ORDER : Lok Pal Singh, J. 1. Petitioner has filed the present writ petition assailing the order dated 29.03.2005, passed by learned District Judge, Dehradun in P.P. Appeal no. 76 of 2004, Diljit Singh vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, whereby the said appeal was allowed and the order dated 07.06.2004, passed by the Estate Officer in case no. M-4 of 1986, LIC vs. Diljit Singh Bindra, was set aside. 2. Briefly put, facts of the case are that Life Insurance Corporation of India (here-in-after referred to as LIC) is the owner of the suit property viz. shop no. 2, Himalaya House, The Mall, Mussoorie. The City Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the suit property in favour of the respondent and inducted the respondent as tenant over said property, without given an opportunity to the petitioner. Respondent became the tenant of said shop at a rent of Rs. 703.12 per annum. The petitioner issued notice to the respondent to pay rent, but for a long time the rent was not paid. However, the City Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no authority to allot the premises in question to the respondent, but as this property was allotted and possession was delivered to the respondent, the petitioner admitted the respondent as tenant and started receiving the rent from him. Subsequently, the respondent did not pay the rent, despite several notices issue to him. Then, petitioner was constrained to terminate the tenancy of the respondent by issuing notice dated 30.08.1993 and asked him to vacate the premises in question and handover the peaceful and vacant possession of the same to the petitioner. Respondent neither paid the rent nor handed over the peaceful and vacant possession of the premises in question to the petitioner. Having considered the possession of the respondent unauthorized, the petitioner filed an application on 04.02.1986 before the Estate Officer to initiate proceedings under Section 5 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act no. 40 of 1971'). 3. Admittedly, LIC is owner and landlord of the shop in question which is a public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act no. 40 of 1971. 4. Respondent was tenant of the shop no. 2 at an agreed rent of Rs. 703.12 Paise (including water tax @ Rs. 78.12 Paise) per annum. 40 of 1971'). 3. Admittedly, LIC is owner and landlord of the shop in question which is a public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act no. 40 of 1971. 4. Respondent was tenant of the shop no. 2 at an agreed rent of Rs. 703.12 Paise (including water tax @ Rs. 78.12 Paise) per annum. The tenancy of the respondent was terminated by legal notice dated 30.08.1993. The respondent did not vacate the premises even after expiry of notice period and, as such, after expiry of notice period, the respondent has become unauthorised occupant of Public Premises. LIC filed the case before the Estate Officer seeking following reliefs: (1) Eviction of the respondent from the public premises as described in schedule. (2) Order against the respondent to pay rent in arrears of Rs. 549.01p. (3) Order against the respondent to pay damages of Rs. 8420/- from 13.10.1983 to 31.01.1986 for unauthorised use of premises and future damages @ Rs. 10/- per day till vacation of the premises. Full cost of the case. 5. The Estate Officer issued notice to the respondent, invited his objection/written statement. In his objection, the respondent stated that he is the tenant over the demised property and is not in unauthorized occupation. Having considered the evidence adduced by the parties, the Estate Officer after framing the points of determination and taking the evidence of the parties has recorded the finding that the premises in question is a public premises, the tenancy of respondent stand terminated by legal notice dated 30.08.1993, after expiry of the period of notice. The respondent neither paid the rent nor vacated the premises in question, therefore, he is in unauthorized possession of the demised property. The order of eviction was passed directing the respondent to vacate the demised property within the given period and he was directed to pay the arrears of rent, damages and mesne profits. 6. Feeling aggrieved by order dated 07.06.2004, passed by the Estate Officer of the LIC, respondent Diljit Singh Bindra preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the Act no. 40 of 1971 before the District Judge, Dehradun. The learned District Judge by impugned judgment and order dated 29.03.2005, allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 07.06.2004 passed by the Estate Officer. Hence, present writ petition. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record. 8. 40 of 1971 before the District Judge, Dehradun. The learned District Judge by impugned judgment and order dated 29.03.2005, allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 07.06.2004 passed by the Estate Officer. Hence, present writ petition. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record. 8. Undisputedly, LIC is established under the Central Act. As per Clause (2) of sub-section (e) of Section 2 of the Act no. 40 of 1971, any premises belonging to any corporation established by or under a Central Act and under or controlled by the Central Government shall be public premises. Being the public premises, provisions of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act no. 13 of 1972') are not applicable to the premises in question. 9. Mr. B.C. Pande, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the demised property is public premises and the same is governed by the Provisions of Central Act no. 40 of 1971. Though the demises property was illegally allotted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the respondent, without the consent of the petitioner, in view of the fact that the petitioner accepted the rent from the respondent the relationship of landlord and tenant was established by said act of the parties. Agreed rent of Rs. 703.12 per annum was fixed by the parties. The premises in dispute is situated in the heart of Mussoorie, which could fetch a volume of rent, the petitioner terminated the tenancy of the respondent by notice dated 30.08.1993. Therefore, in view of Section 2(g) of Act no. 40 of 1971, the respondent became the unauthorized occupant. 