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2019 DIGILAW 439 (CAL)

Kalika Pathak v. Union of India

2019-04-03

ABHIJIT GANGOPADHYAY

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. This judgment is in 8 (eight) parts. Part: I The writ application relates to a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the Railway Protection Force against the petitioner who in the writ application has introduced himself as an Inspector of South Eastern Railway against whom charge-sheet was issued on 10.01.2014 by the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, and South Eastern Railway Kharagpur (RPF, in short, hereafter). In the said writ application writ of mandamus was prayed for direction on the respondent authority (i) for not giving any effect or further effect to the charge-sheet dated 10.01.2014; and (ii) for not giving any effect to the (a) findings of the Enquiry Officer dated 05.06.2014; (b) the speaking order dated 18.04.2015 and 17.12.2016; and (c) the show cause notice dated 21.09.2017. 2. Direction for not disturbing service of the petitioner and writ of or in the nature of prohibition in respect of the above charge-sheet etc. has also been prayed. Part: II 3. This writ application was initially heard by the writ Court on 25.10.2017. The writ Court did not interfere with the disciplinary proceedings and the writ application was dismissed as it was filed at the stage of show cause (more specifically, according to the appeal Court, second show cause). 4. This writ application is still now in the stage of show cause by virtue of show cause notice dated 21.09.2017. 5. Against the order of dismissal of the writ application the petitioner preferred one Intra-Court appeal being MAT No. 1900 of 2017 with a connecting application being CAN 10491 of 2017. 6. The appeal Court remanded the matter back to the writ court for hearing of the writ application on the basis of the observation made in the order passed by the appeal Court dated 17.11.2017. 7. By the said order dated 17.11.2017 both the appeal and the connected application were disposed of. 8. Before referring to the observation made and direction given by the appeal Court on the basis of which the matter was directed to be heard by the Single Judge, back ground of the matter is required to be given briefly. Part: III 9. A charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner by his employer RPF and an Enquiry Officer was appointed. The Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry on 05.06.2014 and on the basis of evidence adduced held the petitioner guilty of the charges. Part: III 9. A charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner by his employer RPF and an Enquiry Officer was appointed. The Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry on 05.06.2014 and on the basis of evidence adduced held the petitioner guilty of the charges. The petitioner had filed his written defence statement on 08.05.2014. On 07.07.2014 a show cause notice was issued by RPF to the petitioner to which the petitioner on 26.07.2014 filed reply. The disciplinary authority on 17.04.2015 passed the speaking order wherein it was recorded that charged officer warranted deterrent punishment which was beyond the competency of the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner RPF, S.E. Railway, Adra (the Commissioner, in short, hereafter) and therefore, the whole proceeding case file was sent for information and necessary action of the IG-Cum-Chief Security Commissioner RPF, S.E. Railway (IG, in short, hereafter) by letter dated 18/20 April 2015. 10. After receiving the said speaking order of the disciplinary proceeding and after examining the records those were remitted back by the IG to the Commissioner for clarification of some points of the case under IG's letter dated 10.05.2016. The Commissioner re-examined the records of the case and re-submitted the case file with necessary clarification on the specific points, by letter dated 17/19-12-2016 of the Commissioner. 11. The relevant papers and documents were again examined by the IG and the IG issued a show cause notice dated 21.09.2017 to the petitioner with observation that the 'departmental enquiry was quite in order' and the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner for giving him one more opportunity to defend himself. This show cause notice dated 21.09.2017 (referred by the appeal Court as the Second show cause notice) has been annexed to the writ application as annexure P-9. 12. It is to be mentioned that the IG after receiving the case file initially, by his letter dated 10.05.2016 raised seven points in respect of the proceeding and directed as follows (as contained in the last paragraph of the said letter dated 10.05.2016) : "In view of the above mentioned facts and the proposal of the then Disciplinary Authority to impose a penalty which is beyond his competence, the entire D&AR case file is returned herewith to the Disciplinary Authority i.e. present Sr. DSC/ ADA with a view to afford him an opportunity to have a fresh look at the case and take appropriate remedial measures as per extant Rules in the larger interest of fair play and justice". 13. This letter of IG dated 10.05.2016 has been annexed to the writ application as annexure P-7. 14. In reply to this letter the Commissioner by his reply letter dated 17/19-12-2016 clarified the seven points (as mentioned by the IG in his letter) reproducing the charges, with the gist in respect of the outcome of the proceeding referring to the charges and also clarified certain other points in his said reply letter. 