JUDGMENT : DIPANKAR DATTA, J. 1. Sexual harassment of insecure women by men, who are in a position of power and might, has assumed menacing proportions in India. Such harassment is not only rampant in public places, viz. roads, parks, gatherings, theatre/cinema halls, departmental stores, transport vehicles, etc., but also in private places, such as the cosy interior of one's home, or chamber/cabin in an office/workshop, or even within the four corners of rooms in hotels/guesthouses, etc. A crosssection of the society perceives such harassment as a disease but more often than not, it is the lust of the high and the mighty that is the real cause therefor. The ravished finds it extremely difficult to get back to normal life; the incident of being sexually harassed by the overpowering class comes to haunt her day after day. This is one side of the coin. On the other side, we have ambitious women who, seeking to move up the ladder of life and to attain a status, allow the high and the mighty to exploit them for obtaining special favours and after sometime, when there is nothing more to be obtained, cry foul and complain of sexual harassment. While it takes years for an honest, dedicated and dutiful man to build up his reputation, tarnishing such reputation built over the years and bringing such a man down in the public eye and subjecting him to ridicule does not take more than a moment's time. Indeed, subject to proof of sexual harassment of insecure women by men to satiate their lust and proof of scheming women complaining of sexual harassment after volunteering to being exploited, ideally should call for both these categories of men and women to be ostracised. 2. This writ petition involves an allegation of sexual harassment of a lowly paid lady railway employee by an officer of the South Eastern Railway, which ultimately has led to imposition of punishment on the railway officer. At the time of the alleged incident of sexual harassment, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereafter 'the 2013 Act', in short) was yet to see the light of the day. At the time of the alleged incident of sexual harassment, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereafter 'the 2013 Act', in short) was yet to see the light of the day. The landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 , was there as the guiding light together with amendments in the relevant Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 following it. We are not called upon to decide here whether the allegation of sexual harassment is correct or not, but to ascertain in the exercise of our judicial review powers whether the railway officer was extended 'reasonable opportunity' within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India to defend the allegation. Also, should judicial interdiction be at all considered imperative, we need to decide the extent of relief that could be given to the parties in this proceeding to sub-serve the ends of justice. 3. The Union of India and 3 (three) officers of the South Eastern Railway are the petitioners before us in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the soundness of a judgment and order dated April 23, 2015 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench (hereafter 'the tribunal', for short) on OA 708 of 2013. By such judgment and order, the tribunal allowed the original application presented before it by the original applicant/railway officer (hereafter 'Mr. Sarkar', for short). The order dated August 27, 2010 imposing upon Mr. Sarkar the penalty of removal from service was set aside and the respondents before the tribunal were granted liberty to proceed in accordance with law upon placing Mr. Sarkar under suspension or by allowing him to resume his duty. 4. At the material time, Mr. Sarkar had been working as Welfare Inspector-II under the Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, South Eastern Railway, Kharagpur and was posted at Santragachi. A complaint dated February 20, 2006 was lodged before the Area Manager, South Eastern Railway, Santragachi against Mr. Sarkar by a lady employee (hereafter the victim), who had been appointed on compassionate ground on the death of her husband. The complaint was of sexual harassment. The translated version of the original complaint in Hindi, which was provided to Mr. A complaint dated February 20, 2006 was lodged before the Area Manager, South Eastern Railway, Santragachi against Mr. Sarkar by a lady employee (hereafter the victim), who had been appointed on compassionate ground on the death of her husband. The complaint was of sexual harassment. The translated version of the original complaint in Hindi, which was provided to Mr. Sarkar, reads as follows: "With due respect I am complaining against Sri Shibram Sarkar the following matter:- (1) I am a widow with a two years old child living in a terror. (2) The reason of my terror is that P.I. Sri Shibram Sarkar is pressurizing me to do dirty jobs. (3) Sri Sarkar is pressurizing me to dirty job and threatened me if I do not agree with his proposal he will kill me and my 2 years old son. He also said that if I do not marry him then he will kill his wife and son. (4) One day Sri Sarkar has caught hold my hand in Howrah Station and I was unconscious and one lady staff of train lighting has helped me. (5) That Sri Sarkar has sent me a letter in my house address in which vulgar words were written, and on the envelopes the handwriting was of Mr. Shibram Sarkar. That I am feeling very insecure due to this incident. Thus I am requesting your honour to give security to me and my 2 years old son. For this act of kindness I will remain ever grateful to you." 5. On receipt of such complaint, the Divisional Personnel Officer, South Eastern Railway, Kharagpur by a letter dated August 20, 2007 informed Mr. Sarkar that an inquiry would be conducted on August 30, 2007 in the chamber of the Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, Kharagpur. Mr. Sarkar was advised to attend the inquiry positively. 6. After attending the inquiry, Mr. Sarkar by his letter dated September 6, 2007 requested the Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, who was the Chairperson of the Women's Right Protection Committee constituted under "Vishaka guidelines" (hereafter 'the WRPC', for short), to furnish to him the documents referred to therein which, inter alia, included the complaint lodged by the victim as well as all documents pertaining to the inquiry and its minutes. 7. Upon receipt of the aforesaid letter from Mr. 7. Upon receipt of the aforesaid letter from Mr. Sarkar, the Chairperson of the WRPC by his letter dated November 2, 2007 furnished to Mr. Sarkar a summary of the complaint lodged by the victim. Insofar as furnishing of documents related to the case and proceedings of day-to-day inquiry sought for by Mr. Sarkar are concerned, the Chairperson observed that the request had been "studied carefully and found to bear no relevance and to be unnecessary. Therefore not provided". Regarding copy of the hand-writing of Mr. Sarkar taken on September 3, 2007, it was informed to Mr. Sarkar that he having given his sample handwriting willingly and without pressure, it was not understood what purpose would be served by giving a copy to him. However, he was given liberty to examine a copy of the same on the next date of inquiry. 