State of Kerala, Represented By Its Secretary to Government, General Education Department v. Hareesh P
2019-06-06
K.VINOD CHANDRAN, V.G.ARUN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Vinod Chandran, J The appeal is by the Government against the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing re-fixation of pay to the petitioner, reckoning his prior service as a HSA. The petitioner was a HSA who was so appointed on 8.6.2006 in the respondent's school. He was appointed as HSST (Jr.) in Malayalam w.e.f 1.12.2011 as per Ext P2. The petitioner claimed fixation of pay under Rule 28A since he was continuing as a HSA earlier to his appointment as HSST. The prayer was rejected by an endorsement in Ext P6 representation which found that the teacher was coming under direct recruitment of HSST (Jr) and hence his salary has been fixed only at the minimum of scale of pay. Subsequent representation also did not evoke any favourable orders. 2. Eventually the Government rejected the case of the petitioner by Ext P10. It was found that there were only 12 vacancies of HSST (HSST(Jr)) in the respondent's school based on the staff fixation order for 2010-2011. Only 25% of the said vacancies could be filled up with by-transfer appointments i.e., appointment of HSA's already working in the school. The petitioner was the 4th person and hence his approval was only as a direct recruit. 3. The learned Single Judge based on the amendments incorporated, as to the application of Rule 28A, by way of Government decisions, found that the petitioner is entitled to claim re-fixation in the post of HSST which is a higher post to that of the post occupied by the petitioner. 4. The learned Government Pleader in opposition contends that since 25% of the vacancies were filled up with by-transfer appointments, the petitioner could be deemed to be only a direct recruitee. Only a person who is appointed, by-transfer could be given the pay fixation taking into account the pay drawn in the earlier post he or she occupied is the argument. The learned counsel for the petitioner however would contend that the amendments made would clearly indicate that the petitioner is eligible for re-fixation. 5. We notice Rule 28A Part I KSR which was extracted by the learned Single Judge.
The learned counsel for the petitioner however would contend that the amendments made would clearly indicate that the petitioner is eligible for re-fixation. 5. We notice Rule 28A Part I KSR which was extracted by the learned Single Judge. It is a non-obstante clause where an officer holding a post in a substantive temporary or officiating capacity is promoted or appointed in a substantive, temporary or officiating capacity to another post carrying a higher time scale of pay, his initial pay in the higher time scale shall be fixed at the stage of next above the pay notionally arrived at in the lower time scale of pay by increasing the actual pay drawn by him in the lower time scale, by one increment. We need not in fact look at the Government decisions later incorporated in the K.S.R. going by the plain words employed in Rule 28A. Admittedly the petitioner was holding a substantive post being that of a HSA in the respondent's school. Even accepting the contention of the Government that his appointment has been approved as a direct recruitee he is thus appointed to a post carrying a higher time scale of pay and hence he is entitled to pay re-fixation as provided in Rule 28A. 6. Further we notice G.O. (P) 475/90/Fin. Dated 25.9.1990, which incorporated amendments by way of Government Decisions. It first refers to Government Decision No. 5, below Rule 28A, permitting benefit of re-fixation of pay only if the appointment or promotion was to a higher post belonging to the regular line of promotion. Later G.O.(P) No. 735/88/Fin. dated 21.10.88 permitted re-fixation even in cases where an officer officiating in a post is appointed to a higher post on the advice of the Public Service Commission. This was found to create an anomaly in so far as the re-fixation permissible only when the appointments are made by the PSC, and the benefit being denied to appointments made by-transfer or by conversion of post. Hence the 1990 decision to confer the benefits on appointments to the higher post on advice by the PSC or otherwise. This brings the subject matter, in tune with our interpretation of the Rule. The post of HSST (Jr.) undoubtedly is an appointment in the regular line of promotion for an HSA.
Hence the 1990 decision to confer the benefits on appointments to the higher post on advice by the PSC or otherwise. This brings the subject matter, in tune with our interpretation of the Rule. The post of HSST (Jr.) undoubtedly is an appointment in the regular line of promotion for an HSA. Hence, the fact that he was a direct appointee would not enable the Government to decline his pay fixation under Rule 28A. We hence find no cause for interference with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 7. Further it has to be noticed that the petitioner was appointed by the Manager of the school on by-transfer appointment, as is evident from Ext. P2. It is the Educational Authority who approved the appointment as on direct recruitment, presumably there were no vacancies remaining to accommodate the petitioner, after filling up the three vacancies with his seniors. If that was the case then the approval should have been rejected and the Manager directed to fill it up by direct recruitment. Be that as it may, even if it was so done and the petitioner applied and got appointed, still he would be entitled to the re-fixation under Rule 28A. 8. The learned Government Pleader also relied on the decision in Mohanan v State of Kerala ( 2013(3) KLT 970 ). The learned Single Judge had considered the same and distinguished the facts which distinction, we find to be perfectly apt. The question therein was in so far as a police constable having joined the Revenue Department claiming grade promotion in the post to which he was subsequently appointed. Grade promotions are granted only when there is stagnation in a particular post. The service rendered in another Department cannot be added on for the purpose of grade promotion since the employee cannot be found to have stagnated in the post to which he was subsequently appointed. The Division Bench also specifically noticed, therein that, the village extension officers, were claiming the benefit of grade promotion clubbing their earlier service as police constables. It was held that the subsequent appointment was after demitting their earlier post, and there was a complete cessation of master and servant relationship, before the second appointment. There could not hence be claimed any continuity in service for the purpose of grade promotion.
It was held that the subsequent appointment was after demitting their earlier post, and there was a complete cessation of master and servant relationship, before the second appointment. There could not hence be claimed any continuity in service for the purpose of grade promotion. We do not see any application for the judgment to the facts of this case. Writ Appeal is rejected. The 4th respondent shall carry out the re-fixation and disburse the benefits within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.