JUDGMENT : V. M. DESHPANDE, J. 1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. Heard Ms. Naziya Pathan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. A. B. Mirza, the learned counsel for respondent no.2 and Mr. N.S. Rao, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent no.1/State. 3. By the present writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the order passed by the learned District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur dated 05.7.2018 below Exh.11 in Criminal Appeal No. 88 of 2017. By the said order, the lower Appellate Court has allowed the application (Exh.11) filed on behalf of respondent no.2, who is petitioner's wife, for grant of interim maintenance. The application (Exh.11) is partly allowed by the impugned order and in stead of Rs.25,000/ per month as claimed by the respondent no.2/wife, Rs.10,000/ per month is given in her favour by way of interim maintenance from the date of application i.e. 07.3.2018. 4. It is the submission of Ms. Pathan, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as "the D.V. Act" for short) filed on behalf of respondent no.2/wife are dismissed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur after holding a full fledged trial vide judgment and order dated 07.3.2017. She, therefore, submitted that the learned lower Appellate Court has committed an error in granting interim maintenance. It is also her submission that respondent no.2 is a Homeopath doctor and therefore, she is able to maintain herself. In this context of her submission, her prayer is that the writ petition needs to be allowed by upsetting the order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court. 5. Per contra, Mr. Mirza, the learned counsel for respondent no.2 submitted that the Court below has rightly passed the order. Mr. Rao, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent no.1/State has vehemently supported the order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court. In my view his support to the impugned order passed by the lower Appellate Court is right since he is a Public Prosecutor and custodian of the interest of the litigant. 6. No doubt true, the proceedings under the D.V. Act initiated by respondent no.2/wife are dismissed on its own merit by the learned Magistrate. In my view his support to the impugned order passed by the lower Appellate Court is right since he is a Public Prosecutor and custodian of the interest of the litigant. 6. No doubt true, the proceedings under the D.V. Act initiated by respondent no.2/wife are dismissed on its own merit by the learned Magistrate. A statutory appeal is provided under the D.V. Act and the respondent/wife has resorted to the remedy of filing the statutory appeal available to her. Since the appeal is filed and it is not yet decided finally, it cannot be said that the judgment and order of dismissal of Domestic Violence proceedings passed by the learned Magistrate has reached to its finality. 7. There is no dispute before this Court that as on today the matrimony between the petitioner and respondent no.2 is in existence. Though, Ms. Pathan, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that necessary steps of filing the proceedings for divorce are already taken by the petitioner, however, the fact remains that as on today respondent no.2 is legally married wife of the petitioner. It is the bounden duty of every husband to maintain his wife. The wife has every right to lead the life equal to the status of her husband. Merely, because due to some matrimonial discord the wife is residing separately, that does not mean that the wife shall lead her life like a destitute. Even though residing separately, she has every right to lead the life in the society as that of her husband is leading. 8. Perusal of the judgment passed by the learned Magistrate in Domestic Violence proceedings shows that the learned Magistrate has found that there are various documents which would show that the petitioner is the Director of one M/s IMarks Digital Online Marketing, having its offices at Mumbai, Hyderabad, Vijaywada and Bangalore. It is the claim of the wife that the petitioner is also Director of Film Factory having offices throughout Indian and in abroad. This fact is not denied by the petitioner. The only submission made before me is that he is not the owner of those factories, however, he is the Director of the companies running those factories. According to respondent no.2/wife, at the time of marriage, on a matrimonial site, the petitioner has uploaded his profile in which the petitioner has shown his monthly income as Rs.5,00,000/ per month. The only submission made before me is that he is not the owner of those factories, however, he is the Director of the companies running those factories. According to respondent no.2/wife, at the time of marriage, on a matrimonial site, the petitioner has uploaded his profile in which the petitioner has shown his monthly income as Rs.5,00,000/ per month. Said uploading on social site of matrimony is not in disputed by the petitioner. Thus, it prima facie shows that the income of the petitioner is not less than Rs.5,00,000/ per month. 9. Though, it is the submission of Ms. Pathan, the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent no.2/wife is a Homeopath, nothing is brought on record to show that where her clinic is situated and what is the income from the said clinic. Suffice to say, it is not at all the case of the petitioner that through her Homeopath practice, the wife is earning more than Rs.5,00,000/. Merely because the wife is earning some paltry income through her practice as a Homeopath, that does not disentitle her to claim maintenance from husband to lead a suitable life commensurate to the life the petitioner/husband is leading. 10. The present petition arises out of the interim order. In my limited writ jurisdiction, I refrain myself from interfering with the order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court since no error on the face of record is appearing. Further, the impugned order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is not perverse. In view of the discussion made herein above, I find no merit in the petition and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. Ms. Pathan, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appeal filed by respondent no.2/wife is still pending before the lower Appellate Court. In the interest of justice, the lower Appellate Court can be requested to decide the said appeal within the stipulated period. Consequently, I pass the following order : ORDER 1. The criminal Writ Petition is dismissed. 2. The learned District Judge-8 and Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur is requested to decide and dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 88 of 2017 pending on its file within a period of Six months from the date of receipt of this order. 3. Needless to mention that respondent no.2/wife will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited by the petitioner with the Registry of this Court. 4. 3. Needless to mention that respondent no.2/wife will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited by the petitioner with the Registry of this Court. 4. With this, the criminal writ petition is dismissed and disposed of.