JUDGMENT : DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. The Public Service Commission, West Bengal (hereafter the PSC, for short) published an advertisement bearing no.4/2010 dated May 5, 2010 (hereafter the said advertisement, for short). Applications were invited thereby for appointment on, inter alia, 193 (one hundred ninety-three) vacant posts of Homeopathic Medical Officer in the West Bengal Homoeopathic Health Service (hereafter the WBHHS, for short). Of such vacancies, 43 (forty-three), 12 (twelve), 14 (fourteen) and 6 (six) vacancies were reserved for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Backward Classes and Persons with Disabilities, respectively. A job aspirant, not more than 40 (forty) years as on January 1, 2010, was required to possess a diploma in Homeopathy or the qualification of a recognized University or Institute as included in the Second Schedule of the Homeopathy Central Council Act, 1973 and have knowledge of Bengali, spoken and written. These were indicated in the said advertisement as the essential qualifications. The desirable qualifications were also indicated in the said advertisement. A note at the foot of the qualifications also required the job aspirants to be registered with the Central Council of Homeopathy or the Council of Homeopathic System of Medicine, West Bengal. 2. Under the heading 'INFORMATION', paragraph 4 read as follows: "4. The prescribed 'essential qualifications are the minimum and mere possession of the same does not entitle applicants to be called in for the interview. Where the number of applications received in response to the advertisement is large and it is not inconvenient or possible for the Commission to interview all the applicants the Commission may restrict the number of candidates for interview to a reasonable limit on the basis of either qualifications or experience higher than the minimum prescribed in the advertisement or on the basis of a Screening Test/Written Test." (underlining in original) 3. A preliminary written examination was conducted by the PSC on January 22, 2011. This was followed by interview of 459 (four hundred fifty-nine) successful candidates of the written examination, held during June/July, 2011. A merit list was published on August 11, 2011 containing names of 179 (one hundred seventy-nine) candidates (General 118, BC 14, SC 43, ST 3, and PH 1) who were recommended for appointment, whereafter the list of candidates appointed on the recommendation of the PSC was published on November 28, 2011. A merit list was published on August 11, 2011 containing names of 179 (one hundred seventy-nine) candidates (General 118, BC 14, SC 43, ST 3, and PH 1) who were recommended for appointment, whereafter the list of candidates appointed on the recommendation of the PSC was published on November 28, 2011. It is not in dispute that the appointees having joined, they are serving as Homeopathic Medical Officers since December, 2011. 4. The process of recruitment conducted by the PSC was first challenged before the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal (hereafter the tribunal, for short) by three unsuccessful candidates in an original application presented on September 6, 2011. It was registered as OA 1015 of 2011 (Dr. Sabyasachi Biswas & ors. v. Public Service Commission & ors.) (hereafter OA-I, for short). Sometime thereafter, April 10, 2012 to be precise, another set of 13 (thirteen) unsuccessful candidates challenged the recruitment process giving rise to OA 440 of 2012 (Dr. Purnendu Ash & ors. v. Public Service Commission & ors.) (hereafter OA-II, for short). A third set of 3 (three) unsuccessful candidates moved the tribunal by presenting OA 1221 of 2013 (Mahesh Chandra Barman v. State of West Bengal & ors.) (hereafter OA-III, for short) challenging the self-same recruitment process conducted by the PSC. 5. In none of the 3 (three) original applications, as aforesaid, any of the successful candidates was impleaded as private respondents. While admitting OA-I, the tribunal by its order dated November 11, 2011 fixed February 16, 2012 "for filing of reply, rejoinder and further order". On consideration of the prayer for interim relief, the tribunal observed that any action taken after filing of OA-I shall abide by its result and the State was directed "to note that if appointment is given in the meantime, all the appointees must be informed about this observation of this Tribunal". By memo dated December 2, 2011, the Additional Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Health and Family Welfare Department informed the appointees of the order dated November 11, 2011. Some of the appointees, after being informed of such observation of the tribunal, sought to intervene in OA-I and OA-II and filed applications for addition of parties and the same were allowed. 6. Oa-I and OA-II were heard analogously by the tribunal. Some of the appointees, after being informed of such observation of the tribunal, sought to intervene in OA-I and OA-II and filed applications for addition of parties and the same were allowed. 6. Oa-I and OA-II were heard analogously by the tribunal. By a common judgment and order dated November 30, 2012, the tribunal dismissed the same holding that there was no reason to interfere with the selection process. 7. OA-III, presented before the tribunal after dismissal of OA-I and OA-II, however, succeeded. The tribunal, for the reasons assigned in its judgment and order dated May 8, 2015, set aside the selection process conducted by the PSC pursuant to the said advertisement. 8. Pertinently, the State and the PSC were the common respondents in all 3 (three) original applications. Neither the State nor the PSC informed the tribunal that the self-same selection process had earlier been upheld on November 30, 2012 when OA-I and OA-II were dismissed by it. 9. While the judgment and order dated November 30, 2012 dismissing OA-II and OA-I are questioned in WPST 31 of 2013 (hereafter WP-I, for short) and WPST 57 of 2013 (hereafter WP-II, for short), respectively, WPST 192 of 2015 (hereafter WP-III, for short) is at the instance of 2 (two) of the 179 (one hundred seventynine) appointees directed against the judgment and order May 8, 2015 allowing OA-III. They apprehended that they would lose their job consequent upon implementation of the judgment and order dated May 8, 2015 allowing OA-III, and hence WP-III came to be presented. 10. WP-I was admitted for hearing by a coordinate Bench on March 22, 2013. It was "made clear that if any candidates have been recruited, their recruitment will be subject to the result of this petition". 11. WP-II was admitted on December 16, 2013, but without any interim order. 12. WP-III was admitted on July 23, 2015. The order of the tribunal setting aside the selection was stayed for a limited period. Such order had been continued from time to time but was not extended beyond the Puja vacation of 2015. 13. Since a common thread runs through all the writ petitions, we had the occasion to hear the same together along with separate applications for intervention/impleadment that were filed therein. We propose to dispose of all the writ petitions and the applications by this common judgment and order. 14. 13. Since a common thread runs through all the writ petitions, we had the occasion to hear the same together along with separate applications for intervention/impleadment that were filed therein. We propose to dispose of all the writ petitions and the applications by this common judgment and order. 14. The selection and consequent appointment on the posts of Homeopathic Medical Officers is not governed by rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. We are informed that in exercise of power conferred by sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 14 read with section 23 of the West Bengal State Homeopathic Health Service Act, 2002, the Governor has framed rules enumerating only the method and qualifications for recruitment to various posts in the cadre of WBHHS under the Health and Family Welfare Department which, inter alia, includes the post of Homeopathic Medical Officer. These rules ordain that recruitment on the post of Homeopathic Medical Officer shall be by selection (direct recruitment) through the PSC and the aspirants would be required to possess the essential qualifications as well as desirable qualifications indicated therein. However, the rules do not lay down the method/procedure of selection for recruitment to the post of Homeopathic Medical Officer in the WBHHS. The State, we are inclined to believe, in its wisdom left the method/procedure for selection of suitable candidates to the discretion of the PSC. We do not for a moment suggest that such a course of action should be frowned upon. The PSC being a constitutional authority and an expert in the matter of recruitment, the trust and faith that the State reposed on it was quite normal. However, the manner in which the PSC went about conducting the selection process has raised eye-brows amongst the unsuccessful candidates. Conflicting decisions of the tribunal in respect of the self-same process of selection have surfaced. This has placed an onerous duty on us to ascertain which of the conflicting views is correct. 15. Coming back to the factual narrative, we find from the reply affidavit filed by the PSC before the tribunal that the job aspirants from different categories were required to obtain a minimum percentage of marks in the written examination for being considered further. 15. Coming back to the factual narrative, we find from the reply affidavit filed by the PSC before the tribunal that the job aspirants from different categories were required to obtain a minimum percentage of marks in the written examination for being considered further. The written examination had full marks of 200 and the General, BC, SC, and ST candidates were required to obtain a minimum of 45%, 42%, 32.5% and 25% marks respectively to be entitled to get a call for attending the interview. Since 459 (four hundred fifty-nine) candidates had cleared the written examination with the minimum percentage of marks, they were again required by the PSC to obtain marks in the interview (full marks - 100) above the cut-off marks (qualifying marks) fixed for each category of job aspirants, i.e., General 30%, BC 28%, SC 25% and ST 20%, in order to be considered for final selection. Upon consolidation of the marks obtained in the written examination and the interview, the PSC appears to have prepared the final merit list of suitable candidates numbering 179 (one hundred seventy-nine). The aforesaid approach of the PSC in consolidation of marks obtained by the candidates in the written examination and the interview, together with fixing of cut-off marks (qualifying marks) both for the written examination and the interview, was sought to be justified by it with reference to a full commission meeting resolution dated February 14, 1988. Such resolution reads as follows: "Item No.2: Preliminary written tests in selection cases- whether marks should be added in all cases for preparation of merit list. The Commission decided that in all cases of selection having a preliminary written test, qualifying marks would be fixed for interview also, and that marks obtained by candidates both at the written test and the interview would be taken into account to prepare the merit lists. The qualifying marks at the written test would depend on the number of available vacancies. The qualifying marks at the interview for General, Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe candidates would be 30 per cent, 25 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. The qualifying marks in the aggregate would be 40 per cent, 35 per cent and 30 per cent for General, Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe candidates. The qualifying marks at the interview for General, Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe candidates would be 30 per cent, 25 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. The qualifying marks in the aggregate would be 40 per cent, 35 per cent and 30 per cent for General, Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe candidates. The Commission also decided that subject to any change to the contrary in the individual cases, for Medical and Engineering Posts, the apportionment of the maximum marks would be 2/3rd for the written test and 1/3rd for the interview. For all other posts, 50 per cent of the maximum marks would be allotted to the written part and 50 per cent for the interview." We propose to consider the terms of the aforesaid resolution later while answering the questions emerging for decision. 