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2019 DIGILAW 401 (JK)

Tanya Khan Afridi v. J&K Board of Professional Entrance Examination

2019-09-05

RAJESH BINDAL

body2019
JUDGMENT : Rajesh Bindal, J.—This order will dispose of two writ petitions bearing WP(C) Nos. 2664 and 2759 of 2019. 2. The claim is regarding admission to MBBS course under the NRI quota. 3. Mr. P. N. Raina, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner passed her 10+2 examination from Central Board of Secondary Education in the year 2018 and appeared in the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (UG) 2019 (for short “the NEET”). She secured 400 out of 720 marks. On 15.06.2019 notice was published inviting applications for various seats under Hindu Minority and NRI quota. As per the notice last date for submission of applications was 07.07.2019. The petitioner being eligible, sent her application through Speed Post on 05.07.2019. It was dispatched from the Post Office situated at Railway Station, Jammu. In the normal routine, the same was to be delivered in the office of J&K Board of Professional Entrance Examination (for short “the BOPEE”) at Jammu, the next day. On 10.07.2019 notice was issued thereby specifying that there are certain deficiencies in the applications submitted by various candidates. The list thereof was published and the candidates were advised to clear the deficiencies up to 17.07.2019. The schedule for 2nd counseling for NRI seats was also notified on 15.07.2019 and the date fixed for second counseling was 19.07.2019. 4. Mr. Raina, learned senior counsel further subthat finding the name of petitioner missing from the list of the candidates who had applied under NRI quota, she filed WP(C) No. 2664/2019 in this Court. In that petition vide order dated 18.07.2019, the petitioner was permitted to appear for counseling on 19.07.2019. The needful was done. After the petitioner appeared for counseling, order was passed by the BOPEE on 19.07.2019, rejecting the candidature of the petitioner. The petitioner was merely granted two hours time to clear the deficiencies, whereas other candidates whose names were notified by the BOPEE earlier were given 07 days time for making up the deficiencies. The documents which were required to be furnished were such which could not possibly be furnished within short time of two hours. These documents were to be procured by the petitioner from the sponsoror or NRI who was residing at Dubai. Immediately the petitioner made efforts and documents were furnished. Thereafter, WP(C) No. 2759/2019 was filed challenging the rejection order dated 19.07.2019. 5. These documents were to be procured by the petitioner from the sponsoror or NRI who was residing at Dubai. Immediately the petitioner made efforts and documents were furnished. Thereafter, WP(C) No. 2759/2019 was filed challenging the rejection order dated 19.07.2019. 5. Impugning the rejection of the petitioner for admission to MBBS course under NRI quota, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that she had secured marks more than the last selected candidate who was granted admission in MBBS course. There was difference of 112 marks. The petitioner secured 400 marks whereas the candidate who was given admission secured 288 marks. There were 2400 candidates in between the petitioner and the selected candidate. In fact in the process the BOPEE has given total go bye to the merit. It failed to appreciate the fact that it was admission to the MBBS course where merit should have been given primary consideration. 6. It was further argued that once the petitioner had dispatched her application through speed post well before the last date fixed for receipt of applications, even if there was delay in delivery, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer on that account. The letter was addressed to the Jammu Office of BOPPE, however, for the reasons not known to the petitioner, it was redirected to Srinagar office of the BOPEE which caused delay. There was some hanky panky. The status of the letter which was sent by speed post was traced and that has been placed on record. It clearly shows that the letter could not be delivered in the office of BOPEE at Jammu on 06.07.2019, as the office was found locked. Once the last date for receipt of the applications was fixed on a holiday the office should not possibly be locked. It was further argued that cut of date fixed for grant of admission will not apply in the case of the petitioner as it is a exceptional case, for the reason that immediately after the candidature of the petitioner was rejected, she filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the illegal action of the BOPEE. Reliance was placed upon judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration & Another vs. Jasmine Kour & Others, 2014 (10) SCC 521 . Reliance was placed upon judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration & Another vs. Jasmine Kour & Others, 2014 (10) SCC 521 . It was further submitted that in S. Krishna Sradha vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2017 (4) SCC 516 , the aforesaid judgment was approved and the matter was referred to a larger Bench only on the issue of grant of damages to a candidate, who was wrongly denied admission. Admission cannot be refused as the career of a meritorious student cannot be jeopardized. 