JUDGMENT : Attau Rahman Masoodi, J. This is a review application filed by the applicants, who were opposite parties no. 2 and 3 in the petition. The review application arises out of the judgment rendered by this Court in Misc. Petition No. 27006 (MS) of 2018 filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Sri Adnan Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of review application on the ground that the same has not been filed by the same counsel who had argued the matter. Thus, the review application would not merit for consideration on the grounds urged. 3. In reply to the argument advanced, Sri R.N. Tilhari, learned counsel for the review applicant very humbly submitted that he would not argue the review petition beyond what lies within the scope of law, hence change of counsel in no manner would reflect anything as unethical. 4. Having considered the argument put forth by learned counsel for the review applicant besides the importance of question involved in the case, the objection raised by Sri Adnan Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner is overruled. 5. The matter involves interpretation of Section 17 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, hence assistance of the State Counsel was also solicited and the matter was argued by Ms. Saima Khan, learned brief holder on behalf of the State. 6. Sri R. N. Tilhari, learned counsel for the review applicant has raised factual aspects of the matter as well as the questions of law. Insofar as the factual aspects are concerned, the same are referable to the aspect that this Court in the body of judgment has observed that no objections as regards the jurisdiction were raised before the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) with regard to the maintainability of the application filed under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC read with Section 151 thereof. Even if there is a factual error in the matter transcribing such a fact but the submission put forth was dealt with within the scope of statute, hence, nothing would turn on such an error for the reasons recorded hereinafter. 7. Even if there is a factual error in the matter transcribing such a fact but the submission put forth was dealt with within the scope of statute, hence, nothing would turn on such an error for the reasons recorded hereinafter. 7. The next submission on the factual aspect of failure to notice the filing of Regular Suit No. 35 of 1980 by the father of the petitioner as put forth by learned counsel for the applicant would also not merit in law, inasmuch as, the court has clearly put on record that the property in dispute was admittedly wakf property, therefore, the compromise by a person not authorised was rightly questioned. Hence, even if some proceeding after the date of compromise decree rendered in the year 1976 was initiated by the petitioner's father for enforcement of the compromise decree, the same would be of no consequence, if the decree ultimately comes out to be proved as unlawful or void. 8. Besides the above, two relevant questions of law have been raised by learned counsel for the review applicant. The first question on the anvil of Section 17 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, is regarding the jurisdiction of Civil Judge (Senior Division) who has set aside the compromise decree by order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011. Section 17 for ready reference is reproduced hereunder :- "17. Continuance of proceeding of Courts ceasing to have jurisdiction. (1) Where any Civil Court under this Act has from any cause ceased to have jurisdiction with respect to any case, any proceeding in relation to that case which, if that Court had not ceased to have jurisdiction, might have been had therein may be had in the Court to which the business of the former Court has been transferred. (2) Nothing in this section applies to cases for which provision is made in sections 36, 37 and 114 of, and Rule 1 of Order XLVII to Schedule 1 to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or in any other enactment for the time being in force." 9. (2) Nothing in this section applies to cases for which provision is made in sections 36, 37 and 114 of, and Rule 1 of Order XLVII to Schedule 1 to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or in any other enactment for the time being in force." 9. In the light of Section 17 of the Act extracted above, it is argued that once the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division who then designated as Civil Judge had rendered the compromise decree on 16/23.12.1976 had ceased to have jurisdiction on the date of filing of the application under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC on 19.2.2007, the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), by operation of law, soon after the decree was rendered, thus ceased to have jurisdiction, as on the date of filing of the application in the year 2007. Hence, the application for setting aside the compromise decree was not maintainable before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), who had passed the decree. 