16. According to Mr. Anindya Lahiri and Mr. Ayan Banerjee, learned advocates for the petitioners in WP-I and WP-II, respectively, the entire selection process is vitiated for more reasons than one. First, earmarking 100 marks for the interview when one could obtain not more than 200 marks in the written examination, is arbitrary and unreasonable. It works out to 33.33% of the total marks, which in itself is on the higher side; and such earmarking has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions, viz. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) AIR SC 487, and Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1987) AIR SC 454 and others. Secondly, fixing cut-off marks for the interview in the midst of the selection process without information to any of the candidates is equally arbitrary and unreasonable. They contended, by referring to decisions of the Supreme Court in K. Manjusree v. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512 , and Hemani Malhotra : High Court of Delhi : AIR 2008 SC 2103 , that the rules of the game could not have been changed after the game had commenced. It was demonstrated that some of the unsuccessful candidates who had scored very high marks in the written examination were awarded very low marks in the interview, i.e., below the cut-off marks (qualifying marks), so as to exclude them from the zone of consideration by labelling them as ineligible to attend the interview. It was demonstrated that some of the unsuccessful candidates who had scored very high marks in the written examination were awarded very low marks in the interview, i.e., below the cut-off marks (qualifying marks), so as to exclude them from the zone of consideration by labelling them as ineligible to attend the interview. If the marks obtained by them both in the written examination and the interview were consolidated, it would be noticed that they had secured marks more than some of the candidates who were ultimately appointed on the recommendation of the PSC. The cases of Dr. Purnendu Ash, a BC candidate, and Dr. Animesh Mondal, a SC candidate, were pointed out. Dr. Ash obtained 130.67 marks in the written examination and 25 marks in the interview, totaling to 155.67 marks. Since the cut-off marks (qualifying marks) in the interview for BC candidates had been fixed at 28%, Dr. Ash was not selected although the last appointed BC candidate, Dr. Soumyadeep Aich, obtained a total of 139.67 marks. Similarly, Dr. Mondal obtained a total of 115 marks [100 (written test) + 15 (interview)]. Since cut-off marks in the interview had not been obtained by him, he did not figure in the merit list of SC candidates although the last appointed SC candidate obtained in all 90 marks (marks in the written test and interview, taken together). Thirdly, it was contended by Mr. Lahiri while referring to the decision in N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) AIR SC 1233 that once a candidate makes an application pursuant to an advertisement for appointment on a public post, he acquires a right of consideration of his candidature in terms of the rules and Government orders as are existing on the date of issuance of such advertisement provided he is eligible and otherwise qualified in terms thereof. The thrust of the contention is that in the absence of statutory recruitment rules providing for the method/procedure for selection, the job aspirants did have a right to claim consideration of their candidature in terms of what were laid down in the said advertisement and those that were not. Fourthly, it was contended by Mr. The thrust of the contention is that in the absence of statutory recruitment rules providing for the method/procedure for selection, the job aspirants did have a right to claim consideration of their candidature in terms of what were laid down in the said advertisement and those that were not. Fourthly, it was contended by Mr. Banerjee by referring to a supplementary affidavit dated September 18, 2012 filed in OA-II that the contents of paragraph 6 (to the effect that "the respondent concerned has introduced the bench mark in the interview without any prior intimation after the interview, which is impermissible under the law and vitiates the entire process") had not been specifically denied by the PSC in its reply affidavit, yet, the tribunal in its judgment dated November 30, 2012 while dismissing OA-II recorded that no allegation had been brought in the case before it that prescribing minimum qualifying marks after the interview is over, was not permissible. Finally, after having access to the scores obtained by the selected candidates pursuant to an order passed by us before closure of arguments, it was contended (without prejudice to the earlier contentions) that the said advertisement should have been strictly followed and any departure therefrom was not legally permissible. Whatever marks the candidates had obtained in the interview should have been considered and not the marks in the written examination, which was conducted for all intents and purposes for elimination of less meritorious job aspirants. Had this been the approach, quite a handful of the petitioners in WP-I and WP-II would have figured in the merit list of suitable candidates. They, accordingly, prayed for an order to set aside the judgment and order dismissing OA-I and OAII and for direction on the PSC to recast the merit list solely on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates in the interview and for further direction on the State to offer appointments to the candidates strictly on the basis of merit. 17. Mr. Samit Sanyal, learned advocate for the original applicants in OA-III and the private respondents in WP-III, adopted the contentions of Mr. Ayan Banerjee and Mr. Anindya Lahiri. 18. Mr. Kishore Datta, learned Advocate General represented the State in WP-I and WP-III. According to him, the process of selection did not suffer from any infirmity and, therefore, no interference is warranted. Samit Sanyal, learned advocate for the original applicants in OA-III and the private respondents in WP-III, adopted the contentions of Mr. Ayan Banerjee and Mr. Anindya Lahiri. 18. Mr. Kishore Datta, learned Advocate General represented the State in WP-I and WP-III. According to him, the process of selection did not suffer from any infirmity and, therefore, no interference is warranted. The resolution dated February 14, 1988 could be followed insofar as the process of recruitment under consideration is concerned and was duly followed; and by reason of the PSC fixing cut-off marks (qualifying marks) and short-listing candidates in terms thereof, none of the candidates suffered any prejudice. Each candidate participating in a process of recruitment has a right of fair consideration of his candidature and in the instant case the unsuccessful candidates cannot complain of any unfair consideration. In an appropriate case where there is no indication in the recruitment rules how selection would be made, it is open to the PSC to fix criteria based on rational, objective and germane reasons. That has exactly been done by the PSC and there being no hint of mala fide in any of the writ petitions, the writ court ought to stay at a distance and not disturb the selection made years ago. Referring to the reasons assigned by the tribunal in its judgment dated November 30, 2012, it was his submission that the tribunal was well and truly justified in not interfering with the selection process and that we ought to uphold the same. 19. Insofar as the judgment impugned in WP-III is concerned, Mr. Datta submitted that the tribunal erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction in interfering with the selection process particularly when the recruitment process stood concluded as far back as in November, 2011. That apart, the tribunal acted illegally in setting aside the selection process without applying its mind to the factual position that none of the appointees had been impleaded in OA-III as respondents. He, thus, prayed for quashing of the judgment dated May 8, 2015 and for restoration of status-quo ante. 20. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the State in WP-II adopted the submissions of Mr. Datta. 21. Mr. He, thus, prayed for quashing of the judgment dated May 8, 2015 and for restoration of status-quo ante. 20. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the State in WP-II adopted the submissions of Mr. Datta. 21. Mr. Pradip Kumar Roy, learned advocate representing the PSC in all the writ petitions raised the following points: (i) The said advertisement not being under challenge, no relief can be granted to the unsuccessful candidates; (ii) The tribunal was first approached by the petitioners in WP-I in September, 2011 after the list of candidates found suitable was published and, therefore, it is a clear case of the unsuccessful candidates taking a chance of selection and approaching the tribunal only when the results of selection were not palatable to them; (iii) All the original applications were defective for non-joinder of necessary parties since none of the candidates found suitable were impleaded as respondents; (iv) The selection process was not vitiated in any manner whatsoever inasmuch as the PSC had faithfully adhered to the procedure that the resolution dated February 14, 1988 of the full commission meeting envisaged; (v) The admit cards issued in favour of the candidates would show that they were required to appear in a preliminary written test and, therefore, it was not a screening test simplicitor for elimination but a test, which was part of a combined exercise consisting of written test and interview to assess the candidate's overall merit; (vi) Earmarking 200 and 100 marks for the written examination and the interview, respectively, did not foul any provision of law or authoritative decision of the Supreme Court; (vii) The PSC acted well within its powers to consolidate the marks obtained by the candidates in the written examination and the interview, and also in fixing cut-off marks (qualifying marks); and (viii) OA-III suffered from gross suppression of material facts in the sense that dismissal of OA-I and OA-II by the tribunal on November 30, 2012 was not disclosed by the applicants with ulterior motives. He, accordingly, prayed that there ought not to be any interference with the selection process conducted by the PSC. 22. We were also addressed by Mr. Arup Kumar Lahiri, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Neogi and Mr. Anant Kumar Shaw, learned advocates representing some of the appointees. 