7. It was further argued that the documents which were required to be filed by the petitioner were not specified earlier by the BOPEE. These were not sought from other candidates. The nature of documents was such that the same could not be furnished within two hours as the petitioner had to get these from the NRI sponsoror and nowhere it was provided that any of the documents had to be attested from a specified authority. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the BOPEE submitted that notice for inviting applications under NRI quota was issued on 15.06.2019 and the last date fixed was 07.07.2019. The petitioner had enough time to deposit the form, however, she failed. As she was not eligible, she sent the application through Speed Post on 05.07.2019, when 07.07.2019 was the last date fixed for receipt of the applications. The letter was posted through a post office which is located just at a distance of half a kilometer from the office of BOPEE at Jammu. This shows the design of the petitioner. Office of the BOPEE was open on 6th and 7th July, 2019. It was kept open for the reason that 07.07.2019 was the last date fixed for receipt of the applications and number of candidates were filling their applications in person. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the report of the postman that office of the BOPEE at Jammu was locked, is factually incorrect. The postal authorities have not been impleaded as respondents in the present petitions. It being a disputed question of fact, the writ petition will not be the appropriate remedy. The argument that there was hanky panky, as the letter addressed to the Jammu Office of the BOPEE was redirected to Srinagar, is denied. The postal authorities have not been impleaded as respondents in the present petitions. It being a disputed question of fact, the writ petition will not be the appropriate remedy. The argument that there was hanky panky, as the letter addressed to the Jammu Office of the BOPEE was redirected to Srinagar, is denied. It was for the postal authorities to explain how this was done. 9. It was further contended that in terms of the order passed by this Court on 18.07.2019, the petitioner was permitted to appear for counseling and bring the requisite documents. She appeared and was informed about the deficiencies in her application. She was granted time to do the needful. As needful could not be done, hence, candidature of the petitioner was rejected even on merits. Even otherwise the application submitted after the last date fixed for receipt of applications could not be considered. All the certificates which have been placed on record by the petitioner are after the last date fixed for counseling. There is no mala-fide alleged against any of the officer of the BOPEE. The last date fixed for submission of application is to be adhered to strictly, as the authority has to close the process of admissions and bring the same to an end. It cannot be left open indefinitely. If in one case date is extended others may also seek same relief. 10. He further submitted that schedule regarding admission to MBBS course for the year in question was notified by Medical Council of India vide notification dated 05.02.2018. The last date fixed for joining under State counseling was 18.08.2019. As that date is over, the petitioner cannot possibly be granted admission. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has laid down that after the cut of date no admission can be granted. In this case the petitioner has not alleged mala-fide. She can claim compensation if admission had wrongly been denied to her. The petitioner does not fall in that category, as she is herself at fault. 11. Mr. Abhinav Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 in WP(C) No. 2759/2019, the candidate who has been granted admission in NRI quota submitted that the undisputed fact is that public notice dated 15.06.2019, inviting applications for various seats under the NRI quota specified 07.07.2019 to be the last date fixed for submission of applications. 11. Mr. Abhinav Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 in WP(C) No. 2759/2019, the candidate who has been granted admission in NRI quota submitted that the undisputed fact is that public notice dated 15.06.2019, inviting applications for various seats under the NRI quota specified 07.07.2019 to be the last date fixed for submission of applications. The applications could either be submitted by hand, by post or by any other mean. The important fact is that the application should be received in the office of the BOPEE up to the last date and time fixed. The petitioner having failed in the process as her application was received after the last date fixed, cannot raise any grievance about the rejection of her candidature. The merits of the issue will come later on. No argument has been addressed by the petitioner regarding the receipt of her application within time in the office of the BOPEE at Jammu. When the office of the BOPEE at Jammu was just at a walking distance from the post office, there was no need to send the application by post. This shows that there was some other purpose behind that. In the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner, no documents in support of her eligibility were attached. 