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2019 DIGILAW 422 (UTT)

Santosh Gaurav v. State of Uttarakhand

2019-08-05

ALOK KUMAR VERMA, RAMESH RANGANATHAN

body2019
JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. C.D. Bahuguna, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner and Mr. Anil Kumar Bisht, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand and, with their consent, the Special Appeal is disposed of at the stage of admission. 2. This Special Appeal is preferred by the appellant-writ petitioner against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 684 of 2019 dated 10.06.2019, dismissing the Writ Petition. 3. The appellant-writ petitioner was appointed as the Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission on 22.04.2015 for a period of three years. His appointment was prematurely cancelled by order dated 29.03.2017. The appellant-writ petitioner questioned the said order by way of Writ Petition (M/S) No. 710 of 2017. Initially an interim order was passed, in favour of the appellant-writ petitioner, on 10.04.2017 and the said Writ Petition was, thereafter, allowed by order dated 11.07.2017; and the order, impugned in the writ petition, was quashed. 4. Aggrieved by the said order dated 11.07.2017, the State Government filed Special Appeal before a Division Bench of this Court which was also dismissed by order dated 26.07.2018. The three year' tenure of the appellant-writ petitioner, as the Vice-Chairperson, had come to an end even prior thereto on 18.05.2018. The third respondent herein was appointed as the Vice-Chairperson, by the State Government, on 07.03.2019. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing Writ Petition (M/S) No.684 of 2019. 5. In Writ Petition (M/S) No. 684 of 2019 (against the order passed in which the present Special Appeal is preferred), the appellant-writ petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 07.03.2019, whereby the third respondent was appointed to the post of Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission; a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1, 2 & 4 not to permit the third respondent to join office of the Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission; and a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1, 2 & 4 to permit the appellant-writ petitioner to hold and retain the post of Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission. 6. 6. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge noted the contention of the appellant-writ petitioner that the third respondent should not be allowed to work as the Vice-Chairperson and, instead, the appellant-writ petitioner should be allowed to work as the Vice-Chairperson for a period of one and a half years during which period he had not worked. The learned Single Judge, thereafter, observed that the prayer of the appellant-writ petitioner was misconceived and could not be granted; and a pragmatic and reasonable relief, in the circumstances, had already been granted to the appellant-writ petitioner by giving him salary/remuneration applicable to the post. Finding no merit in the Writ Petition, the learned Single Judge dismissed the same. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 7. Mr. C.D. Bahuguna, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, would submit that, in the light of the judgment of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018, the appellant-writ petitioner must be deemed to have been in service; consequently, for the period from 29.03.2017 till 18.05.2018, i.e. for a period of around one year two months, since the appellant-writ petitioner was forcibly kept out of office for no fault of his, and as held both by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, in the earlier round of litigation, illegally, he must be deemed to be continuing in office, for the remaining period of one year and two months, as the Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission, since he held office earlier only for a period of around one year and ten months; the amount deposited by the respondents, in his bank account, is only the remuneration which he is entitled to, and is in compliance with the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court directing that he be paid consequential benefits; it is not as if the appellant-writ petitioner had asked for payment of this amount; the said amount was deposited in his account, even without his permission; even this amount did not represent the actual amounts due to him for the remaining duration of a little less than one year and two months i.e. from 29.03.2017 till 18.05.2018; and, if the impugned order were to continue to operate, it would result in the Executive being permitted to blatantly violate orders of Court. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. C.D. Bahuguna, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, would also place reliance on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court, in Bhagwati Prasad Makwana Vs. Union of India and others, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 777 of 2012 dated 06.10.2012, to contend that, since removal of the Vice-Chairperson in that case was also interdicted on the ground that the period of office of three years could not be curtailed, the appellant-writ petitioner ought to be conferred a similar benefit, as otherwise it would amount to discrimination; in compliance with the order passed by this Court, in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 777 of 2012 dated 06.10.2012, both Mr. Ajay Rajore and Mr. Bhagwati Prasad Makwana, who were earlier the Vice-Chairperson and Chairperson, were permitted to continue in office for the unexpired period of the term of three years; and there is no justifiable reason why a similar benefit should not have been extended to the appellant-writ petitioner. 