JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. SARANGI, J. - The petitioner, who was working as Assistant Sub-Inspector/Clerk under the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), has filed this application to quash the order of punishment passed by the Deputy Inspector of General, CISF Unit HEC Ranchi-04 in Annexure-2 dated 29.08.1998 and the order of confirmation made thereof by the appellate authority in Annexure-3 dated 19.04.1999, and further seeks for a direction to grant him all consequential benefits as due and admissible in accordance with law. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that the petitioner, who is a resident of Orissa, in the district of Angul, was selected and appointed on 02.04.1989 as a Constable in CISF First Reserve Battalion, Barwaha, Madhya Pradesh. After successful completion of training at R.T.C. Bhilai, he joined on 10.01.1990. While he was so continuing, he was promoted to the rank of A.S.I./Clerk and directed to proceed for training at NISA, Hyderabad, where he reported on 01.04.1995. After completion of his training for A.S.I./Clerk the petitioner joined at CISF Unit HEC Ranchi on 04.07.1995. The petitioner, while working at Ranchi as A.S.I./Clerk, a disciplinary proceeding was started against him on the following charges:- “ Article of Charge-I “Gross misconduct, misdemeanor and criminal breach of trust on the part of No.894500596 ASI/Clk Janardhan Mohanty in that while he was serving at CISF Ist Res. Battalion, Berwaha at Constable, he was deployed in the accounts section he connived and abetted with other CISF Personnel in preparation of forged/fraudulent TA/DA bills and false acquaintance rolls”. Article of Charge-II “Gross misconduct, indiscipline and highly irresponsible in that No.894500596 ASI/Clk Janardhan Mohanty was sent on temporary duty to CISF 1st Res. Bn. Barwaha from this Unit wef. 26.12.95 for participation in Police investigation against him in connection with embezzlement of Govt. fund and was arrested by police on 21.03.1996 and released on bail on the same day with direction to remain present at Barwaha till further order. But, he left CISF Ist Res. Bn. Barwaha on 10.04.96 and reported to CISF Unit, HEC Ranchi on 13.04.96 and submitted an application dated 15.04.1996 wherein he misrepresented that inquiry against him has been completed and that he had obtained anticipatory bail in order to protect himself from case and police arrest. But, he left CISF Ist Res. Bn. Barwaha on 10.04.96 and reported to CISF Unit, HEC Ranchi on 13.04.96 and submitted an application dated 15.04.1996 wherein he misrepresented that inquiry against him has been completed and that he had obtained anticipatory bail in order to protect himself from case and police arrest. Hence the charge” 2.1 The aforementioned charges were framed in respect of events occurred at CISF Unit, First Reserve Battalion, Barwaha (Madhya Pradesh). On the basis of such charges, inquiry officer was appointed and departmental enquiry was conducted. The inquiry officer, after completion of departmental enquiry, submitted his enquiry report on 17.06.1998. The inquiry officer discharged the petitioner from charge No.(II) but upheld charge No.(I) on the basis of the statement of P.W.-2- Inspector/Ministerial A.K. Mishra and documents exhibited by him during the course of preliminary enquiry. After enquiry report was submitted, the petitioner was supplied with a copy of the same. Before taking final decision by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner submitted his representation dated 08.07.1998 against the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority. But the disciplinary authority, without considering the contention raised in such representation, passed final order on 29.08.1998 awarding punishment of “removal from service” with immediate effect under Rule 29-A read with Rule-31-B of CISF Rules, 1969. The order of removal from service dated 29.08.1998 was served on the petitioner which was received by him on the very same day. The petitioner, challenging the order of removal from service, preferred appeal on 31.08.1998, but the appellate authority, without considering the contention raised in the appeal memo, confirmed the order of punishment dated 29.08.1998 passed by the disciplinary authority, vide order dated 04.09.1999. Hence this application. 3. Mr. N. Biswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. D.R. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner specifically urged that the departmental authorities could not have utilized against the petitioner the statements recorded in a preliminary enquiry, without affording opportunity of hearing, and imposed the major penalty of removal from service for the trivial charges framed against him. It is further contended that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses so deposed in the preliminary enquiry and thereby there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. It is further contended that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses so deposed in the preliminary enquiry and thereby there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority and the order confirmation thereof made by the appellate authority cannot sustain in the eye of law and are liable to be quashed. It is further contended that out of two charges framed since charge no.(II) was not proved, imposition of penalty of removal from service only for charge no.(I) is harsh and disproportionate to the charges leveled against him, therefore such punishment cannot sustain in the eye of law. It is also contended that during pendency of the writ application, the criminal case, which was initiated against the petitioner for the self same allegation, was ended in acquittal and, therefore, once the petitioner has been acquitted of the self same charges by the competent criminal Court, imposition of penalty of removal from service and confirmation made thereof, in a disciplinary proceeding cannot sustain. To substantiate his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar, v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 2148 and Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2013 SC 1513 . 4. Ms. B. Tripathy, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the opposite parties argued justifying the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority and conformation made thereof by the appellate authority and contended that since there are concurrent findings of fact by both the forums, the same should not be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction and therefore prays for dismissal of the writ application. 5. This Court heard Mr. N. Biswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.D.R.Pattnayak, for the petitioner and Ms. B. Tripathy, learned Central Government Counsel for the opposite parties. Pleadings having been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. The facts, which are undisputed, are that on the basis of the allegations made against the petitioner, a preliminary enquiry was conducted from 24.04.1995 to15.05.1995 by the opposite parties. On the basis of preliminary report submitted on 15.09.1995, regular disciplinary proceeding was initiated on 28.04.1996. 6. The facts, which are undisputed, are that on the basis of the allegations made against the petitioner, a preliminary enquiry was conducted from 24.04.1995 to15.05.1995 by the opposite parties. On the basis of preliminary report submitted on 15.09.1995, regular disciplinary proceeding was initiated on 28.04.1996. During the disciplinary proceeding, as would be evident from the impugned order of punishment, three persons were examined, namely, S.I./Min. P.K. Nath, Inspector-Gokul Chand (P.W.1) and Inspector-A.K.Mishra (P.W.2), but S.I./Min. P.K. Nath became hostile. Inspector-A.K.Mishra-P.W.2 produced the statements of S.I./Min. M.K. Bhandari and S.I./Min. P.K. Nath recorded in the preliminary enquiry. Basing on their statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry, the enquiry officer found that charge no.(I) is proved. On 17.06.1998, the enquiry report was submitted holding that the charge no.(I) is proved and charge no.(II) is not proved. To such enquiry report dated 17.06.1998, the petitioner submitted representation on 08.07.1998 specifically mentioning that since S.I./Min. M.P. Bhandari was not examined in the disciplinary proceeding, his statement recorded in the preliminary enquiry cannot be utilized as per the CISF circular no. 1 of 1992. Furthermore, after March, 1993, the petitioner was posted at Non-Government Fund Section, which has no nexus with the Accounts Section, and the alleged incident took place after March, 1993 and, as such, the petitioner is no way connected with the incident took place after he was relieved from the Accounts Section. Even though no evidence was made available against the petitioner, the inquiry officer, basing upon the statements of S.I./Min. M.K. Bhandari and S.I./Min. P.K. Nath recorded in the preliminary enquiry produced by Inspector-A.K.Mishra (P.W.2) found the petitioner guilty so far as charge no.(I) is concerned. Though the petitioner wanted to examine S.I./Min. M.K. Bhandari, but no opportunity was given to him, and even if S.I./Min. P.K. Nath became hostile, utilizing the statements of S.I./Min. M.K. Bhandari and S.I./Min. P.K. Nath recorded in the preliminary inquiry, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of removal from service, which is contrary to the rules and settled position of law. 7. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings may be preceded by preliminary enquiry by the employer to assess as to whether disciplinary proceeding should be initiated or not. Such an enquiry is in the nature of a preliminary enquiry which is undertaken to monitor the conduct and integrity of the employee. 7. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings may be preceded by preliminary enquiry by the employer to assess as to whether disciplinary proceeding should be initiated or not. Such an enquiry is in the nature of a preliminary enquiry which is undertaken to monitor the conduct and integrity of the employee. Such preliminary or fact-finding enquiries are not formal departmental enquiries and observance of prescribed rules of procedure or principles of natural justice could have the result of vitiating such enquiry since its very nature demands non-transparency. 8. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Arunkumar Madhavrao Sindhaya, (2007) 1 SCC 283 : AIR 2007 SC 192 , the apex Court held that the fact that by its very nature the employee was allowed to participate in such preliminary enquiry or some queries were put to certain persons would not alter the nature of enquiry. Even though a disciplinary enquiry was recommended on the basis of a preliminary enquiry, but employer instead chose to exercise its right of termination simpliciter under the appointment letter and although the order terminating the services was wholly innocuous, and did not contain any stigma against him and was passed in terms of the appointment letter, the Supreme Court found that it was a termination by way of punishment. 9. In view of such position, the opposite party employer has every right to cause a preliminary enquiry, but the employer, while causing preliminary enquiry and on that basis initiating disciplinary proceeding, cannot and could not have utilized the materials available in the preliminary enquiry against the delinquent in the disciplinary proceeding without affording opportunity of hearing and without complying the principles of natural justice. More particularly, if a delinquent wants to cross-examine the witnesses examined in the preliminary enquiry, opportunity should have been given to him, as has not been done in the present case. In case of imposition of major penalty of removal/dismissal from service, the rules generally provide sufficiently elaborate procedure incorporating various facets of the principle of natural justices to be followed. As far as dismissal and removal are concerned, there is further Constitutional protection conferred by Article 311(2) of the Constitution in cases where the employee is holding a civil post. In case of imposition of major penalty of removal/dismissal from service, the rules generally provide sufficiently elaborate procedure incorporating various facets of the principle of natural justices to be followed. As far as dismissal and removal are concerned, there is further Constitutional protection conferred by Article 311(2) of the Constitution in cases where the employee is holding a civil post. The proceedings which are initiated in terms of the service rules are generally referred to as departmental proceedings, the major part of which comprises an inquiry which is commonly referred to as a departmental enquiry, which shall be in adherence to the principles of natural justice where the proposal is to dismiss or remove the delinquent from service. 10. The rules of natural justice supplement the enacted law and do not supplant the law. In Rash Lal Yadav (Dr) v. State of Bihar, (1994) 5 SCC 267 Hon’ble Justice Ahmadi, Chief Justice of India, while delivering judgment expressed as follows:- “The concept of natural justice is not a static one but is an ever expanding concept. In the initial stages it was thought that it had only two elements, namely, (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause and (ii) no one shall be condemned unheard. With the passage of time a third element was introduced, namely, of procedural reasonableness because the main objective of the requirement of rule of natural justice is to promote justice and prevent its miscarriage. Therefore, when the legislature confers power on the State Government to be exercised in certain circumstances or eventualities, it would be right to presume that the legislature intends that the said powers be exercised in the manner envisaged by the statute. If the statute confers drastic powers it goes without saying that such powers must be exercised in a proper and fair manner. Drastic substantive laws can be suffered only if they are fairly and reasonably applied. In order to ensure fair and reasonable application of such laws courts have, over a period of time, devised rules of fair procedure to avoid arbitrary exercise of such powers. True it is, the rules of natural justice operate as checks on the freedom of administrative action and often prove time consuming but that is the price one has to pay to ensure fairness in administrative action. True it is, the rules of natural justice operate as checks on the freedom of administrative action and often prove time consuming but that is the price one has to pay to ensure fairness in administrative action. And this fairness can be ensured by adherence to the expanded notion of rule of natural justice. Therefore, where a statute confers wide powers on an administrative authority coupled with wide discretion, the possibility of its arbitrary use can be controlled or checked by insisting on their being exercised in a manner which can be said to be procedurally fair. Rules of natural justice are, therefore, devised for ensuring fairness and promoting satisfactory decision-making. Where the statute is silent and a contrary intention cannot be implied the requirement of the applicability of the rule of natural justice is read into it to ensure fairness and to protect the action from the charge of arbitrariness. Natural justice has thus secured a foothold to supplement enacted law by operating as an implied mandatory requirement thereby protecting it from the vice of arbitrariness. Courts presume this requirement in all its width as implied unless the enactment supplies indications to the contrary as in the present case. This Court in A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India, after referring to the observations in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, observed as under: (SCC page 272, para 20) “the aim of the rules of natural justices is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.” (emphasis supplant) In view of such position, when a major penalty of removal from service has been imposed as a measure of punishment against a public servant for some cause, the same can only be done after affording opportunity of hearing to the delinquent in compliance of principles of natural justice. 11. In the case of Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhr (supra), the apex Court held as follows:- “……..The preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after the issue of the charge-sheet. The former action would be to find whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. After full-fledged enquiry was held, the preliminary enquiry had lost its importance.” 12. In the case of Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhr (supra), the apex Court held as follows:- “……..The preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after the issue of the charge-sheet. The former action would be to find whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. After full-fledged enquiry was held, the preliminary enquiry had lost its importance.” 12. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala, mentioned supra, in which reference has also been made to the case of Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar (supra), in paragraphs 23 and 25 the apex Court held as follows:- “23. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice. xx xx xx 25. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry.” 13. Applying the above principles, as laid down by the apex Court, to the present context, the purpose behind holding a preliminary enquiry is only to take a prima facie view as to whether there can be some substance in the allegations levelled against the employee, which may warrant a regular enquiry. The evidence recorded in preliminary enquiry cannot be used in regular departmental enquiry, as the delinquent is not associated with it and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such enquiry is not given. Therefore, using such evidence would be violative of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the statements of S.I./Min. M.K. Bhandari and S.I./Min. P.K. Nath recorded in the preliminary enquiry, which have been utilized against the petitioner, on being produced by Inspector-A.K.Mishra (P.W.2), without affording opportunity of hearing, amounts to non-compliance of principles of natural justice, and relying upon the same major penalty of removal from service should not have been imposed. It is also admitted by the opposite parties in the counter affidavit that S.I./Min. P.K. Nath had become hostile in the regular disciplinary proceeding and, therefore, imposition of major penalty of removal from service on the basis of his statement as well as the statement of S.I./Min. It is also admitted by the opposite parties in the counter affidavit that S.I./Min. P.K. Nath had become hostile in the regular disciplinary proceeding and, therefore, imposition of major penalty of removal from service on the basis of his statement as well as the statement of S.I./Min. M.K. Bhandari recorded in preliminary enquiry, which were produced by Inspector-A.K.Mishra (P.W.2), cannot sustain in the eye of law. 14. During pendency of the writ application it has been brought to the notice of this Court that for the selfsame charges a criminal case was registered against the petitioner, vide Criminal Case No. 341 of 1995/T.R. No. 350 of 2008 under Section 409/34, IPC, in which the petitioner has been acquitted and, therefore, major penalty of removal from service, which has been imposed without compliance of principles of natural justice, also otherwise cannot have any justification. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the order of major penalty of removal from service passed by the disciplinary authority in Annexure-2 dated 29.08.1998 and the order confirmation made thereof by the appellate authority in Annexure-3 dated 19.04.1999 are liable to be quashed and accordingly the same are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law. 16. The writ petition is thus allowed. No order as to cost. Petition allowed.