JUDGMENT : SHARAD KUMAR SHARMA, J. 1. This Criminal Revision has been preferred by the applicant revisionist, whose application preferred under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., has been rejected by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nainital vide its judgment dated 28th May, 2018, as rendered in Misc. Case No. 135 of 2018, Naveen Chandra Joshi Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others. 2. Few basic questions which the revisionist has sought to raise in the present Revision are : 1. There may be several civil or criminal disputes, which may be inter se pending between the same set of parties which may be having a civil nature and criminal nature and its respective civil consequence, but still, if it involves the ingredients of criminal offences and has any element of criminality, still it ought to have been registered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. as an F.I.R. for initiation of criminal proceedings. 2. It is argued by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the test of lodging of the criminal proceedings by the Court would depend upon the ingredients of the offences alleged of and it cannot be denied merely because of the fact that it involves the incidental adjudication of civil disputes between the parties. 3. The contention of the revisionist is that irrespective of the fact that the dispute between the parties under the same set of facts and circumstances may also simultaneously give rise to the civil and criminal liability in relation to the same subject matter which is involved in the civil case. 4. Lastly, he submits that merely that a case involves some element of a civil liability, it solely cannot be a ground to quash the criminal complaint or not to registered the criminal complaint with regard to the set of allegations leveled by the applicant under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. 3. Before venturing into the merits of the matter, it is necessary to point out that as per the array of parties, apart from the fact that the revisionist is an applicant under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., the respondent No. 3 Jakir Hasan, is said to be one of the partners of a Partnership Firm, along with one Mr. Govind Ballabh Pant, which was said to have been executed between them on 12th August, 1990. Out of the said partnership deed, the respondent Nos. Govind Ballabh Pant, which was said to have been executed between them on 12th August, 1990. Out of the said partnership deed, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to the present Revision were the witnesses of the partnership deed dated 20th August, 1990, executed between the parties. 4. The controversy, at hand, was initiated when on 16th August, 1986, when one Mr. Govind Ballabh Pant, had moved an application before the Nagar Palika, praying for to allot him piece of a land on rent which was situated in the Bakery Compound, Mallital, Nainital, which was otherwise recorded with the Nagar Palika in its records. He submitted that the permission to occupy the said property was, in fact, given to him by the Nagar Palika and he continued to occupy the same for a considerable long period and thus, he submitted that since the land, in question, which is of about 1200 sq.feet was a land adjoining to the Saw Mill, which was being operated by Mr. G.B. Pant, of which, he contended that he was holding the saw mill licence to run the Saw Mill. It was the case of Mr. G.B. Pant that he had been remitting the rent to the Nagar Palika for last over five years in relation to the said land. He had also moved an application before the Nagar Palika for the purposes of allotment of the said land which he contends was lying vacant and unused. In the application thus submitted by him for the allotment of the adjoining vacant land before the Nagar Palika on 16th August, 1986, he has also simultaneously in the application had undertaken that in an event if Nagar Palika decides to allot the land to him, he is undertaking to vacate the same whenever it is required by the Nagar Palika in future or on their demand. 5. It is the case of the applicant Mr. Naveen Chandra Joshi that the Nagar Palika had not taken any decision on the application as such on the application dated 16th August, 1986, by passing any order of allotment, as referred above, rather to the contrary, the Nagar Palika had issued a show cause notice as against Mr. 5. It is the case of the applicant Mr. Naveen Chandra Joshi that the Nagar Palika had not taken any decision on the application as such on the application dated 16th August, 1986, by passing any order of allotment, as referred above, rather to the contrary, the Nagar Palika had issued a show cause notice as against Mr. G.B. Pant on 9th January, 1989, contending thereof that over the land, in question, for which, he was an applicant for allotment, he has raised certain illegal constructions without prior permission and thus, the show cause notice was issued to him to remove the said construction. 6. Mr. G.B. Pant, being aggrieved by the show cause notice issued by the Nagar Palika for removal of the construction raised by him without permission, had preferred a Civil Suit, being Civil Suit No. 185 of 1991, Govind Ballabh Pant Vs. Nagar Palika. In the suit, in question, he has sought a relief by way of decree of a permanent injunction, as a restraint against the Nagar Palika from evicting him from the property, in question, except with due process of law. The suit, thus preferred by Mr. G.B. Pant on 20th September, 1991, was decreed in his favour by the learned Trial Court on 30th October, 1993, and as a consequence thereto, the Nagar Palika was injuncted from interfering over the property described in the plaint by figure 'ABCDEFGHI' in the plaint map, which constituted to be the part of the property so called as Bakery Compound, Mallital, Nainital. Operative portion of the judgment dated 30th October, 1993, reads as under :- ^^oknh dk okn izfroknh ds fo:) LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk gsrq O;; lfgr vkKIr fd;k tkrk gS rFkk ;g vknsf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd izfroknh mlds lekuqnsf'krh deZpkjhx.k rFkk vfHkdrkZx.k oknh ds okn i= ds pj.k esa of.kZr Hkw[k.M ls cyiwoZd rFkk fof/k dh izzfØ;k ds fo:) csn[ky u djsA^^ 7. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree dated 30th March, 1993, the Nagar Palika had preferred a Civil Appeal, under Section 96 of the Act, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1994, Nagar Palika Vs. G.B Pant. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree dated 30th March, 1993, the Nagar Palika had preferred a Civil Appeal, under Section 96 of the Act, which was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1994, Nagar Palika Vs. G.B Pant. This appeal, as preferred by Nagar Palika was dismissed by the First Appellate Court on 25th September, 1996, thereby confirmed the Trial Court's decree and as per the case which has been brought on record by the parties, the said judgment and decree of the Civil Court of granting permanent injunction in favour of Mr. G.B. Pant had attained finality since it was not further questioned by the Nagar Palika before any superior Courts, i.e. by way of filing of the Second Appeal before the High Court. 8. The controversy further germinated in accordance with the averments, which has been made in the criminal revision by the revisionist to the effect that the respondent No. 3 had entered into a forged partnership deed which was admittedly an unregistered deed and as a consequence thereto he had entered into an agreement with Mr. G.B. Pant for running the business of the Saw Mill. The said unregistered partnership deed of 20th August, 1990, which was witnessed by respondent No. 4 and 5 would not grant a legal right to run the Saw Mill, in question, to its partners. 