Ranjan Kumar Singh (male) son of late Rajendra Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Cooperative Department, Government of Bihar, Patna
2019-03-12
ARVIND SRIVASTAVA, JYOTI SARAN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : JYOTI SARAN, J. 1. It is feeling aggrieved by a judgment and order dated 07.01.2019 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No.23631 of 2018 whereby the writ petition has been dismissed that the petitioner as an appellant, is before this Court in this intra-court appeal. 2. The appellant-petitioner before the learned Single Judge prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 19.11.2018/23.11.2018 passed by the Deputy Registrar(Cane), Cooperative Societies, Bihar, Patna in Election Case No. 92 of 2018 circulated vide memo No.10217 dated 23.11.2018 whereby it was held that the nomination of the respondent No.17 was improperly rejected and consequently the election of the appellant-writ petition was set aside. 3. The appellant-writ petitioner also prayed for production of the records whereby the election case had been transferred to the Deputy Registrar(Cane) for hearing and disposal and quashed the same as according to the appellant-writ petitioner, it was contrary to the statutory provisions of the Bihar Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and the Rules framed thereunder because according to the appellant-petitioner, the respondent-Registrar had no jurisdiction to delegate the power to the Deputy Director. 4. Facts of the case briefly noted from the pleadings on record is that a surcharge proceedings was initiated on 09.12.2014 against the Chairman, Assistant Manager and the Branch Manager of the Purhara Primary Agriculture Credit Cooperative Society vide proposal at Annexure-R-17-C to the counter affidavit of the respondent No.17 filed in the writ proceedings. The enclosure to the proposal named only 3 persons and although the Assistant Manager of the society carried the same name as the respondent No.17 but undisputedly the proposal was not against the respondent No.17 who at the relevant time held the post of Chairman of the Bank. Final order was passed in the surcharge proceedings on 28.8.2015/5.10.2015, a copy of which is enclosed at Annexure-P/17 to the writ petition and whereby the Joint Registrar found the erstwhile Managing Director as well as the present Managing Director of the Bank together with the Board of Directors guilty of financial irregularity.
Final order was passed in the surcharge proceedings on 28.8.2015/5.10.2015, a copy of which is enclosed at Annexure-P/17 to the writ petition and whereby the Joint Registrar found the erstwhile Managing Director as well as the present Managing Director of the Bank together with the Board of Directors guilty of financial irregularity. It is feeling aggrieved by such order that the Board of Directors of the Central Cooperative Bank, Aurangabad filed a statutory appeal which was allowed by the appellate authority, who while staying the operation of the order passed by the Joint Registrar, remitted the matter to him for hearing de novo and for passing fresh order. A copy of the order dated 08.05.2017/24.07.2017 of the appellate authority circulated vide Memo No.71 dated 28.07.2017 is enclosed at Annexure-P/18 to the writ petition. On remand, that the matter is being proceeded with by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies as manifest from the order dated 02.01.2018 at Annexure- P/19 to the writ petition. 5. In around this period, the State Election Authority notified the election to the post of Chairman for which the last date of nomination was 09.01.2018. The appellant-writ petitioner as well as the respondent No.17 filed their nominations. Objection was filed by the appellant to the candidature of the respondent No.17 on grounds of pending surcharge proceedings as well as for concealment of such information in his nomination form and thus praying for disqualification under Rule 23(1)(d) of the Bihar Cooperative Societies Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') framed under 'the Act'. On the objection being examined that vide notification bearing Memo No. 43 dated 11.01.2018, the Bihar State Election Authority (hereinafter referred the as 'the Authority') cancelled the election process to the Board of Directors. The appellant-petitioner questioned the cancellation in C.W.J.C. No.1221 of 2018 which was not interfered with. 6. On 16.03.2018 the revised election programme was notified by the 'Authority' and according whereto, the last date for filing nomination was 26.03.2018, the scrutiny was fixed on 27.03.2018 and election was to be held on 05.03.2018. An objection was again filed by the appellant-writ petitioner against the nomination of the respondent No.17 on 27.03.2018 and which was upheld and consequently the nomination of the respondent No.17 was rejected vide Annexure-P-11 to the writ petition. The election was held in which the appellant-writ petitioner was elected. 7.