23. While adopting the contentions raised by Mr. Datta and Mr. Roy, Mr. Lahiri and Mr. 22. We were also addressed by Mr. Arup Kumar Lahiri, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Neogi and Mr. Anant Kumar Shaw, learned advocates representing some of the appointees. 23. While adopting the contentions raised by Mr. Datta and Mr. Roy, Mr. Lahiri and Mr. Shaw urged that the PSC having followed a fair and transparent process of selection and not having denied right of consideration to the unsuccessful candidates, the original applications before the tribunal could not have been maintained and, in fact, were misconceived. It was their further contention that all the appointees not having been impleaded as respondents in the original applications and more than one applicant having joined in one application having identical but independent causes of action, OA-I and OA-II were detective from day one. They also urged that the appointees have been continuing in service for more than 7 (seven) years without blemish, and in the absence of any complaint with regard to due discharge of duties by them their appointments ought not to be disturbed. Finally, they contended that there was no scope for the tribunal to interfere and dismissal of OA-I and OA-II having been rightly ordered by a detailed judgment and order upon due application of mind, no case of interference had been set up in WP-I and WP-II and that the same ought to be dismissed. 24. Insofar as the judgment and order allowing OA-III is concerned, Mr. Neogi appearing in support of WP-III contended that the tribunal committed gross error in not putting any of the appointees on notice and acted illegally. He further contended that OA-III was time barred inasmuch as the same came to be presented before the tribunal more than a year after appointments were offered to the petitioners in WP-III. He too adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Datta and Mr. Roy and submitted that WP-III should be allowed and the judgment and order under challenge there set aside. 25. Mr. Datta, Mr. Roy, Mr. Lahiri, Mr. Neogi and Mr. Shaw, in support of their respective contentions, cited several authorities. Since some of the authorities are common, we shall note the principles of law laid down therein immediately after noting the questions arising for decision on these writ petitions. 26. 25. Mr. Datta, Mr. Roy, Mr. Lahiri, Mr. Neogi and Mr. Shaw, in support of their respective contentions, cited several authorities. Since some of the authorities are common, we shall note the principles of law laid down therein immediately after noting the questions arising for decision on these writ petitions. 26. In reply, much argument has been advanced before us on the contents of the full commission meeting resolution dated February 14, 1988 as well as omission of the PSC not to put it in the public domain. According to the learned advocates for the unsuccessful candidates, the law on accessibility of information relating to working of public authorities has made long strides and in keeping with the same the PSC must have been aware of its obligations under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereafter the RTI Act). By not making the job aspirants aware of how the selection would be conducted, the PSC sought to keep vital information under wraps and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Constitutional authority. That apart, it was submitted that since the petitioners in WP-I and WP-II have been relying on the terms of the said advertisement to secure relief, question of challenging the same does not and cannot arise. The other contentions were also met by advancing submissions which we shall consider at a later part of the judgment. 27. On the rival contentions, the following questions arise for determination: 1. Were the original applications filed before the tribunal defective for nonjoinder of necessary parties as well as defective because several applicants had joined in a single application having independent causes of action, and in particular whether OA-III was time-barred? 2. Having taken part in the selection process and failing in their pursuit of being selected for appointment, did the unsuccessful candidates have any right to approach the tribunal voicing their grievances in regard to the selection process conducted by the PSC? 3. Was the PSC justified in earmarking 100 marks for the interview, which works out to 33.33% of the total marks on which the candidates' merits were to be assessed? 4. Was the PSC justified in fixing cut off-marks (qualifying marks) for the interview without notifying the candidates called upon to attend the interview? 5. Was the PSC justified in consolidating the marks obtained by the job aspirants in the written examination and interview for preparing the merit list? 4. Was the PSC justified in fixing cut off-marks (qualifying marks) for the interview without notifying the candidates called upon to attend the interview? 5. Was the PSC justified in consolidating the marks obtained by the job aspirants in the written examination and interview for preparing the merit list? If not, what should have been the procedure adopted by it for drawing up the merit list? 6. Was the PSC under any obligation to inform the job aspirants the contents of the full commission meeting resolution dated February 14, 1988? 7. Should the applications for addition of parties be allowed? 8. To what relief, if at all, the unsuccessful candidates are entitled? 28. Before deciding the questions, formulated above, which have emerged for answers on consideration of these writ petitions, we deem it proper to ascertain the principles of law laid down in the various decisions cited by the respondents in WP-I and WP-II and the petitioners in WP-III, bearing in mind the relevant paragraphs on which reliance has been placed: On 'non-joinder of necessary parties' :- (a) Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) Supp AIR SC 30 ~ Appointments on 182 (one hundred eighty-two) posts of Medical Laboratory Technician formed the subject matter of challenge before the relevant High Court. Some of the 182 (one hundred eighty-two) appointees were respondents in the writ petition before the High Court. The High Court nullified the appointments of all the 182 (one hundred eighty-two) candidates by quashing the same on the ground that the procedure adopted for selection was vitiated. The Supreme Court laid down the law that since all the appointees were not impleaded as respondents, the writ petition was defective and hence, no relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners. (b) Kulwant Singh v. Dayaram, (2015) 3 SCC 177 ~ Promotion to the posts of head constables in Chandigarh Police was the subject matter of consideration. The Court held that after appearing in a competitive examination and upon being selected, the appointees become an identified category and that if the rights of such appointees forming part of such identified category are to be affected by any determination, the situation commanded that they should have been impleaded in the proceedings as necessary parties and their nonimpleadment now permits them to take the plea that the said impugned order does not bind them. (c) Shrawan Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar, (1991) AIR SC 309 ~ The Supreme Court held that holders of appointment orders are entitled to opportunity of hearing before cancellation of their appointments; cancellation orders without complying with the rules of natural justice are liable to be set aside. On 'estoppel' :- (d) Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1995) 3 SCC 486 ~ Under challenge before the Supreme Court was the process of selection of Munsifs in the State of Jammu and Kashmir undertaken by the Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission pursuant to an advertisement. Written test was followed by viva voce. The Commission prepared a select list of twenty successful candidates in the order of merit on the basis of the aggregate of marks obtained by them in written as well as viva voce test. The main contention of the petitioners was that viva voce test was so manipulated that only preferred candidates, by inflating their marks in the viva voce test, were permitted to get in the select list. Prior to dealing with the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, recorded in paragraph 8 of its decision, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 9 as follows: "9. Before dealing with this contention, we must keep in view the salient fact that the petitioners as well as the contesting successful candidates being respondents concerned herein, were all found eligible in the light of marks obtained in the written test, to be eligible to be called for oral interview. Up to this stage there is no dispute between the parties. The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, (1986) AIR SC 1043, it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such a petitioner." (e) Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission, Uttarakhand, (2011) 1 SCC 150 ~ Selection of Judicial Officers for Uttaranchal Judicial Service was under consideration before the Court. The specific question that engaged the attention of the Court was whether basic knowledge of computer operation is a mandatory requirement or not. The Court held that all the candidates knew the requirement of the selection process and were also fully aware that they must possess the basic knowledge of computer operation, meaning thereby Microsoft Operating System and Microsoft Office operation. Knowing the said criteria, the appellant also appeared in the interview, faced questions from the expert and had taken a chance of selection without any protest at any stage; he, therefore, cannot now turn back to state that the aforesaid procedure adopted was wrong and without jurisdiction. (f) Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 576 ~ The process there pertained to selection of Civil Judges (Junior Division) for recruitment to the Bihar Civil Services (Judicial Branch). The process comprised of a written examination and a viva voce, for which 850 and 200 marks respectively had been earmarked. The petitioner before the Supreme Court knowing fully well that