8. Mr. Sarkar attended the inquiry on November 30, 2007 when he was examined by the members of the WRPC. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Sarkar complained that copies of the proceedings had been withheld from him for reasons unknown and it was in clear breach of principles of natural justice. An apprehension was also expressed by him that the committee members had arrived at a foregone conclusion before the outcome of the inquiry. He also complained of administrative bias. 9. A report, spread over 10 (ten) pages, was prepared by the WRPC after examining witnesses for and against the charge of sexual harassment. It was forwarded to the Senior Divisional Personnel Officer on December 10, 2007. Mr. Sarkar was found guilty of sexual harassment and the WRPC, on the basis of its findings in the inquiry report, recommended as follows: "IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Working conditions in the event of such a continuous, prolonged harassment have been difficult for Smt X (identity withheld by us). If she is desirous of a transfer to a place near her hometown or where the rest of her family is, it may be considered by the administration. 2. Shri Shibram Sarkar should be taken up under D&A rules for violation of Rly conduct rule 1966. 3. He should not be entrusted with EACG cases where the candidates are women. 4. In no case should he be posted in the same area as Smt. X." 10. A show-cause notice was issued on March 24, 2010 calling upon Mr. 2. Shri Shibram Sarkar should be taken up under D&A rules for violation of Rly conduct rule 1966. 3. He should not be entrusted with EACG cases where the candidates are women. 4. In no case should he be posted in the same area as Smt. X." 10. A show-cause notice was issued on March 24, 2010 calling upon Mr. Sarkar to explain why he shall not be removed from service. Mr. Sarkar asked for copies of documents, which were furnished. Mr. Sarkar not having submitted his representation against the report of inquiry prepared by the WRPC, an order dated August 27, 2010 removing Mr. Sarkar from service but with partial retirement benefits, followed. 11. Challenging the show-cause notice dated March 24, 2010 and the order of removal dated August 27, 2010, Mr. Sarkar had the occasion to approach the tribunal by presenting OA 1978 of 2010. By an order dated September 20, 2010, the tribunal disposed of the original application without interfering with the impugned order of removal on the ground that Mr. Sarkar had not exhausted the other remedy available to him, i.e., the remedy of a departmental appeal. However, liberty was granted to Mr. Sarkar to prefer an appeal. It was also observed by the tribunal that Mr. Sarkar shall not be disturbed, if the impugned order of removal had not been implemented, till his appeal is disposed of. 12. Availing the liberty granted by the tribunal, Mr. Sarkar preferred a departmental appeal on September 23, 2010. The appeal was kept pending for some time, which resulted in an action for contempt being initiated before the tribunal (CPC 109 of 2010) by Mr. Sarkar. In course of hearing of the action for contempt, an appellate order dated December 8, 2010 was produced by the alleged contemnor-respondent. The appellate authority quashed the order of removal and substituted it by the following order: "Reduction to the lower post of Jr. Clerk in pay band 5200-20200/- G.P. 1900 on pay Rs.7780/- for a period of 05 (five) years. This will have the effect of postponing both the future increment & seniority on restoration to the post of SWI/Gr.II In pay band 9300-34800, G.P. 4200 on completion of the punishment period. Period of absence i.e. from date of removal upto date on which you resume your duties as Jr. This will have the effect of postponing both the future increment & seniority on restoration to the post of SWI/Gr.II In pay band 9300-34800, G.P. 4200 on completion of the punishment period. Period of absence i.e. from date of removal upto date on which you resume your duties as Jr. Clerk shall be treated as 'Dies-non'." Considering the appellate order, the tribunal disposed of CPC 109 of 2010 by its order dated April 4, 2012 holding that it was beyond its jurisdiction to examine the merits of the appellate order in a contempt application. 13. Despite Mr. Sarkar being reduced in rank, he did not resume duty on the post of Junior Clerk. Notices were sent, which evoked no response from his side. Instead, Mr. Sarkar approached the tribunal by presenting OA 708 of 2013 which, as noticed above, succeeded. 14. From the original application filed by Mr. Sarkar, we find the following prayers: (a) To pass an appropriate order direction the respondent authority to quash and/or set aside the impugned Show Cause Notice issued by Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, South-Eastern Railway, Kharagpur against your applicant dated 24,3.2010 without supplying the relevant documents as well as the Enquiry Report being Annexure 'A-18' to this Original Application. (b) To pass an appropriate order direction the respondent authority to allow the present applicant to resume his duty to the post of post of Senior Welfare Inspector-II under Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, South Eastern Railway, Kharagpur at Santragachi and further directed the respondents to give all consequential arrear benefits including back wages and other benefits as admissible as per Rules along with your applicant for resumption of the duty to the said post. (c) An order quashing and/or setting aside the entire proceeding including the inquiry held against the applicant as well as the appellate order dated 8.12.2010. (d) An order directing the respondents to reinstate the applicant in the post from where he was removed from service and further directing the respondents to grant all consequential benefits by treating the period from removal from service till the date of such reinstatement as on duty for all purposes." 15. (d) An order directing the respondents to reinstate the applicant in the post from where he was removed from service and further directing the respondents to grant all consequential benefits by treating the period from removal from service till the date of such reinstatement as on duty for all purposes." 15. Perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the tribunal does not reveal that the tribunal took into consideration the fact that the order of removal from service had been set aside and the penalty of reduction in rank, to be operative for five years, imposed upon Mr. Sarkar. The tribunal proceeded as if the order of removal only was under challenge and not the appellate order. Upon consideration of the rival contentions, the tribunal was of the view that a regular disciplinary proceeding should have been conducted against Mr. Sarkar on the basis of the report of the WRPC and thereafter any punishment, as warranted on facts and in the circumstances, could have been imposed. 