JUDGMENT : A.C. RAO, J. 1. The present Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 5th May 2016 passed by the Sessions Judge, Surendranagar, in the Sessions Case No.75 of 2014, by which the Sessions Court convicted the appellant herein – original accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/-, and in default of payment of the amount of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one year. I. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION : 2. The case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is as under : (1) On 23.03.2014, the appellant-accused inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the deceased – Bhavin, i.e. the son of the complainant – Chandrikaben. At earlier point of time, Bhavin was taken to the Referral Hospital, Chotila, by his friend Jignesh. Thereafter, he was taken to the Life Care Hospital, Rajkot. On the way to the Life Care Hospital, Rajkot, the deceased Bhavin conveyed to the complainant, i.e. Chandrikaben, and her daughter-in-law, i.e. Kajal, that the appellant – Gabhubhai Navinbhai came to him when he and his friend Jignesh were sitting near the Hanuman temple. The appellant reprimanded him by saying that why was he talking with his sister Nilam and all of a sudden he inflicted a knife blow on the right side of my chest. He tried to reach hospital on his motorcycle but he fell down. When the ambulance reached at the Life Care Hospital, Rajkot, the doctor examined Bhavin and declared him dead. Thereafter, the dead-body of the deceased was taken to the Government Hospital, Rajkot, and the postmortem was performed. (2) A complaint was registered at the Chotila Police Station vide I-C.R.No.35 of 2014 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The investigation was handed over to the Investigating Officer. He recorded the statements of the witnesses, prepared the Inquest Panchnama, collected the postmortem report and carried out the investigation. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chotila. Thereafter, the Criminal Case No.449 of 2014 was registered. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chotila. Thereafter, the Criminal Case No.449 of 2014 was registered. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Sessions Court framed the charge and recorded the plea of the appellant. (3) The appellant-accused did not admit the charge and claimed to be tried. Thereafter, the Sessions Court conducted the trial. 3. The prosecution adduced the following oral as well as documentary evidence before the trial court in support of its case: ORAL EVIDENCE Sr. No. Exhibit Name of Witness 1 6 Deposition of... Dr. Rameshchandra Bhagubhai Shah 2 9 Deposition of... Panch Witness Devendrabhai Manubhai Dhadhal 3 11 Deposition of... Panch Witness Hiren Hasmukhbhai 4 14 Deposition of... Panch Witness Sunil Mansukhbhai 5 15 Deposition of... Panch Witness Shivkubhai Devayatbhai 6 17 Deposition of... Dr. Janmejay Krishnchandra Nathwani 7 24 Deposition of... Panch Witness Hakabhai Somabhai Parmar 8 25 Deposition of... the complainant Chandrika w/o. Mahesh H. Perani. 9 27 Deposition of... Witness Haresh @ Jignesh Bharatbhai Gondaliya 10 28 Deposition of... Witness Kajalben Wf./o. Vishal M. Perani 11 30 Deposition of... Witness Vishal Maheshbhai Perani 12 31 Deposition of... Witness Pravinbhai Prabhubhai Chauhan 13 32 Deposition of... Executive Magistrate Ramnikbhai Karshanbhai Vacchani 14 35 Deposition of... Circle Officer Hariombhai Kantilal Acharya 15 37 Deposition of... P.S.O. Hirabhai Palabhai Paraghi 16 38 Deposition of... P.S.I. Bhikhabhai Hipabhai Posatar 17 39 Deposition of... Investigating Officer Ambalal Laljibhai Haripara DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Sr. No. Exhibit Type of Document Remarks 1 7 OPD Case paper of the deceased of Chotila Hospital Original 2 8 Injury Certificate of the deceased of Chotila Hospital Original 3 10 Copy of Inquest Panchnama Copy 4 12 Panchnama of the scene of offence. Original 5 16 Arrest Panchnama of the accused and Seizure Panchnama of the clothes worn and the knife used by the accused at the time of incident on being produced by the accused. Original 6 18 Police yadi written to perform the Post Mortem of dead body. Original 7 19 Copy of Inquest Panchnama Copy 8 20 Marnottar (after-death) Form Original 9 21 Post Mortem Report Original 10 22 Form of taking the blood sample of the deceased. Original 6 18 Police yadi written to perform the Post Mortem of dead body. Original 7 19 Copy of Inquest Panchnama Copy 8 20 Marnottar (after-death) Form Original 9 21 Post Mortem Report Original 10 22 Form of taking the blood sample of the deceased. Original 11 26 Original Complaint along with F.I.R. Original 12 33 Police yadi written to the Exe. Magistrate to fill the Inquest. Original 13 34 Inquest Panchnama Original 14 36 Map of the scene of offence. Original 15 38 True Copy of Chotila Station Diary Entry no. 3/14. True Copy 16 41 Report of Mobile Laboratory of Regional Forensic Science Laboratory. Original 17 42 Letter