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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 421 (MP)

Ram Kumar Sharma v. State of M. P.

2019-06-19

SANJAY YADAV, VISHAL MISHRA

body2019
ORDER 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is finally heard. 2. Challenge is to an order dated 6.2.2019 passed in Writ Petition No. 1008/2015. 3. The Writ Petition was directed against the order dated 29.10.2011 passed by Superintendent of Police, Bhind, inflicting the penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect for a period of one year and directing that the period of suspension from 12.10.2010 to 1.11.2010 shall be treated as suspension. The appellant had also challenged the order dated 16.5.2012; whereby, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal. 4. The punishment order emanated from the departmental enquiry initiated against the petitioner with the issuance of chargesheet dated 6.5.2011. The charges levelled against the appellant were: ^^fnukad 12-10-2010 dks jkf= x'r ds nkSjku Vªd pkyd lqjs'k dqekj iVsy ,oa ËkesZUæflag ls voSËk olwyh dj Hkz"V vkpj.k dk Án'kZu dj eŒÁŒ flfoy lsok ¼vkpj.k½ fu;e 1965 ds fu;e 3¼1½¼,d½¼nks½¼rhu½ ds Áfrdwy vkpj.k djukA** 5. The denial of charges led to initiation of departmental enquiry whereon the enquiry officer found that charges were not proved. However, the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the finding, recorded his dissent note and after considering the reply filed by the appellant to the dissenting note, inflicted the impugned penalty. The appellate authority and writ Court declined to interfere with the same. 6. Learned Single Judge, taking note of the decisions in Kailash Chandra v. State of M.P., [ 2009 (4) MPLJ 554 ], State Bank of India & Others v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde [ (2006) 7 SCC 212 ] and Govt. of A. P. & Others v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan [ (2006) 2 SCC 373 ], wherein it is held that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority and its jurisdiction is confined and circumscribed to correct error of law or procedure error which is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence, declined to interfere by impugned order. 7. Singular issue raised by the appellant is that, being a case of no evidence, the appellant cannot be punished on mere surmises. To draw home the submission, learned counsel for the appellant has led us through the findings by the enquiry officer as also the dissenting note of the disciplinary authority. 7. Singular issue raised by the appellant is that, being a case of no evidence, the appellant cannot be punished on mere surmises. To draw home the submission, learned counsel for the appellant has led us through the findings by the enquiry officer as also the dissenting note of the disciplinary authority. It is urged that there being no evidence on record to prove the charges, the disciplinary authority ventured through surmises and presumption which is not tenable in the eyes of law, is urged that if the findings recorded by disciplinary authority is seen closely, they are not based on any fact on record but on presumption and suspicion which cannot take the place of proof. Reliance is placed on the decision in Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka [ (2001) 4 SCC 9 ], wherein it is held: “27. In the absence of