16. Having noticed the broad factual background, it is our duty to consider the first contention of Mr. Chatterjee, learned advocate for the petitioners, that the tribunal committed gross error of jurisdiction in setting aside only the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority without, however, setting aside the appellate order, and granting liberty to the petitioners to proceed afresh against Mr. Sarkar by holding disciplinary proceeding. 17. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. M/s Amritlal Bhogilal & Co, (1958) AIR SC 868.), Mr. Chatterjee contended that the order of removal dated August 27, 2010 had merged in the appellate order dated December 8, 2010 and the tribunal having set aside the order of removal without touching the appellate order, it has given rise to an incongruous situation. In any event, the effect thereof was that Mr. Sarkar was under an obligation to join the post of Junior Clerk and not having done so, is disentitled to seek any relief from the court of writ. 18. Next, Mr. Chatterjee referred to paragraph 17 of the decision in Vishaka (supra) where the Supreme Court, while laying down law in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, had prescribed norms and guidelines to be followed by public and private sector employers for preventing sexual harassment of women at workplace. 18. Next, Mr. Chatterjee referred to paragraph 17 of the decision in Vishaka (supra) where the Supreme Court, while laying down law in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, had prescribed norms and guidelines to be followed by public and private sector employers for preventing sexual harassment of women at workplace. Vide clause (b) under the heading 'Preventive Steps' the Court had directed that: "The rules/regulations of government and public sector bodies relating to conduct and discipline should include rules/regulations prohibiting sexual harassment and provide for appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender." 19. The contention advanced by Mr. Chatterjee is that in compliance with such direction, amendments were incorporated in the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (hereafter 'the DA Rules', for short) as far back as in 2004 to deal with allegations of sexual harassment of women at workplace. Referring to rule 9 and the newly inserted proviso to sub-rule (2) as well as the decision of the Supreme Court dated April 26, 2004, since reported in (Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India & ors, (2013) 1 SCC 311 .), he argued that a final order could be passed based on the report of the WRPC and it is not the law that the report of the WRPC, instead of forming the basis of punishment, should be followed by a disciplinary proceeding. 20. We have considered the contention in the light of the direction in Vishaka (supra) and Medha Kotwal Lele (supra) as well as the amended version of the DA Rules. 21. For the reasons as would appear from the discussions to follow, we are not inclined to concur with the reasons assigned by the tribunal. But, there is much more than what meets the eyes and, therefore, we may have to agree with the ultimate conclusion of the tribunal that Mr. Sarkar ought to be proceeded afresh, having not been extended 'reasonable opportunity' to defend himself, but for different reasons that we intend to assign. 22. But, there is much more than what meets the eyes and, therefore, we may have to agree with the ultimate conclusion of the tribunal that Mr. Sarkar ought to be proceeded afresh, having not been extended 'reasonable opportunity' to defend himself, but for different reasons that we intend to assign. 22. After the decision in Vishaka (supra), the Railway Board by a notification dated October 13, 2004 introduced a proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 9 of the DA Rules reading as follows: "In rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, in sub-rule (2) the following proviso shall be inserted at the end, namely: 'Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual harassment within the meaning of rule 3-C of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966, the Complaints Committee established for inquiring into such complaints, shall be deemed to be the inquiry authority appointed by the disciplinary authority for the purpose of these rules and the complaints Committee shall hold, if separate procedure has not been prescribed for the Complaints Committee for holding the inquiry into the complaints of sexual harassment, the inquiry as far as practicable in accordance with the procedure laid down in the rules'." 23. What follows from the above is that if separate procedure has not been provided for the Complaints Committee for holding an inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment, such inquiry, as far as practicable, has to be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid in the DA Rules. It seems that the tribunal had no occasion to consider the amended version of rule 9 of the DA Rules in terms whereof the adverse findings of the WRPC could form the basis of an order of punishment. 24. If indeed the WRPC were found, on scrutiny of the records placed before us that it had followed the provisions contained in the DA Rules, as far as practicable, we may not have had reason to interfere with the order of punishment passed against Mr. Sarkar. However, that is a different aspect which we shall deal with a little later. 25. We are in agreement with Mr. Sarkar. However, that is a different aspect which we shall deal with a little later. 25. We are in agreement with Mr. Chatterjee that the tribunal erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction by making the directions noticed above, upon formation of an opinion that the findings of the WRPC could not have formed the basis of an order of punishment, and that the findings of the WRPC ought to have been followed by a regular disciplinary proceeding. 26. We could have set aside the order of the tribunal and ordered a remand; however, having regard to the lapse of time since the original application was presented (in 2013) and that Mr. Sarkar vide prayer (c) had prayed for quashing and/or setting aside of the entire proceeding including the inquiry held against him as well as the appellate order dated December 8, 2010, we had looked into the records meticulously and found, prima facie, glaring procedural defects in the inquiry conducted against Mr. Sarkar. 27. Before we proceed to refer to the procedural defects one by one, we consider it proper to set out below portions from the depositions of witnesses recorded by the WRPC in course of the inquiry. This is necessary for establishing the perversity in the findings of the WRPC as well as its naivety about holding inquiry proceedings. 