Prof. P. L. Vishweshwar Rao v. State of Telangana, Rep. By Its Chief Secretary to Government
2019-11-22
A.ABHISHEK REDDY, R.S.CHAUHAN
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Raghvendra Singh Chauhan, J. 1. Professor P. L. Vishweshwar Rao, a public spirited person, who also happens to be the Convener of Telangana Democratic Forum, and Vice-President of Telangana Janasamithi, has filed the present Public Interest Litigation in order to challenge the legality of the Cabinet decision dated 02.11.2019, whereby the Cabinet has decided to grant 5,100 stage carriage permits to private transport operators. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation ('the Corporation', for short), respondent No. 3, was formerly the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. The Corporation was created in 2016. Presently, there are about 48,000 persons who work for the said Corporation. The Corporation has a fleet of about 10,500 buses, and plies its buses on 3,726 notified routes throughout the State of Telangana. 3. The trade unions, representing the interests of the workmen, had issued notice to the Corporation in September, 2019, wherein they had claimed that if their demands were not met by the Corporation, and by the State Government, they would go on strike. Despite the best efforts of the Conciliation Officer under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the conciliation proceedings did not fructify into a settlement between the workmen and the Corporation. Therefore, on 05.10.2019, the workers of the Corporation went on strike. Even today, the strike continues to be observed by the trade unions. During the continuation of the strike, on 02.11.2019, the State Cabinet has taken a decision to grant 5,100 stage carriage permits to private transport operators. Aggrieved by the said decision, the present PIL has been filed. 4. Mr. Prabhakar Chikkudu, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court:- Firstly, Article 31B of the Constitution of India provides protection to the Acts, and Regulations, which are specified in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Item 125 of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India specifically mentions Section 66A, and Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. According to the learned counsel, Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is presently Chapter VI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act of 1988', for short). Therefore, according to the learned counsel, Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 has a constitutional protection.
According to the learned counsel, Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is presently Chapter VI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act of 1988', for short). Therefore, according to the learned counsel, Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 has a constitutional protection. Secondly, Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 deals with the "Special Provisions Relating to State Transport Undertakings". Therefore, it covers the Corporation. Thirdly, according to Section 98 of the Act of 1988, the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, and the Rules and orders made there under, shall have effect "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter V, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law". Therefore, according to the learned counsel, Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 has paramountcy over Chapter V of the Act. Fourthly, Chapter V of the Act of 1988 deals with "control of transport vehicles". Although Section 67 of the Act of 1988 empowers the State Government "to control road transport", but the power given under the said provision is not unbridled and cannot be invoked in order to dilute, or derail the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988. Fifthly, Section 99 of the Act of 1988 empowers the State Government to prepare, and publish a proposal regarding road transport service of a State Transport Undertaking. These schemes have to be formulated by the State Government. According to Section 99(2) of the Act of 1988, once a scheme has been published in favour of the Road Transport Corporation, no person can be granted a permit permanently in the routes notified. Only a temporary permit can be granted and that too, for a period of one year. Moreover, according to Section 104 of the Act of 1988, once an area or route has been notified, no permit can be granted by the State Government. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the decision of the State Cabinet to grant stage carriage permits to 5,100 buses belonging to the private transport operators is clearly in violation of not only Section 99 and Section 104 of the Act of 1988, but also the said decision tends to subordinate Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 to Chapter V of the Act of 1988.
Since the said decision is contrary to the statutory provisions, it is an arbitrary and unreasonable decision. Since the said decision is against the statutory provisions, relying on the case of Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 502 , the learned counsel pleads that the State Cabinet decision can be subjected to the power of judicial review. Hence, it should be struck down by this Court. Sixthly, the grant of permits to private transport operators would entail laying off of workers of the Corporation. Hence, the Cabinet decision violates the fundamental rights of the workers under Articles 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Lastly, during the strike by the workmen, both the Management of the Corporation, and the State Government are under a legal duty to negotiate with the workmen, under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act ('the ID Act', for short). Therefore, the decision taken on 02.11.2019 by the State Cabinet is in bad faith. Highlighting the attitude of the State Government, the learned counsel has further pleaded that the Government is working with an ulterior motive of eliminating the Corporation. Therefore, the impugned decision is based on the ulterior motive of destroying the Corporation, and of ushering the private transport operators. Relying on the case of Brij Mohan Lal (supra), the learned counsel submits that since the Cabinet decision is based on an ulterior motive, since the decision has been taken in bad faith, since the decision is arbitrary and unreasonable, the Cabinet decision deserves to be set aside by this Court. 5. On the other hand, Mr. B.S. Prasad, the learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana, has submitted the following counter-arguments:- Firstly, the protection provided under Article 31B of the Constitution of India is to a challenge to an Act, or Regulation on the ground that it violates the fundamental rights as prescribed in Part III of the Constitution of India. However, none of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 are being challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates the fundamental rights of the people. Therefore, the protection provided by Article 31B of the Constitution of India read with Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India to Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 would not come to the rescue of the petitioner.
