in the said Bio date form was correct and true and he had not concealed any matter. In the said Bio-data form dated 09.03.2001, the petitioner has verified and signed that he had worked during that period 232 days. There is no proof that the petitioner had worked some more days before the fielded season had started. In this regard, Mr. Deb learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has referred a decision of the apex court in R.M. Yellati vs Asstt. Executive Engineer reported in (2006) 1 SCC 106 , where it has been held on the aspect of burden of proof in respect of 240 days continuous service and for drawing up of adverse presumption for non-production of the attendance register as under: “Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the afore stated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case.” 11. Having referred to R.M. Yellati (supra) Mr. Deb learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner has failed to discharge that onus. Moreover, the respondents have given a reasonable explanation why they could not produce the said attendance register as that was lost for the necessary entry had been made in the Station Diary of the concerned Police Station. That apart, the Ext.1 the (Bio-data form) as signed by the petitioner clearly shows that the petitioner was short of few days from completing 240 days to acquire the status of that contingent worker. Further Mr. Deb learned senior counsel has submitted that since the apex court has clearly set aside the findings of the Gauhati High Court, the petitioner cannot have any benefit out of those findings. Those cannot resuscitate the claim of the petitioner in any manner. There is no proof at all that the petitioner had acquired the status of temporary contingent worker and hence, the settlement is binding upon the petitioner in terms of Section 18 (3)(d) of the Act. 12. Having appreciated the submission and the records as available with the petition this court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proof that he had worked for 240 days in the consecutive 12 months to acquire the status of the temporary contingent worker. The allegation of coercion in respect of the bio-date form has been left unsubstantiated. The allegation of coercion in respect of the bio-date form has been left unsubstantiated. It appears to the court that the attempt to slap such allegation against the management is a desperate act to bracket him in the 240 days category. But the post „coercion? conduct of the petition does not instill confidence in the mind of the court for purpose of reliance. Hence, the finding as returned by the tribunal does not call for interference. The settlement is binding pervasively on the petitioner in terms of Section 18 (3)(d) of the Act. True it is that the petitioner has failed to show that he had worked for 240 days in the consecutive 12 months but from the Bio-data form (Ext.1) it is apparent that the petitioner has faced “mechanical breaks”. However, in the context, for such act, the petitioner cannot be given advantage as it is not a case where for break in the one of spells, he has been deprived of regularisation. 13. In the result, the writ petition stands dismissed. Before parting with the records, this court is persuaded by the emerged circumstances to observe that the petitioner is allowed to draw the compensation under the settlement (Ext.2), if not drawn in the meanwhile. There shall no order as to the costs.