JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioner, who was working as Clerk in Lal Mohan High School, Bajena in the district of Balasbre, has filed this application to quash the judgment dated 31.10.2009 (order dated 19.09.2009) in Anhexure-6 disallowing Appeal No. 1 of 2006, which was communicated to the petitioner on 05.12.2009, passed by opposite party No. 1, in compliance of the order dated 18.07.2005 of this Court passed in W.P.(C) No. 5169 of 2005. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that Lal Mohan High School, Bajena in the district of Balasore was established in the year 1992 and got recognition under Section 6 of the Orissa Education Act vide order dated 08.06.1994 with effect from the session 1993-94 after due permission from the competent authority. The students were presented to appear in the High School Certificate Examination conducted by Board of Secondary Education, Orissa in the year 1996. Therefore, the educational institution was an unaided recognized institution within the meaning of Section 3(p) of the Orissa Education Act. Thereby, the provisions of Orissa Education Act and Rules made thereunder are applicable to the petitioner's institution. As per staffing pattern prescribed by the State Government in the year 1981, a private High School, besides the number of teaching staff described in the said staffing pattern, has to provide a post of clerk in it. Accordingly, the petitioner was appointed by the managing committee as a Clerk vide order dated 29.12.1997, pursuant to which he joined on 02.01.1998. His name was also indicated by the managing committee, while moving for renewal of recognition of the institution by the Board of Secondary Education, Orissa, from time to time. As such, he was continuing without any difficulties. 2.1. When the school in question became eligible to come within the fold of grant-in-aid, the problem started for the petitioner, as in order to accommodate one Judhistir Samal (alleged to be relation of the then secretary of the managing committee), the petitioner was prevented to discharge his duty. The petitioner intimated this fact to all the authorities in his application dated 14.12.2004, namely, Inspector of Schools, Director, Secondary Education; Secretary/School and Mass Education Department and Board of Secondary Education, Orissa in order to protect him from the harassment proposed to be caused by opposite party No. 3. The petitioner intimated this fact to all the authorities in his application dated 14.12.2004, namely, Inspector of Schools, Director, Secondary Education; Secretary/School and Mass Education Department and Board of Secondary Education, Orissa in order to protect him from the harassment proposed to be caused by opposite party No. 3. The State Government vide circular No. 13585 dated 27.03.1983 delegated power to the Director of the respective departments to function as an appellate authority for the unaided education institutions. Subsequently, the State Government intimated that the Regional Directors could also hear the appeal of the employees of the Unaided recognized schools. Accordingly,' the Regional Director, being the competent authority, the petitioner preferred appeal before him. But, due to inaction of the authority, the petitioner, filed W.P.(C) No. 5169 of 2005 before this Court with a prayer to direct opposite parties No. 1 to 3 to treat him to be continuing in service as Clerk in the School and to extend the service benefit including salary component, and this Court vide order dated 18.07.2005 disposed of the said writ petition directing opposite party No. 1 to hear the appeal preferred by the petitioner and dispose of the same within three months from the date of receipt of the order. 2.2. In spite of direction issued by this Court, the appeal having not been disposed of, the petitioner was compelled to file CONTC No. 681 of 2006 for non-compliance of the order dated 18.07.2005 passed by this Court. After contempt petition was filed, the petitioner was issued with notice by opposite party No. 1 to appear before the appellate authority (opposite party No. 1) for hearing of the appeal of the petitioner which was registered as Appeal No. 1 of 2006. In compliance of the same, the petitioner appeared before the appellate authority and after due notice to all the opposite parties, the order impugned under Annexure-6 was passed, which indicates the date of order as 19.09.2009, the date of judgment as 31.10.2009 and the date of communication to the petitioner as 05.12.2009, by which the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been disallowed. Hence this application. 3. Mr. Hence this application. 3. Mr. D.N. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner emphatically urged before this Court that the petitioner, having been prevented from discharging his duty, preferred an appeal, but the managing committee has made out a new case that the petitioner submitted his resignation on 13.09.2003 and that was accepted by the managing committee on 14.09.2003, which is disputed one, and as such, the petitioner never submitted any resignation, rather the so called resignation has been manufactured to disprove the legitimate claim of the petitioner. It is further contended that the managing committee was approved by the competent authority on 04.04.2000, and as such, its term had expired on 04.04.2003 on completion of three years tenure and succeeding managing committee was approved by the competent authority on 02.08.2004. During the period from 04.04.2003 to 01.08.2004, there was no valid constituted managing committee holding the office, rather as per the provisions of the Odisha Education Act read with the Management Rules, 1991 the Inspector of Schools was to function as the managing committee. Therefore, the so called resignation dated 13.09.2003, which is stated to be accepted by the managing committee on 14.09.2003 is absolutely misconceived and misleading one, and the entire thing has been manipulated to accommodate one Judhistira Samal, who happens to be the relation of the Secretary of the managing committee. More so, it is further contended that to the appeal memo filed by the petitioner and registered as Appeal No. 1 of 2006 no reply was filed, and at the stage of hearing by submitting a written note on 26.09.2008. a hew case has been made out so far as resignation of the petitioner is concerned, but the appellate authority, without giving any opportunity of hearing and without deciding the fact whether it is a case of prevention from discharging duty or voluntary resignation by the petitioner, and as such whether the valid managing committee has accepted such resignation or not, has passed the order impugned and, therefore seeks for quashing of the same. It is further contended that an objection was raised that due to non-joinder of proper party the appeal was to be dismissed, but fact remains said Judhistir Samal was not a necessary party to the proceeding. To substantiate the same, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the apex Court in Poonam v. State of U.P., (2016) 2 SCC 779 . To substantiate the same, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the apex Court in Poonam v. State of U.P., (2016) 2 SCC 779 . It is also contended that acceptance of resignation by the managing committee is not in existence and, therefore, the same is non est in the eye of law. To substantiate the same reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of 2019 (I) OLR 190 Governing Body, Khunta Mahavidyalaya, Khunta v. State of Orissa (OJC No. 17283 of 2001 disposed of on 18.12.2018). It is further contended that whether it is a case of resignation or prevention from discharging duty, that has to be adjudicated first and instead of doing so the order impugned has been passed and, thereby, the order cannot sustain. To substantiate such contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on order of this Court passed in the case of Mrs. Niharabala Majhi v. State of Orissa and others (W.P.(C) No. 2998 of 2012 disposed of on 07.05.2012). His last but not the least contention is that if any personal relation has been appointed, which was the subject-matter of discussion in the meeting, he being personally interested, any decision taken by him is treated to be void and in order to substantiate such contention he has relied upon a decision of this Court reported in Vol. 32 (1990) OJD-60 (S & N) (Anand Chandra Sahu v. State of Orissa), which has been confirmed by the apex Court also. 4. Mr. P.K. Panda, learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department justifies the order passed by opposite party No. 1 and stated that the same, having been passed in accordance with law, may not be interfered with at this stage. It is contended that in the meantime the service of Judhistir Samal has been approved and grant-in-aid has also been released in his favour and in the event of any interference made by this Court it will unsettle the settled position. 5. Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 3 contended that admittedly the petitioner preferred an appeal, the memo of which has been annexed as Annexure-4. 5. Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 3 contended that admittedly the petitioner preferred an appeal, the memo of which has been annexed as Annexure-4. In the said appeal memo, no pleading has been made with regard to the dispute raised at this point of time that the petitioner had not submitted resignation rather he was prevented from discharging the duty. Therefore, such plea can be termed as an afterthought and could not and should not have been adjudicated by opposite party No. 1, as it was not pleaded in the appeal memo. It is further contended that in absence of managing committee as a party to the appeal memo, the appeal ought to have been dismissed by the Director-opposite party No. 1. To substantiate his contention with regard to non-joinder of party, he has relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in J.S. Yadav v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 570 and of this Court in the case of 2015 (I) OLR 297 Smita Rout v. State of Odisha (FAO No. 179 of 2012 disposed of on 26.09.2014) It is further contended that to the written note submitted by the petitioner vide Annexure-5 dated 22.08.2009, the opposite party No. 3 also submitted its written note on 26.09.2009 wherein it has made out a case of resignation instead of prevention from discharging the duty by the petitioner. Therefore, once the petitioner submitted his resignation, he should not have raised a plea subsequently that he was prevented from discharging the duty and thereby justifies the order impugned passed by opposite party No. 1. 6. Having heard Mr. D.N. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. P.K. Panda; learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department appearing for opposite parties No. 1 and 2; and Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 3 and pleadings between the parties having been exchanged, with their consent, the matter is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 7. Admittedly, the School in question is an unaided private institution regulated by the provisions of Orissa Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder where the petitioner was appointed as a Clerk and discharged his duty for a quite long time. 7. Admittedly, the School in question is an unaided private institution regulated by the provisions of Orissa Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder where the petitioner was appointed as a Clerk and discharged his duty for a quite long time. But, for some reason or other, when he was not allowed to discharge his duty, he preferred appeal and the appeal having not been disposed of in time, he approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 5169 of 2005, which was disposed of on 18.07.2005 with a direction to hear the appeal and dispose of the same within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order. In compliance of the order dated 18.07.2005 passed by this Court in the said writ petition, the order impugned in Annexure-6 has been passed. The specific stand, in course of hearing, which has been taken by the petitioner in his written note of submission under Annexure-5, reads as follows: "That the Managing Committee was last approved by the competent authority on 4th of April, 2000 and the term of the Managing Committee had expired on 4th of April, 2003. The succeeding Managing Committee was approved by the competent authority on 2nd of August, 2004. During the period from 4th of April, 2003 to 1st of August, 2004 according to the provisions of the Orissa Education Act read with the Management Rules, 1991 either the Inspector of Schools is to function as the Managing Committee. Therefore, the so called resignation submitted by the petitioner