ORDER : 1. The petitioner is the sole accused in the case registered as Crime No. 875/2017 of Vattiyoorkkavu police station under Sections 188, 447 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code. She seeks to quash Annexure-A1 first information report registered against her, by invoking the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code). 2. The case against the petitioner was registered on the basis of the first information statement given to the police by the third respondent. The material averments in the first information statement are as follows: The son of the third respondent owns two acres and thirty seven cents of property. The third respondent is the power of attorney holder of her son. The petitioner is the wife of the brother of the third respondent. There are civil cases pending with regard to the title and possession of the aforesaid property. On 15.05.2017, the petitioner trespassed into the aforesaid property and cut an anjili tree standing therein, causing a loss of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the third respondent and her son. Such an act was committed by the petitioner in violation of the direction of the civil court to maintain status quo with regard to the property. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor and also the learned counsel for the third respondent. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that registration of the case against the petitioner for an offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained since there was no complaint given by any public servant as envisaged under Section 195 of the Code. Learned counsel also contended that the title and possession of the petitioner and her daughter over the property involved had been declared by the civil court and therefore, the offences punishable under Sections 447 and 427 I.P.C. will also not lie against the petitioner. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the third respondent contended that the first information report (Annexure-A1), which is based on the statement given by the third respondent, discloses commission of the offences punishable under Sections 188, 447 and 427 IPC by the petitioner and therefore, this Court would not be justified in quashing the proceedings against the petitioner by invoking the power under Section 482 of the Code. 6. 6. Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows: "188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant - Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Explanation - It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm." 7. The ingredients of the offence under Section 188 I.P.C. are the following: (1) There was promulgation of an order by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order. (2) Such order directed the accused to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management. (3) The accused was aware of such order. (4) He disobeyed such order. (5) Such disobedience caused or tended to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed or such disobedience caused or tended to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or a riot or affray. 8. In the instant case, the allegation against the petitioner is that, in violation of the order of injunction passed against her by the Civil Court, she trespassed into the property involved and cut a valuable tree. One of the main ingredients of an offence under Section 188 I.P.C. is absent here. 8. In the instant case, the allegation against the petitioner is that, in violation of the order of injunction passed against her by the Civil Court, she trespassed into the property involved and cut a valuable tree. One of the main ingredients of an offence under Section 188 I.P.C. is absent here. There was no order promulgated by a public servant in existence and there was no disobedience of any such order. 9. Section 188 I.P.C. does not contemplate an order passed by a civil court in a suit. The word "promulgated" in Section 188 I.P.C. does not refer to an order passed by a public servant during the course of the proceedings between two parties in a suit. Section 188 I.P.C. applies to orders made by public functionaries and for public purposes, and not to an order passed in a civil suit between party and party - Quinn vs. Keshab Chandra Mukherjee, AIR 1949 Cal 349, Bishan Dutt vs. Emperor, AIR 1948 All 50 , Kunjuraman Asari vs. Chellappan Nair, 1952 KLT 547 and Joseph George vs. State of Kerala, 2000 (3) KLT 275 . 10. In Joseph George (supra), it has been held as follows: “Section 188 I.P.C. does not contemplate orders passed by civil or revenue courts in judicial proceedings. Any breach of such orders can be adequately dealt with under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure but cannot be said that they are orders promulgated within the meaning of Section 188 I.P.C. the disobedience of which would result into obstruction, annoyance or injury.” 11. In the aforesaid circumstances, even if the allegation against the petitioner that she violated the order of injunction passed against her by the civil court is accepted as true, it does not make out an offence under Section 188 I.P.C. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider whether the third respondent, in the light of the provision contained in Section 195 (1)(a) of the Code, was competent to launch a prosecution against the petitioner for committing such an offence. 12. Another offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner is punishable under Section 447 I.P.C. Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of criminal trespass. 12. Another offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner is punishable under Section 447 I.P.C. Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of criminal trespass. It provides that whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit criminal trespass. Section 447 I.P.C. is the penal provision for committing criminal trespass. 13. The ingredients of the offence of criminal trespass are: (1) Entry into or upon property in the possession of another (2) If such entry is lawful, then unlawfully remaining upon such property (3) Such entry or unlawful remaining must be with intent -(i) to commit an offence; or (ii) to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the property. 