JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. The present revisional application has been preferred by the defendants in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, against an order whereby the trial court allowed an application for amendment of plaint taken out by the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1. 2. The reliefs originally claimed in the suit were as follows: "(a) A decree of declaration that the plaintiff company has every legal right or authority to run the business over the property in suit. (b) An order of permanent injunction may be passed against the defendants, and/or their men and agents restraining them from disturbing the plaintiff's peaceful possession over the suit property and/or from running the plaintiff's business over the same and/or from causing any disturbance or hindrance hampering the plaintiff's business over the suit property and/or from causing any demolition work within the suit property by the defendants and/or from changing the nature and character of the property in suit. (c) For all Costs of the suit. (d) Any other relief or reliefs the plaintiff in law and equity is entitled to get." 3. After institution of the suit on April 20, 2013, the defendants issued a notice to the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 on April 23, 2013, thereby asking the plaintiff to remove all its structures and belongings from the suit property within a period of seven days, further alleging that the property had been handed over to the Assistant Director of Fisheries, North 24 Parganas on April 22, 2013 and purportedly cancelling the licence agreement between the parties dated September 23, 1998 in terms of clause (3) thereof. 4. On May 14, 2013, the plaintiff made an application for amendment of plaint, narrating subsequent events, including the factum of issuance of the said notice and also alleging that the plaintiff was still in possession of the suit property. 5. 4. On May 14, 2013, the plaintiff made an application for amendment of plaint, narrating subsequent events, including the factum of issuance of the said notice and also alleging that the plaintiff was still in possession of the suit property. 5. By virtue of the said amendment, the plaintiff further sought to introduce the following additional reliefs: "(aa), Declaration that the purported notice dated 23rd April, 2013 and 2nd May, 2013 issued by the defendant No. 1 and the Memo No. 778-Fish/122-Secy/Fish dated 10th April, 2013 issued by the defendant No. 2 and the purported notice dated 29th April, 2013 referred to therein are malafide, arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal, null and void, unconstitutional and not binding on the plaintiff; (bb), The notice dated 23rd April, 2013 and 2nd May, 2013 issued by the defendant No. 1 being Annexure "F" hereto and the Memo No. 778-Fish/122-Secy/Fish dated 10th April 2013 issued by the defendant No. 2 referred to therein malafide, illegal, arbitrary and void declared, and be delivered up and ordered to be cancelled. (ba) Declaration that clause 3 of the agreement dated 23rd September, 1998 has been superseded by and/or rendered nugatory by the subsequent tripartite contract between the plaintiff and the defendants dated 15th December, 2010; (bb) Mandatory injunction directing the plaintiff to forthwith execute and caused to be registered a deed of lease in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff on the terms as recorded in the agreement dated 23rd September, 1998 to the extent not in consistent with the terms of the agreement dated 15th December, 2010; (bc) Declaration that the purported clause 3 contained in the said Agreement dated 23rd September, 1998 is illegal, void and unconstitutional; (dd) Order of temporary injunction as well as ad-interim injunction in terms of prayer (b) of the plaint." 6. Meanwhile, the opposite party no. 1 filed a writ petition, bearing W.P. No. 12681 (W) of 2013, against the said notice dated April 23, 2013, which was dismissed by a co-ordinate bench on April 30, 2013 in view of the opposite party no. 1 already having approached the civil court. A challenge was preferred against the said order, which resulted in an observation by the division bench taking up the appeal, directing the trial court to decide upon an injunction application of the opposite party no. 1, filed in connection with its suit. 7. 1 already having approached the civil court. A challenge was preferred against the said order, which resulted in an observation by the division bench taking up the appeal, directing the trial court to decide upon an injunction application of the opposite party no. 1, filed in connection with its suit. 7. The trial court, vide order dated May 17, 2013, granted temporary injunction restraining the defendants, that is, the present petitioners and the opposite party no. 2, their men and/or agents from disturbing the occupation and lawful actions of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 over the suit property till disposal of the suit. 8. The petitioners preferred an appeal bearing Miscellaneous Appeal No. 107 of 2013 against the said order of injunction, which was allowed on April 23, 2014, thereby setting aside the aforesaid order of injunction. 9. On the very next date, that is, April 24, 2014, the petitioners, as alleged by the opposite party no. 1, encircled the suit property with men and machines, thereby virtually preventing access of the opposite party no. 1 to the suit property. 