10. Section 2(g) of the Act no. 40 of 1971 is excerpted hereunder: "2(g) 'unauthorised occupation', in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." 11. It is contended that having considered the fact that after terminating the tenancy of the respondent when he failed to hand over the vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlord-petitioner and also did not pay rent to the landlord LIC, the Estate Officer declared the respondent unauthorized occupant. After considering the entire material available on record, a detailed order of eviction was passed against the respondent. Learned District Judge vide judgment and order dated 29.03.2005 allowed the appeal stating that no reasons has been assigned while terminating the tenancy of the respondent and set aside the order passed by the Estate Officer. 12. A bare reading of the judgment passed by the Lower Appellate Court would reveal that the said court without reversing the findings recorded by the Estate Officer has allowed the appeal in a cursory and cryptic manner without assigning any reasons. 13. Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2011) 8 SCC 670 , State of Uttaranchal and another vs. Sunil Kumar Vaish and others, has categorically stated in paragraphs no. 18, 19 and 20 of said judgment as under: "18. Judicial determination has to be seen as an outcome of a reasoned process of adjudication initiated and documented by a party based mainly on events which happened in the past. Court's clear reasoning and analysis are basic requirements in a judicial determination when parties demand it so that they can administer justice justly and correctly, in relation to the findings on law and facts. Judicial decision must be perceived by the parties and by the society at large, as being the result of a correct and proper application of legal rules, proper evaluation of the evidence adduced and application of legal procedure. The parties should be convinced that their case has been properly considered and decided." 19. Judicial decisions must in principle be reasoned and the quality of a judicial decision depends principally on the quality of its reasoning. Proper reasoning is an imperative necessity which should not be sacrificed for expediency. The statement of reasons not only makes the decision easier for the parties to understand and many a times such decisions would be accepted with respect. Proper reasoning is an imperative necessity which should not be sacrificed for expediency. The statement of reasons not only makes the decision easier for the parties to understand and many a times such decisions would be accepted with respect. The requirement of providing reasons obliges the judge to respond to the parties' submissions and to specify the points that justify the decision and make it lawful and it enables the society to understand the functioning of the judicial system and it also enhances the faith and confidence of the people in the judicial system." 20. We are sorry to say that the judgment in question does not satisfy the above standards set for proper determination of disputes. Needless to say these types of orders weaken our judicial system. Serious attention is called for to enhance the quality of adjudication of our courts. Public trust and confidence in courts stem, quite often, from the direct experience of citizens from the judicial adjudication of their disputes." 14. The District Judge has observed that talks were going on between the parties in regard to enhancement of rent. The respondent agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month, excluding the house and water tax. The recommendations were made by the Committee for enhancement of the rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month and to regularize the tenancy of respondent. Plans have been placed on the alleged letter. Having considered the said letter, it is held that determination of the tenancy as per notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act cannot be treated bona fide. The guidelines issued by the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation on 30.05.2002 has been considered. The sole reason for allowing the appeal is that in the letter the committee, which has agreed to enhance the rent, the LIC has wrongly treated the respondent as unauthorized occupant. It is observed that when the rent has been paid the tenancy cannot be determined without any reasons. Thus, the tenant cannot be treated as unauthorized occupant. 15. Mr. Pande, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the reasons recorded by the Lower Appellate Court are not legal as the Appellate Court has travelled beyond its jurisdiction in allowing the appeal on the material which was not produced before the Estate Officer. Thus, the tenant cannot be treated as unauthorized occupant. 15. Mr. Pande, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the reasons recorded by the Lower Appellate Court are not legal as the Appellate Court has travelled beyond its jurisdiction in allowing the appeal on the material which was not produced before the Estate Officer. It is contended that assuming the letter of committee which was considered to fix the tenancy of the respondent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month was not accepted by the petitioner. The said recommendation of the committee has no legal force. Since the tenancy was terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, there is no requirement to record any reasons for terminating the tenancy as the tenant is not protected by any of the provisions, thus, a simpliciter notice is sufficient to terminate the tenancy. 16. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the City Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass allotment order dated 29.10.1971 in favour of the tenant/respondent. LIC being a statutory corporation cannot be commanded to accept an allotment order directing it to let out premises owned by it except for the purposes for which the Statute of the incorporation empowers it and mere acceptance of rent does not give any legal status of the tenant/respondent. It is further contended that the tenant/respondent was in arrears of rent for a period of more than three years and despite several demands the arrears of rent have not been paid and as a consequence thereof, the tenancy of the respondent/tenant was determined by a valid legal notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which was duly received by the respondent/tenant and as soon as the time to vacate the premises mentioned in the said notice expired, the respondent/tenant became unauthorized occupant as per the definition of unauthorized occupant as defined in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act, 1971. It is also contended that neither Section 2(g) of the Act nor Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires any reason to be assigned before determining the tenancy. 17. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of Bombay High Court in Mrs. Rani Sevakram, Mrs. Rani Sevakram (since deceased) by heirs & LRs vs The Oriental Insurance Co. 17. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of Bombay High Court in Mrs. Rani Sevakram, Mrs. Rani Sevakram (since deceased) by heirs & LRs vs The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & others, decided on 28.02.2017, decided on 28.02.2017, wherein following observations were made by the Bombay High Court: "23. Mr. Sanglikar further submitted that even assuming for the time being that Sevakram was inducted in the year 1952 and the Insurer took over the building in 1972, on 19.07.1983, notice was issued by Insurer to Sevakram determining the tenancy…. 39. In paragraph 64 of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 , it was observed as under: "64. …..It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants in respect of premises other than government premises, the Public Premises Act is intended to deal with speedy recovery of possession of premises of public nature, i.e. property belonging to the Central Government, or Companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest or Corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain corporations, institutions, autonomous bodies and local authorities….. The reason underlying the exclusion of property belonging to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act, is that Government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest. …. the provisions of Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions contained in the Rent Control act." 47. In the present case, Sevakram was inducted in the suit premises as a tenant in the year 1952. Thus, she entered into occupation of the suit premises under a valid authority. In 1971, building where the suit premises is situate, was taken over by Insurer. It is not in dispute that the suit premises belongs to Insurer and is a public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e)(2)(i) of the Public Premises Act. It is also established that by notice dated 19.07.1983, tenancy of Sevakram was terminated/determined. In 1971, building where the suit premises is situate, was taken over by Insurer. It is not in dispute that the suit premises belongs to Insurer and is a public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e)(2)(i) of the Public Premises Act. It is also established that by notice dated 19.07.1983, tenancy of Sevakram was terminated/determined. Thus, the definition of expression 'unauthorised occupation' contained in section 2(g) covers a case where a person like Sevakram who was inducted as a tenant and thus had entered into occupation legally under valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been determined. The Constitution Bench held that the words "whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer" in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The definition of unauthorized occupation contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case where a person has entered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in accordance with law. Section 15 of the Public Premises Act mandates that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of (a) the eviction of any person who is unauthorised occupation of any public premises. 48. ..…The entities specified in Section 2(e)(1) and (2) cannot be asked to resort to the provisions of either the Bombay Rent Act or the Maharashtra Rent Act on the ground that the occupant was inducted prior to the premises becoming the public premises. In my opinion, that will be contrary to the provisions of Sections 2(e)(2)(g) and 15 of the Public Premises Act as also it will be contrary to the Statement and Objects and reason for which the Public Premises Act was enacted. Even if a person is inducted prior to 16.09.1958 or prior to the premises becoming a public premises, once it becomes a public premises in terms of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, his tenancy rights are attorned to the concerned entity specified in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act….." [emphasis supplied] 18. Even if a person is inducted prior to 16.09.1958 or prior to the premises becoming a public premises, once it becomes a public premises in terms of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, his tenancy rights are attorned to the concerned entity specified in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act….." [emphasis supplied] 18. Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon a decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in AIR 1991 SC 855 , Ashoka Marketing Ltd. vs Punjab National Bank.. Para no. 70 of said judgment is extracted hereunder: "70. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act cannot be applied to premises which fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. In our opinion, the provisions of the Public Premises Act, to the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act." 19. Reliance is also placed on Para 4 on a decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in (1994) Supp.3 SCC 694, Jiwan Dass vs Life Insurance Corporation., which is excerpted here-in-below: "4. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does indicate that the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days' notice, if it is a premises occupied on monthly tenancy and by giving 6 months' notice if the premises are occupied for agricultural or manufacturing purposes and on expiry thereof proceedings could be initiated. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does not contemplate of giving any reason for terminating the tenancy. Equally the definition of the public premises 'unauthorised occupation' under Section 2(g) of the Act postulates that the tenancy "has been determined for any reason whatsoever". When the statute has advisedly given wide powers to the public authorities under the Act to determine the tenancy, it is not permissible to cut down the width of the powers by reading into it the reasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating action for terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. If it is so read Section 106 of the T.P. Act and Section 2(g) of the Act would become ultra vires. If it is so read Section 106 of the T.P. Act and Section 2(g) of the Act would become ultra vires. The statute advisedly empowered the authority to act in the public interest and determine the tenancy or leave or licence before taking action under Section 5 of the Act. If the contention of the appellant is given acceptance he would be put on a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant under the Rent Act. Take for example that a premises is let out at a low rent years back like the present one. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to revise adequate market rent, tenant became liable to ejectment. The contention then is, action is violative of Article 21 offending right to livelihood. This contention too is devoid of any substance. An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture. As an integral incidence of ejectment of a tenant/licensee is inevitable. So the doctrine of livelihood cannot indiscriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation…." 20. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon Paras no. 9 and 10 of a decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in (1980) 4 SCC 435 , M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs Life Insurance Corporation of India and another. The said paras are being reproduced here-in-below: "9. Thus, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a corporation nor government or corporate bodies. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Section 25-B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, Section 25-B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Section 25-B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, Section 25-B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act. 10. …. in view of Section 3(a) of the Rent Act, which is extracted below, it would appear that the intention of the legislature in passing the Rent Act was merely to exclude from its operation only premises belonging to the government and if the intention was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate Bodies or corporations, then Section 3(a) should have been differently worded: 3. Nothing in this Act shall apply:- (a) to any premises belonging to the government. This, in our opinion, does not advance the case of the appellant any further because once the Premises Act becomes a special Act dealing with premises belonging to Central Government, corporations and other statutory Bodies, the Rent Act stands superseded. We have to consider the provisions of the two Acts, they having been passed by the same legislature, viz., Parliament and the rule of harmonious construction would have to apply in such cases." 21. Further reliance is placed upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in AIR 1974 SC 396 , Qudrat Ullah vs Municipal Board, Bareilly, wherein it has been held in paras 22 and 23 of the said judgment as under: "22. Moreover, the nature of the Act being temporary, the right, if we can attribute that quality to a disability of the other party to enforce his right unless additional grounds were made out, comes to an end when the temporary Act expires at least by efflux of time, if not by premature repeal. The so-called right is short lived and its longevity where it is derived under a temporary statute, cannot exceed the duration of the statute itself. 23. Let us assume for argument's sake that Section 3 of the Act has conferred a right on the tenant in which case it survives by virtue of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. The so-called right is short lived and its longevity where it is derived under a temporary statute, cannot exceed the duration of the statute itself. 23. Let us assume for argument's sake that Section 3 of the Act has conferred a right on the tenant in which case it survives by virtue of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. What follows? The survival of the right or the continuation of the operation of the Act to the proceedings is all that is ensured, not the expansion or extension of that right. For the normal life of the Act i.e. till September 30, 1972, the dispossession of the tenant is permissible only if the grounds in Section 2 are satisfied by the landlord. This right is circumscribed in content to conditions set out and limited in duration to the period beyond which the Act does not exist. To hold otherwise would be to give more quantum of right to the party than he would have enjoyed had the repeal not been made. Not to affect the previous operation cannot be converted into sanctioning subsequent operation. To read post-mortem operation into a temporary Act because of a premature repeal of it is wrong. To adopt the words Jagannadhadas, J. in Indira Sohanlal vs. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, AIR 1956 SC 77 at p. 84 has observed: "What in effect, learned counsel for the appellant contends for is not the "previous operation of the repealed law" but the "future operation of the previous law." On this footing the right, if any, that the defendant claims terminates with the expiration of that temporary statute." 22. Per contra, Mr. L.P. Naithani, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would submit that the respondent is not an unauthorized occupant as he got entered into the premises in question as tenant and for the same reason, Public premises Act, 1971 (Act no. 40 of 1971) is not applicable in the matter. He would further submit that the property was duly allotted to him and rent was fixed accordingly. He would also submit that the premises in question is covered by the provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. 