9. On the other hand Mr. Ajay Rajore and Mr. Bhagwati Prasad Makwana, who were earlier the Vice-Chairperson and Chairperson, were permitted to continue in office for the unexpired period of the term of three years; and there is no justifiable reason why a similar benefit should not have been extended to the appellant-writ petitioner. 9. On the other hand Mr. Anil Kumar Bisht, learned Standing Counsel for the State Government, would submit that, since the term of office as prescribed in the Government Order dated 27.01.2009 is only for three years which period, admittedly, expired on 18.05.2018, the appellant-writ petitioner is not entitled to seek continuance in office as the Vice-Chairperson thereafter; there is no provision in the Government Order dated 27.01.2009 for the term of office, of the Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson, to be automatically extended; the power to extend the term of office is conferred on the State Government, that too only in public interest; the State Government has chosen not to extend the tenure of the appellant-writ petitioner and has, instead, appointed the third respondent as the Vice-Chairperson on 07.03.2019; no mandamus can be issued to the State Government to appoint a person, or to continue him in office beyond the specified term; the order of the Division Bench, in Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018, only required the appellant-writ petitioner to be deemed to continue in office, and to be paid all consequential benefits; the appellant-writ petitioner being deemed to have continued in office, would only mean that he continued to hold office till 18.05.2018 and not beyond; and the consequential benefits, which the appellant-writ petitioner was required to be extended, related only to payment of salary and other emoluments, which he was entitled to when he was in office; and these amounts have already been credited to his account. 10. As the appellant-writ petitioner was appointed on 22.04.2015 for a period of three years, and he joined office as the Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission on 18.05.2015, the term of three years was to expire on 18.05.2018. The tenure of the appellant-writ petitioner was however cut-short, and he was removed from office by order dated 29.03.2017. The premature termination of the office of the appellant-writ petitioner herein, as the Vice-Chairperson, was subjected to challenge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 709 of 2017. The tenure of the appellant-writ petitioner was however cut-short, and he was removed from office by order dated 29.03.2017. The premature termination of the office of the appellant-writ petitioner herein, as the Vice-Chairperson, was subjected to challenge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 709 of 2017. This order dated 29.03.2017 was quashed by the learned Single Judge resulting in the State Government preferring Special Appeal No. 810 of 2017 which formed part of Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch. 11. In Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018, the Division Bench, relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court, in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Girja Shankar Pant & others, 2001 1 SCC 182 ; Union of India Vs. Kuldeep Singh, 2004 2 SCC 590 ; P. Venugopal Vs. Union of India, 2008 5 SCC 1 ; Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I & another, 2008 14 SCC 151 and Kranti Associates Private Ltd. & another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & others, 2010 9 SCC 496, observed that they had gone through the records produced before them; no reasons had been recorded why the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson had been removed; they could only be removed by assigning justifiable reasons; and there was no illegality or perversity in the order under appeal dated 11.07.2017 rendered by the learned Single Judge. The Special Appeals were dismissed with costs of Rs. 25,000/- each; and the first respondent, in all the Special Appeals, were deemed to be in office with all consequential benefits. 12. The constitution of the Commission, and appointment of its Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson, is governed by the Government Order dated 27.01.2009. Clause (3) thereof relates to the appointment of a Chairperson/Vice-Chairperson and members of the Commission. In terms of sub-clause (1) of Clause (3), the Chairperson/Vice-Chairperson shall hold office for a term of three years. However, power has been conferred on the State Government either to extend or to reduce the term in public interest. Sub-clause (2) of Clause (3) confers power on the State Government to remove the Chairperson/Vice-Chairperson from office on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (g) thereunder. It is not in dispute that the case of the appellant-writ petitioner does not fall within the ambit of sub-clause (2) of Clause (3) and it is, therefore, unnecessary for us to examine its scope and ambit. It is not in dispute that the case of the appellant-writ petitioner does not fall within the ambit of sub-clause (2) of Clause (3) and it is, therefore, unnecessary for us to examine its scope and ambit. 13. The only question, which necessitates examination in this appeal, is whether the premature curtailment of the term of office of three years as Vice-Chairperson, as stipulated in sub-clause (1) of Clause (3) of the Government Order dated 27.01.2009, would require the appellant-writ petitioner to be permitted to continue in office for a period of one year and two months, for having deprived him of holding office as the Vice-Chairperson from 29.03.2017 when he was removed from office till 18.05.2018 when he would have, but for his removal, completed his tenure of three years. 