ORDER : Meenakshi Madan Rai, J. 1. By filing the application under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Petitioner herein who was the Complainant before the learned trial Court, seeks leave to Appeal against the impugned Judgment dated 30.11.2016, of the learned Judicial Magistrate, East Sikkim at Gangtok in Private Complaint Case No. 03 of 2015 (Ankit Sarda v. Subash Agarwal), by which, the Respondent herein was acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter, “N.I. Act”). 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner advanced the contention that the Petitioner is a businessman trading in Stock Exchange and had business dealings with the Respondent herein (the accused before the learned trial Court). In October, 2014, the Respondent issued three Cheques to the Petitioner of which two Cheques were of AXIS Bank, Gangtok Branch and one of the Canara Bank, Gangtok Branch, which were marked as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The Cheques when presented by the Petitioner for encashment before the HDFC Bank, Gangtok Branch was dishonoured with the remark “insufficient funds” with regard to Exhibits 1 and 2 and “account closed” for Exhibit 3. The Petitioner consequently issued Legal Notice to the Respondent on 11.11.2014, demanding repayment of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs) only, covered by Exhibits 1 to 3. The Respondent failed to comply with the Legal Notice of the Petitioner upon which the Petitioner filed Private Complaint Case supra on 31.12.2014. It is strenuously urged by learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the said Complaint was well within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 138(c) and Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act. That, on completion of trial before the learned trial Court, the impugned Judgment was pronounced on 30.11.2016, wrongly acquitting the Respondent by overlooking the vital materials on record apart from misreading the provisions of law and erroneously calculating the period of limitation, hence the Petitioner be allowed to file his Appeal. 3. Vehemently resisting the stance of the Petitioner’s Counsel, learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that the concerned Cheques Exhibits 1 to 3 were all issued on 10.10.2014. On 07.11.2014 all the Cheques were dishonoured on the grounds as mentioned by the Petitioner. Notice under Section 138 of the N.I. Act came to be issued on 11.11.2014. In this context, reliance was placed on Exhibit 7 which is the Notice issued to the Respondent. On 07.11.2014 all the Cheques were dishonoured on the grounds as mentioned by the Petitioner. Notice under Section 138 of the N.I. Act came to be issued on 11.11.2014. In this context, reliance was placed on Exhibit 7 which is the Notice issued to the Respondent. On the same day it was despatched by registered AD to the Respondent i.e. 11.11.2014 and the Notice came to be delivered on 12.11.2014. Admittedly no documents have been filed by either party to establish receipt of the Notice by the Respondent on 12.11.2014, however on this count the attention of this Court was drawn by learned Counsel for the Respondent to the cross-examination of the Petitioner. It was urged that in his cross-examination before the learned trial Court the Petitioner has unequivocally admitted that the Notice marked Exhibit 7 is dated 11.11.2014 and was delivered to the accused on 12.11.2014. That, on such admission of the Petitioner nothing further remains to be contested on the fact of the date of delivery of Notice. That, Section 138 of the N.I. Act requires that the payee or the holder of the cheque, as the case may be, is to make a demand for the payment of the required amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days from the receipt of information by him, from the Bank, regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The drawer of such cheque is to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. It is admitted that the Notice, Exhibit 7 was issued within thirty days of the Cheques being dishonoured. When the accused fails to make payment within fifteen days of the receipt of Notice, then Section 142 of the N.I. Act mandates that the Complaint ought to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. That, in the instant case since Notice was delivered on 12.11.2014, fifteen days thereof expired on 27.11.2014, hence the Complaint ought to have been filed on 28.12.2014 but came to be filed only on 31.12.2014 thereby leading to a delay of two days. That, in the instant case since Notice was delivered on 12.11.2014, fifteen days thereof expired on 27.11.2014, hence the Complaint ought to have been filed on 28.12.2014 but came to be filed only on 31.12.2014 thereby leading to a delay of two days. That, although the delay is of two days, the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act requires that if such delay has occurred then the Complainant is required to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a Complaint within such period, upon which, the Court if so convinced, may take cognizance of the Complaint. That the Petitioner failed to take the required steps as mandated by law before the learned trial Court, hence his prayer deserves no consideration and his petition seeking leave to Appeal ought to be rejected. In order to fortify his submissions, reliance was placed on Keshav Chouhan v. Kiran Singh and others, 2015 (4) M.P.L.J. 230 Surekha Sandip Hajare v. Instacomp through Partner Sanjeev Shivapurkar and Another, 2004 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 408 and M/s Saketh India Ltd. v. M/s India Securities Ltd., 1999 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 153 4. I have heard the rival contentions of learned Counsel for the parties and have given due consideration to the same. I have also perused the documents on record of the learned trial Court as well as the citations made at the Bar. 5. Admittedly the Cheques in question were issued on 10.10.2014 which were dishonoured vide Memos dated 07.11.2014. Notice, Exhibit 7, was issued to the Respondent by the Petitioner on 11.11.2014 and delivered on 12.11.2014. Although it is true that no written documents establish delivery of Notice on 12.11.2014 but reference to the cross-examination of the Petitioner before the learned trial Court, relied on by learned Counsel for the Respondent, indubitably establishes as follows; “… It is true that the said notice marked as exbt-7 is dated 11.11.2014. It is true that the said notice was delivered to the accused on 12.11.2014. …” At this juncture, we may pertinently refer to Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides as hereunder; “58. It is true that the said notice was delivered to the accused on 12.11.2014. …” At this juncture, we may pertinently refer to Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides as hereunder; “58. Facts admitted need not be proved.