9. On 12th February, 1998, the partnership deed between the respondent No. 3 and Mr. G.B. Pant, according to the pleadings of the Criminal Revision, was dissolved and the pleadings of the revisionist was also to the effect that the partnership deed was nothing, but an act of forgery which was being conducted by respondent No. 3 to somehow usurp the land which belonged to Nagar Palika. He further contended that in their ill motive, the respondent No. 3 has forged the electricity bill and the water connection bills, which were installed in the premises and it was under this conspiracy, which was hatched by respondent in league with some of the employees of the Nagar Palika, who had made an effort to get the aforesaid property, in dispute, i.e 1200 sq. feet of land converted into a freehold in favour of the private respondents. 10. The revisionist has levelled an allegation of malice as against respondent No. 3 on the ground that in the suit, which was preferred by Mr. feet of land converted into a freehold in favour of the private respondents. 10. The revisionist has levelled an allegation of malice as against respondent No. 3 on the ground that in the suit, which was preferred by Mr. G.B. Pant before the learned Trial Court, who was one of the signatory of the partnership deed of 20th August, 1990, in fact, had not ever disclosed the fact of the partnership deed having been entered into by him along with the respondent No. 3 in the Suit and that too in relation to the property, in question. 11. It is pleaded by the revisionist that Mr. G.B. Pant, who was holding the Saw Mill licence and a partner in the partnership firm continued to operate the Saw Mill despite of the dissolution of the partnership deed with respondent No. 3 and the licence thus granted in favour of partners to run the Saw Mill was got renewed by him from time to time till 2013, in the absence of any partnership firm, despite of the aforesaid fact of dissolution of the partnership firm. 12. The Saw Mill licence No. 2, which stood in favour of Mr. G.B. Pant, is said to have been sold by him along with the Saw Mill to one M/s Saam Udhyog, Rudrapur and the information about the said transfer which was made on 11th November, 2013 and the deed of transfer of title being executed on 6th December, 2014, was received by the revisionist at a belated stage only when he moved an application under the Right to Information Act, before the Divisional Forest Officer as well as Nagar Palika for retrieving the details pertaining to the transfer of the Saw Mill and then only it reflected to him that the transfer of the Saw Mill has taken place as per the report of the Forest Ranger, which was submitted on 27th December, 2018. 13. The contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that adjoining to the land in dispute, he had a small piece of land having an area of about 20 feet x 30 feet, i.e. equivalent to 55.74 sq. meter. 13. The contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that adjoining to the land in dispute, he had a small piece of land having an area of about 20 feet x 30 feet, i.e. equivalent to 55.74 sq. meter. He contends that this land too constituted to be the part and parcel of the nazul land which was vested under the Management of the Nagar Palika, but with the enforcement of the policy of the Government for changing the nazul land into freehold land, the revisionist plot as referred above having an area of 55.74 square meter, the permission of its conversion into free hold was granted by the District Magistrate and a sale deed was executed in relation to it on 26th April, 2016 in his favour and which was registered on 29th April, 2016, said to have been executed in his favour by His Highness the Governor of the State of Uttarakhand. 14. Being aggrieved against the aforesaid conversion, which was granted on 29.04.2016 by the State, what the revisionist contends is that it was an act which was not welcomed by respondent No. 3, as he was taking it as to be act of interference over his part of the property of which he contends that he was holding a decree of Trial Court and under the garb of the conversion deed in his favour, the revisionist, he could not have interfered with the land already held to be in his possession in his favour by the Civil Courts. Hence, respondent No. 3 to somehow protect his interest over the land of which he was holding by way of a decree had made an effort to lodge an F.I.R. before the S.H.O. Mallital, but, the application thus submitted was declined to be registered as F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. before the S.H.O. Mallital, but, the same was not registered by the S.H.O.. Subsequently, he had to file an application under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the application of respondent No. 3 was rejected. 15. This was not the end of the controversy between the parties, which apparently from the above pleadings, it is quite apparent that it relates to an inter se rights which is being claimed by the parties over the land which admittedly according to the revisionist and the respondents was a nazul land. 15. This was not the end of the controversy between the parties, which apparently from the above pleadings, it is quite apparent that it relates to an inter se rights which is being claimed by the parties over the land which admittedly according to the revisionist and the respondents was a nazul land. When the act of interference over the property by way of filing F.I.R., was not entertained by the respondent No. 3, the revisionist had moved an application before the S.H.O. Mallital, Nainital for registering an F.I.R., which was declined to be accepted. Consequently, he submits that on 16th December, 2016, he had submitted the F.I.R. through speed post to the S.H.O., Mallital. When there was no response received by him, and his contention was that the very fact of entering into an unregistered partnership deed, creating a right in relation to a nazul property would fall to be within ambit of offences under Sections 191, 192, 193, 219, 406. 420, 469, 34 and Section 120 of the I.P.C. and as per the version of the revisionist, the S.H.O. was bound to have registered the F.I.R. because the nature of the controversy though apparently it might have been related to a landed property, but the manner in which the documentation was done in order to grab over the property which the revisionist contends that he was holding the freehold rights by the deed of 29th April, 2016 executed by the District Magistrate in his favour. He submitted that the F.I.R. ought to have been registered. 16. Having not done so, he moved an application under Section 156 Cr.P.C. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for registering the F.I.R. which was registered as Misc. Case No. 135 of 2018, Naveen Chandra Joshi Vs. State. He submitted that in view of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Case No. 135 of 2018, Naveen Chandra Joshi Vs. State. He submitted that in view of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Meenakshi Maarwah and another, 2005 4 SCC 370 it was incumbent on the S.H.O. that as soon as a person approaches before the Police Authority for registering an F.I.R., they are bound to register the same in view of the provisions contained under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. He further submitted that the act of not registering the F.I.R. was barred by the provisions as contained under Section 195 (1) (b) (ii) of the Cr.P.C., which he contends that there was no legal bar as such that if the parties are disputing their rights in relation to the landed property, an F.I.R., still can be registered and cognizance could be taken for it. Para 10 to 16 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder : "10. The scheme of the statutory provision may now be examined. Broadly, Section 195 CrPC deals with three distinct categories of offences which have been described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1) contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences against public justice, and (3) offences relating to documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals with offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC which occur in Chapter X IPC and the heading of the Chapter is - "Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants". These are offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI IPC which is headed as - "Of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice". The offences mentioned in this clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a court of justice or before a public servant who is bound or authorised by law to receive such declaration, and also to some other offences which have a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice (Sections 205 and 211 IPC). This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195 viz. This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195 viz. that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 CrPC. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any court. 11. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing to the court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses (b)(i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341 CrPC which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is - "Provisions as to Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice". Though, as a general rule, the language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words of the section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning, but they are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key to the constructions of the sections which follow them than might be afforded by a mere preamble. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn., pp. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn., pp. 207, 209.) The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the administration of justice viz. which is committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an offence affecting the administration of justice. 12. It will be useful to refer to some earlier decisions touching the controversy in dispute which were rendered on Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short "the old Code"). Sub-section (1)(c) of Section 195 of the old Code read as under: "195. Prosecution for certain offences relating to documents given in evidence. - (1) No court shall take cognizance - * * * (c) of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such court, or of some other court to which such court is subordinate" 13. It may be noticed that language used in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC is similar to the above provision except that the words "by a party to any proceeding in any court" occurring therein have been omitted. We will advert to the effect of this omission later on. 14. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh considered the scope of the aforesaid provision and held, that clause (c) of Section 195(1) applies only to cases where an offence is committed by a party, as such, to a proceeding to any court in respect of a document which has been produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. It was held that an offence which has already been committed by a person who does not become a party till, say, 30 years after the commission of the offence, cannot be said to have been committed by a party within the meaning of clause (c). A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat after examination of the controversy in considerable detail observed that as a general rule the courts consider it expedient in the interest of justice to start prosecutions as contemplated by Section 476 (of the old Code which now corresponds to Section 340 CrPC) only if there is a reasonable foundation for the charge and there is a reasonable likelihood of conviction. The requirement of a finding as to the expediency is understandable in case of an offence alleged to have been committed either in or in relation to a proceeding in that court in case of offences specified in clause (b) [of the old Code corresponding to clause (b)(i) CrPC] because of the close nexus between the offence and the proceeding. In case of offences specified in clause (c), they are required to be committed by a party to a proceeding in that court with respect to a document produced or given in evidence in that court. The court approved the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh and held as under in para 7 of the Report: (Patel Laljibhai Somabhai case, SCC pp. 376-77) "(i) The underlying purpose of enacting Sections 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous vexations or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the civil court to file complaint. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the civil court to file complaint. (ii) The offences about which the court alone is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceeding in that court so that it can without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appears to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confirming the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceeding in character as such party. The legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) to the offences mentioned therein, when committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party." 15. The Court clearly rejected any construction being placed on the provision by which a document forged before the commencement of the proceeding in which it may happen to be used in evidence later on, to come within the purview of Section 195, as that would unreasonably restrict the right to initiate prosecution possessed by a person and recognised by Section 190 CrPC. 16. The aforesaid decision was considered in Raghunath v. State of U.P. Here, the accused had obtained sale deed of the property of a widow by setting up of an impostor and thereafter filed a mutation application before the Tahsildar. The widow contested the mutation application on the ground that she had never executed the sale deed and thereafter filed a criminal complaint under Sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC in which the accused were convicted. In appeal, it was contended that the private complaint was barred by virtue of Section 195(1)(c) CrPC and the Revenue Court alone could have filed the complaint. The Court repelled the aforesaid contention after relying upon the ratio of Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat and the private complaint was held to be maintainable. In appeal, it was contended that the private complaint was barred by virtue of Section 195(1)(c) CrPC and the Revenue Court alone could have filed the complaint. The Court repelled the aforesaid contention after relying upon the ratio of Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat and the private complaint was held to be maintainable. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan the abovenoted two decisions were relied upon for holding that provisions of Section 195(1)(c) (old Code) would not be applicable where mutation proceedings were commenced after a Will had been forged. In Legal Remembrancer, Govt. of W.B. v. Haridas Mundra7 Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was), speaking for a three-Judge Bench observed that earlier there was divergence of opinion in various High Courts, but the same was set at rest by this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai and approved the view taken therein that the words of Section 195(1)(c) clearly meant the offence alleged to have been committed by a party to the proceeding in his character as such party i.e. after having become a party to the proceeding, and Sections 195(1)(c), 476 and 476-A (of the old Code) read together indicated beyond doubt that the legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) to the offences mentioned in the said section when committed by a party to a proceeding prior to his becoming such party. Similar view has been taken in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra where the contention that the absence of a complaint by the Revenue Court was a bar to taking cognizance by the criminal court in respect of offences under Sections 446, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B IPC which were committed even before the start of the proceedings before the Revenue Court, was not accepted." 17. The application as submitted by the revisionist, he has contended that apart from the malice, the act of respondent No. 3 in connivance with Mr. G.B. Pant, in fact, there were some of the authorities of the Nagar Palika also, the details of whom was not available with him, who were also instrumental in getting the name of Mr. G.B. Pant mutated based on the decree executed in his favour. G.B. Pant, in fact, there were some of the authorities of the Nagar Palika also, the details of whom was not available with him, who were also instrumental in getting the name of Mr. G.B. Pant mutated based on the decree executed in his favour. He has submitted that since the name of the official was not disclosed and was not known to him, he has impleaded them as party in Revision as unknown official of Nagar Palika as respondent No. 6 to the present revision. The grievance raised by the revisionist was to the effect that the manner in which the Nagar Palika Officers have acted in getting recorded the name of Mr. G.B. Pant and later on recording the name of the subsequent purchasers of the Saw Mill, i.e. M/s Saam Udhyog, Rudrapur, was done by the Nagar Palika official even without going into the physical verification of actual property and vesting of title, as according to the revisionist, in fact, there was no Saw Mill, which was existing there nor there is any licence, which has been issued to respondent No. 3, by the Forest Department to run any such saw mill under the garb of the dissolved partnership firm. 18. The application, thus filed by the revisionist under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. on 15th April, 2018, since was not registered, he has yet again preferred 156 (3) on 19th April, 2018, which was numbered as Misc. Case No. 135 of 2018, which has been rejected by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate by the impugned judgment dated 28th May, 2018. 19. One fact which has also come on record was that the reason which has been assigned by the S.H.O. for not registering the F.I.R. initially was because when the revisionist had filed the 1st complaint on 15th April, 2018, he had referred the matter to S.I.T. to investigate into the matter and submit its report and it was contended by the S.H.O. that it was only after the receipt of the report, it was contended by the S.H.O., respondent No. 2, that he would have made an attempt to register the F.I.R. as sought for by the revisionist. But instead of waiting for the report of the S.I.T. and based on the fact that the act of interference by the respondent over the property, in question, persisted, since it was contrary to the terms of sale deed executed in his favour and since he already stands mutated in the Nagar Palika records in pursuance to the order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1206 of 2018, which was decided on 23rd May, 2018, the action of respondent complained of deserves to be registered as an F.I.R. and for which, he had made reference to the judgment reported in Lalita Kumar Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2014 2 SCC 1 which too has advocated the same principle with regard to the lodging of the F.I.R. on a complaint being submitted before the S.H.O. The application, thus submitted under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. by the revisionist on 19th April, 2018, and which was rejected by the judgment dated 28th May, 2018, was contrary to the intention of law. 20. The view taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, after considering the entire controversy pertaining to the effect of the decree by regular civil suit in favour of respondent No. 3 and the effect of the execution of the sale deed by the Governor, in favour of the revisionist, resulting into the conversion of the property into free hold in favour of the revisionist, the Court has taken a view that since the nature of the dispute as involved being of a Civil nature, the parties are required to settle their dispute before the competent Civil Court and no offences as complained of are said to have been made out and consequently, the 156 (3) Application was rejected on 28th May, 2018. 21. Even this Court too is of the view that under the aforesaid backdrop as already detailed above, in fact, the dispute between respondent No. 3 and the revisionist, there happens to be rather an adverse claim raised over the property, may it be emanating by an unregistered partnership deed or from a regular decree in a suit for a decree of permanent injunction in favour of respondent No. 3 or from a sale deed executed in favour of the revisionist on 29th April, 2016 or transfer of Saw Mill to M/S Saam Udyog of Rudrapur. In fact, on perusal of the complaint submitted by the revisionist under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, in fact, the offences complained of were not made out because the bar of Section 195 (b) (ii) of Cr.P.C., may not be absolutely creating any restriction in registering the F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. But apparently, when the parties are ligating over their rights in relation to a property, it will fall to be outside the ambit of the criminal proceedings and the reason which has been assigned by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in rejecting the application is from the view point that the applicant, in case, if he has got any right to be settled, he ought to approach to a Civil Court for determination of the inter se rights with either the earlier plaintiff G.B. Pant or the respondent No. 3, who claims his right by partition deed and the nature of the dispute complained of will not fall to be within the ambit of a criminal dispute and hence, the Court has rightly rejected the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C., as question raised in complaint related to sale deed, partnership deed, the effect of conversion of land and interpretation of Civil Court decree. 