Therefore, the protection provided by Article 31B of the Constitution of India read with Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India to Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 would not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Secondly, while interpreting an Act, all the provisions would necessarily have to be read together; each Chapter would have to be assigned its distinct position, but within the architectural scheme of the Act. Thirdly, Section 98 of the Act of 1988 while granting paramouncy to the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, clearly contains the words that the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything "inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter V". However, it is not the case of the petitioner that there is any inconsistency between Chapter V and Chapter VI of the Act of 1988. In fact, both the Chapters will have to be read simultaneously in order to concretise the intention of Parliament. Fourthly, Section 67 of the Act of 1988 has recently been amended on 01.09.2019. While the provisions of Section 67(1) of the Act of 1988 have been replaced by a new provision, Section 67(3) of the Act of 1988 is a newly added portion of the said Section. According to the learned Advocate General, while interpreting the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, the intention, the purpose, and the philosophy behind the amended Section 67 of the Act of 1988 would have to be kept in mind. For, according to the learned Advocate General, Section 67 of the Act of 1988 bestows a complete power on the State Government "to control the road transport". Moreover, Section 67(1)(d) of the Act of 1988 clearly states that the State Government shall have control over the transportation having regard to "promote effective competition amongst the transport service providers". The words "transport service providers", according to the learned Advocate General, would necessarily include the State Transport Corporation. Further, the use of the word "competition" clearly indicates that the Government can introduce an element of competition between the State Transport Corporation, and another entity. The only requirement of Section 67(1) of the Act of 1988 is that such a competition should be introduced while keeping in mind "the passengers' convenience, economically competitive fares, prevention of overcrowding, and road safety".
The only requirement of Section 67(1) of the Act of 1988 is that such a competition should be introduced while keeping in mind "the passengers' convenience, economically competitive fares, prevention of overcrowding, and road safety". Fifthly, Section 67(3) of the Act of 1988, which is a newly inserted provision, begins with a non-obstante clause, and empowers the State to make a scheme for transportation of passengers, and to modify any permit issued under the Act. Moreover, the said power will have to be read necessarily in conjunction with Section 102 of the Act of 1988, which falls within Chapter VI of the Act of 1988. Section 102 of the Act of 1988 empowers the State Government to modify any approved scheme after following certain procedure. Therefore, the decision taken by the Cabinet to invoke its power under Section 67(1)(d) of the Act of 1988, and to initiate the procedure prescribed under Section 102 of the Act of 1988, according to the learned Advocate General, is strictly in conformity with the law. Hence, the said decision is neither arbitrary, nor unreasonable. In fact, it is reasonable, just and fair. Sixthly, although the introduction of private transport operators may lead to retrenchment of workers, but the retrenchment would be due to a procedure and power prescribed by law. Therefore, the impugned decision does not violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Seventhly, considering the plight of the people of the State during the strike, considering the need to infuse fresh blood into the transport sector, considering the fact that the Corporation was running in the red, it was imperative for the Cabinet to take a decision to let in the private transport operators. The decision not only makes the transport sector a competitive one, but also strengthens the same for the benefit of the people at large. Therefore, the decision cannot be said to be taken, either "with an ulterior motive", or "in bad faith". According to the learned Advocate General, it is the primary duty, and sovereign function of the State to ensure that transportation is readily provided to the people at large. Therefore, the decision is a reasonable one keeping in mind the entire scheme, and the intention, and the purpose of Section 67 read with Section 102 of the Act of 1988.
