JUDGMENT : M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, J. 1. The applicants in these applications are appellants in the CCCA No. 18 of 2013 and are also defendant Nos. 26 to 30 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997 on the file of IX Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, out of which the said appeal arises. 2. I.A. No. 3 of 2019 is filed by them invoking Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC for a mandatory injunction in their favor and against the respondents 27, 35, 37 and 38 directing the latter to forthwith remove their henchmen from items 2 and 3 of the decree schedule properties. 3. I.A. No. 5 of 2019 is filed by the applicants seeking police aid for removing the personnel/henchmen from these two items of property. 4. I.A. No. 4 of 2019 is filed by applicants invoking Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC for an injunction restraining the respondents 34 to 38 and other respondents also from interfering with the peaceful possession of the applicants in relation to all the items mentioned in the decree schedule attached to the preliminary decree dated 24.09.2012 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997 pending the appeal. 5. Interim orders had been passed allowing these applications earlier by this Court on 16.10.2019, but the same were challenged in the Supreme Court of India by the respondents 34 to 37 in these applications in Civil Appeal Nos. 8447-8449 of 2019. 6. The Supreme Court had allowed the said Civil Appeals on 04-11-2019 and set aside the said orders on the ground that interim orders were granted by this Court without giving opportunity to the respondents 34 to 37 to file counter-affidavits in the applications and grant of such interim orders had left the interlocutory applications lifeless, though they were technically pending. It directed this Court to decide the interlocutory applications on merits after allowing the respondents 34 to 38 to file counter affidavits. 7. After remand, respondents 34 to 37 not only filed counter affidavits but also filed additional counter affidavits apart from written arguments through Sri. Rakesh Sanghi, Advocate. 8. The counsel for the applicants filed a reply affidavit to the counter affidavit filed by respondents 34 to 37 and also filed an additional affidavit on 11.11.2019. The matter was heard on 20.11.2019 and orders were reserved. 9. No counter affidavit was filed by respondent no. Rakesh Sanghi, Advocate. 8. The counsel for the applicants filed a reply affidavit to the counter affidavit filed by respondents 34 to 37 and also filed an additional affidavit on 11.11.2019. The matter was heard on 20.11.2019 and orders were reserved. 9. No counter affidavit was filed by respondent no. 27 in these applications, nor were any arguments advanced on his behalf by his counsel Ms. Anjana Taggarse. 10. Other respondents did not file any counter affidavit to these I.As nor appeared through Counsel to contest these I.As. The Suit: 11. The suit O.S. No. 123 of 1997 had been filed in 1991 as O.S. No. 861 of 1991 in the Court of IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for (a) Administration of the estate of one Syed Aziz, who had died in 1960, (b) for ascertaining and determining the share of Syed Hamza, the original plaintiff, (c) for division and allotment of the same to him in the plaint schedule properties and (d) for a direction to pay the amounts due to him from out of the estate of the deceased together with interest, if any, to him and to put him in separate possession of his lawful share in the estate of the deceased. 12. The 1st plaintiff Syed Hamza and defendants 5 to 8 are brothers, and sons of Late Syed Aziz, defendant No. 1 is the wife and defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are the daughters of late Syed Aziz. 13. The 2nd plaintiff is Dr. Syed Afzal, and 5th defendant is Syed Azam. Syed Azam was the eldest among all the children of late Syed Aziz. 14. The applicants in these applications are legal heirs of Syed Azam, the 5th defendant in the suit, who had died pending suit, and they had been impleaded as defendant Nos. 26 to 30 in the suit. 15. Respondents 34 to 38 in these applications are the legal representatives of Syed Afzal (2nd plaintiff) who had died pending the appeal and they were impleaded as parties/respondents 34 to 38. They are the contesting respondents in these I.As. 16. Before we deal with the applications, briefly we shall advert to the pleadings of the parties in the suit, to highlight the background of the dispute in these applications. The plea of the 1st plaintiff in the suit: 17. They are the contesting respondents in these I.As. 16. Before we deal with the applications, briefly we shall advert to the pleadings of the parties in the suit, to highlight the background of the dispute in these applications. The plea of the 1st plaintiff in the suit: 17. It is the contention of the 1st plaintiff in the suit that late Syed Aziz acquired vast properties, movable and immovable, during his life time and that the 1st plaintiff and defendants, being his legal heirs, are entitled to their lawful shares in the said properties. 18. It was contended that after the demise of Syed Aziz, the 1st plaintiff and the other defendants executed a Power of Attorney on 20.07.1960 in favour of defendant No. 5 giving him all the powers to lease out the properties to the extent of executing the sale deeds relating to the properties left behind by late Syed Aziz, that defendant No. 5 was managing the affairs of the properties and never disclosed which are the properties left over by late Syed Aziz, in spite of several demands made by the 1st plaintiff and that the 1st plaintiff cancelled the GPA by a registered Deed of Cancellation dated 06.10.1986 and had issued a prior notice on 27.09.1986 also to defendant No. 5. 19. Several properties were mentioned in the schedule to the plaint. The written statement of defendant no. 5: 20. Defendant No. 5 filed a common written statement on his behalf and also on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 8 as their GPA holders. 21. He stated that though the 1st plaintiff and defendants executed GPA in his favour authorizing him to look after, manage and deal with the properties, there were huge liabilities at the time of death of Syed Aziz apart from litigations in regard to immovable properties pending in Courts, and so he was requested to take care of these properties and litigation. 22. He denied that he did not disclose what properties were left behind by late Syed Aziz. 23. The 5th defendant claimed that after cancellation of the GPA, the plaintiff apologized to him along with other legal heirs of late Syed Aziz, requested to forgive them, and to continue as the GPA holder. 24. 22. He denied that he did not disclose what properties were left behind by late Syed Aziz. 23. The 5th defendant claimed that after cancellation of the GPA, the plaintiff apologized to him along with other legal heirs of late Syed Aziz, requested to forgive them, and to continue as the GPA holder. 24. He also claimed that he settled all the disputes including litigation in Courts of law and paid large sums to clear the liabilities over the lands by selling other lands to the full knowledge and information of all the legal heirs of late Syed Aziz including the 1st plaintiff. According to him, after the litigation was cleared, he sold several lands and distributed sale proceeds to all the heirs of Late Syed Aziz. 25. He contended that plaintiff had received towards his share large sums of money and also a house at Khairatabad purchased in his name and mulgies at Secretariat in the name of his wife apart from Rs. 3,00,000/- as donation for admitting his son and daughter in medical colleges and also other properties. 26. He contended that 1st plaintiff was also given a piece of land measuring 1200 Sq. Yds. at Deshmukh Colony and another piece of land measuring 1800 Sq. Yds. including land covered by the Petrol Bunk at Amberpet Road and all the other heirs of Late Syed Aziz were also given the same extent of land. 27. He gave details of the remaining properties which had remained unsold and contended that even these properties are subject to litigation and there are no other properties to be administered after clearance of litigation and other disputes and sought dismissal of the suit. 28. He specifically contended that the suit for administration of properties of Late Syed Aziz was not maintainable. Some events pending suit: 29. In 1997, the suit was transferred from the Court of IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad to the Court of IX Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and renumbered as O.S. No. 123 of 1997. 