the legal proof of Exhibit P-77, inadmissibility of the statement of A-4 before Shambulingappa (PW-50) to prove the contents of that document as extra-judicial confession and the circumstance of A-1 being last seen with the deceased not being incriminatory, there is no evidence to hold that she has been proved to be guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. Doubt and suspicion of her involve-ment in the ghastly crime cannot be ruled out but suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof. Lapses in investigation, failure of the judicial officer to record the confessional statement in accordance with law and absence of corroborative evidence leaves us with no option but to give A-1 the benefit of doubt. Moral conviction regarding the involvement of an accused in the commission of crime cannot be a substitute for a legal verdict based upon facts and law. Though with regret, but bound by law, we have no option but to set aside the judgments of the trial as well as the High Court to the extent by which A-1 has been convicted and sentenced for the commission of the offence of murder of Amarnath, her husband.” (empahsis supplied) 8. Learned Additional Advocate General, in his turn, supports the order passed by learned Single Judge. 9. In order to appreciate the rival contention, we have perused the findings by the enquiry officer and by the Disciplinary Authority. 10. Learned Additional Advocate General, in his turn, supports the order passed by learned Single Judge. 9. In order to appreciate the rival contention, we have perused the findings by the enquiry officer and by the Disciplinary Authority. 10. The enquiry officer, on the basis of evidence on record, returned the following findings: ^^16-2 fcUnq Øekad 15-2 dk ldkj.k fu"d"kZ% vlkŒ Øekad 2 /kesUæ flag o vlkŒ Øekad 6 lqjs'k dqekj iVsy ds }kjk ijh{k.k ds nkSjku vius dFku esa crk;k gS fd fnukad 12-10-2010 dks jkr esa dLck esa tk jgs Fks ogka ij vKkr 2&3 yM+dksa ds }kjk Vªd dks jksddj uonqxkZ egksRlo ds fy;s pUnk fy;k x;k FkkA muds Vªd ls fdlh Hkh iqfyl okys us dksbZ ,.Vªh ugha yh vkSj u iqfyl deZpkfj;ksa us Vªd dks jksdkA Tkcfd Fkkuk ÁHkkjh ekSŒ tsŒvkjŒ teukuh ¼vlkŒ 4½ ds }kjk vius dFku esa lkaln th dk feyuk vkSj lkaln o Vªd pkydksa ds }kjk dksbZ f'kdk;r u djuk] ek= lkaln ds dgus ij Vªd pkydksa ds dFku ysuk crk;k x;k gSA ijh{k.k dFku ds Á'u Øekad&3 ds mRrj esa ek= 2 iqfyl okyksa }kjk ,.Vªh djuk crk;k x;k gSA ÁkŒ tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh }kjk Hkh Fkkuk ÁHkkjh ds Áfrosnu ds vk/kkj ij viuk er fn;k x;k gSA mDr rF;ksa dk leFkZu Vªd pkyd@ËkesZUæ flag] ¼vlkŒ 2½ ,oa lqjs'k dqekj iVsy ¼vlkŒ 6½ ds }kjk iqf"V ugha dh xbZ gSA rFkk vlkŒ 1 lSfud jes'k flag }kjk Hkh] tks fd Fkkuk ÁHkkjh tsŒvkjŒ teukuh ¼vlkŒ 4½ ds gejkgh jgk gS] mlds }kjk Hkh vius vius dFku esa dksbZ ,.Vªh vFkok Vªdksa ls voS/k olwyh u djuk crk;k gSA vr% blls Li"V gS fd vipkjh vkjŒ ds }kjk Vªd pkydksa ls dksbZ voS/k olwyh@,.Vªh jksddj ugha dh xbZ gSA 16-3 fcUnq Øekad 15-3 dk ldkj.k fu"d"kZ fcUnq Øekad 16-2 ds vuqlkj vipkjh vkjŒ }kjk Vªd pkydksa dks jksddj muls voS/k olwyh@,.Vªh djus ckcr iqf"V ugha gksrh gS ftl dkj.k mudk d`R; Hkz"V vkpj.k dh Js.kh esa ugha vkrk gS rFkk flfoy lsok ¼vkpj.k½ 1965 ds fu;e 3 ¼1½ ¼,d½ ¼nks½ ¼rhu½ ds Áfrdwy vkpj.k dh Js.kh esa ugha vkrk gSA 17- fopkj.k ds vfrfjDr fcUnq% 18- fu"d"kZ% foHkkxh; tkap esa vipkjh vkjŒ ds fo#) tkjh vkjksi i=] tkap ds nkSjku