forwarded to F.S.L. for the examination of muddamal. Original 18 43 Receipt of F.S.L. about receiving of muddamal. Original 19 44 F.S.L. Report regarding muddamal. Original 20 45 Serological Report regardingmuddamal. Original 21 46 Police yadi written to Chotila Court to record the statement of witness Haresh @ Jignesh u/s. 164 of Cr.P.C. Original 22 47 Notice from the Court of Muli to the witness Haresh @ Jignesh to remain present to give the statement u/s. 164 of Cr.P.C. Original 23 48 Police yadi written to take the blood sample of the accused. Original 24 49 Report of Serious offence. Original 25 50 Letter seeking the permission to submit the Charge sheet against the accused. Original 4. After the evidence was closed, the statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C was recorded. On completion of the trial, the Sessions Court convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTACCUSED: 5. Mr. Nitin Amin, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused, submitted that the prosecution case is based on the evidence of a solitary eye-witness, namely PW-9 – Haresh @ Jignesh Gondaliya. It is submitted that his deposition is not reliable. The evidence of this witness does not inspire any confidence. It is submitted that his presence at the scene of the occurrence is highly doubtful. It is submitted that there was no intention on the part of the appellant-accused to commit murder of the deceased. It is submitted that his deposition is not reliable. The evidence of this witness does not inspire any confidence. It is submitted that his presence at the scene of the occurrence is highly doubtful. It is submitted that there was no intention on the part of the appellant-accused to commit murder of the deceased. It is submitted that looking to the nature of the injury sustained by the deceased, he would not be in a position to give oral dying declaration before the mother and sister-in-law in the ambulance as he was bleeding profusely at that time. The conviction cannot be based solely on such a dying declaration and the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of the dying declaration. 6. Mr. Amin submitted that looking to the nature of the injury sustained by the deceased, it is not possible that he could have given any history to the doctor and informed about the same to his mother and sister-in-law. He submitted that the hospital staff who were present in the ambulance when the deceased was taken to the hospital have not been examined by the prosecution to corroborate the evidence of the mother and sister-in-law. He has further submitted that there is a delay in filing the FIR. The FIR was registered at 5:00 hours, though the doctor had informed the PSO about the same at 21.10 hours on 23.03.2014. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused submitted that there is contradiction in the statement of the solitary eye-witness. He has submitted that at the time of the inquest panchnama, the solitary eye-witness had identified the body, while as per the say of the complainant, she was present at the Government Hospital at Rajkot. It is submitted that as per the say of the complainant, the Rajkot police had recorded the statement of the complainant, but the said statement is not produced on record. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused further submitted that in the cross-examination of the complainant, she stated that when her elder son Vishal tried to talk with the deceased after the incident and called the deceased twice by his name 'Bhavin', the deceased had not responded to. He was not in a position to even say something. Therefore, the story of oral dying declaration cannot be believed and the same cannot be relied upon. He was not in a position to even say something. Therefore, the story of oral dying declaration cannot be believed and the same cannot be relied upon. It is submitted that the doctor at Chotila Hospital, in his statement, has stated that he had informed the PSO about the condition of the deceased but the PSO had not given any evidence. 9. Mr. Amin submitted that the case of the prosecution is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. In such circumstances the Appeal merits consideration and the appellant-accused may be acquitted of all the charges. III. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE STATE : 10. Mr. K.P. Raval, the learned APP appearing on behalf of the State, opposed this Appeal. Mr.Raval submitted that there are two dying declarations in the present case. First, the oral dying declaration before the doctor at the Chotila Hospital in the form of a history given to the doctor and second, the oral dying declaration given to the mother and sister-in-law in the ambulance while shifting the deceased from the hospital at Chotila to the hospital at Rajkot. The learned APP submitted that there is no material contradiction in the deposition of the solitary eye-witness. His presence at the scene of the offence was natural and he has narrated the whole incident in his deposition. It is submitted that, therefore, there was no reason to disbelieve the deposition of the PW-1 Dr. Rameshchandra, who is an independent witness and a Government servant. In such circumstances, Mr.Raval, the learned APP appearing for the State, submitted that the judgment and sentence passed by the trial court convicting the appellant-accused warrants no interference and there being no merit in this Appeal, the same deserves to be dismissed. IV. ANALYSIS : 11. After considering the rival submissions and upon perusal of the record, it appears that the PW-9 Haresh @ Jignesh is the solitary eye-witness to the incident. In his deposition, he has stated that on 23.03.2014, when he was riding as a pillion rider on a motorcycle driven by the appellant-accused, while on the way, they met the deceased Bhavin who was coming from the opposite direction and the deceased was asked to come near the Hanuman temple. In his deposition, he has stated that on 23.03.2014, when he was riding as a pillion rider on a motorcycle driven by the appellant-accused, while on the way, they met the deceased Bhavin who was coming from the opposite direction and the deceased was asked to come near the Hanuman temple. He has deposed that, thereafter, the appellant-accused pointed a knife on the neck of the deceased Bhavin and told him that had Lala been here, he would have inflicted this knife on him and, while saying so, the appellant inflicted the knife on the chest of the deceased Bhavin. The PW-9 Haresh @ Jignesh has deposed that he had caught hold of the right hand of the appellant but, at that time, the appellant had already inflicted a knife blow on the deceased and the deceased started bleeding. Thereafter, the deceased Bhavin headed towards the Referral Hospital on his motorcycle. The PW-9, in his evidence, has deposed that he was asked by the appellant accused to switch-off his mobile and ran away from the place of the occurrence. The PW-9 further deposed that thereafter, he saw the deceased stumbling from his motorcycle near the Referral Hospital. Therefore, he called for a stretcher from the hospital and the deceased was taken to the Referral Hospital in a stretcher. The PW-9 deposed that thereafter he went to the house of the deceased on a motorcycle of the deceased and informed his elder brother Vishal about the incident and he came back at the place of the occurrence with the brother, mother and sister-in-law of the deceased. He deposed that when they reached at the Referral Hospital, the ambulance was ready. The mother (PW-4) and the sister-in-law (PW-7) of the deceased accompanied the deceased in the ambulance and the PW-9 and Vishal, i.e. the elder brother of the deceased, had followed them in their car. The PW-9 has deposed that when they reached at the Life Care Hospital at Rajkot, the doctor available at the hospital, after examining the deceased, declared the deceased dead. Therefore, the dead-body of the deceased was taken to the Government Hospital at Rajkot for performing the post-mortem. A complaint in this regard was given by his mother. The deposition of the PW-9 is fully corroborated by the mother, brother and sister-in-law of the deceased. 12. Therefore, the dead-body of the deceased was taken to the Government Hospital at Rajkot for performing the post-mortem. A complaint in this regard was given by his mother. The deposition of the PW-9 is fully corroborated by the mother, brother and sister-in-law of the deceased. 12. It is pertinent to note that in paragraph 9 of the cross-examination of the PW-9, he has stated as under : “9. It is not true that there is no facility of light in the surrounding area of Hanumanji Deri located near the Referral Hospital. It is not true that it was dark at the time of the incident. I have correctly stated in my police statement that it was dark at the place of the occurrence. But, what I mean to say is that even though it was dark, but one could see. It is true that when Bhavin arrived at the place of the occurrence, an altercation was going on with regard to Lala @ Bhura. It is true that Himanshu had not stated anything regarding the quarrel with Bhavin. It is true that when I and Himanshu were going, at that point of time, Bhavin met us on the way, therefore, we returned back at the platform of Hanumanji and had a talk. It is true that during the said talk, there was no mention of any quarrel, dispute or altercation happened between Bhavin and Himanshu. It is true that what I had stated in my examination-in-chief about the accused Himanshu of putting a knife on the neck of Bhavin and saying that he would stab the knife, was in context that the knife would have been stabbed if Bhuro @ Lalo would have come. It is not true that at that time, the accused Himanshu was fully drunk. I mean to state that I did not smell the liquor. I did not gather from the behaviour of the accused that he was drunk. It is true that the accused did not inflict any knife injury on the neck region of Bhavin. It is not true that while the knife