14. A perusal of the statements, filed along with the writ petition, would show that, while Mr. Ajay Rajore was initially appointed as the Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission on 08.09.2010 and was removed from office on 16.04.2012, he was again appointed as the Vice-Chairperson on 17.12.2012, pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 06.10.2012; and he continued to hold office of Vice-Chairperson till 07.05.2014. Likewise, while Mr. Bhagwati Prasad Makwana was initially appointed as the Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karamchari Commission on 08.09.2010 and was removed from office on 16.04.2012, he was again appointed as the Chairperson on 17.12.2012 and continued to hold the said office till 07.05.2014. 15. In terms of the Government Order dated 27.01.2009, the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson of the Uttarakhand State Safai Karmchari Commission hold office for a period of three years from the date they assume charge. Since the appellant-writ petitioner assumed charge of the office of the Vice-Chairperson on 18.05.2015, his three-year term, in terms of the Government Order dated 27.01.2009, ended on 18.05.2018. It is true that the appellant-writ petitioner was prematurely removed from the office of Vice-Chairperson by order dated 29.03.2017, i.e. a little over one year and ten months after he assumed office on 18.05.2015. While the said order was quashed by the learned Single Judge by his order in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 710 of 2017 dated 11.07.2017, the appellant-writ petitioner was not put back in office and, instead, the respondents herein chose to prefer Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch. While the said order was quashed by the learned Single Judge by his order in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 710 of 2017 dated 11.07.2017, the appellant-writ petitioner was not put back in office and, instead, the respondents herein chose to prefer Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch. While around ten months, of the three-year tenure, still remained after the impugned order dated 29.03.2017 was quashed by the order in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 710 of 2017 dated 11.07.2017, the respondents herein did not permit the appellant-writ petitioner to resume office. 16. By the time Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch was dismissed on 26.07.2018, the appellant-writ petitioner's tenure, of three years as the Vice-Chairperson, had already ended on 18.05.2018. It is, in such circumstances, that the Division Bench had, in its order dated 26.07.2018, opined that the appellant-writ petitioner should be deemed to be in office with all consequential benefits. The order of the Division Bench, in effect, means that the appellant-writ petitioner, by legal fiction, continued in office, i.e. he was to be presumed to have held office as the Vice-Chairperson from 29.03.2017 (when he was removed from the said office) till 18.05.2018 when his term of three years expired. Since the appellant-writ petitioner was entitled, in terms of the order of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No.809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018, for all consequential benefits also, the emoluments and other monetary benefits, which he would have received had he continued in office from 29.03.2017 till 18.05.2018, were required to be paid to him. 17. While Sri Anil Kumar Bisht, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand, would contend that the said amounts were, in fact, paid to him, Sri C.D. Bahuguna, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, would submit that the said amount has not been paid to the appellant-writ petitioner in its entirety, and even this amount was unilaterally transferred to his bank account without his consent. Suffice it, therefore, to hold that, since the order of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018 has attained finality, no appeal having been preferred there against, the State Government, in case it has not paid the appellant-writ petitioner the monetary benefits which he was entitled to if he had continued in office from 29.03.2017 till 18.05.2018, shall pay him the amounts due within one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 18. The appellant-writ petitioner, however, claims that he should be put back in office as the Vice Chairman, for the unexpired term of a little less than one year two months from 29.03.2017 till 18.05.2018, since he was illegally deprived of holding the said office. Clause 3(1) of the Government Order dated 27.01.2009 stipulates that the term of office, of the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson of the State Safai Karmchari Commission, shall be for a period of three years. While discretion is conferred thereunder on the State Government to extend the term, its exercise is conditioned by the need to do so in public interest. The word "discretion", standing single and unsupported by circumstances, signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste. The word in itself implies vigilant circumspection and care; therefore, where the legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility. (Kuldeep Singh, 2004 2 SCC 590 ). Discretion is to know through law what is just. When anything is left to any person to be done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with sound discretion, and according to law. (Tomlin's Law Dictionary). 19. In its ordinary meaning, the word "discretion" signifies unrestrained exercise of choice or will; freedom to act according to one's own judgment; unrestrained exercise of will; the liberty or power of acting without control other than one's own judgment. But, when applied to public functionaries, it means a power or right conferred upon them by law, of acting officially in certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. Discretion is to discern between right and wrong and, therefore, whoever hath power to act at discretion, is bound by the rule of reason and law. (Tomlin's Law Dictionary; Kuldeep Singh, 2004 2 SCC 590 ). Discretion is to discern between right and wrong and, therefore, whoever hath power to act at discretion, is bound by the rule of reason and law. (Tomlin's Law Dictionary; Kuldeep Singh, 2004 2 SCC 590 ). When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself ( Sharp v. Wakefield, All Er Rep 651 (HL); S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, 1967 AIR(SC) 1427 and Kuldeep Singh, 2004 2 SCC 590 ). 