28. We start with the statement of the victim, recorded at the first sitting of the WRPC on August 31, 2007. Relevant portions are quoted below: Q.14- Can you describe one specific incident of harassment? Ans:- Yes. One day in Santragachi station as I was alighting from a train he caught hold of my hand and tried to harass me. On that occasion I was saved by one of my colleagues - Meera, Helper (TL))/Electrical/SRC. Further he always called me on my mobile. Initially I was polite and answered him, but day by day he grew adamant. I was compelled to change my mobile number, but still he somehow came to know my number and started calling me again. Q.16- Do you have any witness? Ans:- Almost everyone in Santragachi knows about this. Q.17- Can you specifically name any one who is witness to any of these incidents of harassment? Ans:- There is one Sri K. L. Das, Chief OS/C&W Stores/Santragachi. Others are - The ARM/SRC, the Ex. ADME, APO/SRC and my colleagues. (Underlining for emphasis) 29. Q.16- Do you have any witness? Ans:- Almost everyone in Santragachi knows about this. Q.17- Can you specifically name any one who is witness to any of these incidents of harassment? Ans:- There is one Sri K. L. Das, Chief OS/C&W Stores/Santragachi. Others are - The ARM/SRC, the Ex. ADME, APO/SRC and my colleagues. (Underlining for emphasis) 29. In the second sitting on September 3, 2007, the statement of Mr. Sarkar was recorded. The portions which we consider material are set out below: Q.14:- One complaint is that one day you caught hold of her hand in Santragachi station and tried to harass her when she was alighting from a train. Do you admit the charge? Ans:- This is a completely baseless allegation. I never did anything like this. Q.15:- Then why did she level such a charge against you? Ans:- I don't know. She may have some unscrupulous intention. She used to come to my office at Santragachi almost regularly before joining. I have been working in S.E. Railway for long 17 years and have processed scores of EA on CG cases. I have led cultural delegations for this division to many places. There have been so many young girls and ladies in those delegations. There has not been a single complaint of harassment by any of them. My behaviour, my dealings with staff have never been questioned. Q.17A:- Did you call her on her mobile. Ans:- Never. Q.17B:- She has alleged that she had to change her mobile no. many times. Ans:- It is a false allegation. Q.31:- Don't you think that your answers are contradictory? Ans:- I don't think so. I am repeatedly saying that this is a fabricated case, and I have not done anything wrong so as to deserve this. Q.33:- Ms. X says that she had a good relationship with you and your family prior to her joining the Railways but after her joining the Railway Service you became aggressive and repeatedly coaxed her to marry you. In one such incident you had suddenly held her hand when she was alighting from train in Santragachi station. Do you admit this? Ans:- No, I never told her to marry me. Its unthinkable for me because I already have a blissful marital life and am blessed with two beautiful children. Moreover, I cannot even think of holding a lady's hand in a crowded station like Santragachi. Do you admit this? Ans:- No, I never told her to marry me. Its unthinkable for me because I already have a blissful marital life and am blessed with two beautiful children. Moreover, I cannot even think of holding a lady's hand in a crowded station like Santragachi. (Underlining for emphasis) 30. It appears that after hearing the answer to question no. 19, Mr. Sarkar was advised by the members of the WRPC not to make remarks about the character of the complainant and to stick to the issues. 31. At the fourth sitting on October 3, 2007, Sri P.K. Tiwari, DY. CME (Works)/GRC, formerly ARM/SRC, was asked to make his oral statement. Relevant portions therefrom are quoted below: Q.7:- Sir what do you think, is there any truth in Miss. X's complaint? Ans:- All the leads that I got in the informal enquiry regarding this case point towards some malafide intention on the part of Mr. Sarkar. It is very clear that this whole thing had been doing on for long time, at least a year, and unable to bear Miss. X finally came to me and told of this. Again, there is no reason why she could complaint against him. This had been going on for some time and lately assumed significantly proportions. Unable to bear she came to me. Q.16:- Sir, we took a sample of handwriting of Sri Sarkar, and on comparison with the letter they seem to be similar. Please have a look. (The copy of the letter written by Sri Sarkar to Ms. X and the sample handwriting of Sri Sarkar were given to Sri Tiwari for comparison.) Ans:- Yes, they are same, through it seems he tried to distort the handwriting to make it appear dissimilar from the one in his letter to Ms. X. (Underlining for emphasis) 32. Smt. Meera Bhagat, supposed to be an eye-witness of the incident of sexual harassment of the victim by Mr. Sarkar deposed at the fifth sitting on October 24, 2007. Her version, to the extent material and relevant, is reproduced below: Q.6:- Ms. X has said that you are a prime witness to one such act of harassment when Sri Sarkar had caught hold of her hand in SRC station. What do you know about it? Ans:- No, I am not witness to any witness to any incident of harassment of Ms. X by anybody. X has said that you are a prime witness to one such act of harassment when Sri Sarkar had caught hold of her hand in SRC station. What do you know about it? Ans:- No, I am not witness to any witness to any incident of harassment of Ms. X by anybody. However, I am witness to one incident involving Ms. X when she had lost consciousness on board the train in ladies compartment. Q.7:- What happened then, please give us detail of it. Ans:- It so happened on that date that both of us boarded in the train in the ladies compartment from Santragachi station. Suddenly, there was a cry from the passengers that someone has lost consciousness and fallen on the train floor. I got up from my seat see that Ms. X had fallen unconscious on the floor of the compartment. We then lifted her and laid her down on the seats and sprinkled water on her face. She slowly regained consciousness. Q.8:- Did not you ever ask her about this incident? Like what happened that day, why she lost consciousness. Is there anything wrong with her? Ans:- Yes, I did ask her. But she said she had this disease. She sometimes loses her consciousness when she was tensed. Q.10:- Ms. X has repeatedly mentioned your name as a witness to this incident when Sri Sarkar had caught her hand at SRC station. Even when ARM/SRC had enquired into the matter she had named you as a witness to this particular incident. Don't you know anything else about this incident or any other incident of her harassment for that matter? Ans:- No Madam. I have told you whatever little I knew. Moreover, we used to meet in transit only. Neither we had any so called friendship amongst us nor did we have enough scope to interact with each other. Q.11:- Has your statement been corroborated by the ARM/SRC? Ans:- Yes I told the same thing there. Q.20:- Do you know this man PI, Sri Shibram? Ans:- No. (Underlining for emphasis) There appears to be no comment made by the members of the WRPC about the demeanour of Smt. Meera Bhagat in course of recording of her oral statement, except that in answer to questions 12 and 14 she stated that she was accompanied by an engineer since she got nervous. 33. Ans:- No. (Underlining for emphasis) There appears to be no comment made by the members of the WRPC about the demeanour of Smt. Meera Bhagat in course of recording of her oral statement, except that in answer to questions 12 and 14 she stated that she was accompanied by an engineer since she got nervous. 