According to the learned Advocate General, it is the primary duty, and sovereign function of the State to ensure that transportation is readily provided to the people at large. Therefore, the decision is a reasonable one keeping in mind the entire scheme, and the intention, and the purpose of Section 67 read with Section 102 of the Act of 1988. Lastly, according to the learned Advocate General, although the petitioner claims that the decision has been taken in bad faith and taken with ulterior motive, no evidence has been led to establish the same. Therefore, merely jumping to conclusions, without evidentiary basis, does not strengthen the arguments of the petitioner. Hence, according to the learned Advocate General, the petition deserves to be dismissed by this Court. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the Cabinet decision. 7. According to the learned Advocate General, the Cabinet decision is a confidential document. Therefore, the contents of the Cabinet decision are not being reproduced in the judgment. Suffice it to say, the crux of the Cabinet decision is that permission is granted to the State Transport Authority to initiate the due process as contained in Section 102 of the Act of 1988, for granting 5,100 stage carriage permits to private transport operators while invoking the power under Section 67(1)(d) of the Act of 1988. Article 31B of the Constitution of India is as under:- 31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations:-Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. 8.
8. A bare perusal of the said Article clearly reveals that it merely provides a protection to the Acts, and Regulations mentioned in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India from being challenged on the ground that the provisions of said Act abridge "any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part", meaning thereby, Part III of the Constitution of India. Admittedly, item 125 of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India, does mention Chapter IVA of the Act of 1939, which is presently the Chapter VI of the Act of 1988. Therefore, Article 31B of the Constitution of India merely states that the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 cannot be challenged on the ground that the provisions abridge, or violate any of the rights conferred under Part III of the Constitution of India. However, the petitioner has not challenged any of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 as being violative of Part III of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since Article 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India protects Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, therefore the Cabinet decision violates Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, such an argument is highly misplaced. 9. Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, as its title suggests, prescribes 'Special Provisions Relating to State Transport Undertakings'. The said Chapter has existed since 1988. While interpreting the said Chapter, it cannot be forgotten that in 1950, the Parliament had already enacted the Road Transportation Corporation Act. In 1950, since the country was newly liberated, it was imperative that the transport sector should be run by a public undertaking. For, at the relevant time, there was no private entity large enough to ply the buses for large areas of a State. Hence, it was imperative to create the Road Transport Corporations under the said Act. Keeping this in mind, Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 emphasised the creation and continuation, the prosperity and promotion of the State Transport Corporations. It is in this light that Sections 98, 99 and Section 104 of the Act of 1988 were framed. 10.
Hence, it was imperative to create the Road Transport Corporations under the said Act. Keeping this in mind, Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 emphasised the creation and continuation, the prosperity and promotion of the State Transport Corporations. It is in this light that Sections 98, 99 and Section 104 of the Act of 1988 were framed. 10. It is, indeed, trite to state that while interpreting the provisions of an Act, a holistic view of the Act has to be taken: an Act cannot be read in piecemeal. Therefore, while interpreting the provisions of Chapter V and Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, each provision would have to be interpreted in the light of other provisions existing in the Chapter and in the Act. 11. Section 98 of the Act of 1988 is as under:- 98. Chapter to override Chapter V and other laws:-The provisions of this Chapter and the rules and orders made there under shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter V or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. 12. While the said provision does provide supremacy to the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, but the supremacy is limited only to the extent when there is "an inconsistency between the provisions of Chapter VI and Chapter V of the Act of 1988". It is not the petitioner's case that there is an inconsistency between the provisions of Chapter VI and Chapter V of the Act of 1988. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is mistaken in claiming that primacy has to be given to Chapter VI over Chapter V of the Act of 1988. For, the situation envisaged in Section 98 of the Act of 1988 has not even arisen in the present case. Hence, the said contention is unsustainable. 13. Section 99 of the Act of 1988 reads as under:- 99.
For, the situation envisaged in Section 98 of the Act of 1988 has not even arisen in the present case. Hence, the said contention is unsustainable. 13. Section 99 of the Act of 1988 reads as under:- 99. Preparation and publication of proposal regarding road transport service of a State Transport Undertaking:-(1) Where any State Government is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State Government may formulate a proposal regarding a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and other relevant particulars respecting thereto and shall publish such proposal in the Official Gazette of the State formulating such proposal and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route proposed to be covered by such scheme and also in such other manner as the State Government formulating such proposal deem fit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), when a proposal is published under that sub-section, then from the date of publication of such proposal, no permit shall be granted to any person, except a temporary permit during the pendency of the proposal and such temporary permit shall be valid only for a period of one year from the date of its issue or till the date of final publication of the scheme under section 100, whichever is earlier. Section 104 of the Act of 1988 reads as under:- 104.