-No fact need to be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the Courts may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.” The unequivocal admission of the Petitioner supra leaves no manner of doubt that not only was the Notice issued on 11.11.2014 but was also delivered to the Respondent on 12.11.2014. The cross-examination supra of the Petitioner was not retracted at any point in time. 6. The air on delivery of Notice having been cleared, I now deem it essential to address the question of limitation as envisaged in Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act. In Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 639 a two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows; “… When a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract and the question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first mentioned or of the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purpose for which the computation has to be made. [Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd. ed.) Vol. 37, p. 92]. There is, however, a volume of authority in England showing that where a certain thing has to be done within a specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded from computation and the day on which such action is taken is to be included. … 5. … The rule is well-established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company). [(1904) KB 1 at 5]. … 5. … The rule is well-established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company). [(1904) KB 1 at 5]. This rule was followed in Cartwright v. Maccormack [(1963) 1 All ER 11 at 13] where the expression “fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy” in a cover note issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. [(1961) 2 QB 135], a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chadman [(1951) 2 KB 792] and In re North, Ex-parte Wasluck [(1895) 2 QB 264]). Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. [See Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.), Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95]. There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here. 6. In computing the period of three months from the date of detention, which was February 5, 1971, before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuation of the detention there-under had to be made, the date of the commencement of detention namely, February 5, 1971, has to be excluded. So done, the order of confirmation was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention. ....................................................................” (Emphasis supplied) In M/s. Saketh India Ltd. v. M/s. India Securities Ltd., 1999 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 153 a two Judge Bench of the Hon?ble Supreme Court while citing the aforestated decision with approval observed as hereunder; “7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Similar provision is made in sub-section (2) for appeal, revision or review. The same principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which, inter alia, provides that in any Central Act made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from?, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. 8. Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in the aforesaid case which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. Ordinarily in computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last. Applying the said rule, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires. Period of 15 days in the present case, expired on 14th October, 1995. So cause of action for filing complaint would arise from 15th October, 1995. That day (15th October) is to be excluded for counting the period of one month. Complaint is filed on 15th November, 1995. The result would be that the complaint filed on 15th November is within time. …” More recently the ratio supra of M/s. Saketh India Ltd. was cited with approval by a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd. and another, AIR 2013 SC 3283 as under; “25. Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly. …” 7. Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act provides that the Complaint is to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. Pertinently it may be noticed that Section 142(1)(b) does not clarify as to how many days one month would comprise of. In such a circumstance, it could be deduced that the term “one month” would be a calendar month in terms of Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act which provides as follows; “3. Definitions.- In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- ............................................................. (35) “month” shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar; …” 8. In the instant case, it is clear that fifteen days from 12.11.2014 after delivery of Notice expired on 27.11.2014. The cause of action for filing the Complaint therefore arose from 28.11.2014. On the anvil of the ratiocinations extracted supra the computation of limitation for one month would commence on 29.11.2014. The Complaint however came to be filed only on 31.12.2014 evidently beyond the period prescribed by the statute. The learned trial Court in the impugned Judgment opined that the case was time barred as the matter came to be filed only on 31.12.2014. No error arises on this conclusion. The Complaint however came to be filed only on 31.12.2014 evidently beyond the period prescribed by the statute. The learned trial Court in the impugned Judgment opined that the case was time barred as the matter came to be filed only on 31.12.2014. No error arises on this conclusion. It is also clear that the Petitioner failed to bring to the Notice of the learned trial Court that a delay in filing the Complaint had occurred neither did he take steps as required under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act. 9. In conclusion, considering the entire gamut of facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the Petitioner not only failed to lodge the Complaint on time but is also guilty of having approached the learned trial Court with unclean hands. Hence the petition deserves to be and is accordingly rejected. 10. Consequently, no leave to Appeal is granted. 11. Criminal Leave Petition No. 10 of 2017 stands disposed of accordingly.