33. Sri K.L. Das, Chief OS/C&W/SRC/Stores, another eye witness according to the victim, was also asked to record his statement at the fifth sitting. This is what he said: Q.4:- Do you know that Ms. X received a threatening letter from the accused person? Ans:- Yes, I know. Q.5:- How do you know that? Ans:- Ms. X had told me that she had received a letter from Shri Shibram Sarkar. She used come to my office and lament. She often used to say things like - I don't want to live etc. She used to cry. I have often heard her uttering his name with awe. Q.6:- As a Chief OS you must have heard staff in your section discussing about this incident of harassment. Ans:- Yes, I have overhead them talking Ms. X's harassment at the hands of Sri Sarkar. But I did not see anything. I mean to say that I am not witness to any incident of harassment. (Underlining for emphasis) 34. In the next sitting held on November 1, 2007, the statement of Sri A.K. Ghosh, APO/SRC was recorded. The material portion of his statement reads as follows: Q.5:- What did the ARM ask Sri Sarkar? Ans:- He (ARM) asked Sri Sarkar, the then PI/SRC, two questions, e.g.:-1) Whether he is involved in this case? If yes, the he may be given one chance to rectify himself. 2) If not, he (ARM) will lodge a complaint against him to OC/Jagachha Police Station. He was allowed two days (48 hours) time to reply to his (ARM's) question. Q.6:- What do you know about the complaint? Ans:- I don't know about the complaint. Only I know that Ms. X has made a complaint against Sri Sarkar as stated by ARM/SRC in presence of me. Q.9:- What is you (sic your) ides (sic idea) of this case? Ans:- Frankly speaking I have no idea of this case. Q.13:- ARM/SRC has made him solely responsible in this case. What do you think. Only I know that Ms. X has made a complaint against Sri Sarkar as stated by ARM/SRC in presence of me. Q.9:- What is you (sic your) ides (sic idea) of this case? Ans:- Frankly speaking I have no idea of this case. Q.13:- ARM/SRC has made him solely responsible in this case. What do you think. Ans:- He may be, but as I don't have any knowledge about the case, I can not say anything. Also I did not get a copy of either the enquiry or the complaint. So I am not in a position to tell anything. Q.14:- Did Sri Sarkar give any written explanation to ARM within 48 hours as was instructed by him. Ans:- No. Q.15:- Did you remind him about that? Ans:- Yes I did remind him about that just after 24 hours. Even after v48 hours I again reminded him but he said that he need not give any explanation since he is not involved in the case in any way. (Underlining for emphasis) 35. It is important to note that at the foot of each deposition, the following declaration appears to have been given by each witness: "I have given the above statement of my own accord, in sound mental and physical health and without any bias against anyone." 36. Perusal of the complaint, the depositions of the witnesses and the findings returned by the WRPC reveal the following procedural defects: (1) The WRPC had obtained oral statement of the victim in the absence of Mr. Sarkar. (2) Mr. Sarkar was not allowed to cross-examine the victim. (3) There was a discrepancy in regard to the place of occurrence of sexual harassment (as stated in the complaint and as orally stated before the WRPC). (4) That the statement of Sri P.K. Tiwari, who had conducted preliminary inquiry into the allegation of the victim and had submitted a report, was neither examined in the presence of Mr. Sarkar nor was Mr. Sakar permitted to cross-examine Sri Tiwari. (5) That two of the witnesses for the management, Smt. Meera Bhagat amd Sri K.L. Das, who were eye-witnesses according to the victim of her sexual harassment by Mr. Sarkar, had not supported the victim's version that they had witnessed Mr. Sarkar sexually harassing the victim and, in fact, such witness version was sufficient to raise eye-brows insofar as veracity of the complaint is concerned. Sarkar, had not supported the victim's version that they had witnessed Mr. Sarkar sexually harassing the victim and, in fact, such witness version was sufficient to raise eye-brows insofar as veracity of the complaint is concerned. (6) That the WRPC did not consider, while returning its findings, the discrepancy in regard to the place of occurrence as material and sought to downplay the same by observing that the victim "mentioned that this happened while boarding train on her return journey to home from her place of work, which is SRC" and since she was not literate, the place of occurrence mentioned in the complaint could have been a mistake of the scribe, little realising that the version of the victim was that Mr. Sarkar held her hand while she was alighting from a train at Santragachi. 37. Having indicated these defects to him, we called upon Mr. Chatterjee to address us on the merits of the proceedings initiated against Mr. Sarkar as well as the appellate order which proceeded to impose the punishment of reduction in rank upon him considering the findings of the WRPC. 38. Mr. Chaterjee ably responded by citing the decisions reported in (Hira Nath Mishra and ors. v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and anr,1973 AIR SC 1206.) and (Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 ). 39. According to Mr. Chatterjee, there cannot be a strait-jacket formula for application of the principles of natural justice. Applicability of natural justice must depend according to the circumstances of different cases. In a case of the present nature, the rules of natural justice did not require either recording of the statement of the victim in the presence of Mr. Sarkar or extending an opportunity to Mr. Sarkar to cross-examine the victim. 40. Referring to A.K. Chopra (supra), it was also submitted by him that in a departmental proceeding, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, such authority would also have the power and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion; on facts, however, the manner in which we have been critical of the proceedings of inquiry conducted by the WRPC tends to suggest reappreciation and/or re-appraisal of evidence recorded in the inquiry proceedings conducted against Mr. Sarkar, which is impermissible. 41. Sarkar, which is impermissible. 41. In support of his submission, Mr. Chatterjee also invited our attention to the conduct of Mr. Sarkar. It was submitted that his nonchalant attitude is apparent in as much as without having any fear that he might lose his job, Mr. Sarkar had not joined on the post of Junior Clerk in terms of the order passed by the appellate authority despite there being no order staying its operation. It is his submission that the period for which Mr. Sarkar was required to serve as Junior Officer has also expired and such an officer does not deserve any relief from the court of writ. 42. We have perused the authorities cited by Mr. Chatterjee. 