JUDGMENT : 1. When the statutory prescription under Rule 185(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (for brevity 'the Rules") for filling up a particular post in a society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (for brevity 'the Act") is by promotion whether dehoring the statutory mandate it can be filled by direct recruitment? This and allied questions crop up for consideration in these intra-court appeals arising from the judgment in WP(C)No.2274/2009 dated 04.04.2019. The parties are reffered hereafter in this judgment in accordance with their rank and status in the said writ petition unless otherwise specifically mentioned. The learned single Judge considered the said main question and answered it in the negative and interfered with Ext.P2 notification issued by the Co-operative Service Examination Board to the extent it relates to the 2nd respondent-Bank. 2. The facts from which the said question germanes are as follows:- The 3rd respondent-Co-operative Service Examination Board issued Ext.P2 notification for appointment to the posts of Secretary, Chief Accountant and Branch Manager in Kizhuvilam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd, the second respondent. In fact, different posts in various co-operative Banks were also notified thereunder. As per Ext.P2 those posts in the 2nd respondent-Bank are sought to be filled up through direct recruitment. It is aggrieved by the same that the petitioners who are employees of the 2nd respondent-Bank filed the above mentioned writ petition. Petitioners 1 to 3 are working as Senior Clerks and petitioners 4 and 5 are working as Junior Clerk and Bill Collector respectively under the 2nd respondent. As noticed hereinbefore, their contentions were upheld by the learned single Judge and the writ petition was virtually allowed. It is feeling aggrieved by the said judgment that the 2nd respondent-Bank filed the former writ appeal and the 5th respondent therein viz., its Board of Directors filed the latter writ appeal. Since these appeals arise from the very same judgment in WP(C)No.2274/2019 they were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 3. Heard Adv. Sri.T.R.Harikumar, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent/ the appellant in the former appeal, Adv.Sri.D.Somasundaram, the learned counsel for the 5th respondent/ the appellant in the latter appeal, Adv.Sri.Nandakumara Menon, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners/respondents 1 to 5 as also the learned senior Government Pleader. 4. As noticed hereinbefore, petitioners 1 to 5 are employees under the 2nd respondent-Bank. 4. As noticed hereinbefore, petitioners 1 to 5 are employees under the 2nd respondent-Bank. Admittedly, none of them is working in the feeder category of any of the notified posts viz., Secretary, Chief Accountant and Branch Manager. Except the first writ petitioner, none of them possessed all the requisite qualifications for appointment to the aforesaid posts. As regards the first petitioner though he possessed all the prescribed qualifications for appointment even to the post of Secretary is not presently working in the feeder category to any of the notified posts. The contention of the appellant in the former appeal viz., the 2nd respondent-Bank is that it is the absence of fully qualified hands in the feeder category to the aforesaid posts that constrained the bank to report those vacancies to the Co-operative Service Examination Board, which ultimately culminated in Ext.P2 notification for direct recruitment. The 2nd respondent-Bank contended that in the absence of fully qualified hands in the feeder category it is permissible to effect direct recruitment to the aforesaid posts through the Co-operative Service Examination Board. The 5th respondent in the O.P, viz., the appellant in the latter appeal would also endorse the contentions of the appellant in the former appeal. The petitioners 1 to 5 would contend in the light of the interdiction under Rule 185 (1) of the Rules and in view of the indisputable fact that the notified posts do not belong to the categories falling within the purview of Rule 185 (2), (3) and (4) of the Rules, that it is impermissible to resort to direct recruitment to fill up the said vacancies in the aforesaid posts. In other words, according to them, in view of the statutory prohibition under Section 185(1) the aforesaid posts could be filled up only by effecting promotion. Resisting the said contentions the respondents-appellants would further contend that in the absence of qualified persons in the feeder category posts, it would be possible only to effect direct recruitment based on the doctrine of necessity. Resisting the said contentions the respondents-appellants would further contend that in the absence of qualified persons in the feeder category posts, it would be possible only to effect direct recruitment based on the doctrine of necessity. To buttress the said contention, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-appellants relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vipulbhai M Chaudhary v. Gujarath Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], a Single Bench decision of this Court in Padmaja v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies reported in [ILR (Ker) 2008 4 766] and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mattanchery Mahajanik Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., Kochi and another v. Rajendran M. and others reported [ 2016 (2) KHC 781 (DB)]. Paradoxically, the petitioners/respondents herein would also rely on the decision in Vipulbhai's case and Mattanchery Mahajanik's case (supra) to canvass the contra position. The learned special Government Pleader would contend that the respondents-appellants are not justified in relying on the doctrine of necessity to get sustained Ext.P2 notification as the said doctrine would apply only in a case where there is absolute absence of any other option or mode than the one opted/prescribed. It is submitted that in view of the provisions under Section 185(1) of the Rules the aforesaid posts falling thereunder could be filled only by effecting promotion. Even in the absence of fully qualified hands in the respective feeder category to the aforesaid posts, the respondents-appellants would not be justified to rely on the doctrine of necessity in view of the provision for granting exemption from qualifications in the matter of promotion under Rule 185(8) of the Rules. It is submitted that in view of the decision in Mattanchery Mahajanik's case (supra), the doctrine of necessity could not be applied if a qualified hand is available in the service of the bank. It is submitted that in view of the decision in Mattanchery Mahajanik's case (supra), the doctrine of necessity could not be applied if a qualified hand is available in the service of the bank. Referring to paragraph 50 of the decision in Vipulbhai's case wherein the Apex Court quoted its earlier decision in Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung [ (1991) 3 SCC 67 ) the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the latter appeal contended that, in a case where the legislature failed to envisage a situation as to what should be done in a particular situation like the one on hand viz., absence of qualified hands for promotion in the respective feeder categories to the posts notified under Ext.P2, it would amount to a lacuna and in such eventualities it is not only necessary but obligatory on the part of the courts to step into fill up the said lacuna. In such circumstances, in this case, it could not be held that resorting to direct recruitment to full up such posts is impermissible in law and in view of the statutory lacuna it is only legal to put seal of approval to the method adopted by the Bank to effect direct recruitment. It is in the aforesaid circumstances the aforesaid question cropped up for consideration. 5. While considering the aforesaid question essentially the applicability of the doctrine of necessity has also to be considered. For a proper consideration of the aforesaid issues it is only apropos to refer firstly to the relevant provisions under the Act and Rules:- "185. Promotion.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rules(2), (3) and (4), appointments to the categories of posts in a society, other than those mentioned in sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) shall be made by promotion, on the basis of seniority in the feeder category. The feeder categories for this purpose shall be specified by the society by framing suitable regulations, with the approval of the Registrar. Provided that if the senior employee/employees in the feeder category to a post relinquishes promotion, the immediate junior to the employee/employees in the feeder category shall be promoted. Provided further that if all the employees in the feeder category to a post relinquishes promotion an employee on the immediate lower category shall be promoted to the post after promoting him to the feeder category post by creating a supernumerary post. Provided further that if all the employees in the feeder category to a post relinquishes promotion an employee on the immediate lower category shall be promoted to the post after promoting him to the feeder category post by creating a supernumerary post. The supernumerary post so created shall be abolished on promotion of the said employee to the higher posts. Provided also that the promotion from sub staff category to the post of Junior Clerks shall be made only if such employees are having the required qualification and minimum three years service in the feeder category. Provided also that no employee of a society shall be promoted to the next higher post, if he has not successfully completed a short term training programme/course conducted by the following institution on the subject which is relevant to the objects/activities of the society which he is employed. (a) Short Term Credit Societies.-Agricultural Credit Staff Training Institute (ACSTI) or Institute (ACSTI) or Institute of Co-op. Management, Thiruvananthapuram/Kannur or Kerala Institute of Making the Best (KIMB), Alappuzha (b) Long Term Credit Societies.-Staff Training College or Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank or Kerala Institute of Making the Best (KIMB) Alappuzha (c) Other Societies.