more than 19% marks had been earmarked for the viva voce, took the written examination. He approached the High Court only when his name did not figure in the merit list prepared by the Bihar Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court held that earmarking 200 marks for viva voce as against 850 marks for written examination did not violate the doctrine of equality embodied in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. He approached the High Court only when his name did not figure in the merit list prepared by the Bihar Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court held that earmarking 200 marks for viva voce as against 850 marks for written examination did not violate the doctrine of equality embodied in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In addition, the Court held that having taken part in the selection process knowing fully well that more than 19% marks had been earmarked for viva voce, the petitioner was not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. The conduct of the petitioner in approaching the High Court after finding that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission clearly disentitled him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error in refusing relief while dismissing the writ petition. Knowledge of the petitioner that as high as 19% marks being earmarked for the viva voce, led the Court to hold that he is not entitled to any relief having taken a chance of selection. (g) D. Saroja Kumari v. R. Helen Trhilakom, (2017) AIR SC 4582 ~ The appellant and the respondent no.1, on direct recruitment basis, were aspirants for the post of music teacher. Respondent no.1 participated in the process, but was not successful. She than raised a claim that she ought to have been promoted to the post of music teacher. The Supreme Court ruled that when applications were invited for direct recruitment, the respondent no.1 did not raise any objection and never contended that she was entitled to be considered for promotion and having taken part in the selection process and not being declared successful, she could not be permitted to turn around and claim that the post of music teacher should have been filled up by direct recruitment. (h) K. H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala, (2006) AIR SC 2339 ~ Unsuccessful candidates for appointment on the post of Munsif Magistrate in the Kerala Judicial Service had challenged the selection process on the ground that in the absence of specific legislative mandate under rule 7(i) of the Kerala Judicial Service Rules, 1991, prescribing cut-off marks in oral examination was violative of the statute. The Supreme Court held that the candidates who participated in the interview with the knowledge that they had to secure prescribed minimum pass marks on being declared unsuccessful in the interview could not turn around and challenge that the said provision of minimum marks was improper. It was also held that the High Court on its administrative side was the best Judge to decide what should be the proper mode of selection. Rule 7 had left it to the High Court to follow such procedure as it deems fit. The High Court was required to exercise its power in the light of the Constitutional scheme so that the best available talent, suitable for manning the judiciary, may get selected. Since the evolution of the procedure had been left to the High Court itself, being a high powered Constitutional authority, and the procedure evolved by it was germane and best suited to achieve the object, the Supreme Court held that it was not proper to scuttle the same as beyond its power. (i) Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 4 SCC 171 ~ The order under appeal before the Supreme Court set aside the entire selection and appointments of assistant teachers (physical education) in Garhwal Mandal. The Court held that two unsuccessful candidates having participated in the process of selection without any demur, they are estopped from challenging the selection criterion. On 'delay' :- (j) S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 ~ Selection made by the relevant Public Service Commission for the post of lower primary/upper primary school assistants was under consideration of the Supreme Court. It was held therein that the writ petitions, filed after other writ petitions were allowed and the State of Kerala having preferred an appeal thereagainst, were not entertainable after long delay. While considering a different aspect, the Court noticed its earlier decisions and held that a person does not acquire a legal right to appointment only because his name appears in the select list as, the State, as an employer, has a right to fill up all the posts or not to fill them up. Unless discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or arbitrariness is committed, the candidate concerned will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. Unless discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or arbitrariness is committed, the candidate concerned will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. On 'several persons joining in one application' :- (k) Dhanyalakshi Rice Mill v. Commissioner of Civil Supplies,1977 AIR SC 2243 ~ It was held by the Court that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is not appropriate in the present cases, inter alia, for the reasons that several petitioners have joined although each petitioner had individual and independent cause of action. On 'the methodology for selection' :- (l) Sunil Kumar v. Bihar Public Service Commission, (2016) 2 SCC 495 ~ The methodology adopted by the relevant Public Service Commission for conducting selection and the scope of judicial review of such methodology fell for consideration. The Supreme Court observed that the Commission having applied the principles adopted by it in its resolution dated January 15, 2013 uniformly and there being absence of any plea of mala fide would not make it an appropriate case for exercise of the power of judicial review. (m) Ramesh Kumar v. High of Delhi, (2010) 3 SCC 104 ~ The Supreme Court was considering two writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking directions to the respondents to offer appointments to the petitioners on the posts in the cadre of District Judge. The Court traced the settled law and summarized it by observing that in case the statutory rules prescribe a particular mode of selection, it has to be strictly adhered to; if, in case, no procedure is prescribed by the rules and there is no other impediment in law, the competent authority while laying down the norms for selection may prescribe for the tests and further specify the minimum bench marks for written test as well as for viva voce. It was further reiterated that where statutory rules do not deal with a particular subject/issue, so far as the appointment of Judicial Officers is concerned, directions issued by the Supreme Court have binding effect. However, in paragraph 18, the Court also held that in the absence of any statutory requirement of securing minimum marks in the interview the administration ought to have followed the same principle as in previous years and that in the given fact situation, the question of acquiescence would not arise. However, in paragraph 18, the Court also held that in the absence of any statutory requirement of securing minimum marks in the interview the administration ought to have followed the same principle as in previous years and that in the given fact situation, the question of acquiescence would not arise. (n) B. Ramakichenin v. Union of India,2008 1 SCC 162 ~ The Supreme Court was seized of a civil appeal arising out of the decision of the relevant High Court in relation to recruitment on the post of Deputy Director (Agriculture) in the Agriculture Department, Government of Pondicherry. The dispute arose because the appellant was excluded on the ground that he did not have two years' experience after M.Sc. degree though he had two years' experience before M.Sc. degree. The advertisement in question was silent on this aspect because it simply provided "Two years' experience...". It was held by the Court that even if there is no rule providing for short listing nor any mention of it in the advertisement inviting applications for the posts, the selectors can resort to a short-listing procedure if there are a large number of eligible candidates who apply and if it is not possible for the selectors to interview all of them. However, a valid short-listing procedure must comply with two requirements, - (1) it has to be on some rational and objective basis; and (2) if a prescribed method of short-listing has been mentioned in the rule or advertisement, then that method alone has to be followed. (o) Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar, (1993) 2 SCC 310 ~ Process of recruitment for filling up 60 vacancies in the cadre of Deputy Executive Engineers conducted by the relevant Public Service Commission was under consideration before the Supreme Court. In the case at hand, the zone of consideration was narrowed by eliminating candidates who did not succeed in the qualifying test, and out of those who succeeded in the qualifying test and secured the minimum marks after interview were considered, and thereafter in the process of selection the preference rule was applied by first choosing the post graduates and thereafter the graduates. It was held that qualification on the basis of higher education qualification with a view to achieving improvement in administrative performance is not abhorrent to Articles 14/16 of the Constitution and the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court on a true interpretation of the relevant rule in the context of the historical background was a plausible view and should commend acceptance as it would advance the cause. (p) Jasvinder Singh v. State of J & K, (2003) 2 SCC 132 ~ The subject matter in issue arose out of a challenge to the selection made for appointment of SubInspectors of Police in the State. Although the writ petition succeeded before the Single Judge, the Division Bench reversed the decision and dismissed the writ petition. While dismissing the civil appeal, the Court observed that the Single Judge had been carried away by few instances noticed by him as to the award of higher percentage of marks in viva voce to those who got lower marks in the written examination as compared to some who scored higher marks in the written examination but could not get as much higher marks in viva voce. The Court further held that picking up a negligible few instances cannot provide the basis for either striking down the method of selection or the selections ultimately made. There is no guarantee that a person who fared well in the written test will or should be presumed to have fared well in the viva voce test also and the expert opinion about as well as experience in viva voce does not lend credence to any such general assumptions, in all circumstances and for all eventualities. That apart, the variation of written test marks of those who were found to have been awarded higher marks in viva voce vis- -vis those who secured