15. This reply of the Commissioner dated 17/19-12-2019 has been annexed to the writ application as annexure P-8. Part: IV. 16. Now in the above backdrop direction given by the appeal Court in its judgment and order dated 17.11.2017 is to be read. The relevant part of the judgment and order of the Appeal Court dated 17.11.2017 is produced here in below: "On perusal of the second show cause notice dated September 21, 2017 issued by the same authority, i.e. the respondent No. 2, we find that though the objection, which had been raised by him earlier, were taken into consideration in the second show cause notice, no reason was assigned to ignore the aforesaid earlier objections raised by him. We only find that, according to the observations made in the second show cause notice, 'departmental enquiry was quite in order'. That observation was not based on any reason. Therefore, this was a fit case for the learned Single Judge to interfere with at this stage, i.e. before imposing the punishment upon the delinquent employee as proposed in the second show cause notice after considering his reply thereto. The satisfaction of the respondent No.2 to issue the second show cause notice dated September 21, 2017 without explaining the reasons to ignore the objections which had been raised by him earlier should have been looked into by the learned Single Judge even before imposing the punishment upon the appellant by the disciplinary authority. The satisfaction of the respondent No.2 to issue the second show cause notice dated September 21, 2017 without explaining the reasons to ignore the objections which had been raised by him earlier should have been looked into by the learned Single Judge even before imposing the punishment upon the appellant by the disciplinary authority. In view of the discussions and observations made hereinabove, we are of the opinion that no useful purpose will be served in keeping this appeal pending and consequently thereupon this appeal and application for passing further order filed in connection within this appeal are taken up treating this appeal as on day's list. The impugned judgment is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned Single Judge for hearing of the writ application on the basis of the observation made here-in ablove." (Emphases mine) 17. Therefore, what is understood from the above judgment and order is that the appeal Court found that the respondent No. 2 (i.e. the IG) who had raised the seven points earlier were taken into consideration in the second show cause notice but no reason was assigned to ignore the earlier objection raised by him and the IG in the second show cause notice had held that "departmental enquiry was quite in order." The appeal Court further held that this observation had not been based on any reason and therefore, it had been a fit case for the Learned Single Judge to interfere with at that stage i.e. before imposing the punishment upon the delinquent employee as proposed in the second show cause notice after considering his reply thereto. The observation of the respondent No. 2 (i.e. the IG) to issue the second show cause notice dated September 21, 2017 without explaining the reason which had been raised by him earlier should have been looked into by the Learned Single Judge even before imposing the punishment upon the appellant by the disciplinary authority. For this reason the judgment of the writ Court was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Learned Single Jude for hearing writ application on the basis of the observation made in the order of the appeal Court. 18. For this reason the judgment of the writ Court was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Learned Single Jude for hearing writ application on the basis of the observation made in the order of the appeal Court. 18. Thus the observations made by the appeal Court were: (i) As the observation of the IG that "departmental enquiry was quite in order" was not based on any reason the learned Single Judge should have interfered with at that stage and (ii) As the respondent No. 2 (i.e. IG) issued the second show cause notice dated September 21. 2017 without explaining the reason by ignoring the "objection" which had been raised by him earlier should have been looked into by the Learned Single Judge. (Emphases mine). 19. Thus the appeal Court wanted the writ Court to see how the said IG issued the second show cause notice dated 21.09.2017 without explaining the "reason" to ignore his earlier "objection"/and the writ Court was allowed interference by the appeal Court. (It is required to be noted that the said IG in his letter dated 10.05.2016 never raised any "objection" he mentioned certain "points"). 