-Institute of Co-operative Management, Thiruvanathapuram/Kannur or Kerala Institute of Making the Best (KIMB), Alappuzha of Kerala Institute of Co-operative management, Neyyardam. Provided also that each employee of a Co-operative society, in the ministerial cadre shall be deputed by the committee, for a short term training programme conducted by the institutions mentioned above or any other institutions approved by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, once in three years, and no exemption shall be granted by the Government/Registrar of Cooperative Societies/ the Committee in attending and completing the training. Provided further that no annual increment shall be sanctioned to the employee, after the recruitment of four years if he has not attended the training programme. Provided further that no annual increment shall be sanctioned to the employee, after the recruitment of four years if he has not attended the training programme. (2) Substantive vacancies in the following posts shall be filled up by promotion and direct recruitment in the ratio 3:1 namely:- (i) Accounts Officer in the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., (ii) Branch Manager and the equivalent posts in the District Co-operative Banks; (iii) Deputy Manager in the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank; (iv) Assistant Secretary/Manager and equivalent posts in Primary Co-operative Societies and Urban Banks having a deposit of more than 10 crores; Provided that no point of time the number of direct recruits shall exceed twenty five percentage of the total strength of the respective posts mentioned above. xxxxx xxxxx (5) Selection of candidates to the posts to be filled up by promotion under sub-rule(2) shall be made from the feeder category in accordance with merit and ability to be assessed through a qualifying examination: Provided that all candidates, irrespective of the fact whether their probation has been declared or not, in the feeder category, shall be eligible to appear for the qualifying examination, even if they do not possess the prescribed minimum educational qualifications for the promotion post: Provided further that 1/2 mark for each completed year of service, subject to a maximum of 10 marks, shall be added on to the marks secured by each candidates in the qualifying examination, as grace marks: Provided also that appointment to 10% of vacancies to be filled up by promotion under sub-rule (2), shall be made, in accordance with seniority in the feeder category, from among those who have attained the age of 52 years, without insisting on merit and ability, to be assessed through qualifying examination. xxxx (8) It shall be competent for the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to relax the qualification other than basic qualification and pass in the competitive examination specified in sub-rule (5), of an employee, for the purpose of promotion in deserving cases, on the request of a society by passing a resolution subject to the following conditions:- (a) Minimum educational qualification for ministerial and supervisory posts other than those requiring technical qualification shall be SSLC. Exemption from passing SSLC shall not be granted under any circumstances provided that in the case of employees who were appointed direct to the ministerial posts before 1.1.74 SSLC need not be insisted. (b) Where the academic qualification prescribed is graduation and above, exemption from acquiring the said qualification may be considered if the incumbent satisfied the following conditions, namely:- (i) should have passed JDC or equivalent (ii) should have a minimum service of five years in the feeder category; and (iii) should not be less than forty-five years of age. Provided that service of five years in the feeder category can be relaxed in the case of those who have completed fifty three years of age and there should not be a qualified graduate who has completed twenty years of service in the same post in the feeder category, junior to that incumbent." (underline supplied) 6. Thus a bare perusal of Rule 185(1) would reveal that subject to the provisions of sub-rules 2, 3, and 4 therein, appointments to categories of posts in a society other than mentioned in sub-rules 2, 3 and 4 shall be effected only by promotion based on seniority in the feeder category. A perusal of Rule 185(1) would reveal that in the absence of qualified persons for promotion to the posts falling under Rule 185(1) what should be the alternative to fill up such posts is not specifically provided thereunder. Essentially, the contention of the appellant is that, that by itself will for close the right of the employer to induct qualified hands into the said posts by resorting to recognised method of appointment viz., by direct recruitment. Essentially, the contention of the appellant is that, that by itself will for close the right of the employer to induct qualified hands into the said posts by resorting to recognised method of appointment viz., by direct recruitment. At the same time, the learned counsel for the petitioners viz., respondents 1 to 5 herein as also the learned Special Government Pleader would submit that in the light of the provisions under Section 185(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Rules it is evident that wherever the legislature thought it fit to