An objection was again filed by the appellant-writ petitioner against the nomination of the respondent No.17 on 27.03.2018 and which was upheld and consequently the nomination of the respondent No.17 was rejected vide Annexure-P-11 to the writ petition. The election was held in which the appellant-writ petitioner was elected. 7. The respondent No.17 questioned the rejection of his nomination by filing Election Case No. 92 of 2018 which was allowed on 19.11.2018 vide Annexure-P-15. The Deputy Registrar (Cooperative Society) while holding that the nomination of the respondent No. 17 had been improperly rejected, set aside the election vide order dated 19.11.2018/23.11.2018 which order was questioned by the appellant-writ petitioner through the writ petition in question which has been dismissed and hence this appeal. 8. We have heard Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner with assistance from Mr. S.B.K. Mangalam and Mr. Rajeev Kumar Singh, Advocate on record. The State is represented by Mr. Ashok Kumar Dubey, A.C. to AAG 11, the State Election Authority is represented through Mr. Mukesh Kumar and the respondent No.17 is represented through Mr. Kamal Nayan Chaubey, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha. 9. Mr. Giri learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner faced with the uphill task in view of the concurrent finding on the issue of improper rejection of the nomination of the respondent No.17 not only by the prescribed authority under the Bihar State Election Authority Act, 2008 and the rules framed thereunder but also by the learned Single Judge, has submitted that Rule 23(1)(d) of 'the Rules' is self eloquent and if a surcharge proceedings is pending against any candidate, he is disqualified from contesting an election. He submits that a surcharge proceeding was initiated against the Chairman and the Assistant Manager of the Cooperative Society including the Branch Manager of the Bank and during the course of surcharge proceeding that the culpability of the Managing Director both past and present came to surface together with the Board of Directors of the Bank and whereupon a surcharge order was passed against them by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Society vide order at Annexure-P-17.
He submits that though this order has been interfered with by the appellate authority vide Annexure-P-18 but then the order of the Joint Registrar has not been set aside rather the matter has simply been remanded for fresh opinion by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Magadh Division, Gaya as manifest from the order of the appellate authority. According to Mr. Giri, if the order of the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies has not been set aside, the surcharge continues against the respondent No.17 and a remand would not reverse the status. He submits that even otherwise, a pendency of a surcharge proceeding is sufficient for a disqualification to contest the election. According to learned Senior counsel, since it is not in dispute that the surcharge proceeding is yet pending the prescribed authority as well as the learned Single Judge in upholding the opinion of the prescribed authority have committed serious error of law and jurisdiction to upset the election of the appellant- writ petitioner. 10. It is the argument of Mr. Giri that the appellate order was passed on 24.07.2017 and on remand the matter was taken up by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies on 02.01.2018 when the respondent no.17 has registered appearance and is participating in the proceedings which continues even today and thus the learned Single Judge as well as the prescribed authority has erred in holding that no surcharge proceedings was pending against the respondent No.17. 11. The argument of Mr. Giri has been contested by Mr K.N. Chaubey, learned Senior counsel who in reference to a judgment of learned Single Judge since reported in AIR1959 Madhya Pradesh 181 (Kaluram and another versus Mehtab Bai and another) submits in reference to paragraph 2 that an order of remand implies a reversal of the decision of the lower court. To the same effect, he has referred to a decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1960 Madras 406 (M.R.M. Periannan Chettiar versus Commissioner of Income Tex) paragraph 12. According to Mr.
To the same effect, he has referred to a decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1960 Madras 406 (M.R.M. Periannan Chettiar versus Commissioner of Income Tex) paragraph 12. According to Mr. Chaubey, learned Senior counsel, the Minister in charge of the Department was holding appellate jurisdiction and thus even if, there may be shortcomings in the language of the order which may bear reasons for raising issue of present kind but the import of the order is very clear and it is the pith and substance of an order which has to be seen rather than a literal interpretation. He submits that the respondent No.17 was undisputedly not named in the proposal and thus a remand would not automatically include his name. 12. In reference to the second proviso to Section 40 of 'the Act' he submits, that a limitation of 3 years regulates such exercise and since the surcharge proposal is dated 09.12.2014, the proceedings would deem to have lapsed on 09.12.2017 i.e on expiry of 3 years. According to Mr. Chaubey, no order could be passed on the surcharge proceedings after 09.12.2017. 13. Learned counsel while making reference to the provisions underlying Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and alongside a judgment of the division bench reported in 1999(2)BLJ 818 (Barhu Ram and others versus Butai Ram and another) submits that a mere second opinion would not be sufficient for interfering with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. He submits that the judgment under challenge also does not warrant interference because respondent Nos.8 to 11 though similarly placed as the appellant-petitioner were not disqualified. 14. Concluding the arguments it is submitted by Mr. Chaubey that learned Single Judge has exhaustively dealt with the matter which is in tune with the statutory provision and requires no interference. 15. Mr. Giri, learned Senior counsel in his short reply submits that the issue involved in the present case is whether or not the nomination has been improperly rejected and since it is not in dispute that the surcharge proceedings on remand is pending, the order of the prescribed authority to interfere with the election after holding that the nomination of the respondent No.17 was improperly rejected, is illegal. 16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we have perused the records. 17.