10. The opposite party no. 1 preferred a revisional application, bearing C.O. No. 1375 of 2014, against the order of the appellate court setting aside the injunction order of the trial court. A co-ordinate bench of this Court, vide order dated September 17, 2015, allowed the said revisional application, thereby setting aside the order of the appellate court with several observations. It was observed inter alia that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property and had filed the suit, on which the trial court had protected its possession by a temporary injunction upon hearing both sides, directing the defendants not to disturb the peaceful possession and carriage of business of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1; but as soon as the order of the trial court was set aside, the State took action with the help of men and agents to get the premises barricaded so that the plaintiff could not run its business. The learned Single Judge further observed that the issue of recovery of possession could be taken up in the facts of the case by the plaintiff by way of an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the trial court, since the plaintiff in the case could not file a separate suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. It was also found by the learned Single Judge that the said bench had observed in an order dated April 25, 2014 that the State authorities tried to take possession by encircling the suit property with police personnel and preventing the petitioner from entering into the disputed premises. It was also observed that there were rival contentions of the parties as to their respective possession in respect of the property. It was held by the learned Single Judge that a serious issue was involved in the suit and it was desired that an order of status quo in respect of the suit premises be enforced in terms of the order of the Court. 11. The said order of the learned Single Judge, dated September 17, 2015 was challenged before the Supreme Court which found no justification to interfere with the impugned order but granted opportunity to the petitioners to file their written statements before the trial court, if permissible in law, on which eventuality it would be open to the petitioners to raise all pleas available to them in accordance with law. 12. On January 20, 2016 the opposite party no. 1 filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of possession, which was dismissed by the trial court on April 22, 2016. The opposite party no. 1 preferred C.O. No. 2270 of 2016 against such order, which a co-ordinate bench allowed on September 21, 2016, directing the trial judge to reconsider the application for restoration of possession in the light of the observations made therein. 13. A special leave petition was filed against such order, which was disposed of without interfering with the order of this court, permitting the petitioners to raise all pleas available to them before the concerned court. 14. The application for restoration of possession was heard afresh and allowed by the trial court vide Order No. 71 dated September 16, 2017, directing the defendants to restore possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within fifteen days from the date of the order. 15. A challenge was preferred against the said order directing restoration of possession, giving rise to C.O. No. 3396 of 2017, which was dismissed on contest vide order dated July 18, 2018, thereby affirming the order of restoration of possession. The opposite party no. 15. A challenge was preferred against the said order directing restoration of possession, giving rise to C.O. No. 3396 of 2017, which was dismissed on contest vide order dated July 18, 2018, thereby affirming the order of restoration of possession. The opposite party no. 1 was given the opportunity to approach the trial court to ensure compliance of the impugned order. A special leave petition was filed against the said order which was disposed of on July 27, 2018 in the following manner: "Considering the facts and circumstances in entirety, liberty is granted to respondent no.1, the plaintiff before the trial court, to file an amendment and the amendment shall be allowed. Respondent no. 1 would be entitled to make an additional prayer subject to payment of court fees, if any. The learned trial Judge shall dispose of the suit within a span of six months and report compliance to the Registry of this Court. In the meantime, status quo, as regards the suit property shall be maintained by all the parties. With the aforesaid modification in the order of the High Court, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, are deemed to have been disposed of." 16. After the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court, the amendment application dated May 14, 2013 came up for hearing before the trial judge. The same was allowed by an order dated August 9, 2018. The said order is quoted below: "Order no. 81 Dated 09.08.2018 Plaintiffs files hazira. Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 files hazira. Today is the date fixed for hearing of the amendment petition filed by the Plaintiffs. Defendant No. 1 files a computerized printed copy of Order passed in connection with Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 19881/2018 dated 27.07.2018 by the Hon'ble Apex Court of India and he prays for disposal of the suit in terms of the Order of the Hon'ble Apex Court of India. Perused the case record. Also perused the computerized printed copy of Order of the Hon'ble Apex Court of India dated 27.07.2018 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court of India has been pleased to give liberty to the Respondent No. 1/the Plaintiff to file amendment petition and the amendment petition shall be allowed. Perused the case record. Also perused the computerized printed copy of Order of the Hon'ble Apex Court of India dated 27.07.2018 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court of India has been pleased to give liberty to the Respondent No. 1/the Plaintiff to file amendment petition and the amendment petition shall be allowed. Further pleased to direct the Respondent No. 1/the Plaintiff to make additional prayer subject to payment of Court fees, if any. In the meantime status-quo, as regards the suit property shall be maintained by all parties. In compliance with the Order of the Hon'ble Apex Court of India, the amendment petition dated 14.05.2016 filed by the Respondent No. 1/the Plaintiff is allowed. Plaintiffs are directed to file amended plaint. Upon filing of the amended plaint the Defendants are at liberty to file additional written statement, if any subject to payment of Court fees assessed by the Sdr. The parties are hereby directed to participate in the disposal of the suit as early as possible as directed by the Hon'ble Apex Court of India within a span of six months. To 20.08.2018 for filing amended plaint. BC-I is directed to note in the register as well as cause title. 17. The amended plaint was filed pursuant to the said order on August 20, 2018. 18. On October 1, 2018 the petitioner filed a second amendment application, inter alia admitting that the State authorities (present petitioners) had taken possession of the suit property on April 24, 2014. Apart from the averments supporting such development, an additional relief of recovery of possession and damages was also sought to be incorporated in the plaint by virtue of the second amendment application. 19. Vide Order No. 90 dated November 28, 2018, the said second amendment application was allowed on contest with costs of Rs.2,000/- each payable to the defendants. Keeping in view the direction of the Supreme Court for disposal of the suit within a specified period, the trial judge gave a short time to the plaintiff to file amended plaint and the defendant to file additional written statement. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the judgment of the Supreme Court dated July 27, 2018, as quoted above, directed the plaintiff to file an amendment in the Trial Court, which was to be allowed. The plaintiff/opposite party no. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the judgment of the Supreme Court dated July 27, 2018, as quoted above, directed the plaintiff to file an amendment in the Trial Court, which was to be allowed. The plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 was also held to be entitled to make an additional prayer, subject to payment of court fees, if any. 21. It is argued that it is evident from the trial court's order dated August 9, 2018 that the trial court allowed the first amendment application of the plaintiff subsequent to the direction of the Supreme Court, "In compliance with the Order of the Hon'ble Apex Court of India". As such, since the said direction gave the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 a single opportunity to file amendment, the opposite party no. 1 was debarred from filing the second amendment application thereafter. It is submitted that the opposite party no. 1 took full advantage of the order of the Supreme Court in having the first amendment application allowed and did not point out to the Trial Court that the said amendment application had been filed previous to the order of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the opposite party no. 1 deposited additional court fees thereafter, giving rise to the presumption that both the parties and the court proceeded on the premise that the opposite party no. 1 had availed of the single window of opportunity granted by the Supreme Court. 22. It is further argued that, despite taking such opportunity, the opposite party no. 1 did not incorporate the additional relief of recovery of possession and as such, could not now be permitted to do so, taking advantage of the order of the Supreme Court twice over. It is argued that the opposite party no. 1 could very well have withdrawn its earlier amendment application and filed the second application for amendment, which the opposite party no. 1 chose not to do, thereby consciously exercising the right given to it by the Supreme Court and relinquishing any further right to incorporate such additional relief by a second amendment. 23. The second limb of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the allegations sought to be introduced by the second amendment are patently contradictory with those incorporated in the first amendment and the two are mutually exclusive with each other. It is argued that in paragraph nos. 23. The second limb of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the allegations sought to be introduced by the second amendment are patently contradictory with those incorporated in the first amendment and the two are mutually exclusive with each other. It is argued that in paragraph nos. 16.12 and 16.26 of the plaint, as it stood after the first amendment, the exclusive possession of the plaintiff was alleged. 