provide promotion or promotion and direct recruitment as the methods of appointments such provisions, as the case may be, are specifically incorporated therefor under the Rules and in such circumstances, the conspicuous absence of a provision for effecting direct recruitment in Rule 185(1) of the Rules should be and could be taken only as a specific exclusion of the method of appointment of direct recruitment as a method of appointment as regards the posts falling within Rule 185(1) of the Rules. The learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5 as also learned Special Government Pleader drew our attention to Section 101 of the Act and Rule 181 and 185(8) of the Rules to strengthen their contentions. They relied on the said provisions to canvass the position that absence of fully qualified hands in the respective feeder category to the posts notified under Ext.P2 would not, by itself, be a reason to import the doctrine of necessity as even in such contingencies and eventualities, going by the decision of the Division Bench in Mattanchery Mahajanik's case (supra) doctrine of necessity could be imported only in the absence of fully qualified officers in the service of the society. Admittedly, the first petitioner is a person possessing all the prescribed qualifications for promotion even to the post of Secretary though he is not presently belonging to the feeder category to the said post as also to the other two notified posts. With equal vehimence they would further contend that even in the absence of fully qualified hands in the service of the Bank the petitioners could not be removed from the zone of consideration for promotion in view of the fact that they are entitled to be considered for the exemptions available under Rule 185(8) of the Rules. With equal vehimence they would further contend that even in the absence of fully qualified hands in the service of the Bank the petitioners could not be removed from the zone of consideration for promotion in view of the fact that they are entitled to be considered for the exemptions available under Rule 185(8) of the Rules. That apart, it is contended that, in view of the provisions under Section 101, the Government could exempt any society or any class of societies by general or specific order for reasons to be recorded, if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in public interest, from any of the provisions of the Act. Under Section 101 of the Act it is also possible for the Government to order that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies subject to such modifications as may be specified in the order. Rule 181 of the Rules reads thus:- "181. Power to exempt from Rules.-The State Government may, by general or special order and subject to such conditions as they deem fit, exempt any registered society or class of such societies from any of the provisions of these rules or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such modifications as may be specified in the order." 7. True that, a reading of Section 101 of the Act and Rule 181 of the Rules would reveal that exemption is for the society or any class of societies. At the same time, Rule 185(8) extracted hereinbefore would reveal that relaxation of qualification other than basic qualifications and pass in competitive examination specified in sub-rule (5) of Rule 185 is available to an employee in deserving cases on the request of a society by passing a resolution subject to the conditions enjoined thereunder. We will deal with this issue a little later. 8. We will now revert to the question relating applicability of doctrine of necessity. In the decision in Mattanchery Mahajanik's case (supra) more particularly in paragraph 10 a Division Bench of this Court held, "there may be a case that there is no person eligible for the post of promotion according to lack of prescribed qualification. 8. We will now revert to the question relating applicability of doctrine of necessity. In the decision in Mattanchery Mahajanik's case (supra) more particularly in paragraph 10 a Division Bench of this Court held, "there may be a case that there is no person eligible for the post of promotion according to lack of prescribed qualification. By rule of necessity, in the event no officer of a Society possesses the necessary qualification, the post can be filled up by other modes permissible in law. The present is not a case where the Society has proceeded for direct recruitment on the finding that there is no one fulfilling the qualification for the post of General Manager. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that no error was committed by the learned Single Judge in setting aside Ext.P1 and Ext.P2(a)". Exts.P1 and P2(a) referred to therein are respectively notification published in 'mathrubhumi' daily on 30.09.2012 for direct recruitment to the post of General Manager and the amended Feeder Category Rules. Evidently, in that case Ext.P2(a) amended feeder category rules provided for direct recruitment and promotion to the post in question. As noticed hereinbefore, holding that the post in question falls within the purview of Rule 185(1) and for the specific reasons mentioned in paragraph 10 referred hereinbefore the Division Bench upheld the judgment of the learned single Judge setting aside Exts.P1 and P2(a), based on which direct recruitment was sought to be effected to a post fall within the purview of Rule 185(1). As noticed hereinbefore, Mattanchery Mahajanik's case (supra) was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants as well, for contending that the said decision virtually recognises initiation of steps for effecting appointments by direct recruitment to the post falling under Rule 185(1) in the absence of a person qualified for promotion. The learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5 and the learned Government Pleader would contend that, the said contention cannot be said to be fully correct as the Division Bench only observed that by rule of necessity such a post could be filled by other modes permissible in law in case no officer of a Society possessing the necessary qualification. It is contended by them that going by the said decision rule of necessity is not applicable in a case where an officer of a society possessing the necessary qualification is available. It is contended by them that going by the said decision rule of necessity is not applicable in a case where an officer of a society possessing the necessary qualification is available. To drive home the said point they relied on Paragraphs 9 and 10 therein which read thus: "9. Now coming to the Feeder Category Rules, which is filed as Ext.P2(a), the said has been amended by decision dated 3rd August, 2010. The amendment proposed is as follows: "To be amended: Name of post Feeder Category 1. General Manager 1.a. Direct appointment b. Promotion from the post of General manager post. From those who are qualified in accordance with the Kerala Co-operative Law and Rules 2. Deputy General Manager 2. Direct appointment/Inspector of branches/Chief Accountant/Branch manager/Internal Auditor/Development Officer (3:1) A perusal of the aforesaid amendment indicates that for General Manger, it is not provided that the post is to be filled up by promotion. Rather, a perusal of the Feeder Category Rules indicates that both direct recruitment and promotion have been used. There is no indication that when the direct recruitment is to be resorted to. As observed above, as per the statutory rule, the posts which are not covered by sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) are to be filled up necessarily by promotion. When there is statutory prescription under sub-rule (1) of Rule 185 for filling up the post by promotion, there is no latitude to the managing committee to frame Feeder Category Rule giving option of filling up the post both by direct recruitment and promotion. 10. There may be a case that there is no person eligible for the post of promotion according to lack of prescribed qualification. By rule of necessity, in the event no officer of a Society possesses the necessary qualification, the post can be filled up by other modes permissible in law. The present is not a case where the Society has proceeded for direct recruitment on the finding that there is no one fulfilling the qualification for the post of General Manager. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that no error was committed by the learned Single Judge in setting aside Ext.P1 and Ext.P2(a)" (underline supplied) 9. The present is not a case where the Society has proceeded for direct recruitment on the finding that there is no one fulfilling the qualification for the post of General Manager. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that no error was committed by the learned Single Judge in setting aside Ext.P1 and Ext.P2(a)" (underline supplied) 9. On considering the said rival contentions with reference to the recital in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said decision we are of the considered view that, it cannot be held that the Division Bench laid down the proposition that a post falling within the purview of Rules 185(1) could be filled up by other modes permissible in law importing the principle of rule of necessity solely because of non-availability of a person in the feeder category to the post in question possessing all the necessary qualifications. In that context it is to be noted that the Division Bench carefully and consciously employed the expression held thus:- “There may be a case that there is no person eligible for the post of promotion according to lack of prescribed qualification. By rule of necessity in the event no officer of a society possesses the necessary qualification, the post can be filled up by other modes permissible in law.” 10. Before proceeding further, it is only appropriate to consider the question whether doctrine of necessity is applicable to the facts of this case. While considering the said question, it is worthwhile to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Election Commission of India and another v. Dr.Subramaniam Swamy and another [ (1996) 4 SCC 104 ]. In paragraph 16 thereunder, the Apex Court explained the doctrine of necessity and held:- “16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It is well settled that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. Stated differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the issue. Stated differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit therefrom.” 