20. Since the Government Order dated 27.01.2009 confers discretion only on the State Government to extend the term of office of the Chairperson/Vice Chairperson, that too in public interest, this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not, ordinarily, substitute its discretion for that of the State Government. Where power is conferred to a particular body, with a discretion as to how it is to be used, it is beyond the power of any court to contest that discretion. Westminster Cpn. v. London & North Western Railway Co., 1905 AC 426; Administrative Law (H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth - Tenth Edition)]. The discretion ought to be that of the designated authority, and not that of the Court. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the Court's function to look further into its merits. 'With the question whether a particular decision is wise or foolish the Court is not concerned; it can only interfere if to pursue it is beyond the powers of the authority.' Administrative Law (H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth - Tenth Edition); Short v. Poole, 1926 Ch 66). 21. The law recognises certain principles upon which discretion must be exercised, but within the four corners of those principles the discretion is absolute, and cannot be questioned in a Court of law. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited vs. Wednesbury Corporation, 1948 1 KB 223; Padfield Vs. Minister of Agriculture, 1968 UKHL 1. 21. The law recognises certain principles upon which discretion must be exercised, but within the four corners of those principles the discretion is absolute, and cannot be questioned in a Court of law. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited vs. Wednesbury Corporation, 1948 1 KB 223; Padfield Vs. Minister of Agriculture, 1968 UKHL 1. The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which has been appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. It is only if it passes those bounds, does it act ultra vires. The Court must, therefore, resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. There is a danger of judges, wrongly though unconsciously, substituting their own views for the views of the decision-maker who alone is charged and authorized to exercise its discretion. [R. vs. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 1989 1 WLR 525 ; Administrative Law (H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth - Tenth Edition)]. The Court must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves, to the deciding authority, the full range of choices which the legislature is presumed to have intended. [Administrative Law (H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth - Tenth Edition); R. vs. Boundary Commission, 1983 QB 600 ]. 22. The very fact that the State Government has, by order dated 07.03.2019, appointed the third respondent as the Vice-Chairperson would show that it had chosen not to exercise its discretion to extend the term of office of the appellant-writ petitioner. The Government Order dated 27.01.2009 confers discretion on the State Government, and this Court would not sit in judgment over the exercise of such discretion. The primary decision-maker enjoys 'a discretionary area of judgment', i.e. an area into which the court will not intrude. [Lenster and Pannick, Human Rights Law and Practice (1999), para. 3.21; Lord Hope in R. vs. DPP ex p. Kebilene, 2000 2 AC 326 ]. This is sometimes referred to as according a 'margin of appreciation' to the authority or a 'margin of discretion'. [Laws LJ in R. (Prolife Alliance) vs. BBC, 2002 EWCA(Civ) 297]. The word commonly used to describe this is 'deference'; the court is said to show deference to the primary decision-maker. This is sometimes referred to as according a 'margin of appreciation' to the authority or a 'margin of discretion'. [Laws LJ in R. (Prolife Alliance) vs. BBC, 2002 EWCA(Civ) 297]. The word commonly used to describe this is 'deference'; the court is said to show deference to the primary decision-maker. But, howsoever it may be phrased, this discretionary area marks the extent to which the decision-maker may exercise autonomous judgment, i.e. the extent to which the test is not a merits review. ("Administrative Law": H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth-Tenth Edition). 23. Views differ on the breadth of deference and the justification for it. On the one hand, decisions taken by an elected decision-maker or a decision-maker accountable to elected representatives are said to be entitled to deference on the ground of democratic principles. And the principle is graduated, with greater deference being accorded to an Act of Parliament and less to a decision of the executive. [International Transport Roth GmbH vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002 EWCA(Civ) 158]. Others hold that the reason for deference (without any connotation of servility) is one of institutional competence. Where the matter raised is one that the courts are institutionally incompetent to decide, and the public authority is in a better position to assess than the court, then judicial intervention is inappropriate. (Jowell, 'Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity?'; "Administrative Law": H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth-Tenth Edition). 24. Different justifications for deference apply to different questions. The necessity question, for instance, is a question of fact and practicality. A measure of expertise, which the court will generally lack, will be required to assess whether a particular measure is no more intrusive than necessary, and yet will achieve the objective. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to defer to the expertise of the official taking the decision. Deference in such matters is justified on the ground that the Executive is in a better position than the court to decide what measures are necessary. ( Home Secretary vs. AP,2008 EWHC 2001; "Administrative Law": H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth-Tenth Edition). There is often no right answer to such questions and the issue is one of the legitimacy of the decision-maker to make that judgment. ( Home Secretary vs. AP,2008 EWHC 2001; "Administrative Law": H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth-Tenth Edition). There is often no right answer to such questions and the issue is one of the legitimacy of the decision-maker to make that judgment. (Kay v. London Borough of Lambeth, 2006 2 AC 465 : 2006 UKHL 10 ; R. (Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, 2008 2 WLR 781 : 2008 UKHL 15). 25. Similarly, where the value judgment is made with due care by a democratically accountable decision-maker the court should not substitute its value judgment for that of the decision-maker. ("Administrative Law": H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth-Tenth Edition). As the State Government has exercised its discretion in terms of the Government Order dated 27.01.2009, in appointing the third respondent as the Vice-Chairperson vide order dated 07.03.2019, the relief sought for in the writ petition, to set aside the appointment of the third respondent and to appoint the appellant-writ petitioner in his place, cannot be granted, for any such order would amount to this Court substituting its discretion for that of the State Government. 26. While it is true that the Division Bench, in Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018, had held that the appellant-writ petitioner must be deemed to have been in service, the said order only required the appellant-writ petitioner to be deemed to have continued in office without interruption from 29.03.2017 (when he was removed from office) till 18.05.2018 when the three-year tenure was due to end. Neither could the Court have, nor did the Division Bench in its order in Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018 extend the three year tenure, of the appellant-writ petitioner as the Vice- Chairperson, beyond 18.05.2018. The Government Order dated 27.01.2009 contains no provision for automatic extension of tenure. 27. The petitioner claims parity with Sri Ajay Rajore, who was hitherto the Vice-Chairperson, and whose premature termination from office was set aside by this Court in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 777 of 2012 dated 06.12.2012 as unjustified. As noted hereinabove, Clause 3(1) of the Government Order dated 27.01.2009 confers power on the State Government to extend the term of office of the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson in public interest. As noted hereinabove, Clause 3(1) of the Government Order dated 27.01.2009 confers power on the State Government to extend the term of office of the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson in public interest. The mere fact that the State Government had extended the tenure in an earlier case does not confer any right on the appellant-writ petitioner to claim parity or to contend that his term of office should also be extended. Accepting such a contention would require this Court to direct the State Government to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, and that is wholly impermissible. The plea of discrimination does not, therefore, merit acceptance. 28. It is no doubt true that, in the light of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 710 of 2017 dated 11.07.2017 as affirmed in Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018, the appellant-writ petitioner may not be unjustified in his claim to have been illegally kept out of office. While the Division Bench had, in its order in Special Appeal No. 809 of 2017 and batch dated 26.07.2018, held that the appellant-writ petitioner should be deemed to have been in office with all consequential benefits and, as a result of the said order, he is entitled for all monetary benefits, which he would have been entitled to if he had continued to hold the office of the Vice-Chairperson from 29.03.2017 till 18.05.2018, any compensation for the legal injury which the appellant-writ petitioner may claim to have suffered from, consequent on his premature termination from the office of the Vice-Chairperson, can only be sought by instituting appropriate legal proceedings before the Competent Civil Court. It would be wholly impermissible for us, in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to determine the damages, if any, suffered by the appellant-writ petitioner. Suffice it to make it clear that neither the order under appeal, nor the order now passed by us, shall disable the appellant-writ petitioner from availing his common law remedy of filing a Civil Suit before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. In case any such Suit is instituted, the Competent Civil Court shall examine his claim on its merits uninfluenced by any observations made either in the order under appeal, or in the order now passed by us. 29. In case any such Suit is instituted, the Competent Civil Court shall examine his claim on its merits uninfluenced by any observations made either in the order under appeal, or in the order now passed by us. 29. It needs no emphasis that the scope of interference, in an intra-Court appeal, is extremely limited, It is only if the order under appeal suffers from a patent illegality would interference be justified. We find no such infirmity in the said order warranting interference in an intra Court appeal. Subject to the modification as detailed hereinabove, the Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.