ijhf{kr vfHk;kstu lk{khx.k 1 yxk;kr 6 rFkk vfHk;kstu Án'kZ 1 yxk;r 9 ,oa vipkjh vkjŒ 1034 jkedqekj] o vkjŒ pkŒ 290 eukst dqekj ds ijh{k.k dFku ,oa vkjksi i= ds rkjrE; esa ÁLrqr mRrj ds lw{e fo'ys"k.k ds vk/kkj ij vipkjh vkj{kdksa ds fo#) vkjksi fnukad 12-10-2010 dh jkf= dks jkf= x'r ds nkSjku Vªd pkyd lqjs'k dqekj iVsy ,oa ËkesUæ flag ls voS/k olwyh dj Hkz"V vkpj.k dk Án'kZu dj e/; izns'k flfoy lsok ¼vkpj.k½ fu;e 1965 ds fu;e 3¼1½¼,d½¼nks½¼rhu½ ds Áfrdwy vkpj.k djukA** 11. Evidently, the enquiry officer returned the findings of no guilt as there is no material evidence on record. If these findings are to be disagreed by the disciplinary authority, incumbent it was upon him to have adverted to cogent material evidence on record. Instead, the disciplinary authority presumes certain facts and returns the findings of guilty. The disciplinary authority observes: ^^;g rF; lR; gS fd vkjksih vkj{kdksa dh Fkkuk ekS ls 'kkldh; eksVj lk;fdy ls x'r ds fy;s jokuxh gqbZA bl ckr dh Hkh iqf"V gqbZ gS fd tgka lkaln th [kMs+ Fks ,oa Fkkuk ÁHkkjh Hkh mlh txg ij igqaps tgka Vªd [kM+k gqvk Fkk ,oa ftl 'kkldh; eksVj lk;dy ls vkjksih vkj{kd jokuk gq;s Fks og Hkh ekStwn FkhA lkekU;r% x'r iSny gksrh gS ftls eksVj lk;fdy ugha nh tkrh gS ftls eksVj lk;fdy x'r ds fy;s nh tkrh gS os eksVj lk;fdy ls gh x'r djrs gSA eksVj lk;fdy lHkh txg NksVh&NksVh xfy;ksa esa vklkuh ls pyrh gSA vkjksfi;ksa ds }kjk ;g crk;k tkuk fd ckfj'k Fkh ,oa isVªksy dh deh Fkh blfy;s lqjf{kr ,d txg j[k nh xbZ Fkh] ;g ,d cgkuk gSA ;fn bu nksuksa phtksa ls voxr Fks rks mUgsa Fkkus ls gh eksVj lk;fdy ugha ys tkuh pkfg;s Fkh iSny x'r ds fy;s th Fkkus ls jokuxh ysuh pkfg;s FkhA Fkkuk ÁHkkjh us vius dFku esa vkjŒ jkedqekj }kjk fd;s x;s Áfrijh{k.k ds nkSjku ;g Hkh crk;k fd ÁkjaHk esa buds }kjk Qksu ls laidZ djus dh dksf'k'k dh xbZ ysfdu Qksu fjflo ugha fd;k x;k ,oa lkaln th ds pys tkus ds i'pkr~ nksuksa vkjksih vkj{kd mifLFkr gq;sA ml LFkku ij Vªd] Vªd MªkbZoj] lkaln th] Fkkuk ÁHkkjh ,oa 'kkldh; eksVj lk;fdy bdV~Bs Fks ysfdu vkjksih vkj{kd dks bldk irk ugha pyuk vk'p;Ztud gSA iwjs ?kVukØe ds nkSjku budk ogka ls xk;c jguk] lkaln th ds tkus ds i'pkr~ budk ml LFky ij vk tkuk ,oa bl nkSjku xk;c jguk bR;kfn lansgkLin gS ;fn vkjksih vkj{kd ds }kjk ,UVªh ugha olwyh tk jgh Fkh rks bUgsa eksVj lk;fdy NksMdj ugha Hkkxuk pkfg;s FkkA ;fn vklikl Fks rks bUgsa fu%ladksp lcds le{k mifLFkr gksuk pkfg;s Fkk ysfdu buds }kjk LFky ij rc mifLFkr gq;s tc ?kVukØe lkekU; gks x;kA vr% vf/kjksfir vkjksi eSa Áekf.kr ekurk g¡wA** 12. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Others [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ], it is held: “12........The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.” 13. Learned Additional Advocate General fails to commend to any material evidence to support the findings by the disciplinary authority. 14. In view whereof, it can be said with certitude that there is no cogent material evidence on record to establish the charges and the findings by the disciplinary authority are perverse, as would sustain the punishment inflicted on the appellant. 15. Consequently, the impugned order dated 29.10.2011 is set aside. As a necessary corollary, the appellate order dated 16.5.2012 and the order dated 6.2.2019 passed in Writ Petition No. 1008/2015 are set aside. The necessary consequences shall ensue. 16. In the result, the appeal is finally disposed of in above terms. No costs.