higher marks in the written test but not so in the viva voce cannot be said to be so much (varying from five marks and at any rate below even 10) as to warrant any proof of inherent vice in the very system of selection or the actual selection in the case. There was no specific allegation of any mala fides or bias against the Board constituted for selection or anyone in the Board nor could any such plea be said to have been substantiated in that case. There was no specific allegation of any mala fides or bias against the Board constituted for selection or anyone in the Board nor could any such plea be said to have been substantiated in that case. The observation by the learned Single Judge that there was a conscious effort made for bringing some candidates within the selection zone, was also held not to be justified from the mere fact of certain instances noticed by him on any general principle or even on the merits of those factual instances alone. (q) Anzar Ahmad v. State of Bihar, (1994) 1 SCC 150 ~ The relevant Public Service Commission was conducting selection for appointment on the post of Unani Medical Officer. The question raised for decision in the appeal was whether the law laid down by the Court regarding fixation of marks for interview in a selection would apply to a case where there is no written test and the selection is made on the basis of academic performance and interview. In the case at hand, the Court found that the State Government in its letter dated September 20, 1990 clearly stated that selection should be made on the basis of interview and held that on the basis of such letter the Commission could have made the selection wholly on the basis of marks obtained at the interview. But in accordance with the past practice, the Commission made the selection on the basis of interview while keeping in view the academic performance and with that end in view the Commission allocated 50% marks for academic performance and 50% marks for interview. The Court held that the said procedure adopted by the Commission cannot be said to suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and also that by giving equal weight to academic performance, the Commission has rather reduced the possibility of arbitrariness. (r) Bishnu Biswas v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 774 ~ The administration had initiated process for appointment on eight posts of Group-D staff. In terms of the recruitment rules, provided for a written examination of 50 marks. Those who obtained in excess of 20 marks were called for an interview, though interview was not part of the recruitment process. The interview was conducted and a final merit list published. In pursuance thereof, appointment letters were issued to the appellants. In terms of the recruitment rules, provided for a written examination of 50 marks. Those who obtained in excess of 20 marks were called for an interview, though interview was not part of the recruitment process. The interview was conducted and a final merit list published. In pursuance thereof, appointment letters were issued to the appellants. The appointments were challenged by unsuccessful candidates on the ground that equal marks were earmarked for both the written examination and the interview. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta (Circuit Bench at Port Blair) held the process to be vitiated and ordered initiation of fresh recruitment process. The appointees/successful candidates challenged the order before the High Court. The reasoning of the tribunal was upheld but the order modified by directing continuance of the process from the point it stood vitiated. In compliance with the order of the High Court, termination orders were issued resulting in the civil appeal before the Supreme Court. The Court held that appropriate allocation of marks for interview, where selection is to be made by written test as well as by interview, would depend upon the nature of posts and no straitjacket formula can be laid down. Further, there is a distinction while considering the case of employment and an admission for an academic course. While for the purpose of admission in an educational institution the allocation of interview marks would not be very high but for the purpose of employment, allocation of marks for interview would depend upon the nature of posts. Considering the facts before the Court, it was held that the rules of the game had been changed after conducting the written test and admittedly not at the stage of initiation of the selection process. The Court also found that the manner in which marks had been awarded to the candidates in the interview indicated lack of transparency and accordingly, it did not interfere with the order under challenge leading to dismissal of the appeal. (s) Yogesh Yadav v. Union of India, (2013) 14 SCC 623 ~ Appointment on the post of Deputy Director (Law) reserved for OBC category, in the office of the Competition Commission of India, was under consideration. Fixation of bench mark when there was no stipulation in the advertisement was challenged. The Supreme Court held that such fixation was permissible, being rational and reasonable, since it was intended to recruit the best candidate. Fixation of bench mark when there was no stipulation in the advertisement was challenged. The Supreme Court held that such fixation was permissible, being rational and reasonable, since it was intended to recruit the best candidate. It was also held that in the absence of any rule governing the issue, such fixation did not amount to changing the rules of the game. (t) State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin, (1988) AIR SC 162 ~ The civil appeals before the Court involved common questions of law relating to determination of seniority of officers appointed as Munsifs in the Uttar Pradesh Nyayik Seva as a result of competitive examinations of 1970, 1972 and 1973 held under the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. The Division Bench of the High Court observed that the Commission had no authority to fix any minimum marks for the viva voce test and even if it had such a power, it could not prescribe the minimum marks without giving notice to the candidates. The Bench further observed that if the Commission had given notice to the candidates before the steps for holding the competitive examination were taken, the candidates may or may not have appeared at the examination. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the High Court committed a serious error in applying the principles of natural justice to a competitive examination. The Court noted that there was a basic difference between an examination held by a college or university or examining body to award degree to candidates appearing at the examination and a competitive examination. The examining body or the authority prescribes minimum pass marks. If a person obtains the minimum marks as prescribed by the authority, he is declared successful and placed in the respective grade according to the number of marks obtained by him. In such a case it would be obligatory on the examining authority to prescribe marks for passing the examination as well as for securing different grades well in advance. However, a competitive examination is of different character. The purpose and object of the competitive examination is to select most suitable candidates for appointment to public services. A person may obtain sufficiently high marks and yet he may not be selected on account of the limited number of posts and availability of persons of higher quality. However, a competitive examination is of different character. The purpose and object of the competitive examination is to select most suitable candidates for appointment to public services. A person may obtain sufficiently high marks and yet he may not be selected on account of the limited number of posts and availability of persons of higher quality. Having regard to the nature and characteristics of a competitive examination, it is neither possible nor necessary to give notice to the candidates about the minimum marks which the Commission may determine for purposes of eliminating the unsuitable candidates. The rule of natural justice does not apply to a competitive examination. On 'Court's power to mould relief' :- (u) Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 678 ~ Unsuccessful candidates for appointment on the post of Medical Technologist (Laboratory) in the State of West Bengal had moved the State Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta alleging that preparation of panel was arbitrary and unreasonable on the ground that the marks obtained at the written examination were completely ignored and the panel was prepared only on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates at oral interview. The tribunal interfered. The merit list prepared on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates at the oral interview was set aside and direction was issued to prepare fresh merit list by consolidating the marks obtained in the written examination and oral interview. Appointments were directed to be given from the fresh panel prepared in order of merit subject to reservation. The tribunal also observed that those who were already in service would not be affected by such order. The High Court was approached, which disposed of the writ petitions observing that since the tribunal had not assigned any reason as to why the candidates who had been appointed should be permitted to be continued in service, the tribunal must consider the matter afresh. According to the High Court, if the tribunal was of the view that the selection process was vitiated, no such sympathy could have been shown to the candidates selected in the said selection process. The tribunal considered the matter on remand. It did not disturb the appointment of 190 (one hundred ninety) candidates who had gained experience of more than three years in the work of investigation. The tribunal considered the matter on remand. It did not disturb the appointment of 190 (one hundred ninety) candidates who had gained experience of more than three years in the work of investigation. Accordingly, a direction was issued to the State to offer appointments to successful candidates in the waiting list subject to availability of vacancies following medical examination and police verification. The decision of the tribunal was challenged before the High Court. The writ petitions were allowed with the observation that the tribunal had committed an error of law in not directing the authorities to prepare merit lists on the basis of marks obtained in the written test as well as viva voce. The directions given by the High Court are traceable to paragraph 20. The decision of the High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court but was withdrawn on April 29, 2004. For non-compliance of the direction of the High Court, contempt proceedings were initiated. The directions passed in such proceedings were then challenged before the Supreme Court by the appellants. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by accepting the contention on behalf of the State Government that the written examination was for short-listing the candidates and was in the nature of "elimination test", having regard to the fact that for 80 (eighty) posts approximately 4000 (four thousand) had applied for appointment. The Court opined that though recruitment rules had not been framed in exercise of the power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, administrative instruction could be issued for the purpose of elimination and short-listing of huge number of candidates provided the action is otherwise bona fide and reasonable. Also, having regard to the fact that the State had not challenged the order of the tribunal in the first round, it was held that in the second round the High Court did not commit any error of law in directing the parties to prepare merit lists on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates in the written examination and the interview. The Court further noted that by the time it was deciding the matter, the selected and appointed candidates had completed ten years and, thus, were having rich experience in the field. There being several vacancies, the stand of the State Government was considered to be fair and reasonable. The Court further noted that by the time it was deciding the matter, the selected and appointed candidates had completed ten years and, thus, were having rich experience in the field. There being several vacancies, the stand of the State Government was considered to be fair and reasonable. It was stated that those candidates who had grievance against the selection and had not waived their right to get similar treatment and had approached the Tribunal, the High Court and the Supreme Court, may be granted similar relief. The Court was also of the view that such relief could be granted in favour of the appellants who were agitated and had raised voice against the selection of candidates before the Tribunal, before the High Court and before the Supreme Court. (v) U.P. Public Service Commission v. Manoj Kumar Yadav, (2018) 3 SCC 706 ~ Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court quashing the results of the concerned examination, the appellant had approached the High Court. The Supreme Court, in appeal, upheld the decision of the High Court clarifying the correct position of law in regard to evaluation of comparative merit on application of the principle of scaling. The Court held that scaling could have been applied for the optional subjects and not for the compulsory subjects. However, this is not the ratio that has been relied on before us. What has been relied on is that in certain situations, on account of subsequent events, the final relief granted by the Court may not be the natural consequence of the ratio decidendi of the judgment; in an appropriate situation, the relief can be moulded by the Court to do complete justice in the matter. The appointment of the candidates selected by the PSC having continued for nearly 8 years, a prayer has been made for moulding of the relief. 29. Having considered all the decisions that were cited before us by the parties, we now proceed to record our answers to the questions formulated by us, as in paragraph 27 (supra), bearing in mind one other settled principle of law that the ratio of a decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and such decision is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows therefrom. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. 30. Question No.1 30.1. The decisions in Ranjan Kumar (supra) and Kulwant Singh (supra) are authorities for the proposition that selectees who are appointed/promoted must be arraigned as parties in the original proceedings where their selection are challenged. Kulwant Singh (supra) has taken a step further and ruled that mere awareness of pendency of litigation does not make the order passed by the court/tribunal interfering with the selection binding upon such appointees/promotees. 30.2. Bound as we feel by the law laid down in Ranjan Kumar (supra) and Kulwant Singh (supra), we are equally bound by the law laid down in Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1984) 4 SCC 251 relied upon by Mr. Banerjee. The Court there laid down the law that a High Court ought not to decide a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least by some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large. We are conscious that Prabodh Verma (supra) has been noticed in Ranjan Kumar (supra), yet, we see no reason as why both the decisions cannot be harmonized. As has been noted above, the tribunal while hearing OA-I had ordered the State on November 11, 2011 to inform all the appointees that their appointments would be subject to the result of OA-I; accordingly, intimation was sent to all the appointees individually. If indeed the appointees intended to defend the selection made by the PSC and their appointments as well offered to them by the Government, they were free to intervene in the proceedings before the tribunal. The purpose behind making the order dated November 11, 2011 by the tribunal was to put on notice all the appointees that their appointments were not final but would be subject to the outcome of OA-I. The tribunal consciously having directed the State to inform all the appointees, it can reasonably be presumed that the tribunal intended all the appointees to place their version before it for consideration, which would have been in strict compliance with rules of natural justice. The number of appointees being large, it may not have been convenient for the original applicants to notify each and every appointee individually and, therefore, the tribunal in its wisdom adopted such procedure by which natural justice could be adhered to. We have also noticed that several appointees upon receiving the communication from the State Government intimating the tribunal's order dated November 11, 2011, joined in the proceedings as additional respondents. The requirement of putting some of the appointees on notice, thus, stood complied with in adherence to the law laid down in Prabodh Verma (supra). In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that Ranjan Kumar (supra) and Kulwant Singh (supra) cannot be relied on to defeat the claims of the petitioners in WP-I and we hold that OA-I was not defective for non-joinder of necessary parties. 30.3. There is another aspect, which cannot be ignored. OA-I was presented at a point of time when appointment letters had not been issued; it was only a merit list of selected candidates that had come into existence by the date of presentation of OA-I. The decision in S.S. Balu (supra) is one amongst several decisions of the Supreme Court which lay down the law that a person does not acquire a legal right to be appointed only because his name appears in the select list. The right of a selected candidate to have an appointment issued in his favour does not mature only on publication of the select list. This being the position in law qua a selected candidate to have an appointment enforced based on inclusion of his name in the select list, we wonder whether it would be obligatory for the unsuccessful candidates to include in the array of respondents the names of the selectees who cannot claim any right in the absence of offers of appointment having been issued in their favour based on their positions in the select list. Even though OA-II and OA-III could have been dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties (the appointees), we are convinced that OA-I did not suffer from the defect of non-joinder of parties and was, therefore, perfectly maintainable at the instance of the original applicants therein. 30.4. Even though OA-II and OA-III could have been dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties (the appointees), we are convinced that OA-I did not suffer from the defect of non-joinder of parties and was, therefore, perfectly maintainable at the instance of the original applicants therein. 30.4. Having held that OA-I was certainly not defective for non-joinder of necessary parties, we further hold that some of the appointees having intervened in OA-II and upon being added as respondents, OA-II too could not have been dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. 30.5. OA-III was filed more than a year after the appointments had taken place. We have not been shown that there was no condonation of delay. In view thereof, we do not express any opinion on this objection. However, OA-III did merit dismissal solely on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. There was no similar order as in OA-I for putting the appointees on notice. WP-III, therefore, must succeed on this ground only. 30.6. The decision in Dhanyalakshi Rice Mill (supra) has no application here since the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 permits moving of a joint application by more than one aggrieved applicant upon obtaining leave of the relevant tribunal. It has not been shown to us that the tribunal did not grant leave. In that view of the matter, we find the objection to be without merit. 30.7. We part with our discussion on the first part of question no.1 for the present by observing that much would depend on the nature of relief that could be extended to the unsuccessful candidates, if at all, and the order that we propose to pass upon consideration of the other formulated questions. If we ultimately form an opinion that it may not be absolutely necessary to tinker with the appointments already made and relief could appropriately be moulded, we may do so. Our final conclusion in regard to question no.1, so far as maintainability of OA-I and OA-II, therefore, must await our conclusion on the other questions. 31. Question No.2 31.1. Having considered the authorities that have been cited before us, we are unable to persuade ourselves to hold that the original applications should have been dismissed on the basis of the proposition of law advanced by Mr. 31. Question No.2 31.1. Having considered the authorities that have been cited before us, we are unable to persuade ourselves to hold that the original applications should have been dismissed on the basis of the proposition of law advanced by Mr. Roy and the learned advocates for the appointees, relying upon the decisions in Madan Lal (supra), Manish Kumar Shahi (supra), D. Saroja Kumari (supra) and other like decisions. The said decisions would have no application here since the aspirants were kept in the dark about the method/procedure of selection to be followed by the PSC, except to the extent that an elimination test could be held to keep the number of interviewees at a reasonable limit if the number of applications received pursuant to the advertisements were large. That the aspirants would be required to obtain cut-off marks (qualifying marks) both for the written examination and the interview, and that the marks obtained in the written examination and the interview would be consolidated to draw up the final merit list, were not informed to any of the job aspirants. In fact, all the job aspirants appeared in the selection examination without knowing the method/procedure to be adopted by the PSC to assess their respective candidature. The PSC has failed to demonstrate that the job aspirants had the knowledge of what the procedure would be for selecting meritorious candidates who deserve appointment as Homeopathic Medical Officers. The aspect of the job aspirants' having knowledge of the procedure to be flawed, yet, they participated in the examination to take a chance of selection, is missing in the present cases and hence, it is clear that the cited decisions on the point would have no application here. Law is well settled that if the procedure adopted is illegal and that the job aspirants were not aware of any deficiency in the process of recruitment that could have been perceived through their senses, prior to taking part in the examination, they cannot be told off at the gate once a challenge is thrown by them merely on the ground of their participation in the selection process. A coordinate Bench of this Court has dealt with this aspect in some details in its decision in Mriganka Mondal v. Asitabha Das : FMA 823 of 2013 and we share the views expressed therein. 