43. In Hira Nath Mishra (supra), the appellants (male students) were alleged to have entered a girls' hostel and misbehaved with inmates thereof. Some of such inmates of the girls' hostel had complained against the appellants to the Principal. In order to hide the identity of the complainants, the committee constituted by the principal of the college to inquire into the complaint considered it proper not to record the statements of the complainants in the presence of the appellants. However, to be sure about the identity of the appellants who were alleged to have misbehaved with the complainants and leaving nothing to chance, the committee had shown photographs of a number of male students which also included the photographs of the appellants. The complainants, more or less, could identify them. Explanations were called for from the appellants, which did not satisfy the committee. On the basis of the statements of the complainants, the explanations furnished by the appellants, and the report of the committee, the Principal came to a finding that the complaint was true and that the appellants had, in fact, misbehaved with the complainants. This resulted in the expulsion of the appellants from the college by the Principal. The matter having been carried to the Supreme Court, it was held that under the circumstances of the case, the requirements of natural justice were fulfilled. In paragraph 10 of the decision, the Supreme Court recorded its satisfaction that the members of the committee, which was entrusted with the duty of inquiry, had been meticulous to see that no injustice was done. The only question was of identity of the delinquent students. In paragraph 10 of the decision, the Supreme Court recorded its satisfaction that the members of the committee, which was entrusted with the duty of inquiry, had been meticulous to see that no injustice was done. The only question was of identity of the delinquent students. The names of the delinquents had been specifically mentioned in the complaint and, not leaving anything to chance, the committee obtained photographs of the four delinquents and mixed them up with photographs of twenty other students. By and large, the complainants identified delinquent students from the photographs. In paragraph 11 of the decision, applicability of rules of natural justice was discussed, and ultimately the appeal stood dismissed. 44. Hira Nath Mishra (supra) cannot be read as an authority for the proposition that whenever the victim of outrageous conduct of a male member is a female member and the male member is proceeded against as an accused or as delinquent, the statement of the victim has to be recorded in the absence of the accused/delinquent or that he would have no right to cross-examine the victim. Neither the landmark decision in Vishaka (supra) nor the provisions of section 11 of the 2013 Act conceive of a situation of denying the accused/delinquent the opportunity of hearing what the victim has to say against him or the opportunity to cross-examine her. Even in terms of the proviso to rule 9(2) of the DA Rules, the rules governing departmental inquiry have to be followed, as far as practicable. The WRPC did not record any reason as to why it would not be feasible to allow the victim to record her statement in the presence of Mr. Sarkar and also as to why he should be denied the opportunity to cross-examine her. 45. Irrespective of our preceding observations, we are inclined to the view that the decision in Hira Nath Mishra (supra) can, at best, justify the approach of the WRPC in not recording the statement of the victim in the presence of Mr. Sarkar as well as not extending an opportunity to Mr. Sarkar to cross-examine her. However, what has troubled us is the approach of the WRPC in not recording the statements of Sri P.K. Tiwari, Sri K.L. Das and Sri A.K. Ghosh, all male railway servants, in the presence of Mr. Sarkar as well as not extending opportunity to him to cross-examine them. Sarkar to cross-examine her. However, what has troubled us is the approach of the WRPC in not recording the statements of Sri P.K. Tiwari, Sri K.L. Das and Sri A.K. Ghosh, all male railway servants, in the presence of Mr. Sarkar as well as not extending opportunity to him to cross-examine them. It has not been shown by Mr. Chatterjee from the DA Rules that in case of an inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment of a lady at the work place or beyond the work place, the accused/delinquent does not have a right to claim that statements of witnesses should be recorded in his presence and also that he cannot claim a right of cross-examination of such witnesses. 46. Mr. Sarkar being a railway servant was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution, clause (2) whereof provides: (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges." 47. We had invited Mr. Chatterjee to peruse the decision of a learned Judge of this Court [Hon'ble D.N. Sinha, J. (as the Hon'ble Chief Justice then was)] in the decision reported in (A.R.S. Choudhury v. The Union of India, (1956) AIR Calcutta 662). It also arose out of departmental proceedings initiated against a railway servant. To our mind, the said decision is a locus classicus. Even at the dawn of the Constitution, when principles relating to departmental proceedings were yet to evolve fully, His Lordship in a short essay delineated the contours of how a departmental proceeding ought to be conducted without leaving any scope for the delinquent to complain at a later stage that either he had not been told what the charges against him are or that he had been condemned unheard. While considering what 'reasonable opportunity' connotes, His Lordship noted that the words have not been defined in the Constitution or in the General Clauses Act but observed that the same have a legal meaning. It could not be left to the vagaries of each individual, since that would introduce a thousand shades of reasonableness which is impermissible. While considering what 'reasonable opportunity' connotes, His Lordship noted that the words have not been defined in the Constitution or in the General Clauses Act but observed that the same have a legal meaning. It could not be left to the vagaries of each individual, since that would introduce a thousand shades of reasonableness which is impermissible. His Lordship, bearing the aforesaid principles in mind (the delinquent must be told clearly and specifically of the offences with which it is intended to charge him and he must not be condemned unheard), comprehended the procedure to be followed in a departmental enquiry as comprised of four main stages, viz. (a) charge, (b) investigation of the charge, (c) finding and punishment, and (d) appeal. While dealing with 'investigation of the charge', His Lordship observed: "The question often arises as to whether, after a person has submitted his written explanation, there should be a personal hearing or not. Ordinarily there must be a personal hearing. If a person is entitled to show cause, he is entitled to a hearing, and if he is entitled to a hearing, he must have the opportunity of being personally heard, of calling his own evidence and cross-examining any witness called by the prosecution." 