JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. C.S. Rawat, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. B.P.S. Mer, learned Brief Holder for the State and Mr. Navneet Kaushik, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner and, with their consent, the Special Appeal is disposed of at the stage of admission. 2. The application to condone the delay, in preferring this appeal, is not opposed and the delay is, therefore, condoned. Delay condonation application stands disposed of. 3. The Society, in whose favour the recovery certificate was issued by the Sugar Commissioner which proceedings were questioned in the Writ Petition, has not been arrayed as a respondent therein. We are satisfied that the Society is a "person aggrieved" by the order under appeal, and are entitled to file an appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Leave to appeal is granted. 4. This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No.1139 of 2019 dated 30.04.2019, quashing the recovery certificate on the ground that the General Manager of the factory was not its occupier. 5. Mr. C.S. Rawat, learned counsel for the appellants, would submit, in our opinion rightly so, that a copy of the impugned proceedings is marked not only to the General Manager but also to the occupier, as the words used in the said letter are "General Manager/occupier". 6. On the other hand Mr. Navneet Kaushik, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner, would submit that the recovery certificate is addressed only to the General Manager, and it is merely a copy thereof which is marked also to the occupier. We are not impressed by this submission. 7. Exercise of jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is discretionary. (C.R. Reddy Law College Employees Association, Eluru W.G. District vs. Bar Council of India, New Delhi, 2004 5 ALD 180 ). The jurisdiction of this Court is exercised only in furtherance of the interest of justice and in larger public interest, and not merely on a legal point being made out. The interest of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. The Court has to weigh public interest vis-`-vis private interest while exercising its discretionary powers. The interest of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. The Court has to weigh public interest vis-`-vis private interest while exercising its discretionary powers. (Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 AIR(SC) 1236; ManoharLal v. Ugrasen & others, 2010 11 SCC 557 ; Master Marine Services Pvt. Ltd v. Metcalfe and Hodgkison Pvt. Ltd, 2005 6 SCC 138 ; Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd, 2000 2 SCC 617 ). A writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari are discretionary, unlike a writ of habeas corpus which can be sought as a matter of right. One of the principles inherent is that the exercise of discretionary power should be for the sake of justice. (State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, 1994 2 SCC 481 ). Even if a legal flaw might be electronically detected, (RashpalMalhotra v. Mrs. Saya Rajput, 1987 AIR(SC) 2235 and Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, 1989 AIR(SC) 1972), or some defect is found in the decision making process, this Court would exercise its discretion with great caution and only in furtherance of public interest, and not merely on the making out of a legal point. Only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, should it intervene. (Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd, 2000 2 SCC 617 ). 8. The object, of addressing such a letter, is to inform the occupier that such a recovery certificate is being issued. Even by marking a copy, the occupier has been made aware of the contents of the recovery certificate. The society consists of cane growers as its members. The amount allegedly due towards commission, as is recorded in the recovery certificate, exceeds Rs.18.00 crores. 9. In any event, this recovery certificate is required to be forwarded to the District Collector under Section 18(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, and it is for the Collector thereafter to issue a recovery citation, and take action pursuant thereto in accordance with law. 9. In any event, this recovery certificate is required to be forwarded to the District Collector under Section 18(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, and it is for the Collector thereafter to issue a recovery citation, and take action pursuant thereto in accordance with law. While we may not be understand to have held that the contents of the recovery certificate, that a sum in excess of Rs.18.00 crores is due, is correct as these are all matters for the Collector to consider and not for this Court to determine, suffice it to hold that interference with the recovery certificate, issued by the Cane Commissioner to the Collector, may not be justified on the hyper-technicality that it was addressed to the General Manager, and marking a copy thereof to the occupier is not sufficient compliance with what the Act requires. 10. We are satisfied, therefore, that the learned Single Judge ought not to have exercised jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with such proceedings. The order under appeal is set-aside, and the Special Appeal is allowed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. 11. Needless to state that, in case, a recovery citation is issued by the District Collector, pursuant to the recovery certificate forwarded to him by the Cane Commissioner, it is always open to the respondent-writ petitioner to question the recovery citation in appropriate legal proceedings.