12. It was further argued that the petitioner cannot claim similarity with the candidates who had submitted their applications within time. The petitioner was allowed to participate in the counseling only because of interim order passed by this Court. As the last date had already been fixed for second counseling, the same could not be extended only for the petitioner. 13. It was further submitted that hue and cry is being raised by the petitioner that there is a gap of 2400 candidates in between the petitioner and the last candidate who was granted admission. However, the same is totally irrelevant. Inter se merit in the same category is to be seen. 14. Referring to order passed in OWP No. 1297/2016, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 submitted that because of the reference of the issue regarding admission after the cut of date to a larger bench in S. Krishna Sradha’s case (supra) the matter was kept pending. Inter se merit in the same category is to be seen. 14. Referring to order passed in OWP No. 1297/2016, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 submitted that because of the reference of the issue regarding admission after the cut of date to a larger bench in S. Krishna Sradha’s case (supra) the matter was kept pending. He further submitted that the law as stands today is that after the cut of date no admission can be granted for the MBBS course and the date for which has admittedly expired on 18.08.2019. 15. It was further contended that the argument that someone had played mischief and redirected the letter, which was addressed to Jammu office of BOPEE, to Srinagar and in fact it should be deemed to have been delivered at Jammu on 06.07.2019, is farfetched. How someone will come to know that the letter posted through Speed Post contains application submitted by a candidate, who may get admission. 16. In response, Mr. Raina, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner referred to a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Competent Authority Entrance Examination, J&K and Anr. vs. Mahesh Kumar Raina and Another, 2016 (2) SLJ 568 (FB) to submit that eligibility is one part whereas completion of formalities is second. For the purpose of admission the authorities were to consider the eligibility of the petitioner for admission i.e., her qualification as 10+2 on a particular day and her marks in NEET whereas other documents regarding eligibility will merely be a formality which may be completed later on. 17. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book. 18. In the case in hand, the issue which is required to be considered is regarding admission of the petitioner for MBBS course under NRI quota for the session 2019-20. Schedule for admissions was notified by the Medical Council of India on 05.02.2018, which reads as under:- “Time Schedule for Completion of the Admission process for First MBBS Course for the Academic Year, 2018-19 and on wards S.No. Schedule for Admission Central Counseling State counseling All India Quota Deemed +CI 1. Conduct of Exam By 10th May 2. Declaration of Result By First Week of June 3. Ist round of counselling 12th June-24th June 12th June-24th June 25th June-5th July 4. Last date of joining 3rd July 3rd July 12th July 5. Conduct of Exam By 10th May 2. Declaration of Result By First Week of June 3. Ist round of counselling 12th June-24th June 12th June-24th June 25th June-5th July 4. Last date of joining 3rd July 3rd July 12th July 5. II round of counselling 6th July-12th July 6th July-12th July 15th July-26th July 6. Last date of joining 22nd July 22nd July 3rd August 7. Mop-up Round 12th Aug-22nd Aug 4th Aug-8th Aug 8. Last date of joining 26th August 12th August 9. Forwarding the list of students in order of merit equaling to ten times the number of vacant seats to the Medical Colleges by the Counseling Authority 27th August 13th August 10. Last date of joining 31st August 18th August 19. Some of the facts which remained undisputed are that notice was issued by the BOPEE on 15.06.2019 inviting applications for admission against the NRI quota. The last date fixed for submission of applications was 07.07.2019 till 4.00 P.M. There is nothing mentioned in the aforesaid public notice that the applications had to be submitted by a particular mode. Hence, important aspect will be that the applications must reach in the office of the BOPEE up to the last date and time fixed. The petitioner claimed that she sent her application through Speed Post on 05.07.2019. It was sent from post office, Railway Station, Jammu. It was not delivered in the office of the BOPEE at Jammu up to 07.07.2019. As per the tracking of the consignment, the petitioner submitted that on 06.07.2019 when the letter was sought to be delivered in the office of the BOPEE at Jammu it was found to be locked. Argument raised was that it was redirected to Srinagar office of BOPEE, where it was delivered on 11.07.2019. There is nothing on record to suggest as to why no effort was made for delivery of the consignment on the next day and how it was redirected to Srinagar. It was pleaded that the letter should be deemed to have been delivered on 06.07.2019. But postal authorities are not parties before the Court. 20. There is no reasonable explanation available on record as to why the petitioner sent her application through Speed Post on 05.07.2019 from Jammu and from a post office which is located just half a kilometre from the office of BOPEE. But postal authorities are not parties before the Court. 