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2019 DIGILAW 431 (JK)

Younis Nabi Naik v. State of J&K

2019-09-27

GITA MITTAL, RASHID ALI DAR

body2019
JUDGMENT : Gita Mittal, CJ.—By way of the instant appeal, the appellant has assailed the judgment dated 9th May 2019 whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the HCP No. 43/2019. This writ petition was filed on behalf of the appellant by his father Ghulam Nabi Naik seeking quashing of detention order No. 71/DMP/PSA/18 dated 19th December 2018 passed in respect of his son Younis Nabi Naik under the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978. 2. There is no material dispute to the facts giving rise to the instant appeal and to the extent necessary, the same are briefly noted hereafter. 3. On 30th November 2018, an FIR bearing FIR No. 111/2018 was registered by Police Station Tral under Section 120-B Ranbir Penal Code Svt. 1989 (1932 A.D.) (RPC hereafter) and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 on the allegations that on 30th November 2018, the appellant Younis Nabi Naik along-with accomplices Riyaz Ahmad Ganaie, Fayaz Ahmad Wani and Bilal Ahmad Rather were travelling in suspicious circumstances from Pinglish to Hafoo. On reaching towards a Naka/check point erected by the Police and CRPF 180 Bn. they attempted to escape from the said check point, but were unsuccessful. Upon search, these persons were found in possession of illegally acquired explosive material resembling to a homemade Hand Grenade regarding which the said case was registered. These four persons were apprehended in the case and remain lodged in police custody pursuant to orders of remand passed by the court of competent jurisdiction. The police alleged that they were having affiliation with the banned terrorist organization Hizbul Mujahideen. During the course of investigation, involvement of seven other persons, namely, Waseem Ahmad Malla, Ghulam Nabi Sheikh, Irshad Ahmad Bhat, Muzaffar Ahmad Bhat, Mohammad Yousuf Wani, Mohammad Yousuf Chopan & Mudasir Ahmad Khan were found who were also arrayed as accused in the case. 4. On 10th December 2018, a supplementary report under Section 120-B RPC; Sections 18, 20, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act was submitted which were also invoked in the case. 5. While, the appellant was in police custody in the said criminal case, an order being Order No. 71/DMP/PSA/18 dated 19th December 2018 under the provisions of Public Safety Act came to be passed against the appellant. 5. While, the appellant was in police custody in the said criminal case, an order being Order No. 71/DMP/PSA/18 dated 19th December 2018 under the provisions of Public Safety Act came to be passed against the appellant. This order of detention was assailed by the appellant by way of a writ petition being HCP No. 43/2019 inter alia on the ground that the order of detention suffers from non-application of mind for it not disclosing compelling reasons or circumstances requiring the detention of the appellant in preventive detention; that the order fail to consider that on the date of passing the order of detention, the appellant was already in police custody; that the material which formed the basis of the detention order had not been furnished to the detenu and he had been deprived of the opportunity to make an effective representation against the same and as such, all procedural safeguards enshrined under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India had been violated. 6. The respondents entered appearance in response to the notice to show cause and submitted a counter affidavit defending the action taken by them. 7. The learned Single Judge considered the matter and by the judgment dated 9th May 2019 dismissed HCP No. 43/2019 holding that on perusal of the records, it was revealed that the detenu had been furnished the grounds of detention along-with the requisite material; had been informed about his right of making representation against the detention, but the detenu had chosen not to make a representation and, therefore, fault, if any, was attributable to the detenu and not the detaining authority. The ground raised with regard to non -furnishing of material to the detenu was hence rejected. 8. The learned Single Judge has also rejected the grievance of the appellant that the order of detention suffers from non-application of mind. Placing reliance on the record produced by the official respondents, it was observed that the record showed that the detenu was found in possession of a homemade hand grenade and involved in other unlawful activities and that the detailed grounds of detention and the records were sufficient to derive satisfaction as regards the detention of the detenu. 9. Placing reliance on the record produced by the official respondents, it was observed that the record showed that the detenu was found in possession of a homemade hand grenade and involved in other unlawful activities and that the detailed grounds of detention and the records were sufficient to derive satisfaction as regards the detention of the detenu. 9. The learned Single Judge has held that the detention order was issued on more than one ground independent of each other and that, even if one of the grounds remains unexplained or proves to be bad in law, the detention order can be maintained in the absence of any explanation on this count by the respondents. 10. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed contending that the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9th May 2019 as well as the detention order dated 19th December 2018 are contrary to law and cannot be sustained. It is urged that the learned Single Judge has wrongly noted even the details of the detention order which the appellant had sought to be quashed. 11. Our attention has been drawn to para 1 of the impugned order dated 9th May 2019 wherein the learned Single Judge has noted that the writ-petitioner has prayed for quashing of the detention order bearing No. 71/DMP/PSA/18 dated 4th October 2018, whereas the appellant had actually sought quashing of the detention order dated 71/DMP/PSA/18 which was dated 19th December 2018. This in our view appears to be an error only in the date for the reason that the correct description has been noted. 