20. Now the writ application is before the writ Court and therefore now it is to be seen whether the observation that "departmental enquiry was quite in order" was based on any reason and how the respondent No. 2 (i.e. the IG) without explaining the reason ignored his objection raised earlier and reached the situation to issue the second show cause notice dated September 21, 2017. Part: V. 21. Now a look is to be taken to the backdrop of the observation of the IG in issuing the second show cause notice wherein the observation "departmental enquiry was quite in order" was made, had any reason or not. 22. For this purpose the letter of IG dated 10.05.2016 (Annexure P-7 of the writ application) and the reply letter of the Commissioner dated 17/19.12.2016 (Annexure P-8 of the writ application) are being considered. (a) In the IG's letter first two points relate to wrong name of prosecution witness at serial No. 15 and name of another witness in two places at serial No. 14 and 21 of the relevant annexure. (a) In the IG's letter first two points relate to wrong name of prosecution witness at serial No. 15 and name of another witness in two places at serial No. 14 and 21 of the relevant annexure. In the reply letter of the said Commissioner this error has been clarified by referring to the issuance of fresh annexure by way of a corrigendum by the Senior D.S.C. RPF, Kharagpur. The above two points of the IG relate to errors which were rectified by way of issuing of corrigendum and fresh annexure which was supplied to the Charged Officer (i.e. the writ petitioner) as well as to the Inquiry Officer (I.O in short) by a letter dated 23.01.2014. This rectifications were flagged in the letter of the said Commissioner as Flag - A. Therefore, no prejudice was caused to anybody because of those two errors as those were immediately rectified. The petitioner never raised any question as to such error. (b) The third point of the IG is, the manager of the Transport Company who made the complaint to and CBI and the two drivers of the two vehicles who were illegally detained were not made prosecution witnesses and they were not called by the IO as witnesses for examination/cross-examination by the Charged Officer. This person could have been crucial in deciding the culpability of the party charged and in bringing out the truth for the departmental proceeding. In respect of this point the said Commissioner in his letter after giving relevant facts in detail replied that the charge was established beyond any reasonable doubt and as such examination/ cross-examination of additional prosecution witness was not required to prove the charge. The said Commissioner also wrote in paragraph - 5 in his reply letter that the charge of illegal detention of the drivers had been proved beyond any reasonable doubt on the basis of the statement given by the staff who approached the drivers to the post and the staff who performed TA and DW duties at the post during material days and reiterate that further examination/ cross-examination of the drivers were not required. This is found at page 143 of the of the writ application. Thus the 3rd point was also clarified by the said Commissioner. This is found at page 143 of the of the writ application. Thus the 3rd point was also clarified by the said Commissioner. (c) The fourth point in the IG's letter was that there was a discrepancy in the day of detention of vehicles' drivers which was shown on 22.11.2013 whereas in the FIR the date of detention was as 20.11.2013 along with their drivers and this discrepancy has not been clarified during the enquiry. In this respect the reply of the Commissioner is found in his letter which is at page 142 of the writ application (first paragraph). In the said reply, the Commissioner clarified that the fact in issue was illegal detention of both the drivers at RPF post/BLS from 5.30 hours 22.11.2013 to 8.45 hours of 23.11.2013. This charge was proved by all the RPF staff who gave evidence in this respect and the charge of detention of the drivers at RPF post without making any diary entry in GD, personal search or entry on Hazat Register had been established by evidence. It was also established that no Hazat Register was maintained in the RPF/POST. It was clarified that as the charge was established by evidence, further examination/cross-examination of any other additional witness was not required. Further in paragraph 4 of the said letter of the Commissioner (vide page 145 of the writ application) it was clarified that nowhere in the complain it was mentioned that the drivers of trailers were detained on 20.11.2013. In this regard in paragraph 4, 5 and 6 of the said letter of the Commissioner it has further been clarified that the charge of illegal detention of the drivers was proved beyond any reasonable doubt on the basis of the statements made by the staff who brought the drivers to the post. Thus the fourth point was also clarified by the said Commissioner by his letter dated 17/19.12.2016. (d) The next point of the IG was that the statement of Ram Vilas Choudhury, one of the drivers of the vehicles was relied upon document, but was not called for cross-examination and other driver of vehicle namely A.K. Md. Sayeed though was present, his statement was not recorded. (d) The next point of the IG was that the statement of Ram Vilas Choudhury, one of the drivers of the vehicles was relied upon document, but was not called for cross-examination and other driver of vehicle namely A.K. Md. Sayeed though was present, his statement was not recorded. In this regard the Commissioner clarified in his letter (vide page 142 of the writ application) that the statement of driver Ram Vilas Choudhury was taken by ASC/OL/KGP and was recorded wherein the said driver described entire incident including taking away of his mobile phone and the copy of the statement was exhibited as exhibit 20 by the Enquiry Officer during the proceeding. Further in the said letter in paragraph 3 (vide page 143 of the writ application) the Commissioner clarified that the examination/ cross-examination of additional witness like the manager of the transport company and the drivers of the truck namely Ram