10. For interpreting the above statutory provision, two expressions were laid emphasis upon, namely, 'any civil court' and 'ceased to have jurisdiction'. It is no more res integra that the expression 'the court' has been succinctly interpreted by the apex court in the decisions, which have already been referred in the body of the judgment and there is no dispute on this aspect of the matter. The import of the word 'the court' as interpreted by the apex court with reference to Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC or the words 'any civil court' in the present review petition would mean the same court. The above provision is not capable of being given a different meaning and the position is well settled. 11. On the interpretation of the phrase ''ceased to have jurisdiction', Sri R.N. Tilhari would submit that as soon as the compromise decree was rendered by the Civil Judge in the year 1976 who is now designated as Civil Judge (Senior Division), sooner the appeal was decided by a compromise decree, the court ceased to have jurisdiction for the purpose of entertaining an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC for not having the appellate jurisdiction. The submission proceeds on the premise that under Section 21 of the Act, the appellate jurisdiction as per statute is vested in the District Judge. The submission proceeds on the premise that under Section 21 of the Act, the appellate jurisdiction as per statute is vested in the District Judge. Therefore, it is the appellate court i.e. District Judge, which shall have the jurisdiction to entertain such an application since the Civil Judge (Senior Division) had ceased to have jurisdiction consequent upon the decision of civil appeal transferred to him by exercising the power under Section 22 of the Act. 12. The submission put forth rests on the plain reading of the statute. The interpretation advanced by the learned counsel is not supported on the strength of any case law. 13. Per contra, Sri Adnan Ahmad and Ms. Saima Khan, both the counsel have argued that the phrase ''ceased to have jurisdiction' has a different meaning as against the one put forth by learned counsel for the review applicant. According to the learned counsel, there is a distinction between ceasing to have jurisdiction and a court having become functus officio. In the present case, both the learned counsel have argued that the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division (then Civil Judge) became functus officio in respect of the matter transferred to him in exercise of power vested in the District Judge by virtue of Section 22 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. It is submitted that the jurisdiction to decide appeals arising out of the court of Munsif Judge, now Civil Judge (Junior Division) has throughout vested in the District Judge. The said power has been made open to be delegated to the court of Civil Judge (now Civil Judge, Senior Division). There has not been any legislative change on the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of regular civil appeals under the statute and thus, once the delegation was made with the exercise of power under Section 22 of the Act and the provision remains unaltered, the jurisdiction conferred under Section 22 in a case would remain intact with the court to which the case was transferred so long as the mandate of authority stipulated under Section 22 exists and is not taken away. 14. The interpretation put forth by learned counsel for the other side when tested in the light of the decisions rendered by the apex court appears to be well founded and consistent. 14. The interpretation put forth by learned counsel for the other side when tested in the light of the decisions rendered by the apex court appears to be well founded and consistent. Any other interpretation of the provision would bring about a hostile situation between the two provisions of the statute for no purpose. Thus, on the aspect of the jurisdictional error, the submissions put forth by learned counsel for the applicant do not merit and are thus liable to be turned down. 15. Sri R.N. Tilhari, learned counsel for the review applicant has next submitted that the order passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) on 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 would become remediless for the applicant once it is held in the judgment sought to be reviewed that the compromise based on the agreement dated 16.12.1976 was unlawful and had wrongly been made part of the decree dated 23.12.1976. It is submitted that an application for setting aside the alleged unlawful compromise had to be decided on its own merit and could not be supported on the basis of reasoning assigned in a suit which was dismissed as non-maintainable. The remedy under Section 105 read with Order 43 Rule 1-A CPC on such an aspect is available to an aggrieved party. It has been so observed for the advantage of review applicant and the observation made is well supported in view of the judgment reported in (1993) 1 SCC 581 , wherein it is laid down that against any order setting aside the compromise decree which otherwise may not be appellable, the aggrieved person would have a right to challenge the same in the appeal arising out of the decree. 16. Any observations made by this Court in the impugned judgment beyond the scope of law would not influence the proceedings before the appellate court and all the grounds available to the applicant against the order dated 21.12.2010/14.1.2011 shall remain open to be urged while challenging the decree rendered against him, if any. 17. With this clarification, the review petition on two-fold ground urged before this Court stands disposed of.