11. It is to be noted that the Division Bench held so, after specifically referring to said Rule 185 and also taking note of the fact that promotion is normally to be effected from person possessing qualifications in the feeder category. 12. The doctrine of necessity is generally invoked in the context of violation of principles of natural justice, especially bias. Certainly, this doctrine permits certain judicial, quasi judicial and administrative actions to be done as a matter of necessity, even though in the ordinary circumstances, such action would have been held as improper or invalid and in fact, it is also an exception to the rule that no man should be a judge in his own cause. In short, it can be said that the said doctrine can be imported only in a case where there is absolutely no other option than which was resorted to and not allowing to follow the said course in unavoidable situation would impede the very course of justice itself. While the appellants contend that the situation prevalent in the society is that to grant promotion to the post of Secretary, Chief Accountant and Branch Manager, no qualified persons are available in the respective feeder categories of the said post. That apart, it is stated that these posts are lying vacant on account of the said reason for the past several years and if direct recruitment is not resorted to fill up the said post, it will prove detrimental to the very functioning of the society. It is in such circumstances that despite the interdiction under Rule 185(1) of the Rules, the appellants were constrained to seek for initiation of steps by the Co-operative Service Examination Board to effect direct recruitment. In short, according to them, it is the absolute necessity that constrained them to resort to such a course and therefore, action is justified in view of the doctrine of necessity. In short, according to them, it is the absolute necessity that constrained them to resort to such a course and therefore, action is justified in view of the doctrine of necessity. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for respondents 1 to 5 as also the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that in view of the factual position obtained in these cases, it cannot be said that no other option is available to overcome the situation. In other words, it is submitted that by no stretch of imagination it can be said that there is total absence of any other option than to take recourse to effect direct recruitment to fill up such posts. In elaboration to the said contention, they would contend that the first petitioner is a person possessing all the prescribed qualifications for being appointed even against the post of Secretary in the bank. That apart, it is contended that persons who are eligible to get exemptions by virtue of the provision under Rule 185(8) are also available in the service of the bank. That apart, the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that though there is provision for exempting a society by general or specific order for reasons to be recorded from any of the provisions of the Act or to direct that such provisions would apply to society only subject to such modification as may be specified in the order, the appellant bank had not approached the Government seeking exemption. The learned Special Government Pleader further submitted that Rule 181 of the Rules also empower the Government to grant exemption from rules by general or specific order. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to Rule 185(8) which we have extracted hereinbefore. Going by the said provision, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is competent to relax the qualification other than basic qualification and pass in the competitive examination specified in sub-rule 5 of Rule 185, for the purpose of promotion in deserving cases, on the request of a society by passing a resolution subject to the conditions specified thereunder. It is relying on the said provisions that they had raised the contention that the case on hand is not a case where there is absolute absence of any other option to fill up the aforesaid posts. It is relying on the said provisions that they had raised the contention that the case on hand is not a case where there is absolute absence of any other option to fill up the aforesaid posts. In short, their contention is that if the aforesaid provisions are invoked by taking appropriate action, it cannot be said that promotions to the aforesaid posts could not be effected. Section 101 of the Act and Rule 181 of the Rules would enable the Government for exempting a society by a general or specific order from any of the provisions of the Act, for reasons to be recorded. We have already adverted to those provisions. We have also adverted to Rule 185(8) of the Rules. Qualifications other than basic qualifications and pass in the competitive examination specified under Rule 185(5) of the Rules could be exempted in deserving cases on request, after passing resolution therefor. When that be the position, it cannot be construed as a case where there is absolute absence of any option other than the one which was resorted to viz., filling