23. The words "public premises", according to the Act no. 40 of 1971) is not applicable in the matter. He would further submit that the property was duly allotted to him and rent was fixed accordingly. He would also submit that the premises in question is covered by the provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. 23. The words "public premises", according to the Act no. 40 of 1971, means any premises belonging to any corporation or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the Central Government and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1980 (61 of 1980), under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat. 24. A perusal of Section 2(g) of Act no. 40 of 1971, especially its second part, reveals that any person may enter into the premises, i.e., into public premises as genuine tenants but may become unauthorized occupant at any point of time if his tenancy is determined for any reason. It is agreed that respondent entered into the premises as genuine tenant giving the rent per mensem so fixed at the relevant point of time, when LIC demanded enhanced rate of rent as per the market value of the premises, respondent declined, then only the tenancy of the respondent was determined by LIC by giving notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and the moment the tenancy was determined, respondent became unauthorized occupants by virtue of Second part of Section 2(g) of Public Premises Act. Therefore, the respondent is unauthorized occupants from the date of determination of his tenancy. 25. Mr. Naithani, learned Senior Counsel would further submit that Public Premises Act is not applicable to the present case as the tenancy of the respondent originated when the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act no. III of 1947) was in existence, therefore, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rant and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act no. XIII of 1972) shall be applicable to the present case being the successor Act of the previous one. III of 1947) was in existence, therefore, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rant and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act no. XIII of 1972) shall be applicable to the present case being the successor Act of the previous one. Learned Senior counsel further contended that at that time when the tenancy was originated, Public Premises Act was not in existence, therefore, Rent Control Act is applicable to the present matter and, therefore, he could not be evicted unless the bar contained under the provisions of the said Act is against eviction of a tenant was removed. 26. U.P. Act no. III of 1947 was repealed by Section 43 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, which came into force with effect from 20.09.1972. After repeal of the said Act the provisions of U.P. Act no. XIII of 1972 were made applicable to all the buildings which were governed by the provisions of Act no. III of 1947. 27. Public Sector Corporation was defined under Section 3(q) of the Act as follows: "Public Sector Corporation" means any corporation owned or controlled by the Government and includes any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the Government." 28. Admittedly, the Life Insurance Corporation is a Public Sector Corporation. The Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 came into force on 26.06.1956. Thereafter in the year 1958, Public Premises Act was enacted by the legislature. The protection which was available to the tenant of a public sector corporation was taken out by the amending Acts. The relationship of landlord and tenant could be governed only under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is misconceived. At the time allotment order dated 29.10.1971 was passed by the City Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the provisions of Act no. 40 of 1971 were applicable and not the provisions of U.P. Act no. XIII of 1972. 29. The next submission of learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is that an owner of public premises while determining the tenancy must disclose the reasons as to why the tenancy is being determined. 40 of 1971 were applicable and not the provisions of U.P. Act no. XIII of 1972. 29. The next submission of learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is that an owner of public premises while determining the tenancy must disclose the reasons as to why the tenancy is being determined. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent/tenant has no substance as Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act does not provide that the lessor must disclose a reason for determining the tenancy. It used the expression "has been determined for any reason whatsoever". It does not prescribe any particular reason. 30. The next contention raised by learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is that the sole intention of the petitioner Corporation was to enhance the rent. It has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 694, Jiwan Dass vs Life Insurance Corporation. that the petitioner Corporation could have asked for enhancement of rent in the following paragraph: "If the contention of the appellant is given acceptance he would be put on a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant under the Rent Act. Take for example that a premises is let out at a low rent years back like the present one. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to revise adequate market rent, tenant became liable to ejectment. The contention then is, action is violative of Article 21 offending right to livelihood. This contention too is devoid of any substance. An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture. As an integral incidence of ejectment of a tenant/licensee is inevitable. So the doctrine of livelihood cannot indiscriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the contentions of the appellant. 