22. For the aforesaid reason, in an event, if we go through the interpretation of Section 190 of the Cr.P.C., the cognizance or a direction for registration of the F.I.R. in pursuance to a direction issued under Section 156 (3), would only be when it satisfies the test of cognizability for the Magistrate in the light of the parameters prescribed under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. Even on scrutiny of the provisions contained under Section 190 Cr.P.C., the nature of the offences complained of do not satisfy the test of cognizability under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. as none of the ingredients for commission of offence under Section 191, 192, 193, 219, 406, 420, 468, 34 or 120- B I.P.C. was made out, for which, the Court could have issued the direction for registering the F.I.R., while exercising the powers under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under :- "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- section (2), may take cognizance of any offence- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under subsection (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try." 23. The learned counsel for the revisionist had made reference to the various authorities, on which, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist to bring his case within the ambit of Section 154 to be read with Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. It becomes incumbent on the Court to deal with each and every case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist. In the chain of judgments, the first being that as reported in Mohammed Ibrahim and others Vs. State of Bihar and another, 2009 8 SCC 751 . In fact, by the said judgment, on which, reliance has been placed, it was a case where the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the situation with regard to the exercise of powers by the High Courts under its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., wherein, the dispute was pertaining to the essentiality of the controversy of being civil nature or criminal nature, it was solely intended to curtail the abuse of process and it intended that the recourse to the criminal proceedings should not be resorted to by the complainant in order to misuse or settle his personal scores from the view point of pressuring the parties who are otherwise engaged in the civil dispute. Though, the judgment has carved out an exception that inspite of being a civil case, the case may be having certain criminal elements also, but that would not be the case applicable in the instant dispute wherein, apparently looking from the records there already happens to be a decree in favour of Mr. G.B. Pant and which was affirmed by the Appellate Court. G.B. Pant and which was affirmed by the Appellate Court. Meaning thereby, the finality was attached to the civil proceedings and the rival claim which was being raised by the parties to the present criminal revision, in fact, it is nothing but an attempt to encroach upon a certain piece of land, which otherwise stood regularized by the Collector by executing a sale deed of conversion in favour of the revisionist. As far as the allegation pertaining to the preparation of the partnership deed, its ultimate dissolution, it will not have any bearing or effect to the rights of the revisionist because whatsoever effect would flow from the partnership deed, it would either inter se bind Mr. G.B. Pant and respondent No.3, to which, the revisionist has no role to play. On scrutiny of the judgment, particularly reference is made to para 8 of the judgment, which is quoted hereunder :- "8. This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. But at the same time, it should be noted that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. (See G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. and Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd.) Let us examine the matter keeping the said principles in mind." Rest of the ingredients involved in present case are pertaining to the aspect which has been dealt with by the Court regarding the preparation of the false documents, the said elements, as dealt in para 14 to 17 of the said judgment will not apply because none of the ingredients was involved in the said case is available or effecting any of the rights of the revisionist. Hence, this judgment will not apply in the instant case. 24. The revisionist has made yet another reference to the judgment reported in Indian Oil Corporation Vs. Hence, this judgment will not apply in the instant case. 24. The revisionist has made yet another reference to the judgment reported in Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. and others, 2006 6 SCC 736 which was the case dealing with an effect of the breach of a contract between the two contracting parties and its maintainability of complaint between the parties to an agreement, viz-a-viz the exercise of power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. At this stage, it would be relevant to point out that the powers under Section 397 Cr.P.C. to revise an order passed by the subordinate Court and to an exercise of inherent power by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for determination of whether a case involves a situation of criminality or not are to be tested on altogether on a different independent pedestal. In fact, the case, in question, the aspect pertaining to the offences under Section 403 of the I.P.C. of misappropriation of immovable property was one of the ingredients which was under consideration which fall to be within the ambit of Section 403 of the I.P.C. The allegations containing the criminal breach of an offence and its interference by the High Court in its exercise of revisional powers is extremely limited as compared to Section 482 Cr.P.C. This judgment too has propounded that the process of criminal prosecution, particularly, in those cases where, it has or is touching any element of a civil disputes and that too more particularly in the instant case when it happens to be pre adjudicated civil disputes, there is no criminality involved in it and the Court below has rightly rejected the application under Section 156 (3) of the revisionist. In particular, reference may be had to para 12 of the said judgment, which has laid down the basic principle and modalities to be adopted to scrutinize the complaint as to whether it all touches the element of criminality and has a legitimate cause of redressal of any grievance to be prevented by the remedies available under the criminal law and, particularly, the complainant who initiate or persist the prosecution, he must be fully aware that there are remedies which lies in the civil law and he should himself be made accountable at the end of the misconceived criminal proceedings to invoke the civil jurisdiction for the redressal of the grievance. "12. "12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few - Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power under Section 250 CrPC more frequently, where they discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the part of the complainant. Be that as it may." 25. Another judgment, on which, reliance has been placed has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist in support of his contention is a judgment reported , Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Be that as it may." 25. Another judgment, on which, reliance has been placed has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist in support of his contention is a judgment reported , Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others., 1998 5 SCC 749 This Court, after going through the aforesaid ratio as propounded by the said judgment particularly in para 22 and 29 of the said judgment, it was dealing with the aspect pertaining to coordinated exercise of powers and its ambit under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India to be read with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It was pertaining to the quashing of the criminal proceedings, which was put to challenge before a High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for which there is a settled law that it should be sparingly utilized only where there is an absolute abuse of process of the Court of law. The said ratio as propounded in the said judgment would not apply because it was dealing with the situation where the criminal Court has passed an order of summoning of an accused and the Hon'ble Apex Court, who was ceased with the issue as to whether at all the Magistrate has applied its mind in summoning of the accused person because it had been made incumbent on the Court to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record before summoning a accused in a criminal proceedings, hence, this judgment too since being based upon altogether a different principle and circumstances involved, has laid down in para 22 and 28 will not apply. "22. It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. 