Section 104 of the Act of 1988 reads as under:- 104. Restriction on grant of permits in respect of a notified area or notified route:-Where a scheme has been published under sub-section (3) of Section 100 in respect of any notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, shall not grant any permit except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme: Provided that where no application for a permit has been made by the State transport undertaking in respect of any notified area or notified route in pursuance of an approved scheme, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may grant temporary permits to any person in respect of such notified area or notified route subject to be condition that such permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State transport undertaking in respect of that area or route. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner is correct in claiming that Section 99 of the Act of 1988 casts a duty on the State Government to formulate schemes for the benefit of the State Transport Corporation. Under Section 99 of the Act of 1988, once the scheme is proposed, no permit shall be granted to any person, except temporary permit. Moreover, as per Section 104 of the Act of 1988, once a scheme has been published under sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the Act of 1988, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority shall not grant any permit for "the notified area, or notified route", except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. 15. However, Section 102 of the Act of 1988 also exists in Chapter VI of the Act of 1988. The analysis of, and discussion about the Section 102 of the Act of 1988 is essential for our purpose. 16. Section 102 of the Act of 1988 as under:- 102. Cancellation or Modification of Scheme:-(1) The State Government may, at any time, if it considers necessary, in the public interest so to do, modify any approved scheme after giving- (i) the State transport undertaking; and (ii) any other person who, in the opinion of the State Government, is likely to be affected by the proposed modification, an opportunity of being heard in respect of the proposed modification.
(2) The State Government shall publish any modification proposed under sub-section (1) in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers in the regional languages circulating in the area in which it is proposed to be covered by such modification, together with the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication in the Official Gazette, and the time and place at which any representation received in this behalf will be heard by the State Government. 17. A bare perusal of the said provision clearly reveals that the State Government is equally empowered "to modify any approved scheme". Such a power can be exercised "at any time", provided that the State Government comes to a conclusion that the modification of a scheme is both "necessary", and "in public interest". Section 102 (1) and (2) of the Act of 1988 further prescribe the procedure that is to be followed for modifying any approved scheme. According to the said procedure, before an approved scheme can be modified, a notice needs to be given to the State Transport Undertaking, and if in the opinion of the State Government, to any other person who may be affected by the proposed modification. Moreover, the proposed modified scheme needs to be published both in the official gazette, and in the newspaper in the regional languages circulated in the area, in which the proposed modified scheme is to come into effect. Furthermore, such a publication should contain the date, which cannot be less than thirty days from the date of publication in the official gazette, and the time, and the place where an opportunity of hearing would be given by the State Government to the State Transport Corporation, and/or to the person concerned who may be adversely affected by the proposed modification. Moreover, according to Section 102 of the Act of 1988, the decision has to be taken by the State Government, and by none else. Most importantly, the decision to modify a scheme shall be taken only after the government concludes that the modification is "necessary" and is "in public interest". 18. It is pertinent to note that sub-clause (ii) of Section 102 of the Act of 1988 speaks of an opportunity of being heard to the State Transport Undertaking and any other person, who in the opinion of the State Government is likely to be affected by the proposed modification.
18. It is pertinent to note that sub-clause (ii) of Section 102 of the Act of 1988 speaks of an opportunity of being heard to the State Transport Undertaking and any other person, who in the opinion of the State Government is likely to be affected by the proposed modification. An opportunity of being heard in respect of the proposed modification is not an empty formality, but it has to be scrupulously followed. The words ''any other person'' can include Road Transport of any other State, the Central Government, any other private bus operator or the RTC Workers or Union. 19. Since Sections 99, 104 and 102 of the Act of 1988 exist in Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, the first two provisions would have to be interpreted in the light of the last provision. A co-joint reading of these three provisions brings out certain salient features: (i) Section 99 of the Act of 1988 bestows the power to formulate a scheme, in favour of the State Transport Corporation, upon the government; Section 99 (2) of the Act of 1988 debars the government from granting a permanent permit to any other entity; (ii) Section 104 of the Act of 1988 further prohibits the government from granting any permit for a notified area or a notified route to any other entity, other than the State Transport Corporation. Yet, Section 102 of the Act of 1988 permits the government to modify the scheme if it is necessary and is in public interest. (ii) Thus, Section 102 of the Act of 1988 is an exception to Sections 99 and 104 of the Act of 1988. (iii) But notwithstanding the partial limitation on the government under Sections 99 and 104 of the Act of 1988, the government does have the power to modify the scheme under Section 102 of the Act of 1988. (iv) The state government has the power to modify the scheme provided such a modification is necessary and in public interest, and provided the procedure prescribed by Section 102 of the Act of 1988 is followed both in spirit and letter. Hence, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unjustified in claiming that in light of Sections 99 and 104 of the Act of 1988, the powers under Sections 67 and 102 of the Act of 1988 cannot be invoked by the State government. 20.