24. However, the second amendment application sought inter alia to introduce the averment that the plaintiff was out of possession of the suit property since April 24, 2014. It is thus argued that, since the second amendment did not seek to delete the earlier averments, incorporated by the first amendment, the resultant position would be that, in the same plaint, the plaintiff alleges both that it was in, as well as out of, possession of the suit property at the same time. Such a contradictory stand, at the belated stage of the suit, was not permissible in law and would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. 25. In this context, the petitioners cite a judgment reported at [M/s Bayer India Ltd. and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (1993) 3 SCC 29 ], wherein it was held that the constitutional scheme and judicial discipline requires that the High Court should give due regard to the orders of the Supreme Court, which are binding on all courts within the territory of India. The request made in the said case was contained in a judicial order and it did no credit to either institution that it had not been heeded to. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners next relies on a judgment reported at [Bharat Earth Movers vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnata, (2000) 6 SCC 645 ], wherein it was held that Article 144 of the Constitution obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India to act in aid of the Supreme Court. Failure had to be deplored. The Supreme Court expected the tribunal to be more responsive and more sensitive to the directions of the Supreme Court. 27. On the strength of the said cited judgments, it is argued on behalf of the petitioners that in view of the Supreme Court having given only a single opportunity to the opposite party no. Failure had to be deplored. The Supreme Court expected the tribunal to be more responsive and more sensitive to the directions of the Supreme Court. 27. On the strength of the said cited judgments, it is argued on behalf of the petitioners that in view of the Supreme Court having given only a single opportunity to the opposite party no. 1 to amend its plaint and incorporate an additional relief, and the opposite party no. 1 having already availed of such relief by having its first amendment allowed after the order of the Supreme Court, the trial court was patently without jurisdiction in allowing the second amendment. 28. As such, it is argued on behalf of the petitioners, the impugned order ought to be set aside. 29. Learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 argues on the basis of the previous orders of this Court that it was specifically held by this court on several occasions that the position as on April 24, 2014 was that the petitioners had barricaded the suit property, thereby preventing the ingress and egress of the opposite party no. 1 in respect of the suit property. It is argued that the first amendment was filed on May 14, 2013, seeking primarily to challenge the notice dated April 23, 2013 cancelling the agreement between the parties. Such application was filed on an apprehension of dispossession and enumerated the details as to how the access of the opposite party no. 1 was sought to be blocked in respect of the suit premises. 30. Although the first amendment was allowed after the order of the Supreme Court dated July 27, 2018, the same had been filed much prior to the said order as well as the act of dispossession on April 24, 2014. As such, there was no scope of the opposite party no. 1 having disclosed the act of dispossession on April 24, 2014 in the first amendment, which was taken out on May 14, 2013, that, is about a year earlier to such dispossession. 31. It is next contended that the order of the Supreme Court specifically permitted the opposite party no. 1 "to file an amendment and the amendment shall be allowed", meaning thereby that the leave was prospective and could not be applied to an amendment application filed five years prior to that. 31. It is next contended that the order of the Supreme Court specifically permitted the opposite party no. 1 "to file an amendment and the amendment shall be allowed", meaning thereby that the leave was prospective and could not be applied to an amendment application filed five years prior to that. Although the trial court, while allowing the first amendment application, proceeded on an erroneous premise that the same was being allowed in terms of the order of the Supreme Court, the said observation was merely an error, which was not challenged by the petitioners, who were aggrieved by the said order, since the amendment application was allowed thereby. There was no occasion for the opposite party no. 1 to challenge the said order, since it was passed in favour of the opposite party no.1. It is the petitioners, who by failing to challenge the same, permitted the order allowing the first amendment to attain finality, which cannot be reopened now. 32. Pursuant to the leave granted by the Supreme Court, the second amendment was filed. However, the Trial Court did not merely allow the same as a matter of course, although it should have done so pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court dated July 27, 2018, but considered the second amendment on merits before allowing it. 33. In view of the subsequent developments incorporated in the second amendment, the same was absolutely necessary and rightly allowed by the Trial Court. 34. In such view of the matter, learned senior counsel for the opposite party no. 1 submits that the impugned order ought to be sustained. 