20. There is no reasonable explanation available on record as to why the petitioner sent her application through Speed Post on 05.07.2019 from Jammu and from a post office which is located just half a kilometre from the office of BOPEE. She very well know that July 5, 2019 was a Friday and July 6 and 7 being Saturday and Sunday, the office may be closed. The postal authorities do not deliver any article on Sunday. Though allegations and counter allegations were sought to be made at the time of hearing that someone played mischief by getting a report on the envelop, either that the office of the BOPEE was closed on July 6, 2019 or someone purposefully got the letter redirected to Srinagar office of BOPEE just to defeat the right of consideration to the petitioner. However, the argument is farfetched. How someone will come to know that the letter being posted through speed post contains application of a candidate, who may get admission. There may be number of other candidates who may have applied otherwise for seeking admission against NRI quota. But the fact remains that the application was not delivered in the office of BOPEE up to the last date and time fixed for submission of applications. 21. When the candidature of the petitioner was not being considered as her application was not received in time, she filed WP(C) No. 2664/2019, praying that her application sent through speed post be treated as submitted within time and she be permitted to participate in the counseling scheduled for 19.07.2019. On 18.07.2019, this court passed the following interim order:- “Notice. Mr. F.A. Natnoo, learned AAG waives notice on behalf of the respondents. He shall file objections, if any, on or before the next date. List on 26.07.2019. In the meantime, subject to objections, the petitioner is permitted to appear in the counseling to be held on 19.07.2019 under Non Resident Indian (NRI) quota subject to eligibility and verification of the documents on her own risk and responsibility and shall remain outcome of the writ petition. Mere participation in the counseling shall not create any right or equity in favour of the petitioner. A copy of this order be provided to learned counsel for the petitioner under the seal and signature of the Bench Secretary.” 22. Mere participation in the counseling shall not create any right or equity in favour of the petitioner. A copy of this order be provided to learned counsel for the petitioner under the seal and signature of the Bench Secretary.” 22. The application submitted by the petitioner against the NRI quota was also found to be deficient besides the same having been received after the last date fixed for submission of application. The reasons given in the order dated 19.07.2019 passed by the BOPEE reads as under:- “Whereas, after conducting preliminary scrutiny of the application of the petitioner on 19.07.2019 by the counseling committee comprising officers of the Board, representatives of the Medical Colleges including the ASCOMS and other co-opted members, it was found to be deficient in some documents viz NRI certificate, pedigree sheet and employment certificate of sponsor and accordingly the petitioner was asked to clear the deficiency by 2.00 p.m so that she may be considered in the ongoing counseling in compliance of the directions of the Hon’ble Court, along with other eligible candidates. However, the candidate failed to produce most of the documents, the committee accordingly observed as under:- “(i) The applicant has not furnished any proof of the sponsor being an NRI as is required under such situation. (ii) Sponsor does not possess even UAE passport or a certificate issued by the embassy of the country with regard to being NRI as has been submitted by all other competing candidates. (iii) Employment agreement with the employer is dated 18.11.2018, which even does not indicate the period of employment/contract. The agreement is not therefore, valid as on date. (iv) Further this agreement is also not attested by the concerned embassy/legal authority of that country. Whereas, despite given an opportunity to the petitioner by the said committee to produce relevant documents, the petitioner produced only pedigree sheet and employment certificate of sponsor, which was also deficient. Now, therefore, the claim of the petitioner has been considered with due deference to the interim order of the Hon’ble High Court of J&K dated 18.07.2019 and the petitioner has been found to be ineligible, as being deficient or requisite documents for being considered under NRI Quota in ASCOMS, Jammu. Hence, the claim of the petitioner stands rejected as being devoid of any merit.” 23. The petitioner was not able to comply with the requirements within the time granted. 24. Hence, the claim of the petitioner stands rejected as being devoid of any merit.” 23. The petitioner was not able to comply with the requirements within the time granted. 24. Two issues will require consideration by this Court are, namely, effect of non-receipt of application sent by a candidate by post up to the last date fixed when no specific mode is provided in the instructions issued. And whether the petitioner is entitled to grant of admission after the last cut of date fixed by the Medical Council of India. 