Hence, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unjustified in claiming that in light of Sections 99 and 104 of the Act of 1988, the powers under Sections 67 and 102 of the Act of 1988 cannot be invoked by the State government. 20. The interpretation being given by the learned counsel for the petitioner to Section 104 of the Act of 1988 that Section 104 of the Act of 1988 restricts the grant of permits in respect of notified areas, or notified routes, thereby impugning on the power of the State to modify the schemes under Section 102 of the Act of 1988 cannot be accepted. For, firstly, if such an interpretation were to be accepted, then in the light of Section 104 of the Act of 1988, Section 102 of the Act of 1988 will become otiose. An interpretation, which would make a provision otiose, is clearly unacceptable. Secondly, the permits granted under Section 104 of the Act of 1988 speak of permits qua notified areas, or notified routes. Whereas, the modification of scheme envisaged under Section 102 read with Section 67 of the Act of 1988 empower the Government to modify the scheme with regard to the grant of permits per se such as stage carriage permits. Therefore, the contention is clearly untenable. 21. Moreover, while interpreting the provision of Section 102 of the Act of 1988, the newly amended Section 67 of the Act of 1988, cannot be ignored. For, considering the change brought in by globalisation, considering the needs of the people, considering the heightened expectations of the people, considering the fact that the laissez faire and capitalist economy have come to rule, "competition" is more encouraged than discouraged. In order to improve the transport sector, in order to make it more competitive, in order to make it convenient for the passengers, in order to prevent overcrowding while ensuring road safety, Section 67 of the Act of 1988 was amended. Moreover, Section 67(3) of the Act of 1988 has recently been introduced on 01.09.2019. 22. Section 67 of the Act of 1988 is as under:- 67.
Moreover, Section 67(3) of the Act of 1988 has recently been introduced on 01.09.2019. 22. Section 67 of the Act of 1988 is as under:- 67. Power to State Government to control road transport:-(1) A State Government, having regard to- (a) the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of motor transport; (b) the desirability of co-ordinating road and rail transport; (c) the desirability of preventing the deterioration of the road system, and (d) promoting effective competition among the transport service providers, may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette issue directions both to the State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authority regarding the passengers' convenience, economically competitive fares, prevention of overcrowding and road safety. (2) Any direction under sub-section (1) regarding the fixing of fares and freights for stage carriages, contract carriages and goods carriages may provide that such fares or freights shall be inclusive of the tax payable by the passengers or the consignors of the goods, as the case may be, to the operators of the stage carriages, contract carriages or goods carriages under any law for the time being in force relating to tax on passengers and goods. Provided that the State Government may subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, and with a view to achieving the objectives specified in clause (d) of sub-section (1), relax all or any of the provisions made under this Chapter. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, modify any permit issued under this Act or make schemes for the transportation of goods and passengers and issue licences under such scheme for the promotion of development and efficiency in transportation- (a) last mile connectivity; (b) rural transport; (c) reducing traffic congestion; (d) improving urban transport; (e) safety of road users; (f) better utilisation of transportation assets; (g) the enhancement of economic vitality of the area, through competitiveness, productivity and efficiency; (h) the increase in the accessibility and mobility of people; (i) the protection and enhancement of the environment; (j) the promotion of energy conservation; (k) improvement of the quality of life; (l) enhance integration and connectivity of the transportation system, across and between modes of transport; and (m) such other matters as the Central Government may deem fit.