12. We propose to examine the grounds urged in support of the appeal in seriatim hereinafter. Appellant already in custody: no possibility of being released. 13. Mr. Wajid Haseeb, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the appellant was in police custody and there was no chance of his being released on bail. In this regard, our attention has been drawn to the averments contained in ground (v), of the writ petition, wherein it was specifically urged that ‘the detenue was already in custody and he had neither applied for bail not bail was otherwise granted to him.’ It is contended that in these circumstances, there was no warrant for passing the order of preventive detention. 14. 14. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at AIR 2000 SC 3675 Amrit Lal & Ors. vs Union of India & Ors. wherein the Supreme Court had held that there must be cogent material before the officer passing the detention order that the detenu who stands arrested, is likely to be released on bail. It was categorically held by the Supreme Court that such conclusion must be drawn from the available material on record and must not be the ipse dixit of the officer passing the order of detention. It was held that ‘likelihood of detenu’s moving an application for bail is not a cogent material’. In para 6, the Supreme Court has observed that ‘likelihood of his moving an application for bail which is different from likelihood to be released on bail’. This reasoning in our view is not sufficient compliance with the requirements as laid down. Thus, merely the possibility of the detenu moving the bail application in a case in which he was in custody but had not obtained the bail order, has been held to be insufficient reason for passing of an order of detention under preventive detention laws. 15. In the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at 2011 (5) SCC 244 Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu, a detention order came to be passed when the detenu was already in custody. So far as the legality of the detention order was concerned, it was argued by counsel for the appellant, that the impugned detention order was passed on 8th April 2010 and that the bail application of the detenu was also dismissed on the same date. The submission was that it could not be said that no bail application was pending when the detention order was passed. The observations of the Court in Paras 25, 26, 27 and 30 relevant for our consideration read as follows: “25. In this connection, it may be noted that there is nothing on the record to indicate whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the bail application of the accused was pending on the date when the detention order was passed on 08.04.2010. On the other hand, in para 4 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that “Thiru. On the other hand, in para 4 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that “Thiru. Ramakrishnan is in remand in crime No. 132/2010 and he has not moved any bail application so far”. Thus, the detaining authority was not even aware whether a bail application of the accused was pending when he passed the detention order, rather the detaining authority passed the detention order under the impression that no bail application of the accused was pending but in similar cases bail had been granted by the courts. We have already stated above that no details of the alleged similar cases has been given. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained. 26. It was held in Union of India Vs. Paul Manickam that if the detaining authority is aware of the fact that the detenu is in custody and the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities he must be detained to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities the detention order can validly be made. 27. In our opinion, there is a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed. 30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is: Was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in question was illegal.”(Emphasis by us) 16. In order to have the complete position with regard to the filing of bail application by the appellant who is before us, as well as the status of detentions of other persons who were arrested in FIR No. 111/2018 or who have been named as accused therein, we had passed an order on 11th September 2019 requiring the respondents to file a status report specifically on these issues and also to disclose as to the status of persons who had been named in the case but are not in custody and the reasons thereof. 17. In compliance of these directions, the respondents have filed a status report dated 17th September 2019, wherein it is disclosed that a report dated 12th September 2019 had been received from the Dy. SP, Tral, disclosing that investigation in the case was still on-going. Steps have to be taken to record the statement of the material witnesses in terms of Section 164-A of Cr.PC. 18. So far as the filing of bail application on behalf of the appellant is concerned, it has been disclosed that, a joint application was filed by the appellant along-with three other accused namely Riyaz Ahmad Ganai, Fayaz Ahmad Wani and Bilal Ahmad Rather for grant of bail in relation to this case before the court of Judicial Magistrate, Tral. Copy of this application was forwarded to the Police Station Tral for a report by the trial court on 1st December 2018. So far as this application for bail was concerned, by an order dated 26th December 2018, other than the appellant-Younis Nabi Naik, the three other applicants (Riyaz Ahmad Ganai, Fayaz Ahmad Wani & Bilal Ahmad Rather) were granted bail. So far as this application for bail was concerned, by an order dated 26th December 2018, other than the appellant-Younis Nabi Naik, the three other applicants (Riyaz Ahmad Ganai, Fayaz Ahmad Wani & Bilal Ahmad Rather) were granted bail. The observations of the Court while granting bail had observed as follows : “…….At this stage after going through the facts and circumstances of the case, the fact that the accused are in custody for last more than fortnight, the fact that investigation of the case is nearly complete and after going through the facts and circumstances in its entirety I deem it proper to exercise discretion till 31.12.2018 in favour of accused except accused No. 1.” 