16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we have perused the records. 17. Although exhaustive arguments have been advanced by both sides on the import of the order of remand as well as on the status of the surcharge proceeding on remand but we do not see any requirement to engage ourselves in a long drawn discussion. 18. Undisputedly, Rule 23 (1)(d) of 'the Rules' disqualifies any person from participating in election to the Managing Committee, if there is any surcharge proceeding relating to any registered society pending against him. For the purpose whether or not a surcharge proceeding was pending against the respondent No. 17, we shall be referring to some of the documents connected with the proceedings. 19. A copy of the proposal dated 09.12.2014 is enclosed at Annexure-R-17C of the counter affidavit of the respondent No.17 in the writ proceedings and names the following three persons for being proceeded for surcharge namely: (a) Shyama Charan Sinha, erstwhile Chairman. (b) Sanjay Kumar Sinha, Assistant Manager. (c) Ram Bihari Singh, Branch Manager, Haspura. 20. It is not in dispute that the person at Serial No. (b) Sanjay Kumar Sinha, Assistant Manager is not the petitioner though he shares a common name. It is again not in dispute that the petitioner at the relevant time held the post of Chairman of the Bank. It is proceeding on the proposal which named the three office bearers exclusively that the Joint Registrar vide order passed on 28.10.2015/05.10.2015 held the erstwhile Managing Director, the present Managing Director together with a Board of Directors, as guilty of financial irregularity and issued orders for deposit of the amount in question failing which to face proceedings for recovery. 21. It is feeling aggrieved by the order so passed which surcharged the Managing Director(s) as well as the Board that the Board of Directors filed statutory appeal before the Minister, which was allowed.
21. It is feeling aggrieved by the order so passed which surcharged the Managing Director(s) as well as the Board that the Board of Directors filed statutory appeal before the Minister, which was allowed. The operative portion of the order passed by the appellate authority enclosed at Annexure- P/18 runs under: ^^----------------------------------------------- bl okn esa la;qDr fuca/kd] lg;ksx lfefr;kW }kjk ikfjr vkns'k dk voyksdu fd;k A vkns'k ds izkjfEHkd ikjk esa ;g Li"V gS fd fuca/kd] lg;ksx lfefr;kWa ds fo'ks"k vads{k.k ny us vius tkWp&izfrosnu esa rRdkyhu v/;{k] ';kek pj.k flag] lgk;d izca/kd] lat; dqekj flag] rRdkyhu 'kk[kk izca/kd] jkefcgkjh flag dks nks"kh ik;k x;k A mDr izfrosnu ds vkyksd esa ftyk vads{k.k inkf/kdkjh] lg;ksx lfefr;kW] vkSjaxkckn }kjk buds fo:) vf/kHkj izLrko la;qDr fuca/kd] lg;ksx lfefr;kWa ds U;k;ky; esa nk;j fd;k x;k Fkk] tcfd lEiw.kZ vkns'k esa ewy vkjksfi;ksa ds fo:) ekeyk u gksdj izca/k funs'kd ,oa cksMZ vkWQ Mk;jsDVj dks jkf'k ds nq:i;ksx gsrq ftEeokj ekurs gq, mUgsa vf/kHkkfjr fd;k x;k gS ,oa jkf'k dh olwyh gsrq vkns'k ikfjr fd;k gS A oLrqr+% ftu dkfeZdksa@in/kkfj;ksa ds fo:) fo'ks"k vads{k.k esa rF; ik;s x;s] mUgsa eqDr dj nsuk ,oa vf/kHkkj izLrko esa ftu dkfeZdksa@in/kkfj;ksa ds fo:) fo'ks"k vads{k.k esa rF; ugha ik;s x;s muds fo:) jkf'k dh olwyh gsrq vf/kHkkj izLrko ikfjr djuk] la'k;dkjh rF; izrhr gksrk gS A ,slh fLFkfr esa lE;d fopkjksijkar ;g U;k;ky; bl vf/kHkkj vihy okn esa la;qDr fuca/kd] lg;ksx lfefr;kW }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 28-10-15@05-02-15 ij rRdky izHkko ls jksd yxkrs gq, lEiw.kZ ekeys dks la;qDr fuca/kd] lg;ksx lfefr;kWa] ex/k izeaMy] x;k dks u;s fljs ls lquokbZ dj iqu% vkns'k ikfjr djus dk funsZ'k nsrh gS A^^ 22. It is on remand that the matter was taken up by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Society on 02.01.2018 and when notice was issued and the respondent No.17 has appeared. Now while according to Mr. Giri, the remand order would mean that the surcharge proceeding was restored to its status and since the respondent no.17 was already surcharged, the proceeding is pending against him, according to Mr. Chaubey, the order passed by the Joint Registrar was reversed by the appellate authority who directed the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Society to hear and dispose of the entire matter de novo.