up of the posts mentioned hereinbefore by direct recruitment. In short, in view of the provisions for exemptions and above all failure on the part of the appellants to verify the availability of existence of fully qualified persons in the service of the Bank, there is absolutely no reason to import the doctrine of necessity to justify the action in resorting to direct recruitment. We have no hesitation to hold that doctrine of necessity could not be imported in a case where to resolve the issue no other remedies are available to overcome a situation like the one on hand. 13. In this context, it is also to be noted that even the decision relied on by the appellants viz., Mattanchery Mahajanik Co-operative Bank's case, paragraphs 9 and 10 extracted hereinbefore would reveal that the Division Bench held that in view of the statutory prescription under sub-rule (1) of Rule 85 for filling up the post by promotion, there is no latitude to the Managing Committee to frame Feeder Category Rule giving option of filling up the post both by direct recruitment and promotion. True that after making such an observation, the Division Bench went on to hold that by rule of necessity, in event no officer of a society possesses the necessary qualification, the post can be filled by other modes permissible in law. The aforesaid conclusions of the Division Bench in Mattanchery Mahajanik Co-operative Bank's case fortify our view that when qualified hands are available in the society, the fact that they are not in the feeder category cannot be a reason to go for direct recruitment in view of the interdiction under sub-rule (1) of Rule 185. 14. In the contextual situation, we are also of the view that the said issue can be approached in a different angle, as well. A careful scrutiny of the provisions under Rule 185 of the Rules viz., Rule 185(1) to 185(4) would reveal that though going by Rules 185(2) to 185(4), direct recruitment and promotion are permissible for the purpose of effecting appointment against the posts falling under those provisions, consciously, the provision for direct recruitment was not prescribed in respect of posts falling within the purview of Rule 185(1) of the Rules. In such circumstances, taking note of the provisions, it can be said with certitude that even after prescribing direct recruitment also as a method of appointment in the case of posts falling under Rules 185(1) to 185(4) of the Rules and the facts that going by Rule 185(1), appointments to the categories of posts in a society other than those mentioned in Sub-rules (2), (3) and (4), shall be made by promotion, on the basis of seniority in the feeder category, that under sub-rules (2) and (3) promotion and direct recruitment are prescribed in the ratio 3:1, that under sub-rule (4) direct recruitment alone is prescribed, how can it be said that prescription of promotion alone as the method of appointment for the categories of posts other than those mentioned in sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) is not intentional or purposeful and that there is lacuna in sub-rule (1) of Rule 185 of the Rules. This cannot be said to be an omission. Whatever be the intention, when it is evident that it was consciously done, it cannot be said to be a lacuna, as well. In such circumstances, there is no room for applying the principles of casus omissus. This cannot be said to be an omission. Whatever be the intention, when it is evident that it was consciously done, it cannot be said to be a lacuna, as well. In such circumstances, there is no room for applying the principles of casus omissus. We have referred to the said doctrine as the learned counsel D.Somasundaram raised a contention relying on paragraph 50 of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vipulbhai's case. Paragraph 50 therein, which was heavily relied on by the learned counsel, is nothing but quoting of paragraph 17 of an earlier judgment of the Apex Court in Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung [ 1991 (3) SCC 67 ], with agreement. It reads thus:- “The legislature often fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values not is it realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step in to fill the lacuna. When courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the object of the legislation and to promote the goals of the society. Or to put it negatively, to prevent the frustration of the legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society and do not travel off its course, so long as they attempt to furnish the felt necessities of the time and do not refurbish them, their role in this respect has to be welcomed.” (underline supplied) 15. In the light of the aforesaid contention made relying on paragraph 50, as extracted above, it is worthy to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas Limited and others [ (2015) 9 SCC 209 ]. It was a case where the Apex Court considered the question whether filling up of lacuna by judicial interpretative process is permissible. In the said decision, the Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in CIT v. National Taj Traders [ (1980) 1 SCC 370 ] wherein the Apex Court clearly laid down two principles of construction