48. Right of cross-examination has invariably been recognised as a basic right of an accused/delinquent in proceedings, criminal or departmental. If an inquiry is conducted without extending the opportunity of cross-examination to a delinquent and findings are returned adverse to his interest, he can legitimately complain before the Court that he has been denied 'reasonable opportunity' to defend himself. If the allegation is found to be correct, the proceeding would stand completely vitiated. We need not refer to further authorities to support such conclusion of ours. Even though the WRPC may have been justified in protecting the victim, we find absolutely no justification in its approach in having the statements of the said three railway servants recorded in the absence of Mr. Sarkar and more importantly, by not extending the opportunity of their cross-examination by Mr. Sarkar. Mr. Chatterjee, despite his earnest efforts, has not been able to satisfy us that such a glaring procedural defect should be given a go bye. 49. We find this to be sufficient to nullify the proceedings of inquiry. 50. Sarkar and more importantly, by not extending the opportunity of their cross-examination by Mr. Sarkar. Mr. Chatterjee, despite his earnest efforts, has not been able to satisfy us that such a glaring procedural defect should be given a go bye. 49. We find this to be sufficient to nullify the proceedings of inquiry. 50. However, since perversity in the findings is writ large and A.K. Chopra (supra) has been cited, we consider it proper to go that extra mile to nullify the proceedings on yet another ground (that of perversity). We hasten to record that such a course is available even in terms of A.K. Chopra (supra). 51. It is a decision rendered by the Supreme Court on a civil appeal arising out of the decision of the Delhi High Court interfering with an order of removal from service ordered by the disciplinary authority of the respondent, since confirmed by his appellate authority, for sexual harassment of a woman at her workplace. The respondent was working as private secretary to the Chairman of the appellant. The victim was an employee of the appellant, employed as clerk-cum-typist. The decision dwells upon various aspects of the power of judicial review exercisable by the courts of writ. Paragraph 16 of the decision has been heavily relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee together with paragraphs 27 and 28. 52. There cannot be any doubt about the proposition of law laid down in such paragraphs. However, we feel that appropriate guidance can be had from paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said decision which are quoted below: "16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole factfinding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 AllER 141 observed: "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court." 17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority." 53. A.K. Chopra (supra) also lays down the law that interference by the High Court in writ jurisdiction would not be proper unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. 54. Our pursuit has been to find out whether based on perverse findings and without extending 'reasonable opportunity' of defence, Mr. Sarkar has been punished or not. 55. We have not faulted the approach of the WRPC in protecting the victim from facing Mr. Sarkar while recording her statement. Given this situation, the statements of the victim can be believed if her versions of the incident are not self-contradictory or/and having stated that someone else was witness to the incident of sexual harassment meted out to her by Mr. Sarkar, such witnesses completely corroborate her version. From the depositions of the victim as well as the witnesses extracted supra, we regret to record a finding that the victim failed on both counts: (i) her statements were self-contradictory; and (ii) her version before the WRPC is not corroborated by the witnesses (Sri K.L. Das and Smt. Meera Bhagat) produced by the management who, according to her, were eyewitnesses. 56. Although in the written complaint the incident of sexual harassment was alleged to have taken place at Howrah railway station, the version of the victim before the WRPC was that the incident occurred at Santragachi railway station. We have indicated above how the WRPC went completely wrong in downplaying the discrepancy. Although it was the victim's statement that while she was 'alighting from a train' the incident of harassment took place, the findings in the report of inquiry record that "she mentioned that this happened while boarding train". We have indicated above how the WRPC went completely wrong in downplaying the discrepancy. Although it was the victim's statement that while she was 'alighting from a train' the incident of harassment took place, the findings in the report of inquiry record that "she mentioned that this happened while boarding train". It is clear that the oral evidence of the victim has been misread by the WRPC to return a finding of guilt against Mr. Sarkar. That apart, although the victim alleged that almost everyone in Santragachi knows about her harassment and she had specifically named Sri K.L. Das and Smt. Meera Bhagat as eye-witnesses, Sri K.L. Das and Smt. Meera Bhagat deposed before the WRPC that they had not witnessed any such incident of sexual harassment of the victim by Mr. Sarkar. 57. Perusal of the inquiry report further reveals the WRPC's formation of opinion that Smt. Meera Bhagat had turned hostile since she was under some disability to speak the truth. Reference was sought to be made to her demeanour. According to the report, while statements of a witness are recorded, the body language, expressions, pauses in conversation and look of the eyes are not recorded which are equally important indicators in themselves. The members unanimously agreed that she was not disclosing anything out of fear. 58. Although a departmental inquiry is not conducted with the rigidity of a criminal trial, there is no legal embargo to note the demeanour of a witness while her statement is being recorded in course of a departmental inquiry. After all, every departmental inquiry ought to be conducted fairly and without any element of bias to achieve a particular result that the disciplinary authority has in mind. If indeed the body language, expressions, pauses in conversation and look of the eyes were so very vital for it to arrive at the conclusion that Smt. Meera Bhagat was not disclosing the truth out of fear, it was the duty of the WRPC to record the same while recording her statement instead of making post-facts observations. Indeed, Mr. Sarkar was advised in course of recording of his statement to stick to the issue and refrain from commenting about the victim's conduct. If such advice could be recorded, there was no earthly reason as to why the demeanour had not been recorded. Indeed, Mr. Sarkar was advised in course of recording of his statement to stick to the issue and refrain from commenting about the victim's conduct. If such advice could be recorded, there was no earthly reason as to why the demeanour had not been recorded. We also wonder in such case, why, if at all, was it required to obtain the declaration from Smt. Meera Bhagat that her statement was given out of her own accord and in sound mental and physical health. Having obtained such declaration, we feel that it was not open to the WRPC to discard the evidence of Smt. Meera Bhagat by referring to her demeanour. 