JUDGMENT : 1. By means of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has challenged the orders dated 16.05.2015 and 21.05.2019 passed by learned trial court and learned revisional court respectively. By order dated 16.05.2015, learned trial court has rejected petitioner’s delay condonation application filed along with her application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. By latter order dated 21.05.2019, learned revisional court has dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner against the order of learned trial court. 2. It transpires that respondent Nos. 1 to 4 had filed Original Suit No. 15 of 2012 for cancellation of Will dated 07.03.2008 alleged to have been executed by father of the petitioner (respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein) in favour of Smt. Santosh (petitioner herein). The said suit was decreed ex parte by learned trial court vide judgment dated 09.10.2012. According to the petitioner, she came to know about the said judgment only on 04.12.2014 when the judgment rendered by trial Court was placed on record by respondent nos. 1 to 4 in the mutation proceedings pending before Tehsildar, Haridwar. According to the petitioner, she made necessary enquiry and then applied for certified copy of the judgment and soon thereafter, she filed an application on 12.12.2014 for setting aside ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. Since there was delay of about two years in filing the said application, therefore, petitioner also filed an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act. Learned trial court/Civil Judge (J.D.), Haridwar rejected the delay condonation application filed by the petitioner vide order dated 16.05.2015. The revision petition filed by the petitioner against learned trial court order having been dismissed, petitioner has approached this Court. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. The sole ground for rejecting petitioner’s delay condonation application recorded by learned trial court is that petitioner had stated in her delay condonation application that the certified copy of the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court was delivered to her on 09.12.2012 and the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C. was filed by her on 10.12.2014, thus, there is unexplained delay of two years. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that due to typing mistake, the date of delivery of certified copy of the judgment to the petitioner was wrongly mentioned as 09.12.2012, while it should have been mentioned as 09.12.2014. To buttress his argument, he has referred to the delay condonation application, which is annexure No. 9 to the writ petition and has drawn my attention to Page No. 72 at third line from bottom, where petitioner specifically stated that she had no knowledge about Original Suit No. 15 of 2012 before 04.12.2014. This, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, clearly indicates that the delay was bonafide and was properly explained. 6. Mr. Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner further referred to the folio whereby certified copy of the judgment of trial Court was obtained, which is enclosed as annexure No. 1 to the supplementary affidavit filed alongwith IA No. 8276 of 2019 filed by the petitioner. A careful perusal of the said document indicates that petitioner had applied for certified copy of the judgment of learned trial court on 05.12.2014, and the same was delivered to the petitioner on 09.12.2014. Based on the said document, Mr. Siddhartha Singh submits that there was no delay whatsoever on the part of the petitioner in moving application for setting aside ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC, inasmuch as, the judgment was delivered to petitioner on 09.12.2014 and the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was moved on 12.12.2014. 7. Per contra, Sri Nikhil Singhal, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 4 submits that once the trial court had recorded a finding, based on admission made by petitioner, that certified copy of the judgment was delivered to her on 09.12.2012, it was open for the petitioner to correct the said date by way of amendment in the delay condonation application, which was not done by her. He further submits that in the revision petition filed by the petitioner, the same date was mentioned as the date, on which certified copy was delivered to her. Thus, he submits that learned courts below were justified in not acceding to the prayer made by the petitioner for condonation of delay. 8. It is well settled that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice and cannot override the necessity to do justice between parties to a suit. Thus, he submits that learned courts below were justified in not acceding to the prayer made by the petitioner for condonation of delay. 8. It is well settled that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice and cannot override the necessity to do justice between parties to a suit. In the case of Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India reported in (1985) 1 SCC 163 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “Let it be recalled what has been said umpteen times that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice and should be so interpreted and not to make them penal statutes for punishing erring parties”. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 693 has held as under:- “5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. 6. The expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay. 10. Similarly in the case of K. Subbarayudu v. LAO reported in (2017) 12 SCC 840 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “11. The term “sufficient cause” is to receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is attributable to the appellants, the Court should adopt a justice-oriented approach in condoning the delay. The term “sufficient cause” is to receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is attributable to the appellants, the Court should adopt a justice-oriented approach in condoning the delay. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao it was held as under: “8. … Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 has held as under:- “9. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji a two-Judge Bench observed that: “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice—that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts.” (emphasis in original) The learned Judges emphasised on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. 10. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice.” 12. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice.” 12. Although petitioner in her delay condonation application had mentioned an incorrect date of delivery of certified copy of the judgment i.e. 09.12.2012, however, the fact remains that certified copy of the judgment was delivered to the petitioner on 09.12.2014. Both the learned Courts below have overlooked the fact that in her delay condonation application itself, petitioner had stated that she had no knowledge about Suit No. 15 of 2012 before 04.12.2014. Thus, it can be safely inferred that whatever delay was caused, it was bonafide and had been explained properly. Therefore, justice should not be denied to the petitioner merely for a typing mistake. Endeavour of the Court should be to do complete justice and justice should not be denied to a party on technicalities. 13. In such view of the matter, writ petition is allowed. Impugned orders dated 16.05.2015 and 21.05.2019 passed by learned trial Court and revisional Court are set aside. The delay condonation application filed by the petitioner is allowed subject to payment of cost of Rs.5,000/- to respondent nos. 1 to 4. Cost shall be payable within two weeks from today. 14. Learned trial Court is requested to decide petitioner’s application for setting-aside ex-parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C., as early as possible, preferably within two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order.