JUDGMENT : ANANT S. DAVE, J. 1. Before we proceed to refer certain facts and reasons recorded by learned Single Judge in the oral judgment dated 27.11.2018 in Special Civil Application No.4796/2015, and consider the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the respective parties, we would like to quote Paragraph-26 from the Larger Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Dashrathlal M.Patel, Heirs and legal Representative of Maganbhai Joitaram v. State of Gujarat reported in 2011(0) GLHEL-HC 225648 : 2011 JX (Guj) 902 : 2011 GLHEL_HC 225648, which reads as under: “26. The decisions rendered by this Court can be summarized as follows :- (i) The power conferred on the Collector under Sub-section (3) of Section 9 is not a legislative power. It is an adjudicatory power in so far as it empowers the Collector to make an order of summary eviction against a person when he is satisfied that such person is un-authorizedly occupying or in possession of the land, the transfer or partition of which either by the act of the parties or by the operation of law, is void under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, and is an executive power in so far it authorizes the Collector to summarily evict such person in enforcement of the order made by him. [Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897]. (ii) This power is obviously conferred upon the Collector to secure enforcement of the salutary and beneficent provisions of the Act. [Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897]. (iii) Sub-section (3) of Section 9 does not say in so many terms that having summarily evicted such person, the Collector may restore possession of the land to the original owner but that is clearly implicit in Sub-section (3) of Section 9. If transfer has been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, it must not have any effect at all and the status quo ante must be restored, for otherwise the object of the Act would be frustrated. [Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897] (iv) The Legislature did not leave it to the transferor to adopt proceedings for recovering possession of the land but provided that the Collector may summarily evict the transferee or any other person who is unauthorizedly in occupation or wrongfully in possession of it, so that possession could be restored to the transferor and the effect of the transfer obliterated. [Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897]. (v) The Collector must obviously, after summarily evicting the unauthorized occupant, hand back possession to the person who is the owner of the land. [Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897]. (vi) The Collector cannot, in the absence of specific provision to that effect, retain possession as against the owner of the land. [Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897]. (vii) The competent authorities under law can take up the stand that the transaction is without obtaining prior permission and, therefore, is void and no limitation would come in the way of the competent authority for declaring that the transaction is void. [Patel Ratilal Maganbhai, 2003 (1) GLR 562 ]. (viii) However, the same is not the case when the transaction is to be declared void and the restoration of possession is to be made at the instance of the seller of the property because the seller will have to establish before the competent Court that when the transaction of sale was entered into it was disclosed by the seller to the purchaser that the permission of the competent authority before entering into the registered sale deed was required and in spite of the same the purchaser has at his own risk agreed to purchase the land without permission of the competent authority. If the purchaser establishes that the seller of the property has withheld this information from the purchaser and has made the purchaser to believe that on account of sale transaction the rights and titles of the seller are fully conveyed and he would become the absolute owner of the property, the Court may decline the relief to the seller for declaring the sale as illegal or void. If the seller establishes that the seller himself as well as the purchaser, both were under the bona fide mistake that the permission of the competent authority for sale is not required, then in the given case, the Court keeping in view the intent of the legislature may declare the transaction of sale as void. But, in those circumstances also the Court may decline the equitable relief of restoring the possession back to the seller and even if the Court decides to restore the possession back to the seller, the Court may also put the seller on condition of repaying the sale consideration and the compensation also if circumstances so demand. But, in those circumstances also the Court may decline the equitable relief of restoring the possession back to the seller and even if the Court decides to restore the possession back to the seller, the Court may also put the seller on condition of repaying the sale consideration and the compensation also if circumstances so demand. All these questions of facts can only be examined in the proceedings of civil suit. [Patel Ratilal Maganbhai, 2003 (1) GLR 562 ] (ix) A Court of equity when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Art. 226 must so act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith, as far as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law. [Patel Ratilal Maganbhai, 2003 (1) GLR 562 ]. (x) Article 226 of the Constitution is an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction, it should be exercised to prevent perpetration of legal fraud and to promote good faith and honesty. It cannot be exercised in favour of a defaulting party to frustrate legitimate claim of the other party. [AP State Financial Corporation, (1994) 2 SCC 647 ] (xi) Sections 7 and 9 clearly imply that whenever a question arises as to whether there is a transfer of fragment or not and whether that transfer is void or not has to be decided either by the State Government or by the authority to whom the powers might have been delegated by the State Government. Section 9 authorizes the Collector to impose fine or to summarily evict a person unauthorizedly in occupation or wrongfully in possession of any fragment. That necessarily implies that the Collector will have to decide first whether transfer is contrary to the provisions of the Act and, therefore, void or not. Without deciding those questions, the Collector cannot impose fine or summarily evict a person in occupation or possession of the same. [Shah Chandulal Velchand vs. Amthaji Balaji Thakore, 1990 (1) GLH 448 ]. (xii) Even the void transaction under Section 9(1) if allowed to remain effective for considerably long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. Even the void transaction cannot be said to be nonexistent in all cases and in all situations. [Shah Chandulal Velchand vs. Amthaji Balaji Thakore, 1990 (1) GLH 448 ]. (xii) Even the void transaction under Section 9(1) if allowed to remain effective for considerably long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. Even the void transaction cannot be said to be nonexistent in all cases and in all situations. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed to remain for a considerable period and with the passage of time it brings about several changes, creating valuable rights in favour of considerable section of people, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the Collector would be entitled to exercise power under Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act. When the things have been allowed to remain as such for years together, the purchaser cannot be deprived of his possession so as to render indirect benefit to the seller who was equally responsible for entering into such illegal transaction. When the authority had considerable opportunities to know about the transaction and despite that, has not taken any action thereon for years together, such authority cannot be allowed to exercise powers conferred upon it at a belated stage. The concept of reasonableness of time will equally apply in such cases. Therefore, even powers conferred upon the Collector under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 are required to be exercised within a reasonable time. [Valjibhai Jagjivanbhai vs. State of Gujarat, 2005 (2) GLH 34 ].” (emphasis supplied) 2. In conclusion, the Larger Bench in the above decision held that the Division Bench decision in the case of Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897] and the Division Bench decision in the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai [ 2003 (1) GLR 562 ], hold good on the ratio laid down by the Division Bench and they do not run counter to each other and the respective Division Bench has to decide the other questions of law that may have to be considered in the facts of each case. 3. 3. The above decision of the Larger Bench of this Court clearly holds that in case where restoration of possession is to be made at the instance of the seller of the property because the seller will have to establish before the competent Court that when the transaction of sale was entered into, it was disclosed by the seller to the purchaser that the permission of the competent authority before entering into the registered Sale Deed was required and in spite of the same, the purchaser has, at his own risk, agreed to purchase the property without permission of the competent authority. Further, if the purchaser establishes that the seller of the property has withheld this information from the purchaser and has made the purchaser to believe that on account of sale transaction the rights and titles of the seller are fully conveyed and he would become the absolute owner of the property, the Court may decline the relief to the seller for declaring the sale as illegal or void. It further transpires from the said decision that if the seller establishes that the seller himself as well as the purchaser, both were under the bona fide mistake that permission of the competent authority for sale is not required, then in a given case, the Court, keeping in view the intent of the legislature, may declare the transaction of such sale as void. However, in such circumstances also, the Court may decline equitable relief of restoring the possession back to the seller and even if the Court decides to restore the possession back to the seller, the Court may also put the seller on condition of repaying the sale consideration and the compensation also if circumstances so demand. 4. Reverting to the facts of the present case, same have been noticed by learned Single Judge in Paragraph-2.1 and we deem it proper to reproduce the same for convenience: “2.1. The land in question bearing survey no.119(old) now 118 was owned by one Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai Patel. After demise of Shri Fakirbhai, the names of the heirs of Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai Patel was mutated by entry no.275. Thereafter, the application was made by Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai for formation of the Co-operative society and in 1997 order for consolidation of the land of village : Kudasan was made when Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai Patel passed away in 1979. After demise of Shri Fakirbhai, the names of the heirs of Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai Patel was mutated by entry no.275. Thereafter, the application was made by Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai for formation of the Co-operative society and in 1997 order for consolidation of the land of village : Kudasan was made when Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai Patel passed away in 1979. Thereafter, the heirs of Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai I.e. Surajaben Wd/o Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai and Dhuliben Bhikhabhai were mutated and it was certified by entry no.1525 on 30.10.1979. However, the land was sold by the heirs of Bhikhabhai Fakirbhai to one Shri Harijanbhai Dahyabhai by a registered sale deed dated 26.03.1980. The application was given by widow on the same day that it is cultivated by her and the entry no.1396 was mutated. Thereafter, in 1986, the proceedings were initiated by said Dhuliben after six years of the sale, filed Fragmentation Case No.446 of 1986, which came to be decided on 30.04.1997 by respondent No.3. However, in between, the two sale transactions took place and one Dahyabhai Madhabhai Patel, who purchased the land sold to one Shankarbhai Babubhai Patel. Therefore, in light of the circular that the land of Village : Kudasan may be deleted from the fragmentation and the mutation entry no.2089 was made. Thereafter, after 11 years, the order came to be passed in Fragmentation Case No.446 of 1986 at Annexure-L. The petitioner, who had purchased the land by registered sale deed, an entry no.4902 was made and therefore, when the petitioner made an application for NA permission, said Dhuliben raised the objection leading to the impugned order passed by the authority.” 5. Having heard rival submissions and considering record of the case, learned Single Judge in Paragraphs-9 and 10 of the judgment has recorded the following observations and conclusions: “9. As could be seen from the background of the facts, respondent No.5 has been pursuing the litigation one after the another as an abuse of process of Court after having sold the land in question by registered sale deed. It is required to be stated that respondent No.5 had earlier filed a petition being Special Civil Application No.10388 of 2017 challenging the order passed by SSRD. The SSRD rejected the Revision Application No.3 of 2015 on the ground that the petitioner has challenged the earlier order dated 30.04.1997 before the High Court by way of Special Civil Application No.4796 of 2015, which is pending. The SSRD rejected the Revision Application No.3 of 2015 on the ground that the petitioner has challenged the earlier order dated 30.04.1997 before the High Court by way of Special Civil Application No.4796 of 2015, which is pending. It is required to be stated that thereafter, the another petition being Special Civil Application No.10388 of 2017 was also withdrawn. It is required to be recorded that earlier the Fragmentation Case No.446 of 1986 against the petitioner and all the three subsequent purchasers had been initiated and the order dated 30.04.1997 came to be passed on the ground that such transactions are in violation of provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Fragmentation Act. Thereafter, SSRD also rejected the revision application upholding the order of respondent No.3-Prant Officer. However, thereafter, the last purchasers (1) Melaji Popatji Thakore, (2) Rameshji Popatji Thakore and (3) Rajendraji Popatji Thakore challenged the order passed by respondent No.3 by way of Special Civil Application No.7627 of 2001 and it was remanded. Again, the Fragmentation Case No.42 of 1990 regarding the sale between the first purchaser Dahyabhai and second purchaser Shankerbhai was initiated and it was held that the land was piyat land and Fragmentation Act would not be attracted and therefore, the sale is valid. Therefore, the order passed by the SSRD earlier was challenged before the High Court by way of Special Civil Application No.7627 of 2001 and interim relief was granted therein and later on, it was confirmed. However, as stated above, Special Civil Application was dismissed for want of prosecution and subsequently, it was disposed of. At the same time, the fact remains that