(4) The scheme framed under sub-section (3), shall specify the fees to be charged, form of application and grant of a licence including the renewal, suspension, cancellation or modification of such licence. 23. A bare perusal of the Sections 67 and 102 of the Act of 1988 clearly reveal that under the former provision, the power to control the road transportation is completely vested in the State Government. The said power necessarily has to be read with the power given to the State Government under Section 102 of the Act of 1988 contained in Chapter VI of the Act of 1988. A co-joint reading of Section 67 with Section 102 of the Act of 1988 clearly brings out certain relevant facet: (i) the State Government has ample power to control the road transportation, and (ii) the State Government has ample power to introduce competition amongst the transport service providers. The term "transport service providers" would include both the State Transport Corporation, and private operators from the private sector. Such a competition can be introduced by the State Government keeping in mind the parameters defined in Section 67(1) of the Act of 1988, namely, passengers' convenience, economically competitive fares, prevention of overcrowding, and road safety. 24. Sub-section (3) of Section 67 of the Act of 1988 goes a step further, and begins with the non-obstante clause with the words "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act", thereby it implies that the embargo contained in Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 can be ignored, while the State Government invokes its power under Section 67(3) of the Act of 1988. Under the said provision, the State Government may modify any permit issued under this Act, or make a scheme for transportation of passengers, for the promotion of development and efficiency in transport, for various reasons mentioned in sub-section (3)(a) to (m), which includes "enhancing integration and connectivity of the transport system, across and between modes of transport". The words "modes of transport" would also include, not only different modes of transport, but also different players who bring in the modes of transport. 25. Section 102 of the Act of 1988 necessarily has to be interpreted in light of the enormous power bestowed upon the State Government to control road transport under Section 67 of the Act of 1988.
25. Section 102 of the Act of 1988 necessarily has to be interpreted in light of the enormous power bestowed upon the State Government to control road transport under Section 67 of the Act of 1988. Section 102 is merely one of the means available to the State Government, for implementing the intention, and purpose of Section 67 of the Act of 1988. For, Section 102 of the Act of 1988 permits the State Government to modify any scheme, provided the modification is considered necessary, and in public interest. 26. Therefore, the State Government does have the power to take a decision to grant 5,100 permits to the private transport operators in compliance with Section 102 of the Act of 1988 while invoking its power under Section 67(1)(d) of the Act of 1988. 27. A bare perusal of the Cabinet decision dated 02.11.2019 clearly reveals that merely a "permission" has been granted to the State Transport Authority "to initiate the due process as prescribed under Section 102 of the Act of 1988". Therefore, the scheme for granting permit has yet to be formulated and procedure contemplated under Section 102 of the Act of 1988 yet to commence. Obviously, the permit can be granted only by following the procedure established under Section 102 read with other provisions, dealing with the grant of stage carriage permits, specified in Chapter V of the Act of 1988. Therefore, presently, merely a "permission" has been granted to initiate the process for modification of the scheme, and other relevant provisions, such as under Sections 102 and 72 of the Act of 1988, have yet to come into operation. Therefore, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a final decision to grant 5100 state carriage permits to the private transport operators has been taken by the Cabinet, the said argument is belied by the record. It is a misplaced argument; it is unacceptable. 28. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that since the Cabinet has taken the decision during the strike observed by the workmen, the decision is in bad faith. However, Section 102 of the Act of 1988 uses the words the State Government may "at any time" modify any approved scheme. Thus, the said provision does not bar the state government from taking such a decision during the period that the workmen are on strike.
However, Section 102 of the Act of 1988 uses the words the State Government may "at any time" modify any approved scheme. Thus, the said provision does not bar the state government from taking such a decision during the period that the workmen are on strike. Moreover, the said provision does not debar the government from initiating the procedure contained in Section 102 of the Act of 1988 during the period of strike. Furthermore, the decision has been taken when the entire bus transport sector has come to a grinding halt. The said decision has been taken when the people are reeling under the lack of availability of bus transport throughout the State. Thus, the decision has been taken in order to ameliorate the condition of the public at large. Hence, the learned Advocate General is justified in claiming that the decision is in public interest. Therefore, the argument that the decision is in bad faith is unacceptable. 29. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also voiced the anxiety of the workmen that in the garb of the decision dated 02.11.2019, the Corporation is likely to be eradicated by the government. However, the said anxiety is highly misplaced. For, obviously, the provisions of Chapter V and Chapter VI of the Act of 1988 will have to be necessarily balanced by the government while invoking its power under Section 102 read with Section 67 of the Act of 1988. 30. The State Government cannot ignore the fact that Section 102 of the Act of 1988 permits the State Government to modify the scheme, if and only if, the modification is "necessary", and "in public interest". The words "public interest" is not limited to the words "the interest of the public at large". But it would have to include, in its folds, "the interest of the workmen" working for the Corporation as well. 31. Further, since the Section also requires that a notice be issued to the State Transport Undertaking, obviously, the interests of the workmen of the Corporation have to be kept in mind. After all, the interests and welfare of the workmen cannot be ignored in light of Article 39 (b), (c) and (e) of the Constitution of India. 32. Furthermore, the word "Corporation" would have to be interpreted expansively to include the interests of the workmen.