35. The two questions which fall for consideration in the present revisional application are: (i) Whether the plaintiff / opposite party no. 1, having already availed of the benefit of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court dated July 27, 2018 by having its first amendment allowed, could file a second amendment application. (ii) Whether the trial judge acted without jurisdiction in allowing the second amendment application even on merits. 36. As regards the first question, the Supreme Court only granted the plaintiff liberty to file an amendment application and also to pray for an additional relief. 37. (ii) Whether the trial judge acted without jurisdiction in allowing the second amendment application even on merits. 36. As regards the first question, the Supreme Court only granted the plaintiff liberty to file an amendment application and also to pray for an additional relief. 37. On the face of it, the order does not restrict the plaintiff in any manner from filing any further necessary amendment even after such liberty was availed of once, and there was nothing in the Supreme Court order to fetter the trial court from allowing such further amendment, of course, if otherwise permitted by law. 38. Secondly, the language in which the Supreme Court order was couched was " liberty is granted to respondent no. 1, the plaintiff before the trial court, to file an amendment and the amendment shall be allowed." It was further observed that "Respondent no. 1 would be entitled to make an additional prayer subject to payment of court fees, if any." Therefore the liberty granted was prospective, being qualified by the expressions "to file" and "would be entitled to make", and could not be construed to cover previous prayers for amendment or additional prayers, which had already been filed or made. 39. So the arguments of the petitioners on both scores, that is, the plaintiff having availed the liberty once, could not file any further amendment application at all and that the trial court's order passing the previously filed amendment was covered by the liberty granted by the Supreme Court, are erroneous in law. 40. Order no. 81 dated August 9, 2018 passed by the trial court was erroneous insofar as it recorded that the first amendment was being allowed "in compliance with" the order of the Supreme Court. The trial court erred in law and in its exercise of jurisdiction in merely citing such reason for allowing the amendment, thereby shirking its duty of adjudicating the amendment application on its merits. However, since the order went against the defendants, including the present petitioners, and the defendants did not challenge the same before any forum, the said order attained finality. The defendants ought to have pointed out such error to the trial court itself at the time of argument on the first amendment, which they failed to do. Even if the plaintiff/opposite party no. The defendants ought to have pointed out such error to the trial court itself at the time of argument on the first amendment, which they failed to do. Even if the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 took undue advantage of such error on the part of the trial court, it had no scope to challenge the order since it went in favour of the plaintiff. As the proverb goes, "two wrongs do not make a right", the erroneous premise of the order allowing the first amendment could not be a justification for refusing the plaintiff the opportunity to exercise the liberty granted by the Supreme Court in filing the second amendment application with an additional prayer of recovery of possession, which had, in fact, to be mandatorily allowed in terms of the direction of the Supreme Court in that regard. 41. Seen from another perspective, the order of the Supreme Court emanated from an adjudication on an application for recovery of possession by the plaintiff, alleging dispossession. Hence the observation of the Supreme Court pertaining to the plaintiff's entitlement to make an "additional prayer" obviously related to that of recovery of possession, which the plaintiff did in the second amendment, but had no scope to do in the first amendment (since at that point of time the plaintiff had not been dispossessed). From such a point of view too, the second amendment pertained to the liberty granted by the Supreme Court and not the first. 42. Hence the plaintiff was, in fact, entitled to the second amendment being allowed as a matter of course pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court that such amendment "shall be allowed", even without any elaborate adjudication as such, because the first amendment, though allowed after the order of the Supreme Court, was filed before the said order and could not come within the purview of the prospective liberty granted by the Supreme Court. As such, it was the second amendment and the second amendment only which fell within the purview of the liberty and direction given by the Supreme Court. 43. As regards the two judgments of the Supreme Court cited by the petitioners, that is, Bharat Earth Movers (supra) and M/s Bayer India Ltd. & Ors. As such, it was the second amendment and the second amendment only which fell within the purview of the liberty and direction given by the Supreme Court. 