30. Defendant No. 8, one of the sons of late Syed Aziz, by name Dr. Syed Afzal filed I.A. No. 1192 of 1998 seeking to transpose himself as 2nd plaintiff which was allowed on 22.09.1998. But after such transposition, he did not file any new pleadings. 31. 30. Defendant No. 8, one of the sons of late Syed Aziz, by name Dr. Syed Afzal filed I.A. No. 1192 of 1998 seeking to transpose himself as 2nd plaintiff which was allowed on 22.09.1998. But after such transposition, he did not file any new pleadings. 31. The original plaintiff Syed Hamza died and his legal heirs were brought on record as plaintiffs 3 to 5. 32. In the trial Court, the plaintiffs examined PWs. 1 to 3 and marked Exs.A1 to A26. The defendants examined DWs. 1 to 4 and marked Exs.B1 to B71. The preliminary decree dated 24.9.2012 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997: 33. On 24.09.2012, a preliminary decree was passed for partition and allotment of shares of seven (7) properties at Aziz Bagh, Bagh Amberpet, Hyderabad and the shares of the plaintiffs and defendants were clearly mentioned in the decree. 34. Of the above seven properties, we are concerned in these applications with only two items i.e. (i) an incomplete structure meant for a movie theatre in 10,000 sq. yds. in Survey Nos. 533, 535 and 536 and (ii) a residential house bearing No. 2-2-22 at Bagh Amberpet, Hyderabad in an area of 6,000 sq. yds. [items (2) and (3) of the decree schedule]. Hereafter these properties would be referred to as items (i) and (ii). 35. An application I.A. No. 819 of 2018 to pass final decree was filed by defendant no. 22/respondent no. 27 in the C.C.C.A. and it is pending before the IX Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The CCCA and the events pending appeal: 36. The CCCA No. 18 of 2013 was filed by defendant Nos. 26 to 30/applicants in IAs. 3 to 5 of 2019 challenging the preliminary decree in the suit and the same is pending on the file of this Court. 37. Though initially interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the preliminary decree was granted by this Court in I.A. No. 1 of 2013 (CCCA MP No. 93 of 2013), respondent No. 27 in the appeal filed CCCA MP No. 773 of 2017 to vacate the said order, and on 11.04.2018, this Court modified the said order granting stay of passing of final decree only while permitting other proceedings to go on. 38. CCCA MP No. 136 of 2013 and CCCA MP No. 137 of 2013 were filed by Dr. 38. CCCA MP No. 136 of 2013 and CCCA MP No. 137 of 2013 were filed by Dr. Syed Afzal (2nd plaintiff/2nd respondent in the CCCA), through whom respondents 34 to 38 claim, seeking a direction to the applicants/appellants not to alienate the suit schedule property and not to change the nature thereof respectively pending disposal of the appeal. 39. On 11.03.2014 an undertaking was given by the applicants/appellants through their counsel that they are not taking any steps for alienation of the suit schedule property or contemplating to change the nature of the suit schedule property. 40. Later Dr. Syed Afzal, the 2nd plaintiff/2nd respondent in the appeal, died and his legal heirs were brought on record as respondents 34 to 38 in the appeal as mentioned above. The pleas in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 filed by the defendant Nos. 26 to 30/LRs of defendant No. 5/appellants in CCCA No. 18 of 2013: 41. I.A. No. 3 of 2019 is filed by the applicants/appellants in CCCA No. 18 of 2013/ defendant Nos. 26 to 30 alleging that on 03.10.2019, the 3rd applicant Dr. Rizwana Habeeb, who was taking care of the above referred properties and also the litigation on behalf of her sisters, was informed by her well wishers that there was some activity going on in item (i) referred to above and some people were walking inside the gate. She contended that she had locked the gate of the premises when she had lodged earlier a police complaint in the Kachiguda Police Station on 26.07.2019 against Mr. Habeeb Ahmed, defendant no. 22/respondent No. 27 in the appeal when he tried to trespass into the said property. 42. She alleged that respondent No. 35, one of the legal heirs of the 2nd plaintiff also tried to trespass into item (ii) of the decree schedule property i.e. the house No. 2-2-22. According to her, the trespassers broke open the lock of the gate, the outhouse and servant quarters and threw all the articles outside the main house on the back side and did not permit the deponent to go inside the gate. She stated that she lodged another complaint in the Police Station, Amberpet on 09.10.2019. 43. According to her, the trespassers broke open the lock of the gate, the outhouse and servant quarters and threw all the articles outside the main house on the back side and did not permit the deponent to go inside the gate. She stated that she lodged another complaint in the Police Station, Amberpet on 09.10.2019. 43. Applicants contend that they have been in possession of the decree schedule properties including items (i) and (ii) mentioned above as their father Syed Azam (5th defendant) had executed gift deeds in their favour. 44. They contend that 5th defendant was in possession of all these properties as owner thereof after the properties were allotted to his share in the partition with his siblings. They stated that 5th defendant had obtained a sanction for construction of a permanent cinema theatre in item (i) in 1978 which was extended from time to time up to 1998, but the construction could not be done due to unavoidable circumstances. They also claimed that their father gave declaration in 1980 before the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities (Ex.B.4) covering these properties; that after the death of defendant No. 5, the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities also tried to take possession of item (i) and the applicants filed W.P. No. 23347 of 2008 and obtained on 22.01.2009, interim order of status quo. 45. It is alleged that 4th applicant was residing in item (ii) of the above property (item 3 of the decree schedule) in the main house, that she had gone to UK in July 2019 to attend on her daughter who was to give birth to a child and the said house was locked. It is alleged that taking advantage of her absence, respondent Nos. 27, 35, 37 and 38 tried to trespass in items (i) and (ii) referred to above taking advantage of the Dussera vacation to the Courts between 5th October and 13th October, 2019. 46. It is alleged that taking advantage of her absence, respondent Nos. 27, 35, 37 and 38 tried to trespass in items (i) and (ii) referred to above taking advantage of the Dussera vacation to the Courts between 5th October and 13th October, 2019. 46. Reliance is placed by applicants in these I.As on the affidavit filed by respondents 31 to 33 in the appeal in I.A. No. 1 of 2018 for appointment of a receiver admitting the possession of the applicants in the above properties; and also on the fact that an Advocate Commissioner, D. Chandrasekhar Reddy, who was appointed in the final decree petition before the IX Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, gave a Memo S. No. 5981/2018 to applicants 1, 2, 3 and 5 to hand over keys of these two items to him and it is pointed out that the Court below passed an order on 10.10.2018 directing them to hand over keys to the Advocate Commissioner. They also rely on fact that two electricity meters exist in item No. 3 of the decree schedule [item No. (ii) referred to above], one of which is in the name of 5th defendant and another in the name of the 4th defendant as indication of their possession. 47. They therefore sought in I.A. No. 3 of 2019 a mandatory injunction against respondent Nos. 27, 35, 37 and 38 to remove their henchmen from the above two items. 48. In I.A. No. 5 of 2019, the applicants sought police aid for removing the personnel/henchmen of respondents 27, 35, 37 and 38 from these two items of property reiterating the contentions mentioned in I.A. No. 3 of 2019 and contending that the police have not taken any action in spite of complaints made on 07.10.2019 to the Commissioner of Police, Basheer Bagh, Hyderabad as well as earlier complaints dated 03.10.2019 made to the Kachiguda Police Station and complaint dated 09.10.2019 to the Amberpet Police Station. 49. In I.A. No. 4 of 2019, they sought injunction restraining the respondents 34 to 38 and other respondents also from interfering with the peaceful possession of the applicants in relation to all the items mentioned in the decree schedule attached to the preliminary decree dated 24.09.2012 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997. 