JUDGMENT : N. KOTISWAR SINGH, J. 1. Heard Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned senior counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. K. Sema, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General, Nagaland assisted by Ms. Livika, learned Govt. Advocate for the State respondents. 2. The core issue involved in this petition is whether the petitioners had rendered 35 (thirty five) years of service under the State Government of Nagaland, which necessitated issuance of the impugned order dated 7.12.2018, by which the State government released the petitioners from service on stated completion of 35 (thirty five) years of service on 28.02.2018. The order also provided that the period from 28.02.2018 till the date of issuance, i.e. 07.12.2018, during which period the petitioners had rendered service shall be regularized and condoned subject to approval of the Cabinet. However, the said period will not be treated for the purpose of enjoying pension though no recovery will be made of the salaries already enjoyed by the petitioners. 3. The objection raised by the petitioners in this petition is that the aforesaid calculation made by the State Government that the petitioners completed 35 (thirty five) years on 28.2.2018 is patently wrong as they were appointed w.e.f. 30.4.1984 in terms of the order dated 17.4.2012, in which event, they would complete 35 (thirty five) years of service under the State Government on 30.8.2019. However, by the impugned release order, they have been prematurely released from service, thus prejudicially affecting their right to continue in service. 4. Before we delve into this contentious issue, it would be apposite to refer to certain undisputed facts, though the effect, scope of such factual positions may be differently interpreted by the contesting parties. 5. The petitioners state that the petitioners underwent Diploma in Civil Engineering from Khelhoshe Polytechnic, Atoizu. The aforesaid Course consists of 3 (three) years of academic studies followed by 6 (six) months of practical training, on completion of which, the Diploma Certificate would be awarded to those undergoing the said Course. 6. It is the case of the petitioners that after the petitioners had completed 3 (three) years of academic studies, but before they underwent 6 (six) months of training Course, they were appointed by the State Government to the posts of Computer Grade II vide order dated 11.02.1983 in the pay-scale of Rs. 6. It is the case of the petitioners that after the petitioners had completed 3 (three) years of academic studies, but before they underwent 6 (six) months of training Course, they were appointed by the State Government to the posts of Computer Grade II vide order dated 11.02.1983 in the pay-scale of Rs. 300-13-365-EB-14-505-EB-15-530/- P.M. Since, the scope and effect of this appointment order would have a bearing on the claims made by the contesting parties, the said order is reproduced hereinbelow. "Government of Nagaland Office of the Superintending Engineer Nagaland: Kohima Office Order No. SE/PHE/EST/6 Dt. Kohima the 11th Feb'83 The following persons are hereby appointed as Computer Grade II in the scale of pay Rs. 300-13-365-EB-14-505-EB-530/- P.M. plus all other allowances as are admissible under rules from time to time to similar post within Nagaland with effect from the date of joining the post or the terms and conditions mentioned thereunder: 1. The appointment is purely temporary and may be terminated without any notice. 2. The appointment carried with it the liability to serve in any part of Nagaland. 3. The appointment is subject to production of fitness from the competent medical authority. 4. The appointment is subject to production of education and other technical qualification certificate. In the interest of public service they are posted in the offices as mentioned against their names. Sl. Name and Address Place of Posting 1. Shri Benjongtoshi, S/O R. Ayangba S.E’s Office Kohima 2. Shri Chujangmeren, S/O Tekewati S.E’s Office Kohima 3. Mr. J. Imo Longkumar, S/o. Jongpongreba E.E.’s Office, PHE Division Wokha 4. Shri L. Tongpang Longkumar C/o Shri T. Shillu Ao E.E.’s Office, PHE D.V.O Office, Kohima 5. Mr. S. Limanungasang Lemtur, S/o Semsaoba E.E.’s Office, PHE Division Mokokchung 6. Shri Masachuba Ozukam S/o Mapuzungba Ao E.E.’s Office, PHE Division Mokokchung 7. Shri K. Merntoshi Walling, S/o ….Lepden E.E.’s Office, PHE Division Zunheboto 8. Mr. P. Mangyang Jamir S/o. Lantasngba E.E.’s Office, PHE Division Zunheboto 9. R. Thepongse Sangatam, Longkhim E.E.’s Office, PHE Tuensang Division 10. Shri C. Chubayari S/o Supongshiba E.E.’s Office, PHE Division, Mon Sd/- (K. Nagarajan) Superintending Engineer Nagaland: Kohima Dated Kohima the 11th Feb'83 No. SE/PHE/EST/6 Copy forwarded to: 1. The Executive Engineer, PHE Division, Wokha/Mokokchung/Zunheboto/Tuensang/Mon (K. Nagarajan) Superintending Engineer Nagaland: Kohima" 7. R. Thepongse Sangatam, Longkhim E.E.’s Office, PHE Tuensang Division 10. Shri C. Chubayari S/o Supongshiba E.E.’s Office, PHE Division, Mon Sd/- (K. Nagarajan) Superintending Engineer Nagaland: Kohima Dated Kohima the 11th Feb'83 No. SE/PHE/EST/6 Copy forwarded to: 1. The Executive Engineer, PHE Division, Wokha/Mokokchung/Zunheboto/Tuensang/Mon (K. Nagarajan) Superintending Engineer Nagaland: Kohima" 7. It is the case of the petitioners that though the petitioners were appointed as Computers Grade II by the aforesaid order dated 11.02.1983, the respondents also do not deny that they were yet to complete the 6 (six) months training Course and hence, they had not yet completed the Diploma Certificate Course and, as such, the said appointments were in the nature of engagement as trainees undergoing 6 (six) months training course as part of the academic course for the Diploma Certificate for which they were paid in the nature of stipend. In other words, according to the petitioners, the aforesaid appointment of the petitioners as Computers Grade II vide order dated 11.02.1983 was in the form of apprenticeship, undergoing training for which they were also granted scholarships, which was paid by way of the pay scale attached to the said posts. The appointments were not in the nature of public appointment within the meaning of the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991. 8. It is the case of the petitioners is that on successful completion of 6 (six) months training course, they were conferred Diploma Certificates by the competent authority in the month of July, 1984 and thereafter, the authorities appointed the petitioners to the posts of Overseer Grade I (which was subsequently re-designated as Section Officer Grade I) in the pay-scale of Rs. 425-25-525-EB-27-795-EB-31-950/- P.M. vide order dated 30.08.1984 w.e.f. from the date of declaration of the results. It is the case of the petitioners that it is only when they were given appointment as Overseers Grade I by the aforesaid appointment order dated 30.08.1984, they can be said to have been appointed in the service of the State Government and it is from that date of the appointment as Overseers Grade I that the period of service rendered by the petitioners under the State Government has to be reckoned with. 9. The aforesaid order dated 30.08.1984 also being highly relevant, is reproduced hereinbelow. 9. The aforesaid order dated 30.08.1984 also being highly relevant, is reproduced hereinbelow. "Government of the Nagaland Office of the Additional Chief Engineer: PHED: Nagaland: :Kohima Office Order No. CE/PHE/EST/6/(Pt-IV) Dated Kohima the___th Aug.'84 The undersigned is pleased to appoint the following persons as Overseer Gr. I in the Scale of pay Rs. 425-25-525-EB-27-795-EB-31-950/- P.M. plus all other allowances as are admissible under rules from time to time to similar post within Nagaland with effect from the date of the declaration of the results. The terms and conditions of the appointment are as follows. The appointment is purely temporary and may be terminated at any time by a month's notice from either side. The appointment carried with it the liability to serve at any part of Nagaland. The appointment is subject to production of character verification and antecedent certificates by the authority concerned and to production of Original academic certificate by the persons concerned. The appointment is further subject to production of certificate of fitness from the competent medical authority if not produced earlier. If any declaration given or information furnished by the candidate proves to be false or if the candidate is found to have willfully suppressed any notarial information he/she will be liable to removal from service and will be liable to such other action as Govt. may deem necessary. Name and address. Shri Benjongtoshi, under PHE Division, Mokokchung. "Chujangmeren, -do-M/C Division, Kohima. "J. Imo Longkumer, under PHE Division, Wokha. "L. Tongpang Longkumar, -do- "S. Limanungsang Lemtur, under PHE Division, Mokokchung "Masachuba Ozukum, -do- "M. Merentoshi Walling, under PHE Division, Tuensang "P. Mangyang Jamir, -do- "R. Thepongse Sangtam In the interest of public service the above persons will continue to be in the same place till further order. (Akangmeren Ao) Addl. Chief Engineer: PHED. Nagaland, Kohima CE/PHE/EST/6/(PttIV) Dated Kohima the 30th Aug.'84. Copy forwarded to:- 1. The Executive Engineer, PHE Division, Wokha/Mokokchung/Zunheboto/Mon/Kohima. 2. The persons concerned. 3. Personal files. 4. Office Order book. (Akangmeren Ao) Addl. Chief Engineer: PHED Nagaland, Kohima" 10. (Akangmeren Ao) Addl. Chief Engineer: PHED. Nagaland, Kohima CE/PHE/EST/6/(PttIV) Dated Kohima the 30th Aug.'84. Copy forwarded to:- 1. The Executive Engineer, PHE Division, Wokha/Mokokchung/Zunheboto/Mon/Kohima. 2. The persons concerned. 3. Personal files. 4. Office Order book. (Akangmeren Ao) Addl. Chief Engineer: PHED Nagaland, Kohima" 10. According to the petitioners, the authorities, by wrongly taking into account the service rendered by the petitioners as trainees on stipend vide order dated 11.02.1983 treated them to be in service w.e.f. 11.2.1983, though in the official seniority list of the Engineering cadre in the Public Health Engineering Department as on 31.03.2012, the entry of the petitioners have been correctly shown to be effective from 30.08.1984 and accordingly, they were shown to be completing 35 (thirty five) years of service on 30.08.2019. 11. The petitioners contend that, as there were some doubts about the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II vide order dated 11.02.2018, the said doubts and the ambiguities were clarified by the Department by issuing the notification dated 17.04.2012 by making it amply clear that the initial appointment order dated 11.02.1983 would stand corrected as appointment on provisional basis during training period and appointment of the petitioners as Section Officers Grade I (re-designated as Overseers Grade I) on completion of requisite Diploma in Civil Engineering vide order issued on 30.08.1984 shall be reckoned as the initial appointments of the petitioners. 12. The petitioners contend that in fact, in view of above clarificatory notification dated 17.04.2012 issued by the Public Health Engineering Department which unambiguously mentioned about the appointment of the petitioners as Section Officers vide order dated 30.08.1984, it should be treated to be the initial appointment of the petitioners. Accordingly, it has been submitted that there is no iota of doubt that the petitioners entered in service on the basis of the aforesaid order dated 30.08.1984, which was correctly reflected in the official merit list mentioned above. The aforesaid order dated 17.04.2012, on the basis of which the petitioners are claiming to have entered service initially in August, 1984, is reproduced hereinbelow: "Government of Nagaland Public Health Engineering Department Nagaland: :Kohima Notification Dated Kohima the 17th April/2012 No. PHE-1/EST/SL-64/2011: The appointment order issued vide order No. SE/PHE/EST/6 & Dated 11th Feb./1983; stands corrected as appointment on provisional basis during training period. Therefore, the appointment as S.O. Gr.-I issued vide Order No. CE/PHE.EST/6 (Pt-IV) & dated 30th August/1984 on completion of the requisite Diploma in Engineering, shall be reckoned as the initial appointment. Accordingly, the date of joining in respect of the concerned incumbents have been affected in the Final seniority list of Gazetted Officers of PHED issued vide O.M. No. PHE-1/EST/SL-64/2011 & dated 14th March 2012. (M. Temsu) Under Secretary to the Government of Nagaland No. PHE-1/19/2015/ Dated Kohima the 17th April/2012 Copy to:- 1. The Accountant General, Nagaland Kohima 2. The Chief Engineer PHED, Nagaland Kohima for necessary action. 3. The Officers concerned. 4. Personal file. 5. Office copy/Guard file. (M. Temsu) Under Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland" 13. The petitioners contend that the doubts created in the mind of the some of the junior colleagues of the petitioners were subsequently clarified by the Department by issuing the order dated 20.2.2018 (Annexure L to the writ petition) stating that the entry of the service of the petitioners mentioned in the records is based on the appointment of the petitioners as Overseers Grade I vide order dated 30.08.1984 and accordingly, since there were no representation against such entries made in the official seniority list of 2012, such entries are valid. 14. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that though it is amply clear from the appointment order dated 30.8.1984, which has been subsequently clarified by the notification dated 17.04.2012 that the date of entry in the service of the petitioners is to be counted w.e.f. 30.08.1984 and as such, the petitioners would complete 35 (thirty five) years of service only on 30.08.2019 and accordingly, the petitioners were allowed to continue in service till the impugned order was issued. 15. The petitioners contend that the authorities out of the blue, issued the impugned order dated 07.12.2018 and abruptly released the petitioners from service on the plea that the petitioners have already completed 35 (thirty five) years of service on 28.02.2018, that too, without giving any prior notice to the petitioners by treating the service rendered by the petitioners from 28.02.2018 till issuance of the order on 07.12.2018 to be irregular and the salary received by the petitioners is to be treated as honorarium only and also by directing that the regular service rendered by the petitioners w.e.f. 28.02.2018 till 07.12.2018 shall not be reckoned for qualifying service for pension. 16. 16. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that prior to issuance of the impugned order dated 07.12.2018, the petitioners had been treated to be in service from 30.08.1984 and had been given all the service benefits on that basis. However, the authorities issued the impugned order under the aforesaid circumstances, contrary to their own notifications issued in this regard, on the purported ground that the petitioners have already completed 35 (thirty five) years of service on 28.2.2018, thus, depriving the petitioners of their lawful entitlement to continue in service. 17. The State respondents have filed their affidavit-in-opposition and have explained the circumstances under which the aforesaid impugned order was issued. The case of the respondent authorities as can be culled from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent authorities, in brief, is that though the petitioners were given appointment as Computers Grade II while they were undergoing practical training course, nevertheless, it was an appointment under the State of Nagaland as they were given salary for the service rendered by them as Computers Grade II in terms of the appointment order dated 11.02.1983. It is a different matter that on completion of the training course, they were given appointment as Overseers Grade I as they fulfilled the eligibility criteria for appointment to the said posts but it will not detract from the fact that the petitioners were earlier appointed as Computers Grade II. If that is so, it cannot be said that they had not entered the Government service in terms of the appointment order dated 11.02.1983. 18. It is also the case of the respondent authorities that the notification issued by the Department on 17.04.2012 was found to be not in consonance with the provisions of the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991, as amended from time to time (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1991) and as decided by the Personnel and Administrative Reforms which is the Nodal Department to decide on this issue. It has been submitted that after considering all the relevant factors, the Nodal Department came to the conclusion that the petitioners had indeed entered service w.e.f. February, 1983 in terms of the order dated 11.02.1983 and as such, they completed 35 (thirty five) years of service as on 28.02.2018 and accordingly, the impugned order was issued. 19. It has been submitted that after considering all the relevant factors, the Nodal Department came to the conclusion that the petitioners had indeed entered service w.e.f. February, 1983 in terms of the order dated 11.02.1983 and as such, they completed 35 (thirty five) years of service as on 28.02.2018 and accordingly, the impugned order was issued. 19. It is the case of the State respondents that there is no dispute as to the fact that as per the aforesaid Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991 as amended from time to time, anyone who has been in public employment under the State Government, on completion of 35 (thirty five) years of service or on attaining the age of 60 (sixty) years, whichever is earlier, is liable to be relieved from service and since, the petitioners had completed 35 (thirty five) years of service on 28.02.2018 as mentioned above, they have been rightly released from service and as such, there is no illegality in the aforesaid act of the State authorities and the impugned order is valid, and is in consonance with the Act and as such, the petitioners are liable to be relieved from service. 20. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners, however, has vehemently contested the claim of the State respondents stating that the clarification notification issued by the State Government on 17.04.2012 has not been reviewed/set aside/annulled or cancelled by the authorities which specifically mentions that their appointment on 30.08.1984 on completion of the requisite Diploma in Engineering, shall be reckoned as the initial appointment. Since it has been specifically mentioned in the said notification dated 17.04.2012 that the appointment of the petitioners as Section Officers Grade I vide order dated 30.08.1984 on completion of the requisite Diploma in Engineering shall be reckoned as an initial appointment, it has to be complied with and cannot be ignored. If that is so, the authorities could not have issued the impugned order contrary to his aforesaid order dated 17.04.2012. 21. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has also imputed mala fide to the State respondents in issuing the said impugned order. If that is so, the authorities could not have issued the impugned order contrary to his aforesaid order dated 17.04.2012. 21. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has also imputed mala fide to the State respondents in issuing the said impugned order. It has been contended that the said impugned order has been issued merely to accommodate and clear the passage for certain junior officers to higher posts as the petitioners were coming in the way of these junior officers which is clearly evident from the clarification made by the authorities on 20.2.2018. 22. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners, while contending that the petitioners cannot be said to have been initially appointed to the service of the State of Nagaland vide order dated 11.02.1983, submits that perusal of the aforesaid appointment order would make it clearly evident that the said appointment is subject to production of education and other technical certificates and the respondents themselves have admitted that the petitioners did not possess the said education and technical certificates as they were yet to complete the said Certificate Course on the date of issuance of the appointment order dated 11.02.1983. 23. It has been submitted that, in fact, the State Government engaged them as Computers Grade II to enable them to complete the Diploma Course by giving stipend. The salary mentioned in the appointment order is to be treated as stipend as the petitioners had not yet completed the Diploma Course. That is the reason why it was clarified in the notification dated 17.04.2012 that the appointment of the petitioners on 11.02.1983 was purely on provisional basis. 24. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the aforesaid order dated 17.04.2012 was issued by way of correction of the mistake in appointing the petitioners as Computer Grade II by clarifying that the said appointment was on purely provisional basis during the training period before they could complete the Certificate Course. It has been submitted that this is an aspect which was known to all the authorities, and the Public Health Engineering Department after verifying the same, had issued the said clarificatory and correctional notification dated 17.04.2012, copies of which were submitted to the Office of the Accountant General, Nagaland and other authorities. It has been submitted that this is an aspect which was known to all the authorities, and the Public Health Engineering Department after verifying the same, had issued the said clarificatory and correctional notification dated 17.04.2012, copies of which were submitted to the Office of the Accountant General, Nagaland and other authorities. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that when the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms (P&AR) undertook the aforesaid exercise, it did not take into consideration many relevant factors including the aforesaid clarificatory order dated 17.04.2012 while arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners had completed 35 (thirty five) years of service w.e.f. 28.2.2018. 25. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the fact that the petitioners entered the service initially on 30.08.1984 as clarified by the order dated 17.4.2012, has been glossed over by the P&AR Department while arriving at the conclusion about the initial date of entry in service. It has been submitted that the clarification made by the PHE Department that the petitioners were appointed as Overseers Grade I w.e.f. the date of declaration of result that and accordingly, were deemed to have joined service on 30.04.1984, has not been taken into consideration while arriving at the conclusion by the State Government. Similarly, the fact that the increments which had been granted to the petitioners while holding the posts of Computer Grade II had not be carried over to the subsequent employment as Overseers Grade I also has been ignored by the Department of P&AR, which would have been carried over, if there was continuity in the government service. Thus, the fact that no benefits were carried forward from the initial service as Computers Grade II to the succeeding appointment as Overseers Grade I, has been totally ignored by the Department of P&AR. 26. It has been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that various judgments relied on by the learned senior Addl. Advocate General rendered by this Court and various office memoranda referred to by the learned Sr. Addl. AG of the State, are all irrelevant for deciding the issue in the present case. 26. It has been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that various judgments relied on by the learned senior Addl. Advocate General rendered by this Court and various office memoranda referred to by the learned Sr. Addl. AG of the State, are all irrelevant for deciding the issue in the present case. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the issue to be decided in this case is whether the engagement of the petitioners as Computers Grade II vide order dated 11.02.1983 till they were appointed as Overseers Grade I is to be counted as service under the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act of 1991, as amended from time, to time. It is only when the person holds a public employment in any pensionable State Public Service or post connected with the State affairs of Nagaland etc., which counts for the purpose of pension, that such service will be counted towards computing the 35 (thirty five) years as referred to in the Act for discontinuing with the service. 27. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that since the petitioners were initially engaged as Computers Grade II without having valid qualifications, they could not have been treated to have been appointed to a pensionable post. Further, the appointments were purely on temporary basis. They were appointed during the training period and as such, the said appointments as trainees could not be counted for the purpose of computing 35 (thirty five) years of service under the aforesaid Act of 1991, as amended from time to time. 28. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners also submits that a minute examination of the office memoranda relied on by the learned senior Addl. AG would show that these OMs were issued by the State Government to clarify certain issues, doubts arising about the nature of service rendered by an contract/ad-hoc/work-charged employees and also whether the service rendered by them prior to their regular appointment are to be counted and as to whether service rendered by such contract/ad-hoc/work-charged service in different posts could also be counted for the purpose of computing 35 (thirty five) years of service. 29. It has been submitted that, in the present case, the issue does not involve any contract/ad-hoc/work-charge appointment and hence the aforesaid memoranda are not applicable. 29. It has been submitted that, in the present case, the issue does not involve any contract/ad-hoc/work-charge appointment and hence the aforesaid memoranda are not applicable. According to the petitioners, the service rendered by the petitioners were before completion of academic course as trainees and thus does not amount to a public employment under the meaning of Section 2(1) of the aforesaid Act and as such, the reference to these office memoranda are all irrelevant. 30. The only issue to be decided in the present case, according to the petitioners, is whether the service rendered by the petitioners as trainees before completing the Diploma Course as Computers Grade II vide order dated 11.02.1983 is to be counted towards computing the 35 (thirty five) years of service, which according to the petitioners, cannot be, as also clearly mentioned in the clarificatory notification dated 17.04.2012. 31. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners also submitted that there is nothing in the Act nor any office memoranda issued by the State Government in this regard which provides that the service rendered by a trainee before completing his academic course could be counted towards computing 35 (thirty five) years of service as in the case of contract/ad-hoc/work-charged services. 32. It has been also submitted that the impugned release order was issued in violation of principle of natural justice that too from a retrospective date and hence, it is impermissible in law. 33. It has been further submitted that in the teeth of the clarificatory notification dated 17.4.2012 issued by the Administrative Department, which clearly mentioned that initial appointment of the petitioners is to be counted by referring to the order dated 30.8.1984, such subsequent justification by way of affidavit by the official respondents would be impermissible in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SCC 851. In Para No. 8 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. In Para No. 8 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 )(at p. 18) "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to, do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to effect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." 34. In response, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General of the State has submitted that as far as the Act of 1991 is concerned, it is clear that anyone who has rendered public employment under the State of Nagaland for 35 years or has attained the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier, as the case may be, is liable to be released from service. It has been submitted that, in the present case, the appointment order dated 11.2.1983 clearly mentions that the petitioners have been appointed as Computers Grade II on temporary basis by giving salaries with certain pay-scale attached to the said post and in fact, they rendered service as Computers Grade II, though at the same time they may be also undergoing training. Even if it is the case of the petitioners that they did not fulfill eligibility criteria for appointment to the posts of Overseers Grade I (to which they were subsequently appointed), it did not mean that they were not appointed to the said post of Computers Grade II. 35. Even if it is the case of the petitioners that they did not fulfill eligibility criteria for appointment to the posts of Overseers Grade I (to which they were subsequently appointed), it did not mean that they were not appointed to the said post of Computers Grade II. 35. It has been submitted that the fact that they had been appointed as Computers Grade II was entered in the Service Books of the petitioners. It has been submitted that apart from the fact that they were given salary as per the pay-scale mentioned in the appointment order, they were also given increments. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioners were not initially appointed to serve in State Government vide order dated 11.02.1983. If that is so, the services of the petitioners have to be counted w.e.f. the date when they were appointed on 11.02.1983. In fact, on realizing this, and the State authorities after finding the inconsistencies arising out of the order issued by the Public Health Engineering Department on 17.4.2012, sought to resolve the same through the Nodal Agency of Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, by undertaking an exercise in this regard by calling for comments from the Department authorities as clearly revealed from the file notings, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the official respondents. The file notings clearly mention that the certain issues arose as to whether the services of the petitioners who were initially appointed as Computers Grade II in February 1983 are to be counted, in connection with which clarifications were sought from the Administrative Department. Administrative Department clarified the queries sought by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms. These clarifications, in the opinion of this Court, would also be highly relevant in resolving the issue at hand and as such the relevant portions of the said file notings are reproduced herein-below. "3. The Department has furnished the following clarifications: Sl. Clarification sought by us Clarification furnished by the Department 1 Clarity with regard to appoint as Overseer Grade-I with effect from the ‘date of declaration of the results’ as stipulated in the order dated 30.08.1984 at P.393/’ accompanied by relevent document in respect of all the 10 (ten) officials listed on P.20/c. Out of 10 (ten) officers, 2 (two) officers had already been expired and 1 (one) retired on attaining superannuation. Documents of the remaining 7 (seven) officers furnished at P.441/c-P.446/c. The officers were appointed as Overseer Grade-I with effect from the date of declaration of result. Accordingly all joint on 30.04.84. 2 Whether any break in service had occurred between the initial employment as Computers Grade-II and the ensuing appointment as Overseer Grade-I. There is no evidence of any break in service between their initial appointment as Computer Grade-II and subsequent appointment as Overseer Grade-I. 3 Whether the 10 (ten) officials were holding the posts of Computer Grade-II at the time of appointment as Overseer Grade-I. As per entire in the Service Books, all officers were holding the posts of Computer Grade-II at the time of appointment as Overseer Grade-I. 4 Whether the 10 (ten) officials had obtained permission/’no objection certificate’ in the course of applying for the post of Overseer Grade-I while manning the post of Computers Grade-II or had resigned from the latter prior to submission of application for appointment against the former. There are no documents available to indicate that the officers had obtained permission/’ no objection certificate’ in the course of applying for the post of Overseer Grade-I while manning the post of Computers Grade-II nor are evidence available to indicate they had resigned from the post of Computer Grade-II at the time of submission of applications of appointment to the post of Overseer Grade-I. 5 Whether any service benefits accrued in the previous appointment as Computer Grade-II viz. increment, leave were carried over to the subsequent employment as Overseer Grade-I. As per entries in the Service Book, the Officers were granted increment in the post of Computer Grade-II which, however, were not carried over to the subsequent employment as Overseer Grade-I. 6 Service Books, Personal Files and Leave Account Sheet maintained in respect of all the 10 (ten) officials. Service Books, Personal Files and Leave Account Sheet maintained in respect of all the 7 (seven) officials has been enclosed in the link folder. 36. The Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, after referring to the clarifications and other relevant records and also after having obtained the view of the Law Department in this regard, came to the conclusion that the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II from February, 1983 has to be counted towards computing the 35 years service period of public employment. 37. Learned Sr. Add. 37. Learned Sr. Add. AG has submitted that perusal of the aforesaid records would clearly indicate that the authorities were mindful of the fact that the service rendered by the petitioners in the posts of the Computer Grade II had been entered in their respective Service Books. It has also been found that the petitioners had been granted increments while serving as Computers Grade II and the question of granting increments would not have arisen if such persons were not employed by the State. 38. It has been submitted that it has also been found that there was no discontinuity or break in service after the petitioners were initially appointed as Computers Grade II and subsequently as Overseers Grade I vide order dated 30.08.1984. It is in this context that the OM dated 29.03.2017 was referred to, by which it has been clarified that the period of service rendered on ad-hoc/contract/work-charged/substitute basis which is followed by regularization or regular appointment without break or any gap in service except resignation but notwithstanding the case of resignation taken up with proper permission for another appointment, shall be treated as public employment and included in computation of length of service for the benefit of service for the purpose of pension under the Nagaland Retirement From Public Employment (2nd Amendment) Act, 2009. It has been submitted by the learned Sr. Addl. AG that even if petitioners were not appointed ad-hoc/contract/work-charged/substitute basis, the said OM has been referred to emphasize that if the earlier service is continued uninterruptedly till regular appointment, the earlier service rendered without break can be counted. In the present case, even though the petitioners were initially appointed on temporary basis as Computers Grade II since there was no break in service when they were appointed as Overseers Grade, the OM dated 29.3.2017 would be applicable for counting the earlier service. It has been also submitted that as regards the issue as to whether the service rendered by an employee in a different post from the one to which he has been subsequently regularly appointed can be counted, is to be found under OM dated 11.10.2011. It has been also submitted that as regards the issue as to whether the service rendered by an employee in a different post from the one to which he has been subsequently regularly appointed can be counted, is to be found under OM dated 11.10.2011. It has been submitted that this issue has been also clarified by this Court in W.P.(C) 270(K)/2011 disposed of on 14.6.2012, by which this Court held that even if the appointments were in different posts, if there is continuity in service, they shall be deemed to be in continuous public employment. According to the State, in the present case also even if the petitioners were initially appointed to the posts of Computer Grade II which were different from the posts of Overseer Grade I to which they were subsequently appointed, since there was no break in service but was continuous, the aforesaid service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II shall be counted while computing 35 years of service. 39. It has been submitted by the learned Sr. Addl. AG for the State that once it is found that the petitioners have completed 35 years of service, the action of the respondent authorities in issuing the impugned release order dated 07.12.2018 cannot be faulted with. Learned Sr. Addl. AG submits that merely because Administrative Department had issued a clarificatory notification on 17.04.2012 that the petitioners shall be treated to have been initially appointed from August, 1984, it cannot create any right in their favour in the teeth of the specific provision of the Act under Section 3(1) which clearly mandates that upon completion of 35 years of service or attaining the age of 60 years, as the case may be, an employee is liable to be discharged from service. 40. It has been contended by the learned Sr. Addl AG that the impugned order was issued on the basis of certain exercise undertaken by the State authorities after consulting the Administrative Department and also the Law Department in this regard. 40. It has been contended by the learned Sr. Addl AG that the impugned order was issued on the basis of certain exercise undertaken by the State authorities after consulting the Administrative Department and also the Law Department in this regard. The authorities have taken a very clear stand that the engagement of the petitioners as Computers Grade II vide order dated 11.02.1983 is to be treated as public employment in terms of Section 2(1) of the Act, for the reason that their services were utilized after they were appointed to the said posts on payment of salary and other service benefits attached to the said posts and as such, merely because the petitioners had not completed their Diploma course does not make any difference as to the issue whether they were given appointment to the said posts of Computer Grade II or not. As far as the State Government is concerned on the basis of the said engagement as Computers Grade II they would be treated as Government employees and services rendered by them in that capacity are to be counted towards computing 35 years of service as mentioned under Section 3(1) of the Act. 41. Learned Sr. Addl. A.G. has submitted that various OMs have been issued to clarify certain doubts arising out of the implementation of the Act which have been clarified by this Court in a series of decisions rendered including in W.P.(C) No. 270(K)/2011 and other writ petitions. It has been submitted that clarifications have been made by this Court in the aforesaid petitions by holding that if a person has continued in service without any service break, earlier service rendered by the employee whether as an ad-hoc/contract/work-charged and even in the different posts shall be counted towards computing 35 years of service. It has been further submitted that such clarifications made by the Courts shall be deemed to have been operating since the very inception of the Act, in support of which contention he has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lily Thomas & Ors. Vs. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 , wherein it has been held that interpretation of a legal provision relates back to the date of the law itself. 42. Learned Sr. Addl. Vs. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 , wherein it has been held that interpretation of a legal provision relates back to the date of the law itself. 42. Learned Sr. Addl. AG for the State in support of his contention that any administrative order which runs contrary to a statute, to that extent, the statutory provisions will prevail and any such administrative action has to be ignored, has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Vs. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur & Ors., (2013) 5 SCC 427 , wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the State and statutory authorities are not bound by the previous erroneous understanding or interpretation of law and the statutory authorities cannot be asked to act in contravention of law. Accordingly, it has been submitted that if the service rendered by the petitioners on the basis of the appointment order dated 11.2.1983 is to be ignored, that would amount to violation and contravention of the 1991 Act and as such the so called clarification notification issued by the Administrative Department on 17.4.2012 to the extent it is contrary to the Act, must be ignored and the petitioners cannot claim any right on the basis of the aforesaid notification dated 17.04.2012. Relying on the decision in Dr. H.S. Rikhy & Ors. Vs. The New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1962 SC 554 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where a statute makes a specific provision to act in a particular manner, and no other manner, that provision of law being mandatory and directory, the same has to be strictly followed and no corporate body can be bound by estoppel to do something beyond its power or to refrain from doing what it is its duty to do. It has been submitted that in the present case also, once it was found that the petitioners have completed 35 years of service as on 28.2.2018, the authorities cannot be prevented from acting upon the provisions of 1991 Act, as amended from time to time, to issue the impugned order, inspite of the so-called clarificatory notification issued by the Administrative Department. 43. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited Vs. 43. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 193 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held to the effect that doctrine of promissory estoppels cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law because none can be compelled against a statute and as such, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law, it has been submitted even if the Administrative Department had issued notification dated 17.04.2012, since it is contrary to the specific provisions of the 1991 Act, as amended from time to time, to that extent the petitioners cannot compel the Administrative Department to act upon the said notification that is clearly contrary to the statute. 44. Further, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Sadagopan & Ors. Vs. Food Corporation of India, Zonal Officer (South Zone) represented by its Zonal Manager & Anr., (1997) 4 SCC 301 , wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is now well settled legal position that executive instructions cannot be issued in derogation of the statutory Regulations, and even if the Administrative Department had issued the clarificatory notification dated 17.04.2012, since it is in contravention of the 1991 Act, to that extent it will be invalid. Further relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in DDA & Ors. Vs. Joginder S. Monga & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 297 , wherein it has been held that whenever there is a conflict between the statute and the executive instruction, to that extent, the statute will prevail, it has been submitted that in the present case, if there is an apparent conflict between the notification dated 17.04.2012 and the 1991 Act as amended from time to time, to that extent, 1991 Act will prevail over the earlier notification dated 17.04.2012, which was issued the contrary to the statutory provision. 45. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 46. 45. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 46. The dispute amongst the contesting parties surrounds the issue as to whether the service rendered by the petitioners after they were appointed vide order dated 11.02.1983 till they were appointed vide order dated 30.08.1984 could be counted for the purpose of computing the 35 years of service as provided under the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991, as amended from time to time. In service jurisprudence, the nature and scope of the service rendered by a person differs from service rules to service rules and has to be examined in the context of the specific statues which governs such service. Service rendered by a person may be admissible for the purpose of salary or such incidental matters but may not be admissible for other purposes like of fixing seniority or for pensionary benefits etc. Accordingly, whether the aforesaid period of service rendered by the petitioners from February, 1983 to August, 1984 will be counted for the purpose of computing 35 years of service, has to be primarily decided with specific reference to the provisions of Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991, as amended from time to time and the relevant rules or memorandum issued in this regard. 47. As regards the intent and purpose of enactment of the aforesaid Act, the matter has been already examined judicially in a number of cases including in Nagaland Senior Government Employees Welfare Association & Ors. Vs. State of Nagaland & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 643 and it is no more res integra. The aforesaid Act had been enacted for the purpose of restricting the service of any employment to a term of 35 years from the date of his joining public employment or until the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier. The aforesaid Act has been enacted by the State of Nagaland as a policy decision to restrict the service of the employees so as to open the way for new entrants in Government service as one of the measures to deal with the issue of unemployment. Further, as also observed in the aforesaid decision in W.P.(C) No. 270(K) of 2011, the Act does not distinguish between a regular or temporary appointment. Further, as also observed in the aforesaid decision in W.P.(C) No. 270(K) of 2011, the Act does not distinguish between a regular or temporary appointment. Be that as it may, as mentioned above, the issue raised in this petition has to be dealt with specific reference to the aforesaid Act. Section 3(1) of the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991, as amended from time to time reads as follows. 3.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any rule or orders for the time being in force, a person in public employment shall hold office for a term of 35 years from the date of joining public employment or until he attains the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier. From the above, it is clear that no person can remain in Government service if he has served 35 years of service or he has attained the age of 60 years as the case may be. As to the meaning of public employment mentioned in the aforesaid Section, it has been defined in the Section 2(1) of aforesaid Act, which reads as follows. "Section 2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context: (1) "Public Employment" mean appointment to any pensionable State Public Service or posts connection with the affairs of the State of Nagaland and the Nagaland Legislative Assembly and includes any appointment under the Government of India, any other State Government, Central or State Public Sector under taking and local authority held by persons prior of their absorption under the Public Service of the State of Nagaland and the Nagaland Legislative Assembly which counts for the purpose of pension." 48. Perusal of the aforesaid definition clause of the words "Public Employment" clearly indicates that such appointment would be a public appointment if the appointment is made to any pensionable State Public Service or post connected with affairs of the State of Nagaland etc, and such service should count for the purpose of pension. In other words, the employment must not be only be against a pensionable State Public Service or post connected with the affairs of the State of Nagaland, but also, such service must count for the purpose of pension. Accordingly, on conjoint reading of Section 3(1) and definition Clause under Section 2(1) of the Act, the following positions emerge. In other words, the employment must not be only be against a pensionable State Public Service or post connected with the affairs of the State of Nagaland, but also, such service must count for the purpose of pension. Accordingly, on conjoint reading of Section 3(1) and definition Clause under Section 2(1) of the Act, the following positions emerge. (i) A person in public employment can hold office for a term of 35 years from the date of his joining public employment or till he attains the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier. (ii) The appointment of such person must be in pensionable State Public Service or (iii) A post connected with the affairs of State of Nagaland and such other authorities mentioned in the Act. (iv) Such service rendered by the employee must count for the purpose of pension. As a corollary, if the appointment is not against a pensionable State Public service or to a post not connected with the state affairs of Nagaland and if it does not count for the purpose of pension, the said service cannot be counted to compute 35 years of service as mentioned under Section 3(1) of the Act. Therefore, in the present case, we have to examine as to whether the service rendered by the petitioners after being appointed vide order dated 11.02.1983 till they were appointed to other posts on 30.08.1984 fulfills all the aforesaid conditions so as to be counted towards computing the aforesaid 35 years of service within the meaning of the Act. 49. The Act is silent as to whether service rendered by a person in different posts could be counted for computing 35 years of service. 50. As mentioned above, after the implementation of the Act, various issues arose as to whether the service rendered by a person not on regular basis, but on a contract/ad-hoc/work-charged period would be counted for the purpose of computing 35 years of service and in that regard, the authorities had issued various office memoranda from time to time. Though the aforesaid office memoranda have not been annexed to this petition, both the parties have referred to these memoranda as mentioned and quoted in W.P.(C) No. 270 (K)/2011 disposed of by this Court on 14.06.2012, which has been relied upon by both the parities and as such, this Court may also refer to these memoranda as mentioned in the aforesaid judgment. 51. One such office memorandum was issued on 26.11.2009. A clarification was made holding that contract/ad-hoc/work charged period of service rendered which counts for increment, leave, pension and other service benefits except seniority will count for determining the length of service for pension purpose in terms of the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment (2nd Amendment) Act, 2009. 52. Similarly, another office memorandum was issued on 15.02.2010 in which it was clarified that the contract/ad-hoc/work-charged service of an employee followed by regularization in the same post, will be counted towards the length of service. However, in case of those employees who are on contract or ad-hoc and who had been given direct appointment to the same post or any other post through NPSC or Selection Board, their services will not be counted towards the length of service. It has been further provided that in case of those who are in regular Government service and who were subsequently given direct appointment to any of the post through NPS Cor the Selection Board in their earlier service, their earlier service will be counted towards length of service provided that the employee has been allowed to count the former service period for the purpose of pension etc, as per the records of service book. 53. In partial modification of the aforesaid memoranda dated 26.11.2009 and 15.2.2010, Office Memorandum dtd. 11.10.2011 was issued, in which it has been provided that where a person appointed on contract/ad-hoc/work-charged basis is subsequently regularized to the same post, the past service rendered in such will be counted towards the length of service. However, whenever a person appointed on contract/ad-hoc/work charged basis, but instead of his services being regularized, he is subsequently appointed to the same post or any other post by direct recruitment through the Nagaland Public Service Commission or the Departmental Selection Board, the length of service of the employees rendered on contract/ad-hoc/work-charged will not be counted. It has been further provided that whenever a person is appointed in a regular service, but subsequently given direct appointment to any other post, either through the Nagaland Public Service Commission or Departmental Selection Board, the past regular service will be counted for the length of service if the employee is given any benefit or continuity of the past regular service, but if no such benefit is given in the new posts/service, then the former service shall not be counted. It was further clarified that the benefit or continuity of the past service can include increment, leave entitlement, counting of such service for length of service for pension purpose etc. 54. Subsequently, another Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011 was issued which further clarified that for the purpose of calculation of length of service under the Act of 2009, such ad-hoc/contract period will be considered to be "deemed regularized" and counted towards the length of public service of the employee. However, this Court is of the view that this Court may not refer to the same in view of the fact that the aforesaid OM dated 22.12.2011 was held to be illegal and accordingly, set aside and quashed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition No. W.P.(C) No. 270 (K)/2011 as mentioned in para 24 thereof, on the ground that the said memorandum was issued in violation of Section 5 of the Act as it was not gazetted. 55. There is also an observation made by this Court in the aforesaid judgment that this Court cannot grant relief to the petitioners on the basis of such office Memoranda by ignoring and glossing over the apparent infirmity in the Office Memoranda which strikes at the very root, denuding the legitimacy of such Office Memoranda and thus, enforceability of the same. The aforesaid observation was made by this Court in the said decision after the learned Sr. Addl. AG also had emphatically submitted at that time that none of the office memoranda had been gazetted and placed before the State Assembly. In this regard, it may be apposite to quote Para Nos. 23 and 24 of the aforesaid judgment, wherein this Court made the following observations about the validity of the aforesaid memoranda. "23. The writ petitioners rely on the Office Memoranda dated 26.11.2009, 15.12.2010 and 11.10.2011 to claim that length of service for the period rendered on contract/ad hoc/work-charged period should not be counted. The counsel for the writ petitioners have argued that the Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011 has been issued in violation of Section 5 of the Act as the said Office Memoranda has not been gazette. It is not the case of the writ petitioners that the previous 3 Office Memoranda had been duly gazetted. The counsel for the writ petitioners have argued that the Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011 has been issued in violation of Section 5 of the Act as the said Office Memoranda has not been gazette. It is not the case of the writ petitioners that the previous 3 Office Memoranda had been duly gazetted. On the contrary, the learned Advocate General is emphatic in his submission that none of the aforesaid Office Memoranda had been gazetted and placed before the Legislative Assembly. The response of the aforesaid submission were articulated by the learned counsel for the petitioners by submitting that the State cannot question its own action and that as there is no challenge to the said Office Memoranda, this Court ought not to scrutinize the legitimacy of the said Office Memoranda. Though is correct as held in Raghava (supra) that the State cannot question its own actions in a writ proceeding, however, it is not that in the instant case the State is questioning its own action but has only brought to the notice of the Court the factual position. The petitioners are invoking equity jurisdiction of this Court and thought the said Memoranda are not challenged, this Court certainly cannot grant relief to the petitioners on the basis of such Office Memoranda by ignoring and glossing over the apparent infirmity in the Office Memoranda, which strikes at the very root, denuding the legitimacy of such Office Memoranda and thus enforceability of the same. The Writ Court, in such circumstances, can decline to invoke its extra-ordinary jurisdiction to grant discretionary relief. 24. The Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011 having not fulfilled the mandate of Section 5 of the act, it is, ex-facie, legally not sustainable and no consequence can flow from the same and therefore, the same is set aside and quashed. As the said Memorandum has been set aside, it is not necessary to go into the concept of "deemed regularized" introduced in the said Memorandum as well as tenability or otherwise of the stipulation regarding counting of contract/ad hoc service towards length of public service of an employee. As the Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011 has been set aside, it is also considered not necessary to discuss the law relating to regularization as enunciated in Umadevi (Supra) on which much reliance was placed by Mr. Jamir in the context of the said Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011. As the Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011 has been set aside, it is also considered not necessary to discuss the law relating to regularization as enunciated in Umadevi (Supra) on which much reliance was placed by Mr. Jamir in the context of the said Office Memorandum dated 22.12.2011. At the same time, for the reasons recorded, the writ petitioners are also not entitled to any benefit on the basis of the clarificatory Office Memoranda dt. 26.11.2009, 15.2.2010 and 11.10.2011." 56. In view of the aforesaid observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision, as regards the other remaining office memoranda as referred to above, it is doubtful whether this Court can refer to the said memoranda for the purpose of deciding the issue at hand. Accordingly, this Court would avoid referring to the aforesaid office memoranda for the purpose of deciding the issue at hand. 57. In view of above, we are back to the original enactment of Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991, as amended from time to time, to decide the issue relating in this petition. As mentioned above, it is only when it is seen that a person has been employed in a pensionable State Public Service or post connected with the affairs of the State of Nagaland and when such period counts for the purpose of pension; and if he has completed 35 years of such public employment, as defined under Section 2(1) of the Act, that the provisions of Section 3(1) will be attracted and such person cannot remain in service. It is in the aforesaid context we have to examine as to whether the service rendered by the petitioners after being appointed vide order dated 11.02.1983 till they were appointed to a new post in August, 1984 could be counted for computing the 35 years of service. As mentioned above, the Act is silent as to how the 35 years is to be counted though the same was sought to be clarified by various memoranda issued in that regard. However, for the reasons discussed above, this Court is not inclined to refer the said memoranda for the purpose of deciding the issue at hand. 58. In the present case, both the petitioners as well as the respondents do not dispute the position that there has been no break in service. However, for the reasons discussed above, this Court is not inclined to refer the said memoranda for the purpose of deciding the issue at hand. 58. In the present case, both the petitioners as well as the respondents do not dispute the position that there has been no break in service. The only dispute as mentioned above relates to whether the service rendered as Computers Grade-II which is different from the service rendered by the petitioners as Overseers Grade I, would be counted for the purpose of computing 35 years of service. It is therefore, for the aforesaid reason, we have to focus our attention as to whether the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II fulfills the conditions mentioned under definition clause under Section 2(1) to bring it within the meaning of public employment as defined therein. As regards the issue as to whether the post of Computer Grade II is a pensionable State Public Service or post connected with State affairs of Nagaland that there does not seem to be any controversy about it. The aforesaid post of Computer Grade II is admittedly a post connected with the affairs of State of Nagaland as it is a post attached to the Superintending Engineer, PHE Division, Government of Nagaland. It may be also observed that the petitioners have not taken a plea that the aforesaid post of Computer Grade II is not a pensionable post. In that view of the matter, this Court would hold that the post of Computers Grade II is a pensionable post connected with the affairs of the State of Nagaland. 59. A plea has been raised by the petitioners that the aforesaid appointment of the petitioners as Computers Grade II is purely provisional, which was made when they were still undergoing training and as such, they were not really appointed in the true sense of the term but merely as probationers or trainees on payment of stipend. As regards this contention, the petitioners might have been led to understand that their appointment as Computers Grade II was during a period when they were undergoing training period for 6 (six) months as they were required to be undergone 6 months training as part of the Diploma Course. But the fact remains that it was nevertheless an appointment. As regards this contention, the petitioners might have been led to understand that their appointment as Computers Grade II was during a period when they were undergoing training period for 6 (six) months as they were required to be undergone 6 months training as part of the Diploma Course. But the fact remains that it was nevertheless an appointment. The terms of the appointment makes it very clear that it was not by way of stipendiary in nature and also by way of training. This Court cannot go beyond the specific words and expressions used in the order to ascertain the nature of the order. The order dated 11.2.1983 specifically mentions that this is an appointment to the post of Computer grade II with monthly salary with certain pay scale mentioned in the order. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that it was an appointment to a government post and not an apprenticeship to undergo training with stipends as contended by the petitioners. 60. It may be mentioned that the petitioners themselves had annexed a document namely, practical training for Diploma students issued by the Directorate of Higher and Technical Education, Nagaland, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-A to the writ petition, wherein it has been mentioned in Para 3 under the heading Practical Training for Diploma Students, that the students who get jobs just after completion of 3 years study in the institute and those who undergo 1 year training under the G.O.I. Apprenticeship Act, must submit monthly training diary report along with prescribed performance report from the industries/Engineering organization through their supervising officers/training officer at the end of each month. The aforesaid Para 3 clearly indicates that a person undergoing Diploma Course if he completes 3 years of academic study in an institute can seek appointment and if such person gets a job and he undertakes the job, he must submit the monthly training diary report at the end of each month. 61. From the above, what can be understood is that a person after completion of 3 years of academic study can get a job or appointment However, the aforesaid experience gained by him after appointment will be treated as a period of apprenticeship which will qualify for the 6 (six) months of practical training required for completion of the Diploma Course and grant of Diploma Certificate. In other words, though the petitioners were appointed as Computers Grade II, the experience gained by them in the said post would be treated to be practical training. From the perspective of completing the Course, it may be stated that the appointment issued on 11.02.1983 was in the nature of apprenticeship for the purpose of fulfillment of 6 (six) months practical training required as part of the Diploma Course. However, it cannot be termed to be purely apprenticeship and not a public employment as contended by the petitioners. 62. Even if it is treated to be an apprenticeship as contended by the petitioners, it can also be treated to be a public employment within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act for the reason that when they were appointed to the said posts of Computer Grade II, they were given certain pay scale which they enjoyed and they were also given certain responsibilities of work attached to the posts of Computer Grade II and which is clearly evident from the entries made in the Service Book of the petitioners. It is not the case of the petitioners that the petitioners were not eligible for appointment to the posts of Computer Grade II. It has been the plea of the petitioners that after having completed the required 6 (six) months training course they were awarded the said Diploma Course Certificate and thereafter, became eligible for the posts of Overseer Grade I and accordingly, they were given appointment to the said post vide order dated 30.08.1984. No plea has been taken that when the petitioners were appointed as Computers Grade II, they were not eligible for the said posts. 63. It may be also observed that if the petitioners had been appointed to the posts of Overseer Grade I soon after they had completed 3 years of academic course in 1983 itself, such an appointment to the posts of Overseer by ineligible candidates before fulfilling the eligibility criteria could not have been considered as appointment in the proper sense of the term. In such an event, the petitioners could have claimed that since they were appointed as Overseers during a training period without fulfilling the requisite qualifications for the said posts, the experience gained by them will not be covered within the meaning of public employment defined under Section 2(1) of the Act. In such an event, the petitioners could have claimed that since they were appointed as Overseers during a training period without fulfilling the requisite qualifications for the said posts, the experience gained by them will not be covered within the meaning of public employment defined under Section 2(1) of the Act. But the fact remains that they were not appointed to the posts of Overseer Grade I in 1983 as they were yet to be eligible for appointment to the said posts, but they were appointed to the posts of Computer Grade II and there is no plea on the part of the petitioners or any material to show record to show that they were not eligible for appointment to the posts of Computer Grade-II when they were appointed to the said posts. Had the appointment of the petitioners as Computer Grade II vide order dated 11.2.1983 been made without fulfilling the requisite qualifications of the Computers Grade II, perhaps the petitioners could have taken the plea that, not being eligible for appointment to the posts of Computer Grade II, such appointment could not have been considered to be appointment in the true sense of the term and as such, service rendered by them as Computers Grade II could not be counted for computing of 35 years of service. That being not the position here, this Court is to conclude on the basis of the available materials that appointment of the petitioners as Computers Grade II would amount to Government employment and these posts are connected with the affairs of State of Nagaland, thus coming within the purview of Section 2(1) of the Act. 64. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has by referring to the term No. 4, mentioned in the appointment letter dated 11.02.1983 submitted that the appointment is subject to production of education and other technical qualification certificates, which would indicate that the appointments were purely provisional in nature during the training period as also clarified in the order dated 17.04.2012. This Court, however, is of the opinion that such mentioning of condition in the appointment order does not ipso facto mean that the petitioners do not have requisite qualifications for appointment to the posts of Computer Grade II. This Court, however, is of the opinion that such mentioning of condition in the appointment order does not ipso facto mean that the petitioners do not have requisite qualifications for appointment to the posts of Computer Grade II. Such condition can be found to be mentioned in appointment order so that at the time of joining or appointment, one has to satisfy the authorities that he possesses the qualification by producing the necessary certificates. Therefore, mentioning of the aforesaid term at serial No. 4 of the appointment order does not mean that the petitioners were not eligible for appointment to the posts of Computer Grade II as the fact remains that petitioners were allowed to hold the posts of Computer Grade II till they were appointed as Overseers Grade I subsequently on 30th August, 1984, which would indicate that they were eligible for holding the said posts of Computers Grade II. In any event, it was never the plea of the petitioners that they were not eligible for appointment to the posts of Computer Grade-II. 65. Accordingly, this Court after having come to the conclusion that they were appointed to the posts of Computer Grade-II and holding posts connected with the affairs of the State of Nagaland, would examine whether the aforesaid service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II counts for the purpose of pension. This is also an issue regarding which the petitioners have not raised any plea to the effect that the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II does not count for the purpose of pension except by submitting, as referred to above, that these were not appointments but was merely apprenticeship by way of undergoing certain training as part of the Diploma Course. If there is no controversy as to the issue that the post of Computer Grade II is a pensionable post unless contrary is shown, normally, the service rendered by a person in a pensionable post would count for the purpose of pension. As mentioned above, since, there is continuity in service of the petitioners while serving as Computers Grade II and after being appointed as Overseer Grade I, under normal circumstances, the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II that may be in the different posts would count for the purpose of pension. As mentioned above, since, there is continuity in service of the petitioners while serving as Computers Grade II and after being appointed as Overseer Grade I, under normal circumstances, the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II that may be in the different posts would count for the purpose of pension. In that view of the matter, if the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade II falls within the purview of the definition of public employment and since they have continued service, there is no reason why this period should not be counted towards computing 35 years of service as contemplated under Section 3(1) of the Act. 66. In this regard, one may also refer to Rule 13 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, which are also adopted and applicable in the State of Nagaland. It provides that if the temporary appointment of an employee is followed by regular appointment to the post of public employment without any break, such period of temporary service can be counted for the purpose of pension. The aforesaid Rule 13 is reproduced hereinbelow- "13. Commencement of qualifying service:-Subject to the provisions of these rules, qualifying service of a Government servant shall commence from the date he takes charge of the post to which he is first appointed either substantively or in an officiating or temporary capacity: Provided that officiating or temporary service is followed without interruption by substantive appointment in the same or another service or post: Provided further that- (a) in the case of a Government servant in a Group 'D' service or post who held a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent pensionable post prior to the 17th April, 1950, service rendered before attaining the age of sixteen years shall not count for any purpose, and (b) in the case of a Government servant not covered by clause (a), service rendered before attaining the age of eighteen years shall not count, except for compensation gratuity. (c) the provisions of clause (b) shall not be applicable in the cases of counting of military service for civil pension under Rule 19." Accordingly, the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade-II which was followed by appointment as Overseers Grade-I without any break would be counted for the purpose of pension. (c) the provisions of clause (b) shall not be applicable in the cases of counting of military service for civil pension under Rule 19." Accordingly, the service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade-II which was followed by appointment as Overseers Grade-I without any break would be counted for the purpose of pension. If that is so, the aforesaid service rendered by the petitioners as Computers Grade-II will be public employment within the meaning of the Section 2(1) of the aforesaid Act. 67. From the above discussion, the following can be observed or inferred. (A) Section 3(1) of the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991 as amended from time to time read with section 2(1) makes it very clear that- (i) A person having completed 35 years of service or having attained the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier, shall be discontinued from service. (ii) Such person must have been appointed to any pensionable State Public Service or post connected with the affairs of the State of Nagaland etc. (iii) And such service should count for the purpose of pension. (B) The petitioners were initially appointed on temporary basis as Computers Grade-II, vide order dated 11.2.1993, and subsequently, they were appointed as Overseers Grade-I, vide order dated 30.08.1994. (C) Even though, the said posts of Computer Grade-II and Overseer Grade-I are different, there was continuity in service. Though, the initial appointment as Computers was temporary in nature, it was still a government employment and it was a post connected with the affairs of the State of Nagaland. (D) The appointment of the petitioners as Computers Grade-II was public employment within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act. Though temporary in nature, it cannot be said to be merely engagement on training or apprenticeship as contended by the petitioners. (E) They were subsequently appointed as Overseers Grade-I, while serving as Computers Grade-II. There was no break in service between these two appointments. (F) It is provided under Rules 13 of the CCS (Pension) Rules that officiating or temporary appointment followed by substantive appointment in any service without interruption will count towards qualifying service. (G) The petitioners were appointed on temporary basis as Computers Grade-II and were subsequently appointed as Overseers Grade-I on substantive basis without any interruption. Hence, their services in the posts of Computer can be counted for the purpose of pension. (G) The petitioners were appointed on temporary basis as Computers Grade-II and were subsequently appointed as Overseers Grade-I on substantive basis without any interruption. Hence, their services in the posts of Computer can be counted for the purpose of pension. (H) Section 2(1) of the Act makes it very clear that if such an employment counts towards for the purpose of pension, it would come within the meaning of public employment and accordingly will come within the purview of Section 3(1) of the Act. 68. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the service conditions of the petitioners fulfill the requirements of Section 2(1) and Section 3(1) of the Nagaland Retirement from Public Employment Act, 1991. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 07.12.2018 cannot be considered to be violative of the Act and as such there is no merit in the writ petition. 69. Before we part, this Court would like to deal with certain other issues raised by the petitioners. It has been alleged that the aforesaid impugned order dated 07.12.2018 was issued in violation of the principles of natural justice by not giving any prior notice before such order was passed, and further it was passed by giving retrospective effect, which are not permissible in law. As regards the issue of violation of principles of natural justice, it is also equally well settled that principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket formula and their applications depends on facts and circumstances of each case and violation of these will not ipso facto lead to nullification of any such order. [See H.P. Transport Vs. K.C. Rahi, (2008) 11 SCC 502 ) 70. It may be also observed that in order to sustain the plea of violation of principles of natural justice, it must be established that the aggrieved parties have been prejudiced. In the present case, what has been noticed that since the petitioners had already completed 35 years of service as on 28.2.2018, it cannot be said that their discontinuance in service has prejudiced their rights. 71. It is also equally settled that principles of natural justice need not be followed if termination of service is on the basis of implementation of legislative direction. [See L.N.M. Institute of Economic Development and Social Change Vs. 71. It is also equally settled that principles of natural justice need not be followed if termination of service is on the basis of implementation of legislative direction. [See L.N.M. Institute of Economic Development and Social Change Vs. State of Bihar, (1988) 2 SCC 433 ] In the present case, since no public employee coming within the purview of Section 2(1) can continue after completion of 35 years of service or on reaching the age of 60 years as the case may be, it is by virtue of provisions of the aforesaid Act, 2009 that the impugned order has been passed and as such, non-adherence to the principles of natural justice will not render the said impugned order as illegal. 72. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the said order had been issued with retrospective effect, though it is true that the said order comes into effect from a retrospective date, the petitioners are not prejudiced, as they have not been deprived of any legally accrued benefits. The impugned order makes it very clear that the period of overstay shall be regularized and condoned, however, subject to the approval of the Cabinet and no recovery will be made for the service of the petitioners, utilized during the aforesaid period The said period of overstay, however, is not reckoned as qualifying service. In that view of the matter, it can be said that no prejudice has been caused by the aforesaid retrospective effect and hence, no grievance can be raised. However, while disposing the petition, this Court would direct the respondent authorities that the period of overstay in service from 01.03.2018 till 07.12.2018 shall be regularized and condoned as it was not the fault of the petitioners for the aforesaid overstay in service, and other conditions as mentioned in the impugned order dated 07.12.2018 be also implemented. 73. As regards the allegation of the petitioners that the official respondents acted with mala fide while issuing the aforesaid release order and that it was done to facilitate junior officers to officiate in higher posts, the same cannot be accepted for the reason that no such materials are forthcoming in the records. 73. As regards the allegation of the petitioners that the official respondents acted with mala fide while issuing the aforesaid release order and that it was done to facilitate junior officers to officiate in higher posts, the same cannot be accepted for the reason that no such materials are forthcoming in the records. Further, merely because some junior officers get benefit out of the release of the petitioners from service, no motive can be imputed, if the said action of the State was as a result of the application of any statutory provision. 74. For the reasons discussed above, this Court is of the view that no case has been made out to interfere with the impugned order dated 07.12.2018 and accordingly, the petition is dismissed, however, without any cost.