43. As regards the two judgments of the Supreme Court cited by the petitioners, that is, Bharat Earth Movers (supra) and M/s Bayer India Ltd. & Ors. (supra), there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition laid down therein, as to the High Courts being obliged to give due regard to the orders of the Supreme Court despite being independent and co-equal institutions. However, in the present case the Supreme Court did not restrict the rights of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 to file further amendment applications after the liberty given therein was exhausted. Moreover, in the present case, although erroneously recorded in the earlier order of the trial court allowing the first amendment, the plaintiff had not exhausted the liberty at that juncture, since the first amendment had been filed before the order of the Supreme Court. It was only by filing the second amendment that the plaintiff availed of such liberty. As such, the order of the Supreme Court order was never violated in any manner. 44. As regards the time-frame fixed by the Supreme Court, the trial court honoured the same in the impugned order by fixing short dates for filing of amended plaint and additional written statement. Undoubtedly the time-frame has to be honoured, but being in the nature of a direction in terroram, the said direction could not be construed to act as a mandate on the trial court to simply dismiss any application filed by the parties after such direction (in this case the second amendment of the plaintiff) without going into its merits just because of such direction, thereby denying complete justice to the parties. 45. As such, the plaintiff was entitled to file the second amendment application despite the first amendment application having been allowed subsequent to the Supreme Court's order dated 16 July 27, 2018. Thus the first question falling for consideration in the present revision is answered in the affirmative. 46. Coming to the second question which has arisen in the present matter, as to whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction in allowing the second amendment application even on its merits, the primary argument of the petitioners is that the said amendment was mutually exclusive with the first amendment. 46. Coming to the second question which has arisen in the present matter, as to whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction in allowing the second amendment application even on its merits, the primary argument of the petitioners is that the said amendment was mutually exclusive with the first amendment. It has been argued that the first amendment introduced the averment that the plaintiff was still in possession of the suit property although it might have been cordoned off by the petitioners. However, the second amendment alleged that the plaintiff had been dispossessed on April 24, 2014 by removal of its structures and belongings, without seeking deletion of the averments introduced by the first amendment. The effect is, that upon the second amendment being carried out, the plaintiff was both in and out of possession at the same time, which facts are mutually exclusive. Such a patent contradiction, according to the petitioners, could not have been permitted by the trial court by allowing the second amendment. 47. It is relevant, in this context, to note that the first amendment, alleging that the plaintiff was still in possession, was filed on May 14, 2013. The scope of the first amendment was primarily to challenge the notice dated April 23, 2013 issued by the petitioners purportedly cancelling the agreement between the parties and threatening dispossession. The same is reflected from a perusal of the said amendment itself, which contains an apprehension of dispossession on the basis of the purported cancellation of agreement. 48. Immediately after the first amendment being filed, on May 17, 2013, the trial court granted temporary injunction restraining the defendants, their men and/or agents from disturbing the occupation and lawful actions of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 over the suit property till disposal of the suit. 49. A miscellaneous appeal preferred by the petitioners against the aforesaid injunction was allowed on April 23, 2014, thereby setting aside the injunction order passed by the trial court. 50. On the very next date, that is, April 24, 2014, the petitioners allegedly cordoned off the suit property with men, police personnel and bulldozers, thereby virtually sealing off the access of the opposite party no. 1 to the suit property. A revisional application, filed by the plaintiff/opposite party no. 50. On the very next date, that is, April 24, 2014, the petitioners allegedly cordoned off the suit property with men, police personnel and bulldozers, thereby virtually sealing off the access of the opposite party no. 1 to the suit property. A revisional application, filed by the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 against the said appellate order, was allowed on September 17, 2015 by a co-ordinate bench of this court, inter alia observing that the issue of recovery of possession could be taken up in the facts of the case by the plaintiff by way of an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the trial court. The order of the revisional court was not interfered with by the Supreme Court in a special leave petition. 51. On January 20, 2016 the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 for the first time filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for restoration of possession, which was dismissed on April 22, 2016 by the trial court. The opposite party no. 1 filed a revisional application against such order, which was allowed, directing the trial judge to reconsider the application for restoration of possession in the light of the observations made therein. Such order survived a special leave petition. 