50. 49. In I.A. No. 4 of 2019, they sought injunction restraining the respondents 34 to 38 and other respondents also from interfering with the peaceful possession of the applicants in relation to all the items mentioned in the decree schedule attached to the preliminary decree dated 24.09.2012 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997. 50. Annexure-I to XXVII were filed by the applicants as Annexure to I.A. No. 3 of 2019 in support of their above pleadings. 51. Counsel for the appellants also brought to the notice of this Court the fact that a Receive and Transmit application was filed by the respondents 34 to 37 before the Vacation Bench of this Court on 09.10.2019 during the Dussera vacation of this Court (between 05.10.2019 and 13.10.2019) to receive and transmit a Civil Suit seeking relief of a perpetual injunction against the appellants/applicants in these applications, along with an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC falsely alleging that Respondents 34-38 were in possession of item (i) property; that only a ‘status quo’ order was granted therein in R&T petition No. 14/2019 and in R&T M.P. No. 1/2019 for two weeks; and when the papers of the said suit were transmitted to the Civil Court and were returned to comply with certain objections, respondents 34 to 37 had not re-presented the returned plaint to the said Court. 52. This fact is admitted by Sri. Rakesh Sanghi, counsel for respondents 34 to 37. Contentions of respondents 34 to 37: 53. It is the contention in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 34 to 37 that in the preliminary decree, the lower Court held that 7 items of property constitute Matruka property of late Syed Aziz and so they are liable to be partitioned and all the plaintiffs and defendants were held to be co-owners and tenants- in- common in these properties. 54. It is contended that though Dr. Syed Afzal (2nd defendant) had filed I.A. No. 2 of 2013 (CCCA MP No. 136 of 2013) and I.A. No. 3 of 2013 (CCCA MP No. 137 of 2013) to restrain the applicants from alienating the suit schedule properties or from changing the nature of the suit schedule properties, they do not contain any statements from which one can infer admissions as to alleged exclusive possession of the above two items of the decree schedule by the applicants. Stray sentences in pleadings, according to them, cannot be read in isolation divorced from context and the entire pleadings should be read to determine whether there is a conscious admission or not. 55. It is also contended that the unilateral statement made by the Advocate Commissioner in Memo S. No. 819/2018 filed by him in the final decree proceedings cannot be equated as an admission made by parties in the pleadings. It is contended that the Advocate Commissioner cannot give any finding regarding exclusive possession in view of the preliminary decree which stated that all the parties are co-owners. 56. With reference to the plea of the appellants (in para no. 7 of affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 3 of 2019) about I.A. No. 1 of 2018 filed by respondents 31 to 33 in the appeal and also relying upon statement admitting possession of the applicants herein of the decree schedule properties including items (i) and (ii), it is contended by respondents 34-37 that any admission by a co-defendant cannot be utilized against another co-defendant. 57. It is contended that this Court would not find any admission by the respondents either in the pleadings or oral testimony about the exclusive possession of the applicants with regard to these two items of properties. 58. According to them, every co-owner is entitled to every portion of the joint property along with other co-owners. 59. It is contended that grant of interim mandatory injunction by this Court amounts to this Court ousting the respondents 34-37 from their joint possession of the properties despite the pendency of the appeal and without hearing the appeal. 60. It is contended that the allegations leveled by the applicants are false and are a figment of their own imagination. 61. According to respondents 34 to 37, the findings of the trial Court about joint possession of the parties to the suit cannot be impeached in interlocutory proceedings when the main appeal is pending. 62. The respondents therefore prayed for dismissal of I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019. They relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court. 63. An additional counter affidavit was filed in relation to an additional affidavit filed by the applicants and further pleas were taken. 64. 62. The respondents therefore prayed for dismissal of I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019. They relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court. 63. An additional counter affidavit was filed in relation to an additional affidavit filed by the applicants and further pleas were taken. 64. It is contended that any statement made by Habeeb Ahmed (respondent No. 27) in I.A. No. 2131 of 2018 filed in I.A. No. 819 of 2018 does not bind them and there was no admission by respondent No. 27 in the said application also. 65. It is contended that a lock and key on item (ii) could have been placed by anybody on the gate of the property shortly before the visit of the Advocate Commissioner who had given advance notice of his visit, that it does not follow that the applicants had exclusive possession of the said item and even the Advocate Commissioner in the Memo S. No. 5981 of 2018 did not state as to when and by whom, lock and key was placed on this item. 66. The respondents even insinuate in para no. 8 at page no. 5 that if this Court were to grant any relief to the applicants in these applications, it would amount to imputing personal knowledge of the members of this Bench as regards the date and time on which lock and key were placed on this item. 67. Several more judgments are referred to in this additional counter affidavit. 68. These contentions are also reiterated in the written arguments. The consideration by the Court: 69. We have noted the contentions of the parties. 70. Firstly we would like to observe that the findings in the preliminary decree given by the Court below have been challenged in this CCCA No. 18 of 2013 and cannot be said to be conclusive and binding on us, when the said appeal is pending. Therefore, we reject the plea of the counsel for respondents 34 to 37 that in these interlocutory applications, this Court cannot take a contrary view. If this plea were to be accepted, the right of appeal would be meaningless and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to grant appropriate interim relief would stand negated totally. 71. Therefore, we reject the plea of the counsel for respondents 34 to 37 that in these interlocutory applications, this Court cannot take a contrary view. If this plea were to be accepted, the right of appeal would be meaningless and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to grant appropriate interim relief would stand negated totally. 71. While considering these applications, the averments in the affidavits filed in this CCCA in support of certain applications filed by other parties in the CCCA, and affidavits filed by defendant no. 22/respondent no. 27 herein in the final decree petition pending in the court below and other material evidence already on record, would be considered, and on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, a view would be taken in these applications on the question whether the applicants had exclusive possession of the above two items prior to 03.10.2019. 72. We are conscious of the decision in Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and Others, (1990) 2 SCC 117 , which deals with the principles governing grant of interim mandatory injunction. In the said decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the legal position and held that interlocutory mandatory injunctions are granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. It held that for grant of such relief, the following would be the guidelines: (i) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima-facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (ii) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (iii) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 73. The Supreme Court held that these guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, but applying these guidelines as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions, would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion. 74. 