19. The prosecution had opposed the application on the ground that the case stands registered under the provisions of ULA(P) Act and as such the rigors of Section 43 (D), (4, 5) thereof disentitled the applicants to grant of bail. The learned trial judge also noted the provisions of the proviso to Section 43 (D) (5) of the ULA(P) Act. It was observed that recovery of arms and ammunition had been effected only from the appellant-Younis Nabi Naik. The trial court drew a distinction in the case of the co-applicants and exercised discretion in favour of the other applicant Nos. 2 to 4 observing as follows: “…….So far as recovery of arms and ammunition is concerned same is alleged to have been made from accused No. 1.” As such, the application of the applicant for grant of bail was rejected by the trial court. 20. We had put it to Mr. Wajid Haseeb, learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the above said position, the appellant had misled the writ Court as well as this Court and made a false statement that no bail application had been filed by him when the detention order was passed. On the contrary, the bail application had been filed before 1st December 2018 and was actually pending before the concerned court on 10th December 2018 when the order of detention dated 19th December 2018 was passed. The bail application was rejected only on 26th December 2018. 21. On the contrary, the bail application had been filed before 1st December 2018 and was actually pending before the concerned court on 10th December 2018 when the order of detention dated 19th December 2018 was passed. The bail application was rejected only on 26th December 2018. 21. This statement in the writ petition is explained by learned counsel for the appellant by the fact that the appellant was lodged in custody and that the writ petition on his behalf was filed by his father Ghulam Nabi Naik. It is further pointed out that the joint bail application was filed by the son-in-law of one Ali Mohammad Dar related to one of the other applicants and that the filing of the application was not known to the father of the appellant or his family members. We accept this explanation on behalf of the appellant. 22. It is additionally submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the filing of the bail application will have no impact in the present case inasmuch as in view of the embargo under Sub-section 5 of Section 43 (D) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act which reads as follows: “43-D xxx (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application of such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on the perusal of a case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”(Emphasis by us) 23. It is submitted by Mr. Wajid Haseeb, that in view of the allegation against the appellant regarding recovery of homemade hand grenade, the filing of the bail application would have been inconsequential in view of the absolute prohibition under the proviso to Section 43 D (5) of the ULA(P) Act. 24. This position could not be contested by Mr. It is submitted by Mr. Wajid Haseeb, that in view of the allegation against the appellant regarding recovery of homemade hand grenade, the filing of the bail application would have been inconsequential in view of the absolute prohibition under the proviso to Section 43 D (5) of the ULA(P) Act. 24. This position could not be contested by Mr. Mir Suhail, learned AAG appearing for the respondents in view of the fact that the prosecution was alleging the recovery of the grenade from the appellant and that the case stood registered against the appellant under the provisions of ULA(P) Act. The embargo under the proviso to sub-Section 5 of Section 43 (D) of the ULA(P) Act would prevent the grant of bail to the appellant. This supports the submission on behalf of the appellant that there was no material before the detaining authority to the effect that the detenu was likely to be released on bail in the case in which he stood arrested. Non-supply of relevant material. 25. It is a salutary and mandatory requirement under the provisions of Public Safety Act, 1978 that copies of all material documents which have been considered and relied upon by the detaining authority in forming his opinion that the detention of a person is necessary, had to be supplied to the detenu. He is additionally required to be informed of his right to make a representation to the detaining authority against the order of detention and also to the State Government and the Central Government. 26. So far as the contours of this requirement and sufficient compliance thereof is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has placed a pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at AIR 1999 SC 3051 Sophia Gulam Mohd. Bham, vs. State of Maharashtra before us wherein the importance of this requirement stands considered. Para 12, 13, and 14 of the same reads as under: “12. The detenu was thus informed that he has a right not only to make a representation to the Detaining Authority against the order of detention but also to the State Government and the Central Government. 