52. Thereafter the trial judge heard the application for restoration of possession afresh and allowed the same vide Order No. 71 dated September 16, 2017. 53. C.O. No. 3396 of 2017, preferred against the said order, met with dismissal on July 18, 2018. A special leave petition filed against the same was disposed of on July 27, 2018, granting the liberty to the plaintiff to file an amendment which shall be allowed, and held the opposite party no. 1 to be entitled to make an additional prayer subject to payment of court fees, if any. 54. Only after the last-mentioned order of the Supreme Court was the first amendment application of the opposite party no. 1 allowed vide Order No. 81 dated August 9, 2018, recorded by the trial court erroneously to be in compliance of the order of the Supreme Court, though such order contemplated only an amendment to be filed in future, whereas the first amendment was filed about five years prior thereto. 55. 1 allowed vide Order No. 81 dated August 9, 2018, recorded by the trial court erroneously to be in compliance of the order of the Supreme Court, though such order contemplated only an amendment to be filed in future, whereas the first amendment was filed about five years prior thereto. 55. Hence the first amendment was filed at a point of time when the plaintiff had no occasion to complain of dispossession, but rather apprehended dispossession on the basis of the notice dated April 23, 2013. The ambit of the first amendment actually revolved around a challenge to the said notice and prayed for relief from consequential apprehension of dispossession. There was no scope to pray for recovery of possession. 56. The prayer for recovery of possession first saw the light of day only on January 20, 2016 with the plaintiff filing an application under Section 151 of the Code seeking such relief. After two rounds of litigation up to the Supreme Court, the prayer culminated in the Supreme Court order dated July 27, 2018, thereby not setting aside the order of restoration granted by the trial court and affirmed by this court, but granting the plaintiff liberty all the same to file another amendment with a direction that the same shall be allowed, and also liberty to the plaintiff to pray for additional relief, subject to payment of additional court fees, if any. Such additional relief, construed in its proper context, was obviously intended to be in the nature of recovery of possession. 57. Thus when the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 filed the second amendment application thereafter on October 1, 2018, it naturally included the relief of recovery of possession and introduced the allegation of dispossession on April 24, 2014, in support of such relief. Hence, although the allegations introduced by the first amendment, as to the plaintiff still being in possession and apprehending dispossession, still remained in the plaint, the subsequent development of dispossession on April 24, 2014 and consequential relief of recovery of possession were also introduced. This apparent discrepancy can very well be reconciled in several ways. 58. First, the second amendment can be seen as an explanation and culmination of the averments introduced by the first amendment, which was the basis and the build-up to the second amendment. 59. This apparent discrepancy can very well be reconciled in several ways. 58. First, the second amendment can be seen as an explanation and culmination of the averments introduced by the first amendment, which was the basis and the build-up to the second amendment. 59. Secondly, the first amendment can be construed to relate back to the date of filing of the suit and the second amendment can be deemed to have been introduced prospectively from the date on which it was filed/allowed, both of which are permissible and well-settled principles for construing the starting-point of amendments. 60. Thirdly, the two amendments are not mutually exclusive since there is no contradiction pertaining to possession relating to the same date, that is, April 24, 2014. Hence, the two amendments can be harmonized and explained away as chronological, and not coincidental, on juncture of occurrence. 61. This apart, the objections taken on merits to such amendment by the petitioners are actually argumentative in nature and not of such a patent nature which make the second amendment liable to be rejected at the outset. The said arguments can very well be advanced by the petitioners at the time of hearing of the suit and countered by the plaintiff at that stage. 62. It is well-settled that merits of an amendment cannot be gone into by the court the time of deciding upon the amendment application itself. As such, it would in any event be premature for the court to consider the merits of the second amendment at the present stage. 63. So the trial court was perfectly justified in allowing the second amendment even on its merits. Hence the second question is answered in the negative. 64. Thus, both the questions which came up for consideration in the present revision are answered in favour of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1. 65. In the circumstances, C. O. No. 4171 of 2018 is dismissed, thereby affirming the impugned order. There will be no order as to costs. 66. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.