i.e., one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading of the statute as a whole. In the said decision, the Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in CIT v. National Taj Traders [ (1980) 1 SCC 370 ] wherein the Apex Court clearly laid down two principles of construction i.e., one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading of the statute as a whole. In paragraph 10 of National Taj Traders' case, the Apex Court held:- “…..In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.” (underline supplied) 16. In short, a scanning of the decision in National Taj Traders' case case would reveal that the question of filling up of lacuna by judicial interpretative process exists only in a case where the legislature has kept a lacuna and when there is clear case of necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. Bearing in mind the aforesaid position, we have carefully gone through the various provisions referred to by the learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 5 and also the learned Special Government Pleader. We have already referred to the provisions under Rules 185(1) to 185(4) and found that confinement of promotion as the sole method of appointment as regards the categories of posts other than sub-rules (2), (3) and (4), as per sub-rule (1) under Rule 185 cannot be said to be a lacuna. That apart, it is pertinent to note that in the very same rule, viz., Rule 185 sub-rule (8) was incorporated to overcome a situation of non-availability persons possessing prescribed qualifications for promotion which may likely to arise as impediment for effecting promotion. That apart, it is pertinent to note that in the very same rule, viz., Rule 185 sub-rule (8) was incorporated to overcome a situation of non-availability persons possessing prescribed qualifications for promotion which may likely to arise as impediment for effecting promotion. In such circumstances, in the light of such provisions viz., Rule 185(8), section 101 and Rule 185(1) of the Rules, it cannot be said that there is absolute absence of any other option to implement the mandate under Rule 185(1) to fill up vacancies within its purview by promotion. In other words, the mere absence of persons in the feeder category to a post falling thereunder by itself cannot be a reason to hold that it is a case where doctrine of necessity could be imported. As held by the Division Bench in Mattanchery Mahajanik Co-operative Bank's case, the question whether any officer having the prescribed qualifications in the society is also a matter to be looked into to decide whether it is a case where rule of necessity should be followed. We may also add that even in a case where no such officer is available in the society, in view of the provisions under Rule 185(8) of the Rules, the question whether any employee who is eligible to be considered for granting exemption is also a matter to be looked into in that regard. That apart, section 101 of the Act and Rule 185(1) of the Rules would reveal the existence of powers with the Government to grant exemptions from any of the provisions to a society or a class of society. The discussions as above based on the principle of doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of casus omissus constrain us to hold that in view of the factual position obtained in this case, the doctrine of necessity as also doctrine casus omissus cannot be imported. In fact, that alone is the ground which was raised by the appellant to justify the action in resorting to direct recruitment as relates the post of Secretary, Chief Accountant and Branch Manager. In such circumstances, we do not find any reason to hold that the interference by the learned Single Judge with Ext.P2 notification warrants appellate interference. In fact, that alone is the ground which was raised by the appellant to justify the action in resorting to direct recruitment as relates the post of Secretary, Chief Accountant and Branch Manager. In such circumstances, we do not find any reason to hold that the interference by the learned Single Judge with Ext.P2 notification warrants appellate interference. That apart, it is evident that as per the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge left full opportunity to the second respondent-bank to act appositely, in terms of the Act if they are so interested, to adopt necessary resolution seeking exemption from Rule 185(1) of the Rules or to move the competent authority of the Government of Kerala in terms of the mandate under section 101 of the Act. As stated earlier, it is the common case that the first writ petitioner who is the first respondent in the appeals is a person possessing all the requisite qualifications for being appointed even to the post of Secretary. It is also a fact that before reporting the vacancies to the Co-operative Service Examination Board which made the Board to issue Ext.P2 notification, the bank had not considered the question of granting relaxation by invoking the provisions under Rule 185(8) to any of its employees. Taking into account all such circumstances, we are of the considered view that impugned judgment does not call for any interference in exercise of the appellate power. Resultantly, these appeals are dismissed.