was being taken away from the neck and the deceased was getting down from his Honda, accidentally the knife blow was inflicted on the deceased on his chest. It is true that till the time Bhavin started bleeding, I did not think that the accused would stab him. It is not true that while the knife was being taken away from the neck and the deceased was getting down from his Honda, accidentally the knife blow was inflicted on the deceased on his chest. It is true that till the time Bhavin started bleeding, I did not think that the accused would stab him. It is not true that when Bhavin started bleeding, both of us, Himanshu and myself, were frightened. It is true that it did not happen that after suffering the injury, Bhavin left on his motorcycle and at that time the accused- Himanshu chased him in order to assault him further. It is true that it did not happen that the accused tried to hit another blow upon the deceased at the same place. It is true that it also did not happen that when I caught hold of the accused- Himanshu, he tried to get himself released from my clutches or tried to injure me while releasing his hand. It is not true that, in the present case, the injury caused to Bhavin appeared to have been caused accidentally.” 13. From the cross-examination of the PW-9 Haresh @ Jignesh, it is apparently clear that the suggestion put to the witness proves the presence of the appellant-accused on the spot at the time of the occurrence. It is well settled that the suggestions given by the defence counsel to a prosecution witness in the cross-examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except the concession on the point of law. 14. In the aforesaid context, it would be fruitful to refer to a judgment of this Court rendered in case of Bachubhai Baldevji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2014 Criminal Law Journal (Guj) 678, wherein one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) was a member, wherein it is held as under : “25. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, we find that the PW. No.1, the complainant who is an eyewitness, has, in detail, narrated the incident. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, we find that the PW. No.1, the complainant who is an eyewitness, has, in detail, narrated the incident. It appears that in the cross-examination, a specific suggestion was given to him on behalf of the accused persons that as the deceased told that Narmada Canal is the Government property and it was not owned by anybody’s father, the appellant No.1 got infuriated, caught hold of the deceased and inflicted the injuries and the complainant has admitted such suggestion. From the aforesaid suggestion, it is clear that the incident narrated by the complainant is the true version. Mr. Kanani tried to convince us that it is apparent from the aforesaid suggestion that the incident occurred as the appellant No.1 was provoked by the victim, and, therefore, at the most, it is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We are afraid, we are not impressed by such submission of Mr. Kanani. If it appears that the deceased, in exercise of his lawful right to use Narmada water for the purpose of his cultivation, resisted the illegal action of the appellant No.1 by which he prevented the deceased from taking the water at the relevant time, and in the process, uttered those words, such action cannot be branded as a provocation leading to the crime. What the deceased said was correct and there is nothing wrong in saying that the Narmada water is a Government property and is not owned by anybody s father. 26. It is not the case of the appellant No.1 that he was not at all present at the place of the incident and that somebody else had killed the victim. Such being the position, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the version of the complainant particularly having regard to the nature of suggestion given to him in the cross-examination on behalf of the accused as indicated above. 27. Such being the position, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the version of the complainant particularly having regard to the nature of suggestion given to him in the cross-examination on behalf of the accused as indicated above. 27. In Tarun Bora alias Alok Hazarika v. State of Assam reported in 2002 Cri.LJ 4076, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal against the order passed by the Designated Court, Guwahati, in TADA Sessions case wherein the appellant was convicted under Section 365 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 3 (1) and 3 (5) of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. 28. The Supreme Court while considering the evidence on record took note of a suggestion which was put to one of the witnesses and considering the reply given by the witness to the suggestion put by the accused, arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused was admitted. We quote with profit the following observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 15, 16 and 17: 15. The witness further stated that during the assault, the assailant accused him of giving information to the army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). He further stated that on the third night he was carried away blind-folded on a bicycle to a different place and when his eyes were unfolded, he could see his younger brother-Kumud Kakati (P.W.-2) and his wife Smt. Prema Kakati (P.W.-3). The place was Duliapather, which is about 6-7 kms. away from his village Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant-Tarun Bora and stated that it is he who took him in an ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident. 16. In cross-examination the witness stated as under : "Accused-Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes nor he assaulted me." 17. This part of cross-examination is suggestive of the presence of accused-Tarun Bora in the whole episode. This will clearly suggest the presence of the accused- Tarun Bora as admitted. The only denial is the accused did not participate in blind-folding the eyes of the witness nor assaulted him. 29. This part of cross-examination is suggestive of the presence of accused-Tarun Bora in the whole episode. This will clearly suggest the presence of the accused- Tarun Bora as admitted. The only denial is the accused did not participate in blind-folding the eyes of the witness nor assaulted him. 29. In Rakeshkumar alias Babli v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 690 , the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and three other persons were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. While re-appreciating the evidence on record, the Supreme Court noticed that in the cross-examination of the PW 4, Sube Sing, a suggestion was made with regard to the colour of the shirt worn by one of the accused persons at the time of the incident. The Supreme Court taking into consideration the nature of the suggestion put by the defence and the reply arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused namely Dharam Vir was established on the spot at the time of occurrence. We quote with profit the following observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 and 9 as under: 8. P.W. 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination-in-chief that he had identified the accused at the time of occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not cross-examined as to how and in what manner he could identify the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. No suggestion was also given to him that the place was dark and it was not possible to identify the assailants of the deceased. 9. In his cross-examination, P.W. 4, Sube Singh, stated that the accused Dharam Vir. was wearing a shirt of white colour. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a shirt of cream colour. In answer to that suggestion, P.W. 4 said "It is not correct that Dharam Vir accused was wearing a shirt of cream colour and not a white colour at that time." The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of accused Dharam Vir, on the spot at the time of occurrence. 30. In answer to that suggestion, P.W. 4 said "It is not correct that Dharam Vir accused was wearing a shirt of cream colour and not a white colour at that time." The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of accused Dharam Vir, on the spot at the time of occurrence. 30. Thus, from the above two cases it is evident that the suggestion given by the defence counsel to a prosecution witness in the cross-examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except the concession on the point of law. In this connection, we may appropriately refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of BSNL vs. Subhash Chandra Kanchan reported in AIR 2006 SC 3335 while dealing with the question of binding nature of concession by a counsel on a question of fact: "Furthermore, in terms of Order III, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a litigant is represented by an advocate. A concession made by such an advocate is binding on the part whom he represents. If it is binding on the parties, again subject to just exceptions, they cannot at a later stage resile there from. The matter may, however, be different if a concession is made on a question of law. A wrong concession on legal question may not be binding upon his client. Here, however, despite the stand taken by the Appellant in its written statement before the High Court the learned Advocate consented to appointment of a person as an arbitrator by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, in our considered view, the same should not be permitted to be resiled from. A person may have a legal right but if the same is waived, enforcement thereof cannot be insisted." 15. A person may have a legal right but if the same is waived, enforcement thereof cannot be insisted." 15. Applying the dictum of the aforesaid decision to the facts of the present case, we do not find any substance in the submission that the presence of the PW-9 at the place of the occurrence is doubtful. We do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence of the PW-1 Dr. Rameshchandra Bhagubhai Shah before whom the deceased had given the history that the appellant-accused had inflicted a knife injury upon him. 16. The Supreme Court, in Surendra Kumar v. Delhi Administration, reported in 1987 Criminal Law Journal 537, has held that even if the dying declaration has not been recorded by the Magistrate in his own hand and if it testifies to other tests, it can be relied. It was not necessary for him to record the statement in question-answer format. 17. In Padmaben v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1991 AIR SCW 464, it has been held that if the dying declaration is not recorded in question-answer format, even then it can be relied. 18. It is well settled law that the dying declaration, written or verbal, may form sole basis for conviction of an accused. However, the evidence of witness, on dying declaration, must stand the test of reliability like any other witness and it has to be judged in light of surrounding circumstances and facts of each case. The Supreme Court, in a decision rendered in case of Harbans Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1962 SC 439 , in paragraph 18, has held as follows : “In view of this latest pronouncement of this Court-which it should be stated in fairness to the Trial Judge was made long after he gave his judgment-it must be held that it is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration requires to be corroborated by other evidence before a conviction can be based thereon. The evidence furnished by the dying declaration must be considered by the Judge, just as the evidence of any witness, though undoubtedly some special considerations arise in the assessment of dying declarations which do not arise in the case of assessing the value of a statement made in Court by a person claiming to be witness of the occurrence. The evidence furnished by the dying declaration must be considered by the Judge, just as the evidence of any witness, though undoubtedly some special considerations arise in the assessment of dying declarations which do not arise in the case of assessing the value of a statement made in Court by a person claiming to be witness of the occurrence. In the first place, the Court has to make sure as to what the statement of the dead man actually was. This itself is often a difficult task, specially where the statement had not been put into writing. In the second place, the court has to be certain about the identity of the persons named in the dying declaration-a difficulty which does not arise where a person gives his depositions in Court and identifies the person who is present in court as the person whom he has named. Other special considerations which arise in assessing the value of dying declarations have been mentioned by this Court in AIR 1958 SC 22 and need not be repeated here.” 19. The dying declaration in this case is well corroborated with the evidence of the PW-9. The PW-8 and PW-10 have also supported the case of the prosecution that the deceased had given oral dying declaration in the ambulance van on the way he was taken to the Rajkot Hospital. Even if the evidence of the PW- 8 and PW-10 is discarded, considering the submission that the deceased was not in a condition to speak anything, there is sufficient evidence to establish the case against the appellant as per the settled position of law as discussed in the above referred cases. 20. So far as the contention regarding delay in filing the FIR is concerned, it is clear from the deposition of the PW-1 Dr. Rameshchandra Shah that he had telephonically informed about the incident to the Police Constable Shri Pargi at about 21.10 hours on the day of the incident. The prosecution has not examined the Police Constable Shri Pargi as a witness. The police had registered complaint at 5.00 a.m. after the inquest panchnama. It can be said that the police may have reached Rajkot as the doctor had telephonically informed the Police Constable about the incident. So the benefit of such faulty investigation cannot be given to the appellant. 21. The police had registered complaint at 5.00 a.m. after the inquest panchnama. It can be said that the police may have reached Rajkot as the doctor had telephonically informed the Police Constable about the incident. So the benefit of such faulty investigation cannot be given to the appellant. 21. In the overall view of the matter, we do not find any illegality or any error of law on the part of the trial Judge. The Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. We are convinced that the accused has been rightly held guilty of the offence of murder by the trial court. No interference is warranted with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 5th May 2016 passed by the Sessions Judge, Surendranagar, in the Sessions Case No.75 of 2014, convicting the accused for the offence of murder.