59. Further, perusal of the answer of Sri P.K. Tiwari to question no. 16, extracted supra, would reveal that he had been spoon fed as to what the answer should be. There was no presenting officer and all questions were put to the witnesses by the WRPC. In such a situation, the WRPC was supposed to act impartially but the manner in which the inquiry was conducted leaves a lot to be desired. 60. Moreover, we wished to peruse the alleged letter written by Mr. Sarkar to the victim as well as his sample hand writing, on which reliance had been placed by the WRPC. It is indeed surprising that neither Mr. Chatterjee nor the officer instructing him could find from the records of inquiry the original letter alleged to have been written by Mr. Sarkar to the victim as well as the sample hand writing of Mr. Sarkar, which the WRPC had obtained from him; and which, according to Sri P.K. Tiwari, must have been written by Mr. Sarkar notwithstanding the alleged distortion attempted by him. This inability casts a shadow on the answer that Sri P.K. Tiwari gave in response to such question and an inference can legitimately be drawn that had such documentary evidence been produced, it would have not suited the management's cause. 61. We further find that the defence of Mr. Sarkar was not considered at all. It is not the law that whenever a victim of sexual harassment at workplace asserts her case in course of inquiry and the same is rebutted by the accused/delinquent, a presumption could be drawn that harassment had taken place and it is for the accused/delinquent to disprove the charge. Sarkar was not considered at all. It is not the law that whenever a victim of sexual harassment at workplace asserts her case in course of inquiry and the same is rebutted by the accused/delinquent, a presumption could be drawn that harassment had taken place and it is for the accused/delinquent to disprove the charge. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court from its decision reported in (Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer, (1985) 3 SCC 378 ), we observe that the WRPC did not permit a peep into its mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to it in preference to the evidence produced by Mr. Sarkar. Reasons had to be assigned why the evidence produced by Mr. Sarkar did not appeal to it to be credit-worthy. Omission to assign reasons does make the report vulnerable. 62. Finally, we note, again with some degree of concern, that the respondents were not diligent in proving the charge against Mr. Sarkar with the result that the victim is exposed to being branded as 'untruthful'. The victim had asserted that Mr. Sarkar was pestering her on the mobile phone time and again for which she had to change her number. If an effort had been made to check the call-list details of both Mr. Sarkar and the victim, the truth could have been unearthed easily. No effort worth the name was made in this direction and we have no other option left but to hold that the entire exercise has been rendered futile. 63. Mr. Chatterjee might be right in his contention that it is not for the writ court in exercise of judicial review powers to re-appreciate and/or re-appraise evidence but whether a finding is perverse or not, i.e., based on any evidence or not, cannot be ascertained unless the Court reads the evidence as a whole. We are yet to find an authority having the effect of a binding precedent which lays down the law that a finding of a perversity can be arrived at without looking into the evidence. We are yet to find an authority having the effect of a binding precedent which lays down the law that a finding of a perversity can be arrived at without looking into the evidence. Our endeavour to highlight the contradictions as well as lack of corroboration together with the flaws that crept in in the inquiry proceedings, is not intended to upset the factual findings rendered by the WRPC on the ground that another view was possible, but is intended to project and hold that on the materials before the WRPC, only one conclusion was plausible and that is, the management had failed to establish the charge of sexual harassment owing to complete lack of incriminating evidence and that 'reasonable opportunity' of defence had been denied to Mr. Sarkar. This much, we feel, the High Court is competent to record in exercise of its power of judicial review. 64. We are also of the view that the decision of the disciplinary authority to impose the penalty of removal on Mr. Sarkar with partial retirement benefits as well as the decision of the appellate authority scaling down such punishment to that of reduction in rank for five years, was not arrived at after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice in that Mr. Sarkar had not been accorded reasonable opportunity to defend the charge of sexual harassment and did not receive fair treatment to meet the case against him. Following the dictum in A.K. Chopra (supra), we hold the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority to be bad and indefensible. 65. For the reasons aforesaid, the appellate order dated December 8, 2010 stands set aside with the result that Mr. Sarkar is entitled to reinstatement in service on such post he held prior to the order of removal dated August 27, 2010 was passed, i.e., Senior Welfare Inspector. However, we have been informed that Mr. Sarkar had not joined as Junior Clerk pursuant to the order of the appellate authority even without prejudice to his rights and contentions in proceedings initiated by him challenging the appellate order and by this time five years have passed. It could either be the audacity of Mr. Sarkar not to join in a lower post, or could be the action of a self-respecting person who believes in himself that he did no wrong. 66. It could either be the audacity of Mr. Sarkar not to join in a lower post, or could be the action of a self-respecting person who believes in himself that he did no wrong. 66. Be that as it may, we are of the further considered view that interest of justice would be sufficiently served if Mr. Sarkar's employer is not saddled with the liability of effecting payment of back wages. We make it clear that Mr. Sarkar shall not be entitled to any financial benefit for the period of his absence from the date of removal till resumption of duty in terms of this order. However, such period of absence shall count only for computing his retrial benefits as and when such occasion arises. It is also made clear that the victim shall not be posted in the same office where Mr. Sarkar shall be permitted to resume his duty. Let Mr. Sarkar be allowed such resumption immediately on production of a copy of this judgment and order by him before his appointing authority. 67. With the aforesaid modification of the order of the tribunal, the writ petition as well as the application for vacating interim order stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 68. The file containing records of inquiry shall be returned to Ms. Chanda, learned advocate-on-record for the petitioners by the Assistant Court Officer who shall obtain an acknowledgement of receipt from her. I agree – Bibek Chaudhuri, J.