respondent No.5-Dhuliben filed a Special Civil Suit No.89 of 2013 before the 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Gandhinagar after the Special Civil Application No.7627 of 2001 was disposed of for want of prosecution and therefore, the subsequent purchaser respondent No.11 filed an application for rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 and the mutation entries came to be passed, which led to the further revision application by respondent No.5 against the order of Deputy Collector and Collector, Gandhinagar and also before the SSRD. However, the SSRD also rejected the revision application on the ground that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30.04.1997 before the High Court by way of Special Civil Application No.4796 of 2015 which is pending. However, the SSRD also rejected the revision application on the ground that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30.04.1997 before the High Court by way of Special Civil Application No.4796 of 2015 which is pending. It is required to be stated that respondent No.5- Dhuliben, therefore, has been litigating and in fact in 1986, she had initiated the proceedings after six years of the sale deed executed by her. Therefore, the SSRD vide order dated 18.03.2015 disposed of the application of respondent No.5-Dhuliben on the ground that the proceedings before the Prant Officer as well as the SSRD are regarding the Fragmentation Act and there is no justification to interfere with the order passed by the Collector. On that basis, again, the Prant Officer while deciding the fragmentation proceedings under Case No.PO/T.D./Appeal/SR.09/2014 passed the order produced on record at Annexure-Z/2. It has been clearly observed referring to the background of the facts that the applicant therein I.e. respondent No.5-Dhuliben has no locus standi having sold the land and therefore, disposed of the same with specific detail about the certification of the entries made regarding the subsequent transactions as well as sequence of events. 10. It is in these circumstances, again when the respondent No.5 pursuing the proceedings by way of Fragmentation Case No.446 of 2018 before the Prant Officer, who accepted that transaction is violation of Fragmentation Act and thereafter, further proceedings by way of fragmentation proceedings under Case No.PO/T.D./Appeal/SR.09/2014 at Annexure-D cannot be sustained and the order was passed confirming the order dated 30.04.1997 passed by the Prant Officer, Gandhinagar and/or fragmentation proceedings under Case No.PO/T.D./Appeal/ SR.09/2014 would not survive......” 6. Apart from merit, the learned Single Judge even considered the ground raised by the original petitioner regarding power to be exercised within reasonable period and upon considering the law on the issue, observed in Paragraph-14 as under: “14. Thus, it has also been well settled that even if there are such powers with the authority, the same has to be exercised within a reasonable period. Having failed in the proceedings and get out from the registered sale deed, the heirs of the original owner-respondent No.5 have been raising the boggy of Fragmentation Act before the authority and thereafter, at belated stage, have also filed Special Civil Suit No.89 of 2013. Having failed in the proceedings and get out from the registered sale deed, the heirs of the original owner-respondent No.5 have been raising the boggy of Fragmentation Act before the authority and thereafter, at belated stage, have also filed Special Civil Suit No.89 of 2013. However, the fact remains that the registered sale deed has not been held to be invalid conveying the title in the property or the land in question. Therefore, what cannot be done directly is sought to be achieved indirectly. This reflects the policy of dog in a manger as stated to extract some benefit.....” 7. Having regard to totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the ratio of law laid down by a Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Dashrathlal M.Patel, Heirs and legal Representative of Maganbhai Joitaram v. State of Gujarat (supra), in our view, the case on hand will be governed by the above declaration of law and the decision in the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai v. State of Gujarat reported in 2003(1) GLR 562 will be applicable. 8. In above view of the matter, the learned Single Judge has rightly quashed and set aside the order dated 31.01.2000 passed by Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, confirming the order dated 30.04.1997 passed by the Prant Officer, Gandhinagar and the proceedings under Case No.PO/TD/Appeal/ SR.09/2014. We do not find any illegality or error apparent on the face of the oral judgment dated 27.11.2018 of learned Single Judge requiring our interference. 9. The appeal, being bereft of any merit, is dismissed. It is, however, made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the pending civil proceedings and the observations made hereinabove shall have no bearing on such proceedings initiated by the original owner with regard to the subject land. 10. In view of dismissal of appeal, Civil Application for interim relief would not survive. It, accordingly, stands disposed of.