K. N. R. Muzaffarpur, Barauni Tollways Private Limited v. State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary cum Commissioner
2019-03-14
ARVIND SRIVASTAVA, JYOTI SARAN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : JYOTI SARAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. Amit Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2860 of 2019 and Mr. Sandip Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in second writ petition, i.e., C.W.J.C. No. 3208 of 2019. Mr. Vikash Kumar, learned S.C.11 appears for the State. 2. In the nature of the order that we intend to pass, we do not need to discuss the merits of the case because the issue is to be resolved on the basis of the stipulation present in Section 25(2) read with the proviso attached to rule 21(2) of the Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and the Rules framed thereunder. 3. The two petitioners herein were identically proceeded for re-assessment on scrutiny, in exercise of power vested in the Assessing Authority under Section 25(2) read with Rule 21 of the Rules framed under ‘the Act’ for the period 2014-15 and 2013-14 respectively. Though Mr. Shrivastava and Mr. Sandip Kumar do contest the initiation on many a grounds, but for the purpose of disposal, we are persuaded to restrict ourselves to the issue of limitation so raised by the learned counsel, to question the initiation for, according to them, the proceedings initiated in the year 2018 are hopelessly time barred and much beyond the limitation period prescribed in Section 25(2) read along side Rule 21 thereof. It is submitted by learned counsel that while the notice relatable to the Assessment Years 2014-15 and 2013-14 respectively was issued on 20.03.2018 vide Annexure-4, the final order passed on 28.03.2018 at Annexure-6 to the writ petition even when the statutory prescriptions do not permit scrutiny beyond 31st March, 2016 for the Assessment Year 201415 and 31st March, 2014, in so far as Assessment Year 2013-14 is concerned. 4. Learned counsel in reference to the notices present at Annexures 3 and 4 to each of the two writ petitions submit that while there is a confusion as regarding the initiation, admittedly, the order was passed on 28.03.2018 and which is hit by the limitation prescribed under the proviso attached to Rule 21(2), which allows time to the Assessing Authority to carry out scrutiny and return his finding before the end of the year following the year to which the return relates.
According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the two cases, since the year to which the return relates is 2014-15 and 201314 respectively, any scrutiny, as per the statutory prescriptions is permissible only until 31st March, 2016 in so far as the year 2014-15 is concerned and 31st March, 2015 in so far as the year 2013-14 is concerned, but not beyond that. It is, thus, submitted that since undisputedly the proceedings have been initiated much beyond the limitation period and the final orders passed even thereafter, the orders are unsustainable. 5. Mr. Vikash Kumar, learned S.C.11 appearing for the State in each of the two cases though attempts to defend the order impugned, but considering the facts on record which speak for themselves and applying them to the statutory provisions underlying Section 25 read with the proviso attached to Rule 21(2) of the Rules, in our opinion, the attempt is defenseless for the proceedings initiated against the two petitioners are hopelessly time barred and, accordingly, cannot be sustained. 6. The term year is defined under Section 2(zi) of the Act and means a financial year. Section 25(2) read with the proviso to rule 21(2) confirms that any scrutiny can only be carried out by the end of the year following the year in question. As already discussed, the year following in the case of the years 2014-15 and 2013-14 would be 2015-16 and 2014-15 respectively. Meaning thereby in each of the two cases the scrutiny had to be done by 31.03.2016 and 31.03.2015 respectively. Now while the notices on record indicate initiation on 20.03.2018 or thereafter, there is neither anything in the counter affidavit(s) filed nor anything was brought to our notice to counter the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners, that the scrutiny was not carried out within the limitation period. In such situation, the result is a foregone conclusion. 7. In result, the orders passed by the Assessing Authority dated 28.03.2018 together with the demand notice impugned at Annexure-6 and Annexure-7 respectively to each of the two writ petitions for the period 2014-15 and 2013-14 respectively cannot be upheld and are accordingly set aside. 8. The writ petitions are allowed.