25. Effect of non-delivery of an application by the postal authorities before the last date though posted earlier was considered by Full Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Rahul Prabhakar v. Punjab Technical University, Jalandhar, AIR 1998 PH 18 (FB), wherein it was opined that when date and time has been fixed for receipt of any application, it is for the candidate to ensure that the same reaches the addressee within the stipulated period by whatever means. On failure, the candidate forfeits his right of consideration. Mere personal hardship or sympathies have no place. The authority is not obliged to consider the applications which were received after the cut-off date and time. Relevant paras thereof are extracted below: “35. I am, therefore, of the opinion that when the date or time has been stipulated in the advertisement and also in the Information Brochure, it must be strictly adhered to as otherwise it leads to uncertainty, unending process, anomaly and deprivation of equality clause and further it widens the competition amongst the candidates seeking admission into professional courses. It is also difficult to determine up to what period the time limit can be extended. If such power is to be exercised, it will lead to arbitrariness. 36. The condition in the advertisement and the information brochure enabling the candidates to have their applications delivered either in person or by registered post is to ensure safe delivery within the stipulated time and the stipulation of time and date operates as a condition precedent for entertaining and considering the application of the candidate. It is for the applicant concerned to ensure that delivery of the application within the stipulated time to the concerned authority, whatever may be the mode of such delivery which he himself chooses to adopt or avail out of the alternatives available to him. It is for the applicant concerned to ensure that delivery of the application within the stipulated time to the concerned authority, whatever may be the mode of such delivery which he himself chooses to adopt or avail out of the alternatives available to him. If he is unable to send the application so as to reach the Coordinator, he forfeits his right to have his application considered. Mere personal hardship or general notions of justice or abstract considerations of sympathies cannot be taken into consideration to exonerate an applicant from his obligation to ensure delivery of this application to the Coordinator within the stipulated time. The fact that the applicant expected his application to reach the Coordinator in time in the ordinary course or the lapse on the part of the postal authorities resulting in the belated delivery of the envelope containing the application is no ground to compel the Coordinator to consider the application of the candidate even though it reached him after the stipulated time, the Coordinator is not obliged and has no duty in law to entertain such a belated application and consider the claims of such a candidate along with claims of others whose applications were delivered within time.” 26. In State of Bihar vs. Amrendra Kumar Mishra, (2006) 12 SCC 561 Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed that postal delay by itself may not be a ground to take a sympathetic view. Reference can also be made to a Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sushil Kumar Tripathi and others vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another, 2019 (4) MPLJ 555 . 27. It was for the petitioner to prove that her application was received in the office of BOPEE within the time prescribed. Onus was on her. Merely by blaming others she cannot claim that her application be treated to have been received in time. Postal Department has not been impleaded as party to clarify as to how the letter remained undelivered on 06.07.2019 and redirected to Srinagar office. In the case in hand no specific mode was provided in the advertisement for submission of applications. The only requirement was that it should reach in the office of the BOPEE before the date and time fixed. In the case in hand no specific mode was provided in the advertisement for submission of applications. The only requirement was that it should reach in the office of the BOPEE before the date and time fixed. Lot of stress was sought to be laid on merit, merit and merit without ensuring that for consideration of her candidature, a candidate is required to submit her application within the time permitted. Comparative merit has to be determined amongst the candidates who are the applicants within the time permitted and not who remain out. 28. The stand taken by the BOPEE in the objections filed is that their office remained open on 6th and 7th July, 2019, as last date had been fixed for receipt of applications. To this the petitioner has not filed any rejoinder to controvert this fact. Hence, there is nothing produced on record to show that the application sent by the petitioner was received or deemed to be received before the last cut of date. Her candidature, hence, could not be considered. 