dated 13th of September, 2003. and the acceptance thereof by the Managing Committee dated 14th of September, 2003 are incorrect, baseless and has no legal force. It is profitable to make a mention that the Secretary of the Managing committee showed a letter of resignation purported to have been submitted by the petitioner to which the petitioner denied the same either to be written by him, submitted by him or the signature. The petitioner submitted the so called resignation letter is a manufactured document and the same is not to be relied upon." 8. The written note submitted by opposite party No. 3 in Annexure-7 dated 26.09.2008 wherein paragraphs-3 and 4 read thus:- "3. That the separate memorandum on Dt. 15.01.2003 and Dt. 26.8.2003 respectively were served to Mr. A.K. Behera by the Headmaster to join the duty. 4. That finally Mr. The written note submitted by opposite party No. 3 in Annexure-7 dated 26.09.2008 wherein paragraphs-3 and 4 read thus:- "3. That the separate memorandum on Dt. 15.01.2003 and Dt. 26.8.2003 respectively were served to Mr. A.K. Behera by the Headmaster to join the duty. 4. That finally Mr. A.K. Behera's resignation was accepted on 20.9.2003 on his application stating personal problems on 13.9.2003 vide M.C. approval No. 57 dt. 14.9.2003." On the basis of the specific stand taken by both the parties, the irresistible conclusion is that the management has taken a definite stand that it is a clear case of resignation which was accepted by the managing committee. Therefore, no illegality or irregularity has been committed in accepting the resignation of the petitioner. But then, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no valid managing committee available by the time the so called resignation was accepted, and as such, he was prevented from discharging his duty. Therefore, he preferred appeal and in the same took the stand that in order to accommodate one Judhistir Samal, who happens to be the relation of the then Secretary of the managing committee, the entire action has been taken against the petitioner, when the School in question was eligible to receive grant-in-aid pursuant to Grant-In-Order, 2004. In order to deprive the legitimate claim of the petitioner, such steps have been taken. But in the order impugned passed by opposite party No. 1, the questions raised have not been considered nor answered resolving the dispute between the parties. Rather the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa has passed the order without any application of mind, reason being the order of this Court with regard to disposal of the appeal has not been complied with, and as such, the contempt matter was pending against him and to wriggle out from the contempt proceeding, the order impugned has been passed. Further, the order itself indicates that the "date of order" is 19.09.2009, the "date of judgment" is 31.10.2009 but the same has been "communicated to the petitioner" on 05.12.2009. If the "date of order" is 19.09.2009, the "date of judgment" cannot be 31.10.2009 and why it has been "communicated" after more than one month, i.e., on 0.5.12.2009, the reason thereof has not been indicted anywhere. 9. Opposite party No. 1 has come to a finding in paragraph-5 which reads as follows:- "5. If the "date of order" is 19.09.2009, the "date of judgment" cannot be 31.10.2009 and why it has been "communicated" after more than one month, i.e., on 0.5.12.2009, the reason thereof has not been indicted anywhere. 9. Opposite party No. 1 has come to a finding in paragraph-5 which reads as follows:- "5. The appellant has disowned his signature on the resignation application dated 13.09.2003. The concerned Inspector of Schools, Balasore in his letter No. 5058 dt. 6.5.2006 has upheld the resignation to be valid and genuine one. In view of the fact and circumstances, it is concluded that the petitioner has tendered resignation on 13.9.2003 which has been accepted on 20.9.2003, so the deemed date of appointment of Shri Judhistira Samal, Junior Clerk may be counted as 21.9.2003 not 24.6.2002. The school in question, in the meantime has been notified to receive Block grant with effect from 1.4.2008 vide Govt., notification No. 19433/S & ME, dt. 27.9.2008. Circle Inspector of Schools, Balasore is to take steps for approval of appointment of Shri Judhistira Samal, Junior clerk, Lai Mohan School, Bajena as per guideline issued earlier." The above finding, upholding the so called resignation submitted by the petitioner, has been arrived at without verifying whether the resignation submitted by the petitioner is genuine or forged one and whether the managing committee is competent to accept such resignation letter. Without verifying the documents in proper perspective and without appreciating the dispute raised before him, the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa has come to an evasive conclusion, thereby the order impugned cannot sustain in the eye of law. 10. The plea made before this Court with regard to maintainability of the application for non-joinder of the parties, that question can also be considered by the Director while adjudicating the matter afresh. 11. Certiorari (quashing order) is an order of the superior court by which decisions of an inferior court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons who are susceptible to judicial review may be quashed. 12. The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demanded. 13. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demanded. 13. In Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 223 , the Constitution Bench of 7-Judge have laid down the following propositions as well settled and beyond dispute:- (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in certiorari. 14. Applying the above mentioned principles to the present context, since the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa has not passed the order on the basis of the contentions raised before him, the order impugned in Annexure-6 cannot sustain in the eye of law and the same is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa to rehear the matter, in accordance with law, by affording opportunity of hearing to the parties, and pass a reasoned and speaking order within a period of six months from the date of communication/production of a certified copy of this judgment, as it is a year old case. 15. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. However, no order as to costs.