73. The Supreme Court held that these guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, but applying these guidelines as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions, would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion. 74. Recently in Hammad Ahmed vs. Abdul Majeed and Others, (2019) 5 Scale 698 , the Supreme Court also held that relief of interim mandatory injunction is to be granted if the Court is satisfied that withholding of such relief would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end, the Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. It quoted its own earlier judgment in Deoraj vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2004) 4 SCC 697. 75. No doubt, it is settled law that every co-owner has a right to possession and enjoyment of each and every part of the property equal to that of other co-owners. Therefore, in theory, every co-owner has an interest in every infinitesimal portion of the subject-matter, each has a right irrespective of the quantity of its interest, to be in possession of every part and parcel of the property jointly with others. A co-owner of a property owns every part of the composite property along with others and he cannot be held to be a fractional owner of the property unless partition takes place. Budh Ram and Others vs. Bansi and Others, (2010) 11 SCC 476 : 2010 AIR SCW 5071. 76. But the law also contemplates a situation where a co-owner is in exclusive possession of some items of the allegedly co-owned property, in certain circumstances, and the need to protect his possession by grant of appropriate relief, if need be. 77. In T. Lakshmipathi vs. P. Nithyananda Reddy, (2003) 5 SCC 150 , the Supreme Court had held as under: “25.........A co-owner may, by an arrangement, express or implied, with his other co-owners, possess and enjoy any property exclusively. Such a co-owner can also protect his possession against the other co-owners and if he is dispossessed by the latter, he can recover exclusive possession. Jahuri Sah vs. Dwarika Prasad Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1967 SC 109 .” (Emphasis supplied) 78. Such a co-owner can also protect his possession against the other co-owners and if he is dispossessed by the latter, he can recover exclusive possession. Jahuri Sah vs. Dwarika Prasad Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1967 SC 109 .” (Emphasis supplied) 78. Likewise in Tanusree Basu and Others vs. Ishani Prasad Basu and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 791 , the Supreme Court considered the question if a co-owner in specific possession of the joint property, could be dispossessed therefrom without the intervention of the Court. It answered the said question as under: “23. It is not the law that a party to a suit during pendency thereof shall take law into his hands and dispossess the other co-sharer. If a party takes recourse to any contrivance to dispossess another, during pendency of the suit either in violation of the order of injunction or otherwise, the court indisputably will have jurisdiction to restore the parties back to the same position. 24. In Israil vs. Samset Rahman, AIR 1914 Cal. 362 Mookerjee, J. held that a co-owner being in exclusive possession of a joint property would be entitled to injunction. If a person is entitled to a prohibitory injunction, a fortiori he shall also be entitled to a mandatory injunction. Spandan Diagnostic and Research Centre (P) Ltd. vs. Ritendra Nath Ghosh, (2000) 2 Cal. LT 83.” 79. Therefore, it is first necessary for this Court to see: “Whether the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 had exclusive possession of the two items of property prior to 03.10.2019 and if so, whether their possession has to be protected by grant of reliefs in these applications?” 80. If the applicants are found to be in exclusive possession of these two items, we shall consider whether they were illegally dispossessed by the respondents 34-37. We will not decide whether these items are exclusively owned by the applicants or they are co-owners: “Whether the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 had exclusive possession of the two items of property prior to 03.10.2019?” 81. In order to answer this question, we will refer to relevant portions of the oral evidence adduced in the suit. 82. Syed Mohd. Ahmed, respondent no. 35 in the appeal/respondent no. 35 in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 had exclusive possession of the two items of property prior to 03.10.2019?” 81. In order to answer this question, we will refer to relevant portions of the oral evidence adduced in the suit. 82. Syed Mohd. Ahmed, respondent no. 35 in the appeal/respondent no. 35 in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 was examined as PW-1 and stated and there were three partial partitions of the estate of late Syed Aziz, twice in 1980 and once in 1985 and though the partial partition of 1980 was not reduced to writing, the partial partition of 1985 was reduced in writing in 1986. He stated that all the members of the family were given their proportionate shares during those partitions and they were also given separate possession and enjoyment of their respective shares. But he stated that Dr. Syed Afzal, his father, was jointly residing in the house bearing No. 2-2-22, Aziz Bagh, Amberpet, Hyderabad [item (ii)]. According to him, it is in ‘joint possession’ of his father. He admitted that his father was given 2500 Sq. Yds. in Sy. No. 78/1 during the 1985 partition. A suggestion was made to him that there was no land still to be divided and his father had already received his share of the properties in the form of cash and plots which was denied by him. 83. PW-1 did not say that exclusive possession of items (i) or (ii) was with his father, the 2nd plaintiff Dr. Syed Afzal. His admission about three partial partitions and about delivery of separate possession of the property to the sharers, throws a doubt as to whether there was so called “joint possession” at all after 1985 of items (i) and (ii) referred to above. 84. Dr. Syed Afzal, the 2nd plaintiff and father of respondent nos. 34 to 38 was examined as PW-2 in the suit. He also admitted that there were partial partitions of the family property in 1978 and 1985 and that he got 1200 Sq. Yds. of site in which he constructed a house and also 1000 Sq. Yds. of site meant for construction of a clinic in 1978 partition. He further stated in 1985 he got 2500 Sq. Yds. of site. He also admitted that there were partial partitions of the family property in 1978 and 1985 and that he got 1200 Sq. Yds. of site in which he constructed a house and also 1000 Sq. Yds. of site meant for construction of a clinic in 1978 partition. He further stated in 1985 he got 2500 Sq. Yds. of site. He admitted that 5th defendant constructed a theatre by selling matruka property; that he had given Ex.B62, an affidavit in O.S. No. 2285 of 1988 before the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad [a suit filed by some third party against the 1st plaintiff and 5th defendant] to strengthen the hands of 5th defendant and at his instance so as to save the matruka properties; and in his evidence as DW-2 in the said suit, he deposed that 5th defendant was given the land in Sy. No. 533, 535 and 536 of Amberpet in the interim settlement over which he constructed a theatre. But he sought to explain it by saying that he signed it without reading its contents. He admitted that he was given 1200 Sq. Yds. of plot at Durgabhai Deshmukh colony for construction of a house by 5th defendant under oral settlement among the heirs, and that in 1989, 5th defendant gave him 750 Sq. Yds. of site near Central Training Institute, Shivam Road, which he had sold to a lecturer. He stated that he was given plots of 1250 Sq. Yds. each in Survey No. 78/1 Bagh Amberpet under the oral settlement in respect of which a Memorandum of family settlement was executed on 14.08.1986 and that the original of the said memorandum was with him. He did not file the said settlement. A suggestion was put to him that he had filed an affidavit in O.S. No. 2285 of 1988 on 10.08.1989 that 5th defendant was allotted 8400 Sq. Yds. in Survey No. 533, 535 and 536 of Bagh Amberpet [item no. (i)] in the oral family settlement, that he is in possession and enjoyment and he obtained permission for construction of a theatre and a clinic in that site, but he denied it. 85. In the affidavit in O.S. No. 2285 of 1988 before the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, marked as Ex.B62 in the O.S. No. 123/1997, the 2nd plaintiff had stated as under: “The land in Sy. Nos. 85. In the affidavit in O.S. No. 2285 of 1988 before the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, marked as Ex.B62 in the O.S. No. 123/1997, the 2nd plaintiff had stated as under: “The land in Sy. Nos. 533, 535 and 536 more than 8400 sq. yds. has been allotted to my brother Syed Azam before 1980 and he having been in possession and enjoyment thereof obtained permission for construction of clinic and theatre thereon. Myself, my mother, brothers and sisters being the heirs of my late father Syed Aziz made an oral partition by mutual settlement and arrangements among ourselves in presence of my mother and we have been allotted different portions of land, as such the land in the said survey numbers are exclusively belong to my brother Syed Azam who has been in possession and enjoyment thereof.......” (Emphasis supplied) 86. In Sita Ram Bhau Patil vs. Ramchandra Nago Patil, (1977) 2 SCC 49 , the Supreme Court held as follows, at page 53: “17.......The general principle is that before any person is to be faced with any statement he should be given an opportunity to see that statement and to answer the same. The specific statutory provision is contained in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act that “A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 87. In the instant case, Ex.B.62 was confronted to PW-2 and he admitted that he gave such affidavit in O.S. No. 2285 of 1988. His explanation to wriggle out of the admission is in our opinion, unbelievable. Since the respondent nos. 34-37 are claiming through the 2nd plaintiff, his admission binds them as well in view of Sec. 18 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as from PW-2 only they derive interest allegedly in the above two items of property. 88. The evidence of PW-2 about the family settlement being reduced into a Memorandum of Settlement on 14.08.1986 also corroborates the evidence of PW-1 in so far as happening of the events of the prior partitions. 88. The evidence of PW-2 about the family settlement being reduced into a Memorandum of Settlement on 14.08.1986 also corroborates the evidence of PW-1 in so far as happening of the events of the prior partitions. His admission in cross-examination that he gave a statement as DW-2 in O.S. No. 2285 of 1998 that 5th defendant was given the land in Sy. No. 533, 535 and 536 of Amberpet in the interim settlement over which he constructed a theatre, show that item (i) referred to above was in exclusive possession of the 5th defendant. PW-2 further statement about himself being given some portions of the land in other areas also supports prima-facie that there were prior partitions and possible separate possession and enjoyment by sharers of their respective shares. In our view his evidence proves that the 5th defendant during his life time (till 2006) was in exclusive possession of item (i). 89. After the death of 5th defendant, his legal heirs i.e. the applicants would be presumed to be in exclusive possession of the said item, unless the respondents 34-37 place material before this court to show how they got exclusive possession of this item after 2006, which is lacking. 90. The 5th defendant was examined as DW-1 in the suit. He stated that a major portion of the house bearing No. 2-2-22 [item no. (ii)] of extent 2900 Sq. Yds. was in his occupation and the remaining portion in that house is in possession of 1st plaintiff; the houses bearing nos. 24 and 24/3 are also in occupation of the 1st plaintiff and the above houses were allotted to them in the mutual settlement entered by all the heirs. According to him, the other houses 2-2-22/2, 2-2-23, 2-2-22/3, 2-2-24/1, 2-2-24/2 and 2-2-24/3 were allotted to defendant nos. 2 and 3. He claimed to have constructed a house from out of the common funds in 1200 Sq. Yds. at Durgabai Desmukh Colony for the sake of PW-2 and that it was disclosed in declarations filed before the Urban Land Ceiling authorities. In the cross-examination he reiterated that there was an oral partition amongst himself and brothers number of times and that except one brother who is residing in America, the rest of the family members are the sharers in the family partition which took place orally. He categorically stated that he constructed a theatre in item no. In the cross-examination he reiterated that there was an oral partition amongst himself and brothers number of times and that except one brother who is residing in America, the rest of the family members are the sharers in the family partition which took place orally. He categorically stated that he constructed a theatre in item no. (i) with his own funds though it is not completed. 91. From the above oral evidence, it is clear that item (i) was in exclusive possession of the 5th defendant, the father of the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 pursuant to prior partitions/oral settlement and there is no evidence of any joint enjoyment of the said item or exclusive enjoyment of it by 2nd plaintiff or his sons, the defendants 34 to 37/respondents 34 to 37 in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019. 92. Defendant Nos. 31 to 33/respondents 31 to 33 in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 had filed I.A. No. 1 of 2018 on 18.12.2018 in C.C.C.A. No. 18 of 2013 to appoint a Receiver for the estate of late Syed Aziz as per the preliminary decree dated 24.09.2012 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997 pending disposal of the appeal by removing defendants 26 to 30/applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 from possession and custody of the property as per the preliminary decree. Defendant Nos. 31 to 33 are the legal heirs of Ms. Shareefa Ameena (9th defendant), who was the sister of the plaintiffs and 5th defendant and also one of the daughters of late Syed Aziz. 93. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 1 of 2018, they stated in para 8 that after the death of Syed Aziz, Syed Azam (5th defendant), as the eldest member of the family was looking after and managing the estate of late Syed Aziz and was collecting income on the estate till he died in 2006, and thereafter Syed Azam’s five daughters i.e. defendants 26 to 30/applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 were in possession and enjoyment of the estate of late Syed Aziz. It was alleged that defendant No. 33 is suffering from kidney ailments and requires constant medical aid and defendants 26 to 30 should be made to contribute for his medical expenses. 94. 3 to 5 of 2019 were in possession and enjoyment of the estate of late Syed Aziz. It was alleged that defendant No. 33 is suffering from kidney ailments and requires constant medical aid and defendants 26 to 30 should be made to contribute for his medical expenses. 94. It is important to note that no counter affidavit was filed by respondents 34 to 38 to this affidavit. Thus, they never disputed the contents of the said affidavit. Therefore, they are deemed to have acquiesced and accepted the said pleas. 95. The statement of respondent nos. 31 to 33 in the above affidavit, is an important piece of evidence, which also makes probable the exclusive possession of applicants of both items of property prior to 03.10.2019. 96. Habib Ahmed, respondent No. 27/defendant No. 22 had filed I.A. No. 819 of 2018 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997 before the IX Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for passing of final decree. He is the son of Hafizunnisa Begum (3rd defendant), the sister of the plaintiffs and 5th defendant and also a daughter of late Syed Aziz. In the affidavit filed in support of that application, he stated in para no. 15 as under: “15. It is respectfully submitted that the suit was originally filed and numbered as O.S. No. 861 of 1991. The suit was subsequently re-numbered as O.S. No. 123 of 1997. It is submitted that 27 years have lapsed since the suit was filed and earlier the defendant no. 5 and thereafter his legal representatives have been enjoying the properties of my grandfather. I am living a life of penury in spite of being heir to the vast joint family properties of my grandfather. My health is badly affected and I need my property and the income therefrom, to obtain medical help for myself and to sustain myself, to have a roof over my head and to live a life of dignity. The contesting parties are in possession of the joint properties and are living lavish lives and hence are procrastinating the hearing of the case........” (Emphasis supplied) 97. It is not the case of respondents 34 to 38 that they filed counter affidavit to the above affidavit of respondent No. 27 disputing the contents of the said affidavit. Therefore, they are deemed to have acquiesced and accepted the said pleas. 98. Respondent no. It is not the case of respondents 34 to 38 that they filed counter affidavit to the above affidavit of respondent No. 27 disputing the contents of the said affidavit. Therefore, they are deemed to have acquiesced and accepted the said pleas. 98. Respondent no. 27 filed I.A. No. 2131 of 2018 in the final decree petition I.A. No. 819 of 2018 before the IX Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in O.S. No. 123 of 1997 seeking a direction from the trial court to the Advocate-Commissioner to break open the lock of item no. (ii) above [item no. 3 of the decree schedule] with the help of the Bailiff. In the said affidavit he stated the following in para nos. 7 and 8: “8. Besides, in the said Memo it is also stated that with respect to No. 3 item of the schedule properties it is under lock and key of respondent no. 33 represented by Ganu, Advocate and presently she is stationed abroad, as such the petitioner is rightly approaching this Hon’ble Court for directing the Advocate Commissioner to break open the lock of this third decretal property so as to legally move ahead in the matter and in due compliance of the order dated 10.10.2018.” 99. It is not the case of respondents 34 to 38 that they filed counter affidavit to the above affidavit of respondent No. 27 disputing the contents of the said affidavit. Therefore, they are deemed to have acquiesced and accepted the said pleas. 100. The admission of 27th respondent/22nd defendant as to decree schedule items being in possession of 5th defendant and the applicants after his death, and item no. (ii) property being under lock and key of Respondent no. 33 before the trial court, i.e. the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 is also clear and unambiguous and is a piece of evidence showing the exclusive possession of the applicants over the said item and also item No. (i) prior to 03.10.2019. 101. Lastly, in CCCA MP No. 136 of 2013, Dr. Syed Afzal, the father of respondents 34 to 38, sought relief that applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019/defendants 26 to 30 should not alienate or change the nature of the properties covered by the decree. 101. Lastly, in CCCA MP No. 136 of 2013, Dr. Syed Afzal, the father of respondents 34 to 38, sought relief that applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019/defendants 26 to 30 should not alienate or change the nature of the properties covered by the decree. The question of the applicants changing the nature of property would arise only if they are in exclusive possession of the property and not otherwise. Thus, this suggests that the exclusive possession of items (i) and (ii) was with the applicants. 102. In this regard, no doubt a plea is raised by the counsel for respondents 34 to 37 relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sudha Devi vs. M.P. Narayanan and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1381 , that affidavits are not included in the definition of ‘evidence’ in Section 3 of the Evidence Act and can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reason, the Court passes an order under Order XIX Rules 1 or 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to him, the averments in these affidavits, therefore, cannot be construed as ‘evidence’ and should be eschewed from consideration. 103. In the instant case, we are considering averments in affidavits filed in support of petitions by defendant No. 22/respondent No. 27 or Defendant Nos. 31 to 33/respondents 31 to 33 in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019. They had not been intended at the time when they were filed by the said parties to be treated as evidence. But, in the I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 filed in October, 2019, the contents of the said affidavits and the statements of the parties who filed the said affidavits have become relevant in order to decide the question as to whether exclusive possession of items (i) and (ii) is with the applicants or not. 104. We take note of the language in Order XXXIX Rule 1 CPC which begins with the words: “Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise......(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff.......” 105. The Parliament had enacted the same taking note of the fact that sometimes urgent interim orders require to be passed by Courts. 104. We take note of the language in Order XXXIX Rule 1 CPC which begins with the words: “Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise......(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff.......” 105. The Parliament had enacted the same taking note of the fact that sometimes urgent interim orders require to be passed by Courts. It has dispensed with the regular procedure of examining the parties and their witnesses and conferred special power on the Court to decide the matter by affidavits also keeping in mind that the scope of enquiry is quite limited and rights of parties are not decided finally. 106. So, in applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, like I.A. Nos. 3 and 5 of 2019 in this CCCA, facts can be proved by affidavit. When the CPC itself carves out an exception to the rule ‘affidavit is not evidence’ by permitting certain facts to be proved by ‘affidavit’ it is not open to the respondents 34 to 37 to contend that the averments in the affidavits referred to above cannot be taken into account. Therefore the said decision has no application to petitions filed invoking Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. 107. Also we are doubtful whether the ratio in the said decision would continue to be valid after Order XVIII Rule 4 CPC was amended by Act 22 of 2002 permitting in every case, examination in chief of a witness, to be on an affidavit, to be followed by cross-examination. 108. Recently, the Supreme Court in Shreya Vidyarthi vs. Ashok Vidyarthi, (2015) 16 SCC 46 , relied upon an affidavit given in an earlier proceeding by a defendant in a suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for a decree of partition. In that case, one H was the common ancestor to both parties. He died leaving behind his two wives SV and RV. Respondent/plaintiff is the son of SV whereas RV was having two daughters ML and SL. Appellant/defendant 8 is the adoptive daughter of SL and legatee of ML. Respondent/plaintiff contended that suit properties were joint family properties. Therefore, he prayed for injunction and, in alternative, share in suit properties. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The High Court decreed the suit by allotting share to the respondent/plaintiff. This was challenged in the Supreme Court by the appellant. Respondent/plaintiff contended that suit properties were joint family properties. Therefore, he prayed for injunction and, in alternative, share in suit properties. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The High Court decreed the suit by allotting share to the respondent/plaintiff. This was challenged in the Supreme Court by the appellant. The Supreme Court held that SV was the real mother of respondent/plaintiff, but RV played a dominant role in the affairs of the family whereas real mother of respondent/plaintiff played submissive role. It held that SV never objected to the dominant role played by RV; after the death of H, respondent/plaintiff was sole surviving coparcener and he was minor. As step mother, RV acted as manager of respondent/plaintiff and RV being disentitled to become coparcener, she could not have acted as karta. It held that in an earlier suit RV admitted in an affidavit that the suit property was purchased out of insurance money following the death of H. So, other legal heirs of H were also entitled for share in insurance amount even though RV received it as nominee of H. During life time of H, family continued to be joint and it was joint family for almost 7 years after purchase of the suit property by R.V. Dealing with the admission in the affidavit of RV in the earlier suit, it held: “19. The affidavit of Rama Vidyarthi (RV) in Suit No. 147 of 1968 filed by Savitri Vidyarthi (SV) discloses that she was looking after the family as the manager taking care of Respondent 1, her stepson i.e. the son of the first wife of Hari Shankar Vidyarthi. In the said affidavit, it is also admitted that she had received the insurance money following the death of Hari Shankar Vidyarthi and the same was used for the purchase of the suit property along with other funds which she had generated on her own. The virtual admission by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant of the use of the insurance money to acquire the suit property is significant. Though the claim of absolute ownership of the suit property had been made by Rama Vidyarthi in the aforesaid affidavit, the said claim is belied by the true legal position with regard to the claims/entitlement of the other legal heirs to the insurance amount. Though the claim of absolute ownership of the suit property had been made by Rama Vidyarthi in the aforesaid affidavit, the said claim is belied by the true legal position with regard to the claims/entitlement of the other legal heirs to the insurance amount. Such amounts constitute the entitlement of all the legal heirs of the deceased though the same may have been received by Rama Vidyarthi as the nominee of her husband. The above would seem to follow from the view expressed by this Court in Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424 .” (Emphasis supplied) 109. In our opinion, though Section 1 of the Evidence Act which extends the Act to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court does not extend it to affidavits presented to any Court or Officer, this only means that it excludes the rules of evidence as laid down in the Act. The law on ‘affidavits’ is not to be found in the Evidence Act but in the Civil Procedure Code. Section 30 of the Code which invests Civil Courts with certain powers says that the Court may, at any time, either of its own motion or on the application of any party, order any fact to be proved by an affidavit. 110. This clearly shows that the Court can treat affidavits as proof of the facts contained therein, the prerequisite, of course, being there. As held above, the language of Clause (1) of Order XXXIX itself permits temporary injunction to be granted in a suit if in the suit, it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel for the respondents 34 to 37. 111. In our view, the above referred material evidence renders probable the exclusive possession of the applicants of these two items of property even after this appeal was filed by the applicants in 2013 prior to 03.10.2019. 112. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel for the respondents 34 to 37. 111. In our view, the above referred material evidence renders probable the exclusive possession of the applicants of these two items of property even after this appeal was filed by the applicants in 2013 prior to 03.10.2019. 112. Along with I.A. No. 3 of 2019, the following documents were filed by the applicants to show that 5th defendant exclusively in possession prior to his death and thereafter the applicants dealt with these two items of property during his lifetime: (i) Letter No. L&AO/A3/2735/78 dated 31.7.1990 addressed by the Office of Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad to 5th defendant w.r.t. construction of permanent cinema theatre in item (i) property. (ii) Permission granted by the Office of Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad to 5th defendant vide Proceedings L&AO/A3/2735/78 dated 26.6.1991 to construct a permanent cinema theatre building in item (i) property. (iii) Proceedings L&AO/A3/2735/78 dated 6.1.1994 of the Office of Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad to 5th defendant extending time to complete construction of a permanent cinema theatre building in item (i) property. (iv) Proceedings L&AO/A3/2735/78 dated October, 1994 of the Office of Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad to 5th defendant communicating approval of fresh sanctioned plan for construction of a permanent cinema theatre building in item (i) property. (v) Proceedings G.O.Rt. No. 1484 Home (General A Department) 27.6.1996 extending time to complete construction of a permanent cinema theatre building in item (i) property up to 30.6.1998. (vi) Demand notice to 5th defendant issued on 3.7.1995 by the Revenue Inspector, Hyderabad to pay Non-Agricultural Land Assessment tax in regard to item no. (i) property. (vii) Challan dated 3.7.1995 evidencing payment of the same by 5th defendant in the Treasury. (viii) Demand notice to 5th defendant issued on 30.4.1997 by the Revenue Inspector, Hyderabad to pay Non-Agricultural Land Assessment tax in regard to item no. (i) property. (ix) Interim order dated 30.3.1999 in WPMP No. 7613 of 1999 in WP No. 6071/1999 directing the revenue and the Police departments not to interfere with the construction of Cinema theater in item (i) property by the 5th defendant. (i) property. (ix) Interim order dated 30.3.1999 in WPMP No. 7613 of 1999 in WP No. 6071/1999 directing the revenue and the Police departments not to interfere with the construction of Cinema theater in item (i) property by the 5th defendant. (x) Interim order dated 22.1.1999 in WPMP No. 30428 of 2008 in WP No. 23347/2008 staying dispossession of the applicants by the Special officer, Urban land Ceiling, Hyderabad and others of properties covered by CC No. H2/100039/76 situated at Bagh Amberpet village and Mandal of extent 97,124.58 sq. m. (xi) Letter dated 22.10.2018 issued by the Advocate Commissioner to S. Malla Rao, counsel for the applicants in the final decree petition to hand over the keys of all properties mentioned in the preliminary decree. (xii) Memo dated 10.10.2018 filed by the Advocate Commissioner in the final decree petition in the court below seeking direction to applicants to hand over the keys of these two items of property. (xiii) Order dated 10.10.2018 of the IX Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, directing the applicants to hand over the keys of the said properties to the Advocate Commissioner. (xiv) Electricity bills dated 10.10.2019 for one electricity meter in item (ii) property in name of 5th defendant and for another electricity meter in item (ii) property in name of 4th applicant. 113. In our considered opinion, (i) the pleadings in I.A. No. 1 of 2018 on 18.12.2018 in C.C.C.A. No. 18 of 2013 of defendants 31 to 33, (ii) the affidavit of defendant No. 27 in I.A. No. 819 of 2018 and I.A. No. 2131 of 2018 in I.A. No. 819 of 2018 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997 and (iii) the affidavit of Dr. Syed Afzal, father of respondents 34 to 37, indicate that even item (ii) was in the exclusive possession of 5th defendant and on his death with the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019, and the other material evidence referred to in para no. 91 supra probablise the exclusive possession of the applicants in regard to these two items of property and do not prove the possession of the respondent nos. 34-37 of the said properties prior to 03.10.2019. 114. In contrast, it is important to note that no material is filed in I.A. Nos. 91 supra probablise the exclusive possession of the applicants in regard to these two items of property and do not prove the possession of the respondent nos. 34-37 of the said properties prior to 03.10.2019. 114. In contrast, it is important to note that no material is filed in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 by respondents 34 to 37 to show their exclusive possession of items (i) and (ii) before 03.10.2019 or during the pendency of the suit. The respondent nos. 34 to 37 contend that applicants are not exclusive owners of the two items, and the applicants are joint owners and the possession of the applicants is that of co-owners. 115. Consequently, we hold that prior to 03.10.2019, the applicants had exclusive possession of these two items: “Whether the applicants were dispossessed of these two items after 05.10.2019.” 116. Next we shall consider the question whether the applicants were dispossessed of these two items after 03.10.2019. 117. Respondent no. 35 had filed on 09.10.2019 in the High Court during the Dussera Vacation on behalf of himself and respondent nos. 34 and 36 to 38 in these applications Receive and Transmit Petition No. 14 of 2019 to receive the plaint in a suit filed by them for perpetual injunction restraining the applicants from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. 118. Along with the said application, respondent nos. 35 to 38 had filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to restrain the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 in C.C.C.A. No. 18 of 2013 from interfering with their possession over item no. (ii), i.e. premises No. 2-2-22, Durgabai Deshmukh Colony, Azizbagh, Hyderabad of extent 3000 Sq. Yds. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application and made the following allegations: “2..........I also submit that to note all our family members are entitled to their respective shares in the petition premises and even if some of them do stay away it is a common rule of Law that possession of one is considered to be the possession of all, as such no force can disturb our possession over the petition premises. 3. It is now submitted that the simmering difference between ourselves and the respondents came to the fore when the respondent no. 3. It is now submitted that the simmering difference between ourselves and the respondents came to the fore when the respondent no. 1 to 5 along with a large contingent comprising of local thugs and minor politicians of every hue and column tried to dispossess and dislodge us from our possession of the petition premises. I submit that we have never ever denied the right to access the suit premises in spite of us enjoying possession thereon, but we can hardly be expected to tolerate concerted attempts to dislodge us from our legitimate and legal possession over the subject premises. I would also feel it extremely pertinent to add that our sisters, i.e. respondent nos. 1 to 5 have sought help from a M.L.A. who is a friendly party to the ruling establishment who in turn has overtly tried to influence the local P.S. against us and has sought the aid of the police to dislodge us from possession of the suit premises..........I submit that all these attempts have till now remained unfruitful, but the threat of imminent dispossession from the suit premises remains very real as the police has refused to come to our aid even though we have lodged a complaint against my cousins dated 04.10.2019, have still chosen to remain non-committal in spite of the seriousness of the threat of dispossession to which me and my family members are exposed, thus leaving us with no choice, but to approach this Hon’ble Court seeking to restrain the respondent nos. 1 to 5 from interfering in our absolute and lawful possession over the suit premises bearing M. No. 2-2-22 situated at D.D. Colony, Amberpet, Hyderabad, admeasuring nearly 3000 Sq. Yds.” (Emphasis supplied) 119. The copy of this affidavit filed along with copy of application seeking ad-interim injunction in the Suit filed in the High Court to receive and transmit it to the City Civil Court were filed along with the reply-affidavit of applicants and their contents were not denied by the Sri. Rakesh Sanghi, counsel for respondent nos. 34 to 37. 120. The underlined passages in para nos. 2 and 3 of the said affidavit filed in support of ad-interim injunction application show that respondent nos. Rakesh Sanghi, counsel for respondent nos. 34 to 37. 120. The underlined passages in para nos. 2 and 3 of the said affidavit filed in support of ad-interim injunction application show that respondent nos. 34 to 38 assert ‘absolute and lawful possession’ over item No. (ii)/item No. 3 of the Decree Schedule, though they tried to camouflage the said plea by also saying that possession of one co-owner is that of other co-owner. 121. Thus, for the first time, since 1991, when the suit was filed, exclusive possession or absolute possession of item (ii) was pleaded only on 09.10.2019 in the ad-interim injunction application by the respondent nos. 34 to 37. How they got such exclusive or absolute possession has not been mentioned in the said affidavit. 122. These pleas of respondent nos. 34 to 38 in the ad-interim injunction have to be juxtaposed with contents of complaint dated 04.10.2019 lodged by the applicant No. 3 before the Amberpet P.S. which was registered as F.I.R. 372 of 2019 on 09.10.2019 under Section 447, 427 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. against unknown persons. In this complaint she alleged that 20 to 25 people broke the gate lock of Item No. (ii), entered the house, that her watchman left the house on being threatened, that the watchman’s accommodation door and chairs were broken, etc., and on 03.10.2019, the gate of the Item No. (i) property was broken for which she filed a complaint with Kachiguda P.S. and F.I.R. No. 250 of 2019 was registered. 123. The pleadings in the ad-interim injunction application of respondents 34-37 referred to above and the contents of the complaints lodged with police by the applicants, in our view, probablise the applicants’ dispossession by respondent nos. 34-37 after 03.10.2019 just prior to or during the Dussera vacation of this Court. 124. We therefore hold that in the absence of any valid explanation as to how respondent nos. 34 to 37 came into exclusive possession of these two items of property after 03.10.2019, the only conclusion possible is that they had dispossessed the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 with force, highhandedly and illegally by taking the law into their own hands when the final decree petition I.A. No. 819 of 2018 was still pending before the trial court. To what relief, if any, are the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 with force, highhandedly and illegally by taking the law into their own hands when the final decree petition I.A. No. 819 of 2018 was still pending before the trial court. To what relief, if any, are the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019 entitled to: 125. We hold that the respondents could not have forcibly dispossessed the applicants by taking the law into their own hands. The decisions in T. Lakshmipathi (supra) and Tanusree Basu (supra) clearly prohibit such actions on part of respondents 34-37 in altering the status quo prevailing as on 03.10.2019 by forcibly dispossessing the applicants who were in exclusive possession of these two items. 126. It is also pertinent to note that in T. Ravi and Another vs. B. Chinna Narasimha and Others, (2017) 7 SCC 342 , the Supreme Court has held that general principles of Islamic jurisprudence do not contemplate administration of the estate of a deceased Muhammadan and relied on the authoritative textbook ‘Outlines of Muhammadan Law’ by Asaf A.A. Fyzee. The Supreme Court held that as per Muhammadan Law, only a mere distribution of the estate as per the principles laid down in Sirajiyyah is contemplated. 127. Therefore, prima-facie, it appears that the very suit O.S. No. 123 of 1997 filed for administration of the estate of Late Syed Aziz by Syed Hamza (1st plaintiff) supported by Dr. Syed Afzal (2nd plaintiff) and others, is not maintainable. 128. We are therefore of the opinion, that the applicants in I.A. Nos. 3 to 5 of 2019/appellants in CCCA No. 18 of 2013 have a strong case of a higher standard than a prima-facie case; they cannot be compensated in terms of money and irreparable loss has been caused to them; balance of convenience is in their favour because the disposal of the appeal will take considerable time in this Court; and withholding relief in these applications to the applicants would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to it’s sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the pendency of the appeal and at the end, we fell that this Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. It would also amount to rewarding the illegal conduct of the respondents 34-37. 129. Though several judgments were quoted in the counter-affidavit/additional counter-affidavits and written arguments by respondent nos. It would also amount to rewarding the illegal conduct of the respondents 34-37. 129. Though several judgments were quoted in the counter-affidavit/additional counter-affidavits and written arguments by respondent nos. 34 to 37, we are not inclined to discuss them in detail in view of the reasons given by us as above. 130. For the aforesaid reasons: (i) I.A. No. 3 of 2019 is allowed and a mandatory injunction is granted in favor of the applicants and against the respondents 27, 35, 37 and 38 to forthwith remove themselves and their henchmen from items 2 and 3 of the decree schedule properties i.e. items (i) and (ii) mentioned above. (ii) I.A. No. 5 of 2019 is allowed and the applicants are granted police aid for removing the respondents 27, 35, 37 and 38 and their personnel/henchmen from these two items of property. (iii) I.A. No. 4 of 2019 is allowed and an injunction restraining the respondents 34 to 38 and other respondents also from interfering with the peaceful possession of the applicants in relation to items (i) and (ii)/item Nos. 2 and 3 mentioned in the decree schedule attached to the preliminary decree dated 24.09.2012 in O.S. No. 123 of 1997, is granted. (iv) The respondents 34-37 shall pay costs of Rs. 20,000/- to the applicants therein. 131. We make it clear that whatever observations or findings are recorded in this order are for the limited purpose of deciding these applications and the appeal would have to be decided on merits uninfluenced by these observations or findings.