14. It is pertinent to note that the husband of the petitioner had filed a suit as O.S. No. 917/1994 against his mother and the third respondent for granting a decree of declaration of his title and possession over the property involved in the case. The aforesaid suit was decreed in his favour declaring his title and possession over the property. The husband of the petitioner is no more. On his death, the right over the property would have devolved upon the petitioner and her daughter. True, the aforesaid decree is an ex-parte decree. But, unless and until it is set aside, it is a valid decree. 15. The husband of the petitioner had instituted another suit as O.S. No. 740/1994 against his mother and the third respondent seeking a decree of injunction restraining them from trespassing into the property. This suit was decreed in his favour restraining them from trespassing into the property and causing any obstruction to the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property by him. 16. In the suit O.S. No. 454/2013, which is referred to by the third respondent in the first information statement, the petitioner and her daughter had obtained an order of temporary injunction dated 04.10.2013 restraining another son of the petitioner (the plaintiff in that suit) from disturbing their possession over the property. 16. In the suit O.S. No. 454/2013, which is referred to by the third respondent in the first information statement, the petitioner and her daughter had obtained an order of temporary injunction dated 04.10.2013 restraining another son of the petitioner (the plaintiff in that suit) from disturbing their possession over the property. The appeal filed against this order had been dismissed by judgment dated 18.02.2015 by the appellate court. 17. In the first information statement given to the police by the third respondent, there is no allegation or averment that any civil court has declared that her son has got title or possession over the property. There is also no averment in the first information statement that the third respondent or her son has got exclusive possession over the property in any lawful manner after the death of the husband of the petitioner. In order to attract the offence punishable under Section 447 I.P.C. the property entered into by the accused must be in the possession of another person. As on the date of commission of the offences alleged, the possession of the petitioner over the property in question, stood recognised by the orders/decrees passed by the civil courts concerned. In these circumstances, even if the allegation against the petitioner that she entered into the property is accepted as true, it does not make out an offence punishable under Section 447 I.P.C. 18. The other offence alleged against the petitioner is punishable under Section 427 I.P.C. The offence of mischief is defined under Section 425 I.P.C. which reads as follows: "Whoever, with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person, causes the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits "Mischief." Explanation 1 - It is not essential to the offence of mischief that the offender should intend to cause loss or damage to the owner of the property injured or destroyed. It is sufficient if be intends to cause, or knows that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to any person by injuring any property, whether it belongs to that person or not. It is sufficient if be intends to cause, or knows that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to any person by injuring any property, whether it belongs to that person or not. Explanation 2 - Mischief may be committed by an act affecting property belonging to the person who commits the act, or to that person and others jointly." 19. Even if there are bona-fide civil disputes pending between the parties, if a party takes law into his hands and causes mischief, it would definitely come within the purview of the offence punishable under Section 427 I.P.C. Mere assertion of a claim of right by the accused is not sufficient. The question is whether the accused had acted in good faith as an assertion of the claim of reasonable right over the property. If the accused was asserting his bona-fide claim of right, there cannot be an offence of mischief as defined in Section 425 I.P.C. The true test in such case is whether the accused acted out of malice or in assertion of bona-fide claim of right over the property. Francis vs. Tony John, 1987 (2) KLT 798 . 20. In the instant case, the right of the petitioner and her daughter over the property in question, as on the date of commission of the acts alleged, stood recognized and declared by the civil courts concerned. Therefore, it cannot be found that the petitioner had the intention to cause wrongful loss or damage to any person by cutting the tree in the property. The act alleged to have been committed by her can only be regarded as an act in assertion of her right over the property. In such circumstances, the allegations against the petitioner do no make out an offence punishable under Section 427 I.P.C. 21. The petitioner has produced copies of the judgments/orders passed by the civil courts concerned to substantiate her contentions. Ordinarily, the defence of an accused, although appears to be plausible, should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code. The petitioner has produced copies of the judgments/orders passed by the civil courts concerned to substantiate her contentions. Ordinarily, the defence of an accused, although appears to be plausible, should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code. But, it does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration by this Court for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of Court - Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills vs. Rajvir Industries, AIR 2008 SC 1683 . 22. There is an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement of a dispute. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But, it has to be seen whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is in fact adopted, there can be no hesitation to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court. In the instant case, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would be an abuse of process of court. The proceedings against her are liable to be quashed. 23. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 188, 427 and 447 I.P.C. on the basis of Annexure-A1 first information report, are hereby quashed.