28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." 26. The learned counsel for the revisionist had also made reference to a judgment Rajesh Bajaj Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and others, 1999 AIR(SC) 1216 which yet again is not relevant for the purposes of adjudication of the present dispute pertaining to the rejection of 156 (3) Cr.P.C. application because it was yet again based on the parameters of determination of the exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 482, wherein, it has laid down that it becomes essential for the Court to derive a conclusion as to whether the allegation complained of at all involved in it any element of criminality or commission of an offence of which could have otherwise necessitated a trial. At the risk of repetition, it is once again submitted that the said ratio would not apply because in the case at hand, the dispute already stood settled by Civil Court and the inter se rights between the parties stood determined and there was no criminal element which was apparently left to be adjudicated by the criminal court, particularly when, the allegation of the mode and manner of the execution of the partnership deed or of the sale of the Saw Mill, had nothing to do with regard to the complaint of the revisionist under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. Hence, this ratio will not be applicable. Para 10, 11 and 12 of the said judgment, on which reliance was placed, reads as under : "11. The crux of the postulate is the intention of the person who induces the victim of his representation and not the nature of the transaction which would become decisive in discerning whether there was commission of offence or not. Para 10, 11 and 12 of the said judgment, on which reliance was placed, reads as under : "11. The crux of the postulate is the intention of the person who induces the victim of his representation and not the nature of the transaction which would become decisive in discerning whether there was commission of offence or not. The complainant has stated in the body of the complaint that he was induced to believe that the respondent would honour payment on receipt of invoices, and that the complainant realised later that the intentions of the respondent were not clear. He also mentioned that the respondent after receiving the goods had sold them to others and still he did not pay the money. Such averments would prima facie make out a case for investigation by the authorities. 12. The High Court seems to have adopted a strictly hypertechnical approach and sieved the complaint through a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients under Section 415 IPC. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial, but certainly not during the stage of investigation. At any rate, it is too premature a stage for the High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring that it is a commercial transaction simpliciter wherein no semblance of criminal offence is involved. 13. The appellant is, therefore, right in contending that the FIR should not have been quashed in this case and the investigation should have been allowed to proceed." 27. 13. The appellant is, therefore, right in contending that the FIR should not have been quashed in this case and the investigation should have been allowed to proceed." 27. The counsel for the revisionist has harped upon the principles of Section 154 which has been widely made applicable in the various judgments which has casted upon a duty upon the police officials to register an F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. But the basic element for determination of impact of Section 154 is that the information submitted under Section 154 has to be given by the complainant which actually and apparently discloses a criminal offence alleged and, particularly, when the set of allegation has got no relation to the commission of criminal offence and particularly when the effect of execution of a document was not having any effect on the rights of the revisionist, as it will have no bearing and this factor in itself will lead to an unflinching inference that the nature of offence complained, which was sought to be raised by the revisionist by filing an application under Section 156 (3), in fact, had hidden intention to settle his right of claiming his possession over the property which he intended to occupy and which was the subject matter of a civil decree, which stood settled with Mr. G.B. Pant, which ultimately, now stood transferred to new firm of Rudrapur, after dissolution of the unregistered partnership deed. Even otherwise also, if the story as narrated by the revisionist is taken into consideration, under the partnership law, a settlement of a partnership between the two signatories to it by way of unregistered document, it will not create any legally enforceable rights and that too when in the instant case the said partnership deed stood dissolved even prior to the registering of the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that the basic intention of the revisionist was to somehow by exerting pressure by initiation of criminal proceedings, he was trying to have an overriding effect of the decree which had already settled the rights of Mr. G.B. Pant, who was one of the signatories of the partnership deed. 28. The learned counsel for the revisionist has yet again placed reliance on the judgment reported in Minu Kumari and another Vs. G.B. Pant, who was one of the signatories of the partnership deed. 28. The learned counsel for the revisionist has yet again placed reliance on the judgment reported in Minu Kumari and another Vs. State of Bihar and others, 2006 4 SCC 359 which yet again cannot be equated in its interpretation to the powers under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. with that of the powers conferred on the High Court while exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and it was on the said proposition that the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the principles and the expanse of powers which has been vested with the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which is much wider than the limited powers under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. Reference may be had to para 19 and 20 of the said judgment, which had got no applicability in the present set of controversy as it was not dealing with a situation where the Court was ceased with the impact of considering the implications of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. in corelation to Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., and the liability which the police authority had to discharge while mandatorily requiring to register the F.I.R. Para 19 and 20 of the said judgment reads as under :- "19. The section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. 20. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar.]" 29. The counsel for the revisionist had made reference to the Constitution Bench judgment as reported in Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and other, 2014 2 SCC 1 which has laid down the wider principle under which, it becomes mandatory for the police official to register the F.I.R. and where it has been held out that it becomes mandatory for the police officials to register the F.I.R. and they cannot exercise their discretion and latitude in conducting the preliminary investigation before registering the F.I.R. This Court is of the view that the principle of mandatory registration of the F.I.R. on the receipt of the information, what is relevant and required to be considered by the police authorities is that even in accordance with the language used under Section 154, it only contemplates, it to be mandatory for registration of the F.I.R. when the set of allegations levelled discloses a cognizability of an offence as provided under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. There cannot be any dispute pertaining to the ratio as propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment in its para 93, 101 to 105, 115, 117, 119 and 120. But the basic structure, if the entire judgment is scrutinized in its letter and spirits, which provides the registration of an F.I.R. as the basic functionaries of the police authorities, in fact, what is to be testified is as to whether at all there occurs "a cognizable offence" or not. But the basic structure, if the entire judgment is scrutinized in its letter and spirits, which provides the registration of an F.I.R. as the basic functionaries of the police authorities, in fact, what is to be testified is as to whether at all there occurs "a cognizable offence" or not. Otherwise, in case if the principle of invariably registering the F.I.R. under Section 154 is permitted to be carried without giving the latitude to the police authorities to scrutinize the justifiability of the complaint and whether it contains an element of congnizability, there may be invariably situations where the registration of the F.I.R. would be adopted in order to exert a pressure on the opposite sides, which admittedly, as in the instant case, looking to the facts already dealt with in the judgment, in question, since the rights of Mr. G.B. Pant, Mr. Zakir Husan, respondent No. 3 and the revisionist himself in a claim in relation to the immovable landed property was already settled, there was no criminal dispute, which would require cognizability of the offence. As already observed above, the allegation pertaining to the partnership deed in relation to sale of Saw Mill, the licence of the Saw Mill, which was emanating from the partnership deed to the third person, will have no effect as far as the revisionist's rights are concerned which he has claimed to have acquired over the land, having an area of 55.74, which was sold to him by the Collector under the najul conversion policy. Thus, this ratio though absolutely perfect and recognized by State at the relevant time will not apply in the instant case. Para 93, 101 to 105, 115, 117, 119 and 120, of the said judgment reads as under : "93. The object sought to be achieved by registering the earliest information as FIR is inter alia twofold: one, that the criminal process is set into motion and is well documented from the very start; and second, that the earliest information received in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded so that there cannot be any embellishment, etc. later. 101. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, protection of the interests of the poor is clearly one of the main objects of the Code. later. 101. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, protection of the interests of the poor is clearly one of the main objects of the Code. Making registration of information relating to commission of a cognizable offence mandatory would help the society, especially, the poor in rural and remote areas of the country. 102. The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System headed by Dr Justice V.S. Malimath also noticed the plight faced by several people due to non-registration of FIRs and recommended that action should be taken against police officers who refuse to register such information. The Committee observed: "7.19.1. According to Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the officer in charge of a police station is mandated to register every information oral or written relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. Nonregistration of cases is a serious complaint against the police. The National Police Commission in its 4th Report lamented that the police 'evade registering cases for taking up investigation where specific complaints are lodged at the police stations'. It referred to a study conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi regarding 'Image of the Police in India' which observed that over 50% of the respondents mention non-registration of complaints as a common practice in police stations. 7.19.2. The Committee recommends that all complaints should be registered promptly, failing which appropriate action should be taken. This would necessitate change in the mind-set of the political executive and that of senior officers. * * * 7.19.4. There are two more aspects relating to registration. The first is minimisation of offences by the police by way of not invoking appropriate sections of law. We disapprove of this tendency. Appropriate sections of law should be invoked in each case unmindful of the gravity of offences involved. The second issue is relating to the registration of written complaints. There is an increasing tendency amongst the police station officers to advise the informants, who come to give oral complaints, to bring written complaints. This is wrong. Registration is delayed resulting in valuable loss of time in launching the investigation and apprehension of criminals. Besides, the complainant gets an opportunity to consult his friends, relatives and, sometimes even lawyers and often tends to exaggerate the crime and implicate innocent persons. This eventually has adverse effect at the trial. This is wrong. Registration is delayed resulting in valuable loss of time in launching the investigation and apprehension of criminals. Besides, the complainant gets an opportunity to consult his friends, relatives and, sometimes even lawyers and often tends to exaggerate the crime and implicate innocent persons. This eventually has adverse effect at the trial. The information should be reduced in writing by the SHO, if given orally, without any loss of time so that the first version of the alleged crime comes on record. * * * 7.20.11. It has come to the notice of the Committee that even in cognizable cases quite often the police officers do not entertain the complaint and send the complainant away saying that the offence is not cognizable. Sometimes the police twist facts to bring the case within the cognizable category even though it is non-cognizable, due to political or other pressures or corruption. This menace can be stopped by making it obligatory on the police officer to register every complaint received by him. Breach of this duty should become an offence punishable in law to prevent misuse of the power by the police officer." 103. It means that the number of FIRs not registered is approximately equivalent to the number of FIRs actually registered. Keeping in view the NCRB figures that show that about 60 lakh cognizable offences were registered in India during the year 2012, the burking of crime may itself be in the range of about 60 lakhs every year. Thus, it is seen that such a large number of FIRs are not registered every year, which is a clear violation of the rights of the victims of such a large number of crimes. 104. Burking of crime leads to dilution of the rule of law in the short run; and also has a very negative impact on the rule of law in the long run since people stop having respect for the rule of law. Thus, non-registration of such a large number of FIRs leads to a definite lawlessness in the society. 105. Therefore, reading Section 154 in any other form would not only be detrimental to the scheme of the Code but also to the society as a whole. Thus, non-registration of such a large number of FIRs leads to a definite lawlessness in the society. 