31.2. This question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. 32. A coordinate Bench of this Court has dealt with this aspect in some details in its decision in Mriganka Mondal v. Asitabha Das : FMA 823 of 2013 and we share the views expressed therein. 31.2. This question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. 32. Questions 3, 4, and 5 32.1. These questions are considered together as the same are related to the procedure for selection adopted by the PSC. 32.2. Mr. Roy has placed much reliance on the full commission meeting resolution dated February 14, 1988. We have quoted such resolution hereinbefore. 32.3. The said resolution, in our opinion, has four parts. What emerges on a plain reading of the first part is that in all cases of selection having a preliminary written test, qualifying marks would be fixed for interview also and that marks obtained by the candidates both at the written test and the interview would be taken into account for preparing the merit list. And, the qualifying marks at the written test would depend upon the number of vacancies. Therefore, this part deals with preparation of merit list in the manner decided by the PSC. The second part is in respect of what the qualifying marks at the interview and the aggregate would be, for candidates belonging to the different categories. The third part conceives of the apportionment of the maximum marks being 2/3rd for the written test and 1/3rd for the interview for Medical and Engineering posts, subject to change to the contrary in individual cases. The fourth part, which is applicable to all other posts, meaning thereby non-medical and non-engineering posts, ordains that maximum marks would be divided equally between the written part and the interview (i.e., in the ratio of 50:50). 32.4. We read the resolution as providing for (i) qualifying marks for both written test (where the procedure of selection requires a written test) and interview, and marks above the qualifying marks in both (written test and interview) being taken into account for preparing the merit list; (ii) different qualifying marks for candidates belonging to different categories; (iii) apportionment of maximum marks for the written test and interview being 2/3rd and 1/3rd, respectively, for medical and engineering posts, subject to any change in individual cases; and (iv) apportionment of maximum marks for the written test and interview for all other posts in the ratio of 50:50. 32.5. 32.5. As noticed earlier, the method/procedure for selection for consequent appointment on the posts of Homeopathic Medical Officer is not regulated by any statute. The State Government left it to the discretion of the PSC. The said advertisement having been issued, the candidates would obviously be bound by whatever is provided therein. 32.6. We have quoted paragraph 4 under the heading 'INFORMATION' from the said advertisement hereinbefore, for, in our opinion the fate of these writ petitions hinges on a proper construction thereof. 32.7. Bare reading of paragraph 4 was bound to create an impression in the minds of the job aspirants that the procedure for assessing their merits would be 'interview' based. The message was loud and clear ~ possession of the essential qualifications, which were the minimum, did not entitle a job aspirant to receive a call to attend the interview. If the number of applications received in response to the advertisement were large and should the PSC not consider it convenient or possible to interview all the job aspirants, the number of candidates to be called at the interview could be restricted to a reasonable limit on the basis of either (i) qualification, or (ii) experience higher than the minimum prescribed, or (iii) on the basis of a Screening Test/Written Test. We have noticed from the said advertisement that the last option has been underlined. It has not been explained before us why it has been so underlined. We cannot also presume, in the absence of any explanation, that the underlining was there to suggest that the PSC would opt for it. If indeed it were so decided at the inception of the process that the PSC intends to hold a written examination/screening test for restricting the number of candidates to be called at the interview, we wonder why the PSC included in paragraph 4 the first two options. No real meaning can, therefore, be attributed to the underlined portion. The moment the PSC has spoken of restricting the number of candidates to be called at the interview to a reasonable limit by indicating the options, it necessarily relates to a process of elimination that the PSC reserved its right to undertake. No real meaning can, therefore, be attributed to the underlined portion. The moment the PSC has spoken of restricting the number of candidates to be called at the interview to a reasonable limit by indicating the options, it necessarily relates to a process of elimination that the PSC reserved its right to undertake. However, the logical corollary of the above stipulations is that if the number of applications received were not large, obviously the PSC would not be required to go for the process of elimination, and it could draw the merit list only on the basis of the results of interview. In the absence of recruitment rules laying down the method/procedure for selection, selection being interview based was an available option for the PSC which was clearly expressed in paragraph 4. Having regard to the fact that the PSC called 459 (four hundred fifty-nine) candidates for the interview, we presume it had the wherewithal to interview as much candidates if only such number had responded to the said advertisement and in such a case, a written examination/screening test for eliminating large number of candidates would not have arisen. 32.8. Be that as it may, the PSC opted for the third option in paragraph 4. The question that would naturally arise is, whether it was an elimination test or was it a test which, in addition to the interview, had been conducted to assess the merits of the rival candidates? We are inclined, having regard to our interpretation of paragraph 4, to hold that the written test was in fact a test arranged for eliminating a large number of job aspirants who had applied and to filter out the best from many who were eligible to offer their candidature having regard to the essential qualifications stipulated in the said advertisement. Although Mr. Roy by referring to the admit cards sought to persuade us hold that the job aspirants were informed beforehand that they were participating in a preliminary written test and that, by virtue of the full commission meeting resolution dated February 14, 1988, the PSC could consider the marks obtained at such written test for drawing up the final merit list, we are not impressed. 32.9. It is obligatory for the PSC, in terms of the Constitutional provisions, to undertake the responsibility of selecting suitable candidates for public employment. 32.9. It is obligatory for the PSC, in terms of the Constitutional provisions, to undertake the responsibility of selecting suitable candidates for public employment. The range of selection might vary from Group 'D' staff to Group 'A' officers. Certain selections have to be made strictly adhering to the rules of recruitment while in others, where recruitment rules are not in place, in accordance with such method/procedure the PSC considers best to suit the convenience of the service/post that is sought to be filled up. The preliminary written test referred to in the first part of the February 14, 1988 resolution, in our opinion, is such preliminary written test which the recruitment rules pertaining to a particular service/post requires the PSC to conduct; and it is only after totaling the marks obtained by the candidates in the written test and the interview that merit list has to be drawn up. In the absence of recruitment rules, as in the present case, the preliminary written test, as paragraph 4 under the heading 'INFORMATION' would suggest, is only a screening test to short list candidates fit to be called for the interview. We hold that the PSC by consolidating the marks of the written test and the interview did not act in terms of the said advertisement and did, in fact, alter the rules of the game after it had commenced. 32.10. The view that we have taken above is fortified by the decision in B. Ramakichenin (supra). The law laid down therein, on which Mr. Datta relied, has been noted above. However, whatever has been laid down in paragraph 20 onwards of such decision is aptly applicable here. 32.11. While discussing the facts in B. Ramakichenin (supra), we have noticed how the dispute before the Court arose. The appellant was excluded because he did not have a certain experience after obtaining M.Sc. degree. The advertisement was silent as to whether the experience had to be obtained before or after obtention of M.Sc. degree. 32.11. While discussing the facts in B. Ramakichenin (supra), we have noticed how the dispute before the Court arose. The appellant was excluded because he did not have a certain experience after obtaining M.Sc. degree. The advertisement was silent as to whether the experience had to be obtained before or after obtention of M.Sc. degree. The advertisement dated May 23, 1998 issued by the Union Public Service Commission (hereafter the UPSC, for short), provided as follows: "Where the number of applications received in response to an advertisement is large and it will not be convenient or possible for the Commission to interview all the candidates, the Commission may restrict the number of candidates to a reasonable limit on the basis of either qualifications and experience higher than the minimum prescribed in the advertisement or on the basis of the experience higher than the minimum prescribed in the advertisement or on the basis of experience in the relevant field, or by holding a screening test. The candidate should, therefore, mention all the qualifications and experience in the relevant field over and above the minimum qualifications and should attach attested/self-certified copies of the certificates in support thereof." 