After all, the interests and welfare of the workmen cannot be ignored in light of Article 39 (b), (c) and (e) of the Constitution of India. 32. Furthermore, the word "Corporation" would have to be interpreted expansively to include the interests of the workmen. Therefore, while following the procedure prescribed under Section 102 of the Act of 1988, not only the interest of the Management, but also the interests of workmen will have to be kept in mind before modifying any scheme under Section 102 of the Act of 1988. 33. Moreover, merely because the State Government has the power to invite private transport operators into the transport sector, the said power cannot be used to the extent of obliterating the very existence of the Corporation. A balance necessarily has to be struck between the primacy to be given to the State Transport Corporation under Chapter VI of the Act of 1988, which is protected under Article 31-B, read with Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India on one hand, and the power of the State under Section 67, read with Section 102 of the Act of 1988, to invite the private transport sector operators, on the other hand. Therefore, the state government cannot over look the architectural scheme of the relevant laws. 34. Further, Section 67(1)(d) of the Act of 1988 speaks of "competition". Competition can only be had if even-level playing field were provided, and if parties were permitted to compete. Thus, the word "competition" would not permit the State Government to have only the private transport operators functioning in the transport sector. Section 67(1)(d) of the Act of 1988 also points to the necessity of keeping the State Transport Corporation alive, progressive and prosperous. Therefore, the State Government would not be justified in claiming that while invoking its power under Section 67(1) read with Section 102 of the Act of 1988, it has an unfettered power to wipe out the Corporation. Such a power is neither envisaged, nor bestowed by the Act of 1988. 35. Furthermore, the Act of 1988 necessarily has to be read with the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Therefore, at best, the State Government would be justified in bringing in the private sector players only to the maximum extent of 50%, but not beyond.
Such a power is neither envisaged, nor bestowed by the Act of 1988. 35. Furthermore, the Act of 1988 necessarily has to be read with the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Therefore, at best, the State Government would be justified in bringing in the private sector players only to the maximum extent of 50%, but not beyond. Hence, while exercising the power under Sections 67 and 102 of the Act of 1988, the state government does not exercise an unbridled power. In fact, it is legally required to balance the conflicting interests of various stakeholders, and to judiciously decide about the induction of the private transport operators into the public transport sector. 36. According to Section 102 of the Act of 1988, the decision to modify a scheme necessarily has to be taken by the State Government. The State Government is represented by the Principal Secretary, Transport. However, the Cabinet decision, as mentioned hereinabove, in its succinct form, grants permission to the State Transport Authority. But the State Transport Authority has been constituted under Section 68 of the Act of 1988. The State Transport Authority is basically a quasi-judicial authority, which according to Section 68(3) of the Act of 1988, has the power to resolve the disputes, and to coordinate and regulate the activities, and policies of the Regional Transport Authority. Hence, the State Transport Authority does not personify the state government. Once this fact was pointed out to the learned Advocate General that the permission has been given to a quasi-judicial authority mentioned in Section 68 of the Act of 1988, rather than to the Principal Secretary, Transport, the learned Advocate General gives an undertaking, before this Court that, in fact, the procedure mentioned under Section 102 of the Act of 1988 shall be carried out by the Principal Secretary, Transport, Government of Telangana, and by none else. 37. Once this undertaking has been given by the learned Advocate General, once this Court has concluded that the State Government has ample power to take a decision to initiate the procedure under Section 102 of the Act of 1988, this Court does not find any fault with the impugned decision of the Cabinet dated 02.11.2019. 38. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the present writ petition; it is, hereby, dismissed. No order as to costs. 39.
38. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the present writ petition; it is, hereby, dismissed. No order as to costs. 39. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.