Vilas Choudhury and A.K.Md. Sayeed was redundant as evidence gathered during enquiry and the documents exhibited in course of enquiry appeared to be sufficient to establish the charges levelled against the charged officer (i.e. the petitioner). Thus the fifth point was also clarified by the Commissioner by his aforesaid letter. (e) The sixth point raised by the IG was that no CBI officials was made PW in the enquiry to corroborate trap story and they could have been called during the enquiry to provide adequate opportunity of cross-examination to the party charged in the interest of fair play and natural justice. Effort of the IO in this regard could not be noticed in the file. This point was clarified by the Commissioner by the letter dated17/19.12.2016 which is in paragraph 6 of the said letter (vide page 143 of the writ application). It was clarified by the Commissioner that the charges levelled against the Charged Officer in the departmental proceedings were quite different from criminal charges framed by the CBI for which they have instituted a case, arrested and prosecuted the Charged Officer. The criminal case of CBI was of demanding and accepting illegal gratification from the manager of the transport company was sub judiced and for the charges in the departmental proceeding the examination of CBI official was not at all required to prove the charges. The criminal case of CBI was of demanding and accepting illegal gratification from the manager of the transport company was sub judiced and for the charges in the departmental proceeding the examination of CBI official was not at all required to prove the charges. It was further mentioned that the Charged Officer was given ample opportunity to defend his case who cross-examined all the witness during enquiry. Thus the sixth point of the IG was also clarified by the said Commissioner. (f) The seventh point of the IG was that in respect of the allegation of corruption, discreditable conduct, disobedience of order, arrest by officer and staff of CBI for demanding and accepting illegal gratification mentioned in the statement of charge, not much evidence had been collected for arriving at the findings. 23. Clarification in this point is found in paragraph 6 and 7 of the said letter of the Commissioner wherein it was stated that charges levelled against the Charged Officer (i.e. the petitioner) in the departmental proceedings were quite different from the criminal charges framed by the CBI. For the charges of the departmental proceeding examination of CBI officials was not at all required. On the basis of the report submitted by the preliminary Enquiry Officer, the departmental proceedings were initiated against the Charge Officer therefore, the matter of arrest by CBI and other allegation was mentioned in the statement of charge as the backdrop of the incident whereas the four charges which were framed against the Charged officer were quite different from the criminal charges framed by CBI. The CBI case was sub judiced in the Court of law and was not the subject matter of the departmental proceeding. 24. In the said letter of the Inspector other clarification on general principles of disciplinary proceedings was also given. It was clarified that in the disciplinary proceeding the technicalities of criminal law cannot be invoked and strict mode of proof prescribed by the Evidence Act may not be applied with equal vigour. It was also clarified that the Enquiry Officer conducting enquiry against a public servant is not bound by the strict rules of law of evidence and the degree of proof which is necessary to record an order of conviction is different from the degree of proof which is necessary to record the commission of a delinquency. It was also clarified that the Enquiry Officer conducting enquiry against a public servant is not bound by the strict rules of law of evidence and the degree of proof which is necessary to record an order of conviction is different from the degree of proof which is necessary to record the commission of a delinquency. The Commissioner further clarified that the Rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not identical; referring to Rule 153.14 of RPF Rules 1987 it has been stated that unless specifically mentioned in the said Rules (i.e. the RPF Rules) the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and the Indian evidence Act, 1872 should not apply to the departmental proceedings under the RPF Rules. Part-VI 25. After perusal of the said letter of the Commissioner the IG issued the show cause notice dated 21.09.2017 wherein inter alia the following has been recorded. "On receipt of the records of the case, the matter was thoroughly examined at this end. Entire records were remitted back to Sr. DSC/RPF/Adra for clarification on some points of the case, vide this office letter dated 10.05.2016. Accordingly, the Sr. DSC/RPF/Adra re-examined the records of the case and resubmitted the case file with necessary clarification on the specific issues vide his letter dated 17/19.12.2016 (copy enclosed). The undersigned has gone through all the relevant documents in this D&AR case file including the charge Memorandum, Enquiry Officer's report, written defence statement and the representation submitted (by the party charged) to the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority respectively as well as recommendations of Sri J.K. Satija, the then Sr. DSC/RPF/Adra and Sri A.K. Chaurasia, present Sr. DSC/RPF/Adra. On such examination, it