Chaubey, the order passed by the Joint Registrar was reversed by the appellate authority who directed the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Society to hear and dispose of the entire matter de novo. In our opinion, a plain reading of the operative portion of the order passed by the appellate authority at Annexure-P-18 would discern that the appellate authority has been cautious enough to stay the order dated 28.10.2015/05.02.2015 of the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies whereby the surcharge order was passed against the respondent No.17 and others and while doing so, has directed the Joint Registrar to hold de novo proceeding in the matter and pass a fresh order. The remand order is too explicit on its directions for any confusion and in the nature of the order passed by the appellate authority which casts clear obligation on the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies to proceed de novo in the matter and pass fresh order in accordance with law, may be the appellate authority fell short of quashing the order passed by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Society but the import of the order can be gathered from the consequential obligation cast on the Joint Register, Cooperative Societies for proceeding de novo in the matter and in accordance with law. The reasons for the order of remand is traced in the penultimate paragraph wherein the appellate authority has taken note of the fact that while those office bearers against whom the surcharge proposal was submitted, were let of, those against whom there was no adverse report, were surcharged. 23. In our considered opinion, an order of remand passed by an appellate forum requiring the lower forum to proceed de novo and to pass a fresh order itself, implies a reversal of the original order unless, the order of remand itself limits the exercise to be carried out by the forum below on clear and explicit terms. 24. We thus revert to the proposal enclosed at Annexure-R/17C to the counter affidavit of the respondent No.17 filed in the writ proceedings and which as stated above, names three persons but not the respondent No.17.
24. We thus revert to the proposal enclosed at Annexure-R/17C to the counter affidavit of the respondent No.17 filed in the writ proceedings and which as stated above, names three persons but not the respondent No.17. In such situation where the surcharge proposal was submitted in respect of office bearers of the society other than the respondent No.17 and because the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies exceeded his jurisdiction to surcharge even those who were not named in the proposal, that the appellate authority remanded the matter for consideration afresh and de novo. 25. In the circumstances noted, the arguments of Mr. Giri that the remand of the matter would restore the surcharge proceedings at the pending stage even against the respondent No.17, is wholly unacceptable because admittedly no proposal was submitted by the Special Audit Officer against respondent No.17 and until such time that any such proposal would have been submitted in the name of the respondent No.17, the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies had no jurisdiction to proceed against respondent No.17. It is noting such glaring illegality in the proceeding that the appellate authority interfered with the order of the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies. The other argument of Mr. Giri that since the respondent No.17 along with some others had been surcharged by the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Society and thus no further notice is required, is again contrary to the prescriptions. We opine thus, because unless the name of respondent No.17 finds mention in the proposal submitted by the audit after holding enquiry, inspection etc. in the manner prescribed, the proceeding before the Joint Registrar would be limited to the persons named by the audit in the proposal at Annexure R-17/C and cannot be expanded during the course of the proceedings. In fact any such exercise would be without jurisdiction and dehors the provisions of Section 40 of 'the Act'. 26. We conclude thus, by confirming the opinion of the learned Single Judge present at paragraphs 24 and 32 of the judgment as until such time that the respondent No.17 is named in the proposal submitted by the Audit, he can neither be arraigned in the proceeding nor in absence of any such proposal, any such proceeding would be stated to be pending against him. 27.
27. In so far as the issue of limitation is concerned, since the legality/validity of the surcharge proceeding is not a subject matter of the present dispute we refrain from expressing any opinion thereon. 28. For the reasons and discussions above, we are in agreement with the opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge passed on the writ petition which calls for no interference. The appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs.