JUDGMENT : Abdul Moin, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Chief Standing counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 1 and 2. 2. The instant writ petition has been field inter-alia praying for the following reliefs:- ^^¼v½ ;g fd ekuuh; U;k;ky; foi{kh la[;k&2 }kjk ikfjr fd;k x;k vkns'k fnukad 07-09-2018 tks fd ÁLrqr ;kfpdk dk layXud la[;k&2 gS vkSj ftls ;kph ds ifjopkn dks iks"k.kh; u ekurs gq;s fujLr fd;k x;k gS] dks U;k;fgr esa fujLr djus dh d`ik dh tk;sA ¼c½ ;g fd ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk U;k;fgr esa foi{kh la[;k&2 dks bl vk'k; dk ijekns'k ys[k fuxZr djrs gq, funsZf'kr fd;k tk;s fd og ;kfpdkdrkZ }kjk ÁLrqr mlds osru cdk;k Hkqxrku gsrq ÁLrqr fd;k x;k okn la[;k&38@2016 tks fd ÁLrqr ;kfpdk dk layXud la[;k&1 gS dks ;kfpdkdrkZ ds i{k esa fu.khZr djrs gq, foi{kh la[;k&3 o foi{kh la[;k&4 ls mldk cdk;k ikfjJfed C;kt lfgr Hkqxrku djok;sA ¼l½ vU; mfpr mi'ke] tks ekuuh; U;k;ky;] ;kph ds fgr esa foi{khx.kksa ds fo:) fuxZr djuk pkgsa] fuxZr djus dh d`ik dh tk;sA ¼n½ ;kfpdkdrkZ dks foi{khx.kksa ls ;kfpdk dk O;; fnyk;s tkus dk vkns'k fuxZr djus dh d`ik djsaA** 3. The case set forth by the petitioner is that he was appointed on 08.09.2010 in the respondent no. 4 school as a teacher. The emoluments as were payable to the petitioner were Rs. 25,000/- per month. It is alleged that on 20.06.2014, the service of the petitioner was dispensed with without giving any payment thereof. It is also alleged that for the period from 20.01.2014 to 20.06.2014, no salary payment was made to the petitioner. Despite the petitioner having allegedly met the respondents no. 3 and 4 for payment of his salary, no heed was paid and accordingly the petitioner was constrained to file an application under Section 33C (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "Act 1947") which was registered as Case No. 38/2019 for payment of his dues. Copy of the said application is annexure 1 to the writ petition. However, the Labour Court vide its order dated 07.09.2018 dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the claim petition filed by the petitioner, a teacher would not be maintainable before the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Act, 1947. Copy of order dated 07.09.2018, is annexure 2 to the writ petition. However, the Labour Court vide its order dated 07.09.2018 dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the claim petition filed by the petitioner, a teacher would not be maintainable before the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Act, 1947. Copy of order dated 07.09.2018, is annexure 2 to the writ petition. Being aggrieved with the said order, the present petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order dated 07.09.2018 passed by the Labour Court argues that irrespective of the fact that he is a teacher, the respondents no. 3 and 4 in the capacity of running an educational institution and being a school are working as an Industry and consequently the petitioner, a teacher in the capacity of being employed in the said educational institution, would fall within the ambit of being a workman and, accordingly the Labour Court patently erred in law in dismissing the claim petition filed by the petitioner. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa and Others, AIR 1978 SC 548 . It is argued that the Labour Court patently erred in not holding that the respondents no. 3 and 4 are an Industry keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra) and hence it has been prayed that the impugned order passed by the Labour Court be set aside and Labour Court be directed to decide the claim of the petitioner. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the records. 6. From a perusal of records and the pleadings as made in the petition, it clearly comes out that the petitioner was employed as a teacher in the respondent no. 4 educational institution and being aggrieved with non payment of his salary for a period of six months, the claim petition was preferred by him in the year 2016. Whether a teacher would fall within the ambit of being a "workman" as defined under the provisions of the Act, 1947 is the issue which confronts the Court and dependent upon the decision on the said question can the validity of the impugned order passed by the Labour Court be seen. Whether a teacher would fall within the ambit of being a "workman" as defined under the provisions of the Act, 1947 is the issue which confronts the Court and dependent upon the decision on the said question can the validity of the impugned order passed by the Labour Court be seen. In this regard, the Court may see the definition of a "workman" as defined under Section 2 (s) of the Act, 1947 as follows: “A "workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, technical, operatinal, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person: (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957). (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison. (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding (ten thousand rupees) per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, function mainly of a managerial nature.” 7. From the aforesaid definition, it clearly comes out that in order to be a workman, a person must satisfy the following conditions namely: (i) he should be a person employed in any industry for hire or reward. (ii) he should be engaged in skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work. (iii) he should not be a person falling under any of the four clauses i.e (i) to (iv) mentioned in the definition of workman. (ii) he should be engaged in skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work. (iii) he should not be a person falling under any of the four clauses i.e (i) to (iv) mentioned in the definition of workman. The definition also provides that a workman employed in an industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, an industrial dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. 8. In the instant case even if the respondent nos. 3 and 4, for the sake of arguments, are held to be an industry yet a workman, in case he is not engaged in skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, cannot be considered to be a workman. Thus, whether a teacher is a workman and would fall under any of the four categories namely doing skilled or unskilled manual work, supervisory, technical work or clerical work would have to be seen. 9. In this regard, the Court may safely take the definition of "Workman" as defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of May and Baker (India) Ltd. vs. Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678 as under: “A "workman" was then defined as any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. Therefore, doing manual or clerical work was necessary before a person could be called a workman. This definition came for consideration before industrial tribunals and it was consistently held that the designation of the employee was not of great moment and what was of importance was the nature of his duties. If the nature of the duties is manual or clerical then the person must be held to be a workman. On the other hand if manual or clerical work is only a small part of the duties of the person concerned and incidental to his main work which is not manual or clerical, then such a person would not be a workman. On the other hand if manual or clerical work is only a small part of the duties of the person concerned and incidental to his main work which is not manual or clerical, then such a person would not be a workman. It has, therefore, to be seen in each case from the nature of the duties whether a person employed is a workman or not, under the definition of that word as it existed before the amendment of 1956.The nature of the duties of Mukerjee is not in dispute in this case and the only question, therefore, is whether looking to the nature of the duties it can be said that Mukerjee was a workman within the meaning of Section. 2(s) as it stood at the relevant time. We find from the nature of the duties assigned to Mukerjee that his main work was that of canvassing and any clerical or manual work that he had to do was incidental to his main work of canvassing and could not take more than a small fraction of the time for which he had to work. In the circumstances the tribunal's conclusion that Mukerjee was a workman is incorrect. The tribunal seems to have been led away by the fact that Mukherjee had no supervisory duties and had to work under the directions of his superior officers. That, however, would not necessarily mean that Mukerjee's duties were mainly manual or clerical. From what the tribunal itself has found it is clear that Mukerjee's duties were mainly neither clerical nor manual. Therefore, as Mukerjee was not a workman his case would not be covered by the Industrial Disputes Act and the tribunal would have no jurisdiction to order his reinstatement. We, therefore, set aside the order of the tribunal directing reinstatement of Mukerjee along with other reliefs.” 10. From the aforesaid definition of "Workman" as was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of May and Baker (India) Ltd. (supra) it clearly comes out that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in order for an employee to be a workman, he had to be merely employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward which are the only two classes for employees who qualify for being termed as "Workman" under the Act, 1947. Even though subsequently the definition of workman has undergone a change keeping in view the amendment introduced with effect from 21.08.1984 in Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947 wherein technical work as well as supervisory work has also been included in the definition of workman yet again the question for consideration would be whether after inclusion of "technical work" and "supervisory work" the "teacher" would swim within the definition of being a workman. 11. In this regard, the Court may consider the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Miss A. Sundarambal vs. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and Others, (1988) 4 SCC 42 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of a teacher that teachers employed in educational institutions cannot be called as "Workman" within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act, 1947 as imparting of education, which is the main function of teachers, cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work as imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. The clerical work, if any, that the teacher may do is only incidental to the principal work of teaching. For the sake of convenience, the relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Miss A. Sundarambal (supra) are reproduced as under: “The question for consideration is whether even after the inclusion of the above two classes of employees in the definition of the expression "workman" in the Act a teacher in a school can be called a workman We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said institutions are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post graduate education cannot be called as "workmen" within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of teachers. The clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of teachers. The clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that teachers cannot be treated as 'workmen' as defined under the Act.” 12. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussions as well as the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of May and Baker (India) Ltd and Miss A. Sundarambal (supra), it can clearly be said that a "teacher" would not fall within the ambit of being a workman so as to be entitled to prefer a claim before the Industrial Tribunal. Accordingly, when the impugned order passed by the Labour Court is seen in the light of aforesaid discussions, it clearly comes out that there is no illegality or infirmity with the same and requires no interference by the Court. 13. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. 14. However, it would be open for the petitioner to avail other remedies that may be available to him before the appropriate Court for his grievances.