32.12. Upon interpretation of para 3.1 of the advertisement, which is pari materia with paragraph 4 under the heading 'INFORMATION' of the said advertisement, the Supreme Court held that had para 3.1 not been there in the advertisement of the UPSC it is possible that it could have taken a view in favour of the respondents since in that case it was open to the UPSC to resort to any rational method of shortlisting of its choosing (provided it was fair and objective), but since in the case at hand a particular manner of shortlisting had been prescribed in para 3.1 it was not open to the UPSC to resort to any other method of shortlisting even if such other method were fair and objective. 32.13. Applying the law laid down in paragraph 23 of the decision, we have no hesitation to hold that even though the PSC may have acted bona fide, it could not have deviated from paragraph 4. The only method of assessing suitability for drawing up the merit list was interview, and not on consolidation of marks obtained at the preliminary written test and at the interview. 32.14. The only method of assessing suitability for drawing up the merit list was interview, and not on consolidation of marks obtained at the preliminary written test and at the interview. 32.14. The ratio of the other cited decisions, having regard to the fact situation obtaining in the cases in which the same were delivered, does not fit in with the facts here and hence, are distinguishable. 32.15. Question no.5 stands answered, accordingly. 32.16. Having held so, the other questions (3 and 4) are rendered academic. All the candidates who are presently before us either as petitioners or private respondents had cleared the written test. It is true that in view of K. Manjusree (supra), cut-off marks (qualifying marks) could not have been set by the PSC without informing the candidates, in the midst of the selection process or even thereafter. However, even if the PSC had fixed cut-off marks (qualifying marks) for the interview in such midst or after the interview was over, nothing much turns on it. Earmarking 100 marks for the interview and fixing cut-off marks (qualifying marks) after the interviewees had attended the interview, do not in the present circumstances call for any critical analysis since the marks obtained at the interview should have been the only yardstick for assessing merit and for drawing up the merit list based thereon, in terms of what was publicly notified to the job aspirants at the inception of the selection process. Hence, questions 3 and 4 are answered by holding that in view of the discussions aforesaid, the same are of academic interest and no specific answer is required to be given. 33. Question No.6 33.1. This question has to be addressed keeping in mind the decision in Rafiquddin (supra), where it has been held that rules of natural justice do not apply to a competitive examination. However, the decision is distinguishable in the sense that the overwhelming necessity of ensuring fairness and being transparent while conducting a process of selection did not fall for consideration there. 33.2. We have to be critical of the PSC's action not because it did not inform the job aspirants the method/procedure for selection as part of natural justice, but because it did not maintain transparency in the process of selection to keep itself above board. 33.2. We have to be critical of the PSC's action not because it did not inform the job aspirants the method/procedure for selection as part of natural justice, but because it did not maintain transparency in the process of selection to keep itself above board. The process, in our opinion, could have been more fair and transparent if only the PSC were alive to its statutory obligations. We had repeatedly called upon Mr. Roy to apprise us whether the full commission meeting resolution dated February 14, 1988 is in the public domain since 2005 or not. He answered the query evasively, for which we had called upon the PSC to depute a competent officer in Court. He did not fare better. We, thus, have reasons to believe that the PSC has not discharged the obligations in terms of the provisions of section 4(1)(a) and various clauses of section 4(2) of the RTI Act. 33.3. We hold that any decision taken by the PSC in closed chambers touching upon the method/procedure of selection that it wishes to adopt pertaining to selection for a service/post, in the absence of any guidance from the governing recruitment rules, must be published so that a job aspirant can be aware of how his candidature would be tested by the PSC. It is not to serve the cause of natural justice that such information should be made public; it is required for ensuring that the rules of the game are not altered after the game has begun and thereby, prevent arbitrariness mid-stream. 33.4. We hope and trust that the PSC shall live up to the expectations of the people at large, whose will has been expressed by the legislature in the RTI ACT, and that there shall be no slip in placing matters of importance relating to its overall functioning in the public domain in terms thereof in future. 33.5. The question is, thus, answered accordingly. 34. Question No.7 34.1. There are three interim applications before us. 34.2. The first is an application for addition of party (CAN 8449 of 2015) in WP-III at the instance of unsuccessful candidates, who claim that they are similarly situate as the original applicants in OA-III/private respondents in WP-III. 34.3. The second one is CAN 905 of 2019, also in WP-III. Question No.7 34.1. There are three interim applications before us. 34.2. The first is an application for addition of party (CAN 8449 of 2015) in WP-III at the instance of unsuccessful candidates, who claim that they are similarly situate as the original applicants in OA-III/private respondents in WP-III. 34.3. The second one is CAN 905 of 2019, also in WP-III. It too is an application for addition of party, but at the instance of successful candidates claiming to be at par with the petitioners in WP-III. 34.4. Since we have held that OA-III was defective for non-joinder of necessary parties and as such should not have been entertained, dismissal of OA-III is imminent. In that view of the matter, we propose not to pass any orders on CAN 8449 of 2015 and CAN 905 of 2019. 34.5. The last application, registered as CAN 1182 of 2019 and filed in WP-II, is at the instance of unsuccessful candidates who claim parity with the petitioners in WPII. 34.6. It appears that this application is inspired by observations that we had made in open court in course of consideration of WP-I, WP-II and WP-III. The applicants after failing to secure a place in the merit list, which on their own showing was published in August, 2011 (an annexure to the application) took no interest whatsoever to participate in the proceedings before the tribunal as well as this Court at any earlier stage. The conduct of the applicants does suggest that they are fence-sitters who did not have any intention to participate in the proceedings. Since exchange of views in course of court proceedings have given a glimmer of hope for the petitioners in WP-II, the applicants felt encouraged to join other unsuccessful candidates seeking relief. Such conduct is condemnable and we do not feel persuaded to allow the prayer for addition; hence, no relief can be granted to them. 34.7. The three interim applications stand dismissed, without order for costs. 35. Question No.8 35.1. Insofar as WP-III is concerned, the same stands allowed. The judgment and order dated May 8, 2015 stands quashed not on the ground that there is any infirmity in the reasons assigned by the tribunal but because rules of natural justice were observed in the breach qua the appointees. OA-III presented before the tribunal would, thus, stand dismissed. There shall be no order for costs. 35.2. The judgment and order dated May 8, 2015 stands quashed not on the ground that there is any infirmity in the reasons assigned by the tribunal but because rules of natural justice were observed in the breach qua the appointees. OA-III presented before the tribunal would, thus, stand dismissed. There shall be no order for costs. 35.2. It is the question of grant of relief to the petitioners in WP-I and WP-II, in the light of our discussions while answering questions 5 and 6, which seems to be a daunting task. Re-drawing of the merit list keeping in view the marks obtained by each of the 459 (four hundred fifty-nine) candidates at the interview and directing appointments to be made therefrom, would seem to be the logical order. However, such re-drawing of the merit list might result in some of the appointees being dislodged. The appointees having put in almost 8 (eight) years' service, it would appear to be inequitous to disturb them at this late stage. At the same time, having to the decision of the Supreme Court in Beg Raj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2003) 1 SCC 726 , the time taken by the Court to dispose of the lis cannot operate to the prejudice of the petitioners in WP-I and WP-II since the right to relief relates back to the dates of presentation of the writ petitions. 35.3. In such peculiar facts and circumstances, we direct the PSC to recommend those of the petitioners in WP-I and WP-II for appointment to the State, who have obtained marks more than the last appointed candidate in the respective category to which such petitioners belong. We are conscious that a question relating to availability of vacancies would arise. In course of hearing, we were informed that after the recruitment process under consideration no fresh process has been undertaken. If indeed that be so, by now there must be more vacancies than the number of petitioners in WP-I and WP-II who could claim accommodation after the exercise in terms of this order is conducted. If there be inadequate vacancies hindering the process of implementation of the aforesaid direction, the State shall create supernumerary posts for such of the petitioners who qualify for appointment, but such posts shall be personal to them and stand abolished as soon as they fall vacant either by resignation, death, retirement, promotion, etc. If there be inadequate vacancies hindering the process of implementation of the aforesaid direction, the State shall create supernumerary posts for such of the petitioners who qualify for appointment, but such posts shall be personal to them and stand abolished as soon as they fall vacant either by resignation, death, retirement, promotion, etc. This direction is given in the special facts because the petitioners were not at fault for the position they find themselves in presently. We also make it clear that such of the petitioners who are offered appointment in terms of this order shall not be entitled to any service benefit except that the period from December, 2011 (when the appointees joined) till their respective dates of joining shall be counted for the purpose of retirement benefits. 36. In the result, the judgment and order of the tribunal dated November 30, 2012 stands set aside. WP-I and WP-II are allowed to the extent mentioned above. There shall be no order for costs.