13. Now, an effective representation can be made against the order of detention only when copies of the material documents which were considered and relied upon by the Detaining Authority in forming his opinion that the detention of Bham Faisal Gulam Mohammed was necessary, were supplied to him. 13. Now, an effective representation can be made against the order of detention only when copies of the material documents which were considered and relied upon by the Detaining Authority in forming his opinion that the detention of Bham Faisal Gulam Mohammed was necessary, were supplied to him. It is only when he has looked into those documents, read and understood their contents that it can be said that the detenu can make an effective representation to the Detaining Authority, State or Central Government, as laid down in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution which provides as under: “When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” 14. The above will show that when a person is detained in pursuance of an order made for preventive detention, he has to be provided the grounds on which the order was made. He has also to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against that order. Both the requirements have to be complied with by the authorities making the order of detention. These are the rights guaranteed to the person detained by this clause of Article 22 and if any of the rights is violated, in the sense that either the grounds are not communicated or opportunity of making a representation is not afforded at the earliest, the detention order would become bad. The use of the words “as soon as may be” indicate a positive action on the part of the Detaining Authority in supplying the grounds of detention. There should not be any delay in supplying the grounds on which the order of detention was based to the detenu. The use of the words “earliest opportunity” also carry the same philosophy that there should not be any delay in affording an adequate opportunity to the detenu of making a representation against the order of detention. The right to be communicated the grounds of detention flows from Article 22(5) while the right to be supplied all the material on which the grounds are based flows from the right given to the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention. The right to be communicated the grounds of detention flows from Article 22(5) while the right to be supplied all the material on which the grounds are based flows from the right given to the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention. A representation can be made and the order of detention can be assailed only when all the grounds on which the order is based are communicated the detenu and the material on which those grounds are based are also disclosed and copies thereof are supplied to the person detained, in his own language.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. So far as examination of this ground of challenge was concerned, we deemed it appropriate to call for the records of the detaining authority to ascertain what was the material furnished to the appellant upon his detention. This record has been placed by learned counsel for the respondents before us. 28. A perusal of the order of detention would show that the same is premised the order of detention dated 19th December 2018, stands passed by the District Magistrate, Pulwama who while passing the order, has recorded his satisfaction with regard to the sufficiency of grounds ‘on the basis of dossier placed before me by the SSP’. The order of detention also specifically notes that “the activities as projected in the foregoing paras of the instant dossier runs heavily against you and are highly prejudicial to the Security of the State”. The original record placed before us contains this dossier which runs into three number of pages. 29. Learned counsel for the respondents has also pointed out the receipt which was obtained from the appellant upon service of the order of detention. This refers to the service of following documents upon the detenu: i. Order of detention One leaf ii. Notice of attention One leaf iii. Grounds of detention Two leaves. iv. Dossier of detention Nil v. Other related documents Nil 30. The respondents have thus failed to supply the dossier, based whereupon the order of detention has been passed to the detenu. The appellant has thus been prevented from making an effective representation in accordance with law and his rights under Article 22 of the Constitution of India again lending substance to the challenge to the detention order. Detention order not based on relevant facts. 31. The appellant has thus been prevented from making an effective representation in accordance with law and his rights under Article 22 of the Constitution of India again lending substance to the challenge to the detention order. Detention order not based on relevant facts. 31. It is further contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the detention order against the appellant notes that FIR No. 111/2018 stands registered at Police Station Tral wherein the appellant was implicated. Learned counsel for the appellant has staunchly contended that so far as the penal provisions under which this case was registered are concerned, the District Magistrate and the detaining authority has mentioned that the criminal case relates only to the appellant’s implication in offences under Section 120-B of RPC and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. Mr. Haseeb, would contend that the alleged commission of offences under Section 18, 20, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act stands added in the case. It is submitted that this material fact was an existence on 19th December 2018 when the order of detention was passed and the detaining authority has failed to consider this material fact. It is submitted that for this reason by itself the order of detention has to be set-aside and quashed. 32. In support of this submission, Mr. Wajid Haseeb has placed reliance on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at (2009) 5 SCC 296 Pooja Batra vs. Union of India & Ors. In this case, the Supreme Court has expounded on the jurisdiction of the Court while considering challenge exercising power of judicial review into an order of detention in the following terms: “30. It is settled law that Courts exercising powers of judicial review do not consider the challenge to an order of detention as if on an appeal, reappreciating the materials, yet since an order of detention in prison involves the fundamental rights of citizens, freedom of movement and pursuit of normal life and liberty, no absolute immunity can be claimed by the authorities as to the decision arrived, and it is open to the Courts to see whether there has been due and proper application of mind and that all the relevant and vital materials for the purpose have been noticed, adverted to and considered.”