31. Reliance has been placed by learned Senior Counsel for the respondent upon a judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in (2014) 4 SCC 657 , Dr. Suhas H. Pophale vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.. On the strength of said judgment, he would argue that LIC cannot enhance the rent unilaterally. Hon'ble Apex Court in Paras 1 and 4 of the decision rendered in (1994) Supp. Suhas H. Pophale vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.. On the strength of said judgment, he would argue that LIC cannot enhance the rent unilaterally. Hon'ble Apex Court in Paras 1 and 4 of the decision rendered in (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 694, Jiwan Dass vs Life Insurance Corporation., has turned down such a plea, in favour of LIC. Learned counsel for the respondent/tenant would further argue that the judgment rendered by a coordinate bench of this Court in SBI vs. Addl. District Judge and another, bearing WPMS no. 210 of 2007 dated 25.03.2015 is per incuriam, as Hon'ble Court, in said judgment did not distinguish the authority of Hon'ble Apex Court in (2014) 4 SCC 657 , Dr. Suhas H. Pophale vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.. In reply to this, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that applicability of (2014) 4 SCC 657 , Dr. Suhas H. Pophale vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. has been rejected by coordinate bench of this Court at its threshold by considering the argument of counsel for LIC that there is no applicability of the aforesaid authority into the present matter, i.e. SBI vs. Addl. District Judge, for the reason that in Bombay Rent Control Act and subsequently in Maharashtra Rent Control Act, there is protection to the tenants of the public premises also. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would also submit that said authority is not applicable to the present case, as the protection which has been provided to the tenants of public premises in State of U.P./Uttarakhand has already been taken out in the year 1985, by substitution of Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. 32. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent would further submit that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not the remedy available to the LIC to determine the tenancy of the respondent as it can only be done in respect of lessee and the respondent is tenant by the operation of law. Factually there is no difference between a tenant and lessee. Section 3 of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 defines 'tenant' and Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act defines 'lessee'. It is apt to mention here that definition of 'tenant' cannot be taken into consideration for the disposal of present case by virtue of Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. Section 3 of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 defines 'tenant' and Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act defines 'lessee'. It is apt to mention here that definition of 'tenant' cannot be taken into consideration for the disposal of present case by virtue of Section 2(1)(a) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 which clearly stipulates that nothing in this Act shall apply to the properties of Government, Corporations etc. and it is not in dispute that the present premises is public premises. The protection under the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the respondent in view of the provisions contained in Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (Act no. 40 of 1971). Since the premises in question is a public premises, Section 2(g) of Act no. 40 of 1971 as well as provisions contained in Section 2(1)(a) of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 debars the protection to such a tenant. The protection of the Rent Act is not applicable to a tenant of a Government or Corporation property. 33. In the instant case, tenancy of the respondent was terminated by a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act issued by the LIC. Therefore, after expiry of the period of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, respondent falls within the definition of 'unauthorised occupant'. In the case in hand, the Estate Officer has complied with the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Act no. 40 of 1971 before passing final order of eviction, payment of arrears of rent & damages against the respondent. The tenancy of the respondent was determined by the landlord LIC by a legal notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, after the determination of the tenancy, he became an unauthorised occupant. 34. This Court is of the firm opinion that the tenancy of the respondent was terminated by assigning reasons for nonpayment of rent and on termination of his tenancy respondent became unauthorised occupant since he did not comply with the notice. The proceedings were rightly initiated against the respondent under Sections 4 and 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Act no. 40 of 1971). The proceedings were rightly initiated against the respondent under Sections 4 and 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Act no. 40 of 1971). Learned District Judge has committed illegality in allowing the appeal without recording any reason in a cursory and cryptic manner and committed a manifest error of law in allowing the appeal and has caused serious miscarriage of justice to the petitioner. 35. It would depict from the record that the tenant has committed default in payment of arrears of rent. Further the respondent, who is enjoying the property in question situated at the heart of Mussoorie city, after taking the same on rent on dirt cheap price, despite the valid notice issued by the petitioner did not comply with the notice and again committed default in payment of arrears of rent. Neither before the Estate Officer, nor thereafter, respondent paid arrears of rent and damages to the petitioner. Petitioner Life Insurance Corporation of India has every right to increase its income from the property owned by it, as is available to an individual landlord. As such, the tenancy of the respondent was rightly determined by the petitioner by issuing a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside. 36. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 29.03.2005, passed by learned District Judge, Dehradun is hereby set aside. The order dated 07.06.2004 passed by the Estate Officer is hereby affirmed. 37. No order as to costs.