105. Therefore, reading Section 154 in any other form would not only be detrimental to the scheme of the Code but also to the society as a whole. It is thus seen that this Court has repeatedly held in various decided cases that registration of FIR is mandatory if the information given to the police under Section 154 of the Code discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. 115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offences, yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry may be required owing to the change in genesis and novelty of crimes with the passage of time. One such instance is in the case of allegations relating to medical negligence on the part of doctors. It will be unfair and inequitable to prosecute a medical professional only on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. 117. In the context of offences relating to corruption, this Court in P. Sirajuddin6 expressed the need for a preliminary inquiry before proceeding against public servants. 119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR. 120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: 120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. 120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. 120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. 120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence. 120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. 120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. 120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. 120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. 120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above." 30. Lastly, the judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist is reported in Krishnan and another Vs. Krishnaveni and another, 1997 CrLJ 1519 which was dealing with the scope of the High Court's power under Sections 397 and 401, i.e. the revisional power and Section 482 Cr.P.C., i.e. the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. The principle as enunciated in the said judgment, particularly, a reference may be had to para 6 to 10, it had laid down that the scope of inference by the High Court in revision under Section 397/401 is discretionary in nature and its exercise of the powers conferred on the Court is an express power which is distinct to the powers and spirit of law under Section 397. So there is a distinction of power which has been carved out by the said judgment pertaining to the exercise of powers under Section 482, 483 and under Sections 397 and 401 which altogether provides for different parameters to be exercised by the Courts to deal different circumstances for exercising its jurisdiction. Para 6 to 10 of the said judgment reads as under :- "6. Section 401 of the Code gives to every High Court the power of revision. Sub-section (1) of the said section provides that in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389 and 391 and on a Court of Sessions by Section 307. Apart from the express power under Section 397(1), the High Court has been invested with suo motu power under Section 401 to exercise revisional power. In addition, Section 482 saves inherent powers of the High Court postulating that: "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." Section 483 enjoins upon every High Court to so exercise its continuous superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it as to ensure that there is an expeditious and proper disposal of cases by such Magistrates. It is, therefore, clear that the power of the High Court of continuous supervisory jurisdiction is of paramount importance to examine the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed as also regularity of the proceedings of all inferior criminal courts. 7. It is seen that exercise of the revisional power by the High Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 is to call for the records of any inferior criminal court and to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court and to pass appropriate orders. The Court of Sessions and the Magistrates are inferior criminal courts to the High Court and Courts of Judicial Magistrate are inferior criminal courts to the Sessions Judge. Ordinarily, in the matter of exercise of power of revision by any High Court, Section 397 and Section 401 are required to be read together. Section 397 gives powers to the High Court to call for the records as also suo motu power under Section 401 to exercise the revisional power on the grounds mentioned therein, i.e., to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court, and to dispose of the revision in the manner indicated under Section 401 of the Code. The revisional power of the High Court merely conserves the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence and that its subordinate courts do not exceed the jurisdiction or abuse the power vested in them under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the inferior criminal courts or to prevent miscarriage of justice. 8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its juridical process or illegality of sentence or order. 9. The inherent power of the High Court is not one conferred by the Code but one which the High Court already has in it and which is preserved by the Code. The object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. As seen, under sub-section (3) of Section 397, revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by "any person" but the Code has not defined the word "person". However, under Section 11 of the IPC, "person" includes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. The word "person" would, therefore, include not only natural person but also juridical person in whatever form designated and whether incorporated or not. However, under Section 11 of the IPC, "person" includes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. The word "person" would, therefore, include not only natural person but also juridical person in whatever form designated and whether incorporated or not. By implication, the State stands excluded from the purview of the word "person" for the purpose of limiting its right to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Code for the reason that the State, being the prosecutor of the offender, is enjoined to conduct prosecution on behalf of the society and to take such remedial steps as it deems proper. The object behind criminal law is to maintain law, public order, stability as also peace and progress in the society. Generally, private complaints under Section 202 of the Code are laid in respect of non-cognizable offences or when it is found that police has failed to perform its duty under Chapter XII of the Code or to report a mistake of fact. In view of the principle laid down in the maxim ex debito justitiae, i.e., in accordance with the requirements of justice, the prohibition under Section 397(3) on revisional power given to the High Court would not apply when the State seeks revision under Section 401. So the State is not prohibited to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. 10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously." 31. In view of the aforesaid reasons and coupled with the fact that none of the cases relied by the learned counsel for the revisionist, satisfies the test of cognizablity of the offence which is the basic element required for invoking of the powers under Section 397 Cr.P.C. were available for the Court to interfere, particularly, when the rights between the parities already stood settled in the regular civil proceedings. 32. For the reasons assigned above, this Court is also of the considered view that considering the set of allegations, the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. has rightly been rejected by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, which does not call for interference while exercising the revisional jurisdiction by this Court. 33. Consequently, the Criminal Revision is dismissed.