(Emphasis supplied) 33. In the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at AIR 2009 SC 628 Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. the petitioner stood implicated for commission of offences under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The preventive detention order was issued against the petitioner which was based on confessions which had been made by the petitioner. However, the retraction of these confessions made by the petitioner was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority. As a result, the confessions were taken into consideration by the detaining authority while passing the orders of detention. The Court observed that retraction of the confessions was a vital fact which would have influenced the minds of the detaining authority one way or the other. It was therefore held that there was ‘non-application of mind to the most material and vital facts vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority thereto and thereby rendering the impugned order of detention as invalid and illegal. 34. In para 40 of the Deepak Bajaj, the Supreme Court refers to its announcement reported at (1979) 1 SCC 222 Ashadevi vs. K. Shivraj, & Anr. which was rendered in similar facts wherein it had been held as follows : “………primarily for the detaining authority to consider before deciding to issue the impugned detention order but since admittedly the aforesaid vital facts which would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other were neither placed before nor considered by the detaining authority it must be held that there was non-application of mind to the most material and vital facts vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority thereby rendering the impugned detention order invalid and illegal”.(Emphasis by us) 35. In para 46 of the Deepak Bajaj, the Supreme Court observed that failure to place the retractions and other materials before the detaining authority, would vitiate the impugned detention order. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that failure to place the retraction and other material was a relevant material which was not placed before the detaining authority and therefore vitiated the detention order which was consequently held to be illegal and set-aside. 36. In (2006) 4 SCC 792 , K. S. Nagamuthu v. State of T.N. & Ors. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that failure to place the retraction and other material was a relevant material which was not placed before the detaining authority and therefore vitiated the detention order which was consequently held to be illegal and set-aside. 36. In (2006) 4 SCC 792 , K. S. Nagamuthu v. State of T.N. & Ors. also retraction of the confession was not placed before the detaining authority and the order of detention was set-aside on this ground. 37. Mr. Mir Suhail, learned AAG has placed the record of the case which includes the dossier which was examined by the detaining authority and which lead to the passing of the detention order dated 19th December 2018. 38. We have been informed by the respondents that apart from the impugned detention order dated 19th December 2018 against the appellant, orders under Section 8 of the Public Safety Act 1978 also stand passed on 15th January 2019 against his co-accused Muzaffar Ahmad Bhat and on 19th April 2019 against Mohammad Yousuf Chopan. Out of the total of eleven persons accused of commission of offences in FIR No. 111/2018 of Police Station, Tral, eight stand admitted to bail. 39. Pursuant to the above detention orders passed against the appellant and two others. Muzaffar Ahmad Bhat and Mohammad Yousuf Chopan, their custody has been taken over by the National Investigation Agency in connection with Case No. RC-08/2019/NIA/DLI U/Ss. 120-B, 121-A IPC, Section 17, 18, 18-A, 18-B, 20, 38 & 39 of ULA(P) Act registered by Police Station NIA, New Delhi from the concerned Jail. One of the accused Mudasir Ahmad Khan stands neutralized in an encounter with Security Forces/Police on 10th March 2019 in Pinglish, Tral. 40. There is no mention in the dossier of the supplementary report by the investigating officer which lead to the addition of the offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act in the FIR No. 111/2018 registered at Police Station, Tral. It is admitted before us by Mr. Mir Suhail, learned AAG that this vital fact, and very relevant material was not placed before the Detaining Authority which would have enabled him to take notice of the fact that having been arrested in the said case, in view of the prohibition contained under the proviso of Section 43 (D) (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, there was little chance of the appellant being able to secure bail. Thus, these relevant and vita facts have not been considered by the detaining authority before the order of detention dated 19th December 2018 came to be passed. In view thereof, on application of the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Pooja Batra; Deepak Bajaj and K. S. Nagamuthu, it has to be held that the order of detention was purely illegal and deserves to be set-aside. 41. We find that the impugned judgment dated 9th May 2019 Younis Nabi Naik vs. State of JK & Anr. of the learned Single Judge has failed to consider these issues and therefore is contrary to the well settled principles of law on the subject. The same is not sustainable in law. Result 42. In view thereof, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 9th May 2019 in HCP No. 43/2019 is hereby set-aside and quashed. It is further held that the order of detention bearing No. 71/DMP/PSA/18 dated 19th December 2018 under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978 is contrary to law and is hereby set-aside and quashed. 43. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.