29. The issue as to whether Court should direct for grant of admission after the last cut of date was considered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Jasmine Kaur”s case (supra). In that case while noticing the earlier judgments on the issue, Hon’ble the Supreme Court had discerned the following principles. “30. Having noted the various decisions relied upon by the Appellant in SLP (C) No.18099 of 2014 and the contesting Respondent, we are able to discern the following principles: (1) The schedule relating to admissions to the professional colleges should be strictly and scrupulously adhered to and shall not be deviated under any circumstances either by the courts or the Board and midstream admission should not be permitted. (2) Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds that there is no fault attributable to the candidate, i.e., the candidate has pursued his or her legal right expeditiously without any delay and that there is fault only on the part of the authorities or there is an apparent breach of rules and regulations as well as related principles in the process of grant of admission which would violate the right to equality and equal treatment to the competing candidates and the relief of admission can be directed within the time schedule prescribed, it would be completely just and fair to provide exceptional reliefs to the candidate under such circumstances alone. (3) If a candidate is not selected during a particular academic year due to the fault of the Institutions/ Authorities and in this process if the seats are filled up and the scope for granting admission is lost due to eclipse of time schedule, then under such circumstances, the candidate should not be victimized for no fault of his/her and the Court may consider grant of appropriate compensation to offset the loss caused, if any. (4) When a candidate does not exercise or pursue his/her rights or legal remedies against his/her non-selection expeditiously and promptly, then the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate in the form of securing an admission. (5) If the candidate takes a calculated risk/chance by subjecting himself/herself to the selection process and after knowing his/her non-selection, he/she cannot subsequently turn around and content that the process of selection was unfair. (6) If it is found that the candidate acquiesces or waives his/her right to claim relief before the Court promptly, then in such cases, the legal maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit, which means that equity aids only the vigilant and not the ones who sleep over their rights, will be highly appropriate. (7) No relief can be granted even though the prospectus is declared illegal or invalid if the same is not challenged promptly. Once the candidate is aware that he/she does not fulfill the criteria of the prospectus he/she cannot be heard to state that, he/she chose to challenge the same only after preferring the application and after the same is refused on the ground of eligibility. Once the candidate is aware that he/she does not fulfill the criteria of the prospectus he/she cannot be heard to state that, he/she chose to challenge the same only after preferring the application and after the same is refused on the ground of eligibility. (8) There cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one year with permitted seats of the subsequent year i.e. carry forward of seats cannot be permitted how much ever meritorious a candidate is and deserved admission. In such circumstances, the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate but it is up to the candidate to reapply next academic year. (9) There cannot be at any point of time a direction given either by the Court or the Board to increase the number of seats which is exclusively in the realm of the Medical Council of India. (10) Each of these above mentioned principles should be applied based on the unique and distinguishable facts and circumstances of each case and no two cases can be held to be identical.” 30. The issue, which was considered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in S. Krishna Sradha’s case (supra), was whether grant of monetary compensation can be considered as a sole and adequate remedy for a student, who has been deprived of admission to MBBS course even though meritorious and whether the constitutional courts would feel handicapped because of expiry of time schedule fixed by the Court to deny the relief to the candidate by pronouncing, “relief denied as the time has expired”. 31. In the aforesaid judgment, though the issue raised was resolved as the candidate therein had been granted admission by way of interim order, which was regularized later on. However, Hon’ble the Supreme Court went on to deal with the issue further especially the judgment delivered in Jasmine Kaur”s case (supra), in terms of which obstruction had been created for grant of admission to the candidates if the last cut off date had expired. One view was expressed that the time fixed for admissions should be scrupulously followed. Learned Amicus Curiae appointed by the court while referring to earlier judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Asha v. Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences & Ors, (2012) 7 SCC 389 submitted that in exceptional circumstances, the court is not powerless to direct admission even after the cutoff date. Learned Amicus Curiae appointed by the court while referring to earlier judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Asha v. Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences & Ors, (2012) 7 SCC 389 submitted that in exceptional circumstances, the court is not powerless to direct admission even after the cutoff date. While referring to various decisions rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court earlier, it was opined that Jasmine Kaur’s case (supra) requires reconsideration. Hence, the matter was referred for consideration by a larger bench. The matter is stated to be still pending. 32. As to what is the course to be adopted in case earlier judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court is doubted by subsequent bench and the matter is referred to the larger bench. Whether the law laid down in the judgment which has been doubted is still a good law and a binding precedent. The question was considered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s R. S. Sharma and Co., (1988) 4 SCC 353 . It was opined therein that final determination of a controversy cannot be kept pending only on the ground that the issue is pending adjudication by a larger Bench. The argument raised by the parties before Hon’ble the Supreme Court was that pending consideration of the issue by the Constitution Bench, the case should not be decided. However, keeping in view the law, as existing, the matter was finally decided. The relevant paras thereof are extracted below: “7. It was contended before us that the question whether on the ground of absence of reasons, the award is bad per se, is pending consideration by a Constitution Bench of this Court in C.A. Nos. 3137-39 of 1985, 3145 of 1985-Jaipur Development Authority v. Firm Chhokhamal Contractor. It was, hence, urged that this should await adjudication on this point by the Constitution Bench. We are unable to accept this contention. In our opinion pendency of this question should not postpone all decisions by this Court. One of the cardinal principles of the administration of justice is to ensure quick disposal of disputes in accordance with law, justice and For Subsequent orders see CWP-26508-2015, CWP-787-2016, CWP-788-2016 and 1 more. 8. We are unable to accept this contention. In our opinion pendency of this question should not postpone all decisions by this Court. One of the cardinal principles of the administration of justice is to ensure quick disposal of disputes in accordance with law, justice and For Subsequent orders see CWP-26508-2015, CWP-787-2016, CWP-788-2016 and 1 more. 8. The law it stands today is clear that unless there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award, the award cannot be challenged merely on the ground of absence of reasons. This is settled law by a long series of decisions. Interests of justice and administration of justice would not be served by keeping at bay final adjudication of the controversy in this case on the plea that the question whether an unreasoned award is bad or not, is pending adjudication by a larger bench. There have been a large number of sittings before the arbitrators. Parties have been heard. There was no mis-conduct in the proceedings. There has been no violation of the principles of natural justice. In such a situation it would be inappropriate to postpone the decision pending adjudication of this question by a larger bench of this Court. We do not know how long it would take to decide that question, and whether ultimately this Court would decide that unreasoned awards per se are bad or whether the decision would have prospective application only in view of the long settled position of law on this aspect in this country or not. Justice between the parties in a particular case, should not be in suspended animation.......” 33. Similar was the view expressed in State of Orissa v. Dandasi Sahu, (1988) 4 SCC 12 . 34. The issue was subsequently considered by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Madhao vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors, 2009 SCC Online Bom. 688. On the subject-matter involved therein, the legal issue was decided by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh, (1995 Supp (2) SCC 475), however, doubting the judgment delivered by two Hon’ble Judges in the aforesaid case, in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 505 (hereinafter referred to as “Girnar-I case”), the matter was referred to a larger Bench. The Bench consisting of three-Judges in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555 (hereinafter referred to as “Girnar-II case”) referred the matter to by a larger Bench. The contention sought to be raised by the party before the Bombay High Court was that in view of the order passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in “Girnar-I and Girnar-II cases”, the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Sant Joginder Singh’s case (supra) no more holds the field, hence, cannot be relied upon, as the issue has not been finally decided by Hon’ble the Supreme Court after reference in “Girnar-II case” (supra). While referring to the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in R. S. Sharma and Co.’s case (supra) and other judgments on the issue, it was opined that pending decision of a reference by a larger Bench, any lis between the parties cannot be kept suspended. Any reference to a larger Bench does not make the law already laid down by the Apex Court not binding on the courts below till the issue is decided by a larger Bench. Relevant paragraph there from is extracted below: “56. In view of the above referred observations of the Apex Court and the Division benches of this Court, it is evident that justice between the parties should not be kept in suspended animation in view of pendency of reference for decision before the larger Bench. For Subsequent orders see CWP-26508-2015, CWP-787-2016, CWP-788-2016 and 1 more. Similarly, the decision of the Apex Court referred to the larger Bench does not make the law already laid down by the Apex Court not binding on the High Court till the authoritative pronouncement is delivered by the larger Bench of the Apex Court. In the instant case, the land acquisition proceedings were initiated much prior to 2005 and the award came to be passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 20.6.2008. There is no challenge to the land acquisition procedure adopted by the Authorities nor validity of the award is questioned except on the ground of applicability of provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Apex Court in the case of Sant Joginder Singh has already declared the law on the subject by holding that Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is not applicable to the proceedings under the MRTP Act. The Apex Court in the case of Sant Joginder Singh has already declared the law on the subject by holding that Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is not applicable to the proceedings under the MRTP Act. In the subsequent decision in the case of Girnar-I, the Apex Court by giving reasons referred the decision in Sant Joginder Singh’s case for re-consideration to the three-Judges’ Bench, which in turn, again referred the said issue to the five Judges’ Bench without declaring the law on the subject, with the result the law declared by the Apex Court in Sant Joginder Singh’s case continues to hold field and, therefore, for the reasons stated above, it is difficult for us to accept the contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard.” 35. In the aforesaid judgment, Division Bench of Bombay High Court had framed four issues, two of which relevant herein, are extracted below: “(II) Whether the decisions of the Apex Court in Girnar-I and Girnar-II cases affect the binding nature of the law declared by the Apex Court in Sant Joginder Singh’s case and whether it loses its efficacy? (III) Whether the law declared by the Apex Court in the case of Sant Joginder Singh in regards to applicability of Section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act to the acquisition proceedings under the MRTP Act loses its binding nature under Article 141 of the Constitution in view of pendency of reference in this regard before the larger Bench of the Apex Court for decision?” 36. Both the aforesaid questions were answered in negative. 37. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Denny Fernandez v. State of Kerala, 2003(1) KLT 280 opined that the judgment pronounced by Hon’ble the Supreme Court continues to be the law of land under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and binding upon all the courts below till such time it is reversed or modified by a larger Bench. The observation made in Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Barauni v. The Presiding Officer Central Government Industrial Tribunal and another, 1994 SCC On Line Pat 277 in para No. 23 is also in same line. The relevant para there from is extracted below: “23. The observation made in Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Barauni v. The Presiding Officer Central Government Industrial Tribunal and another, 1994 SCC On Line Pat 277 in para No. 23 is also in same line. The relevant para there from is extracted below: “23. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the correctness of the aforesaid Constitution Bench decisions of the Supreme Court is likely to be reconsidered by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court since a similar question arising in a batch of matters before the Supreme Court has been referred to a larger Bench. Assuming it to be so, the decision of the Supreme Court is nonetheless binding upon me as the law of the land declared, which I am bound to follow having regard to the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution. The mere fact that the matter has been referred to a larger Bench does not denude the decision of its authority as a binding precedent.......” 38. Similar view was expressed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and another v. Sarva Shramik Sangh, Sangli and others, (2013) 16 SCC 16 . The aforesaid judgments were followed by the Division Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Dhingra Jardine Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of Haryana and others, 2017 (2) PLR 65.” 39. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law by Hon’ble the Supreme Court till such time the view expressed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Jasmine Kaur’s case (supra) is over ruled. The same is a binding precedent. As on today it is the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matter of admissions to professional colleges. 40. If the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments is considered, no admission can be possibly be granted after the expiry of last date of joining of candidates for the State Counseling, which was August 18, 2019. 41. For the reasons mentioned above, in my opinion, no case is made out by the petitioner to interfere in the present petition. The same is accordingly, dismissed.