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2019 DIGILAW 40 (GUJ)

Manojkumar Prajapati S/o Jai Prakash v. State of Gujarat

2019-01-21

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2019
JUDGMENT : By way of the present petition, the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs : (I) Quash the FIR bearing No. I/121/2017, registered under sections 498(A)/294(B)/323/114 and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police station Satellite, Ahmedabad and consequential proceedings emanating therefrom. (II) During the pendency and final disposal of the present petition, may be pleased to stay the investigation under taken by the police at P.S. Satellite, Ahmedabad in FIR No. I/121/2017. 2. The petitioner no. 1 is a Government servant, employed with IRCTC, Indian Railways, presently posted at New Delhi. 3. The petitioner no.2 is a retired Government servant from the Central Ware House Corporation at Government of India Undertaking, Adampur, Hisar, Haryana. Petitioner no. 3 is an house wife residing at Mandi Adampur, Hisar, Haryana. 4. The petitioner no. 4 is also a Government servant and on 5.6.2017, he joined the Oriental Bank of Commerce, a Government of India Undertaking at Faridabad, Haryana and is also a permanent resident of Mandi Adampur, Hisar, Haryana. 5. It transpires from the FIR that on 5.6.2017, the respondent no. 2, complainant, namely Mrs. Sadhna Singh, filed a complaint against all the petitioners before the Satellite, Police Station, Ahmedabad which culminated into FIR being C.R No. I/121/2017 dated 5.6.2017 and put criminal law into motion. 6. At the outset, learned advocate Mr. Chandan Singh appearing for learned advocate Mr. Jayneel Parikh for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned FIR is required to be quashed and set aside since it is registered beyond the territorial jurisdiction. He has submitted that the entire allegations made in the impugned FIR pertains to the alleged offences committed by the present petitioners at Delhi and Haryana whereas the impugned FIR has been lodged at Ahmedabad. 7. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioners that respondent no. 2, married the petitioner no.1-husband on 25.2.2012 and at that time she was residing at Maharashtra with her parents. Thereafter, the present respondent no. 2, stayed with the petitioners no. 2 to 4 at her matrimonial home at Hisar, Haryana whereas the petitioner no.1, who is the husband of respondent no.2 was working at Delhi. He has submitted that the petitioner no. 1, was a Government servant employed at IRCTC, Indian Railways posted at New Delhi. Thereafter, the present respondent no. 2, stayed with the petitioners no. 2 to 4 at her matrimonial home at Hisar, Haryana whereas the petitioner no.1, who is the husband of respondent no.2 was working at Delhi. He has submitted that the petitioner no. 1, was a Government servant employed at IRCTC, Indian Railways posted at New Delhi. He has invited the attention of this Court to the contents of the FIR wherein it is stated that petitioner no.1 used to call her at Delhi but she was residing at Haryana with her aged parents. 8. It is further alleged that her husband used to doubt about her character and when she used to interact with the neighbours, her husband used to beat her and thereafter she went back to Haryana with her parents. 9. It is further alleged that in the year 2013, on the occasion of Diwali, the petitioner no.1 slapped her and even cast aspersions on her character. Lastly it is submitted that on 28.2.2017 at around 6:30 pm, when she was staying at Delhi, she was assaulted by petitioner no.1, at the residence of her neighbour Richaben. After the said alleged incident, she returned to her parents in Ahmedabad and it is alleged that the petitioner no.1, used to threaten her on the telephone. 10. Learned advocate, Mr. Singh has submitted that there is no offence registered under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code against the present applicants. 11. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Mr. Chandan Singh for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors (2014) 2 SCC 1 , and has submitted that despite the directions of the Apex Court no preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Investigating Officer and straightaway the FIR has been lodged. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Bhura Ram & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2008 SC 2666 , to substantiate his submissions, that the trial court at Ahmedabad has no jurisdiction, since the cause of action has arisen outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2008 SC 2666 , to substantiate his submissions, that the trial court at Ahmedabad has no jurisdiction, since the cause of action has arisen outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. Vs Inspector of Police, chennai and Ors AIR 2004 SC 4286 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Manish Ratan and Ors. Vs State of M.P and Anr. (2007) 1 SCC 262 . 13. In view of the foregoing, learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned FIR being C.R No. I-121/2017, needs to be quashed and set aside. 14. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Ms Moxa Thakkar, appearing for the State, has submitted that further investigation reveals that the offence, as alleged in the impugned FIR, is committed by the present petitioners and the same may not be quashed and set aside. 15. Learned advocate Mr. Akshat Khare, for the respondent no. 2, has submitted that further investigation as well as the statements of the witnesses, reveal that the present petitioners, used to harass the respondent no. 2 and, therefore, the impugned FIR may not be quashed and set aside. He has further submitted that presently the respondent no. 2 is residing in Ahmedabad and thereafter, also the petitioner no. 2 used to threaten her by making telephone calls. Learned advocate Mr. Khare has also pointed out the contents of the charge-sheet, wherein it is stated that till the lodgement of the FIR the petitioners in connivance with each other, time and again issued threats to respondent no. 2, and demanded dowry of Rs 20,00,000/-. It is submitted by learned advocate Mr. Khare that since the harassment by the petitioners continued at Ahmedabad, the FIR cannot be quashed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction and the same is rightly registered at Ahmedabad. 16. In the present case, the contents of the FIR reveal that the alleged cruelty, meted out by the present petitioners, on respondent no. 2, is said to have occurred at Haryana at her matrimonial home of respondent no.2, and also in Delhi where the husband of respondent no. 2, used to work. 16. In the present case, the contents of the FIR reveal that the alleged cruelty, meted out by the present petitioners, on respondent no. 2, is said to have occurred at Haryana at her matrimonial home of respondent no.2, and also in Delhi where the husband of respondent no. 2, used to work. Lastly, it is alleged in the impugned FIR by respondent no.2 that on 20.5.2017, the petitioner no.1, who is the husband of respondent no.2 assaulted her at the house of her neighbour Richaben and thereafter, she left for Ahmedabad. The impugned FIR has been lodged on 5.6.2017, i.e. within one month of the alleged incident. It is further alleged that petitioner no.1, has issued threats on telephone to respondent no. 2. The further allegation of demanding dowry of Rs 20,00,000/- from the present respondent no. 2 is made. It is not specified in the FIR that the alleged demand of dowry was made by the applicants when the respondent no. 2 was staying at Ahmedabad. It is not specified that the same has been made by the petitioners after she was residing with her parents at Ahmedabad. 17. Sections 177, 178,179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : “Section 177 : Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 : Place of inquiry or trial (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed,or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be comitted in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into and tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Section 179 : Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues : When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court withing whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.” 18. In the case of Manish Ratan and Ors. In the case of Manish Ratan and Ors. (supra), wherein it was alleged by the complainant that the cruelty of the in-laws continued even at the place of her parents where she was living. The Apex Court has observed thus in para: “16: yet again Ramesh Vs. State of T.N, Abraham Ajith was followed by this Court stating: “In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that Court. Almost all the allegations pertains to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 491-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in chennai. It is alleged that when the relation of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13.10.1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded.” 12. Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy.” 19. The Apex Court in the case of Bhura Ram (supra) wherein in paras 3 and 4, it has been held as under : “3. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy.” 19. The Apex Court in the case of Bhura Ram (supra) wherein in paras 3 and 4, it has been held as under : “3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the question involved is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors Vs Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another (2004) 8SCC 100, wherein this Court has held that cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court where the offence was committed, could not be tried by the Court where no part of offence was committed”. “4. The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The Court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and therefore the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.” 20. Thus, in the present case, the contents of the FIR reveal that the offences under sections 498 (A), 294(B), 323, 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were alleged to have been committed by the present petitioners, mostly in Haryana and Delhi and prima facie there is nothing in the entire complaint, to show that the acts constituting the alleged offences have been committed in Ahmedabad. 21. It is also not in dispute that no offence under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is registered against the present petitioners. 22. 21. It is also not in dispute that no offence under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is registered against the present petitioners. 22. In view of the law enunciated by the Apex Court and in the aforesaid judgment and the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant and the impugned FIR does not disclose any part of the factual aspects arising in Ahmedabad and hence, the concerned Magistrate, Mirzapur has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 23. Consequently, the proceedings and the FIR being C.R. No. I-121/2017, Satellite Police Station are hereby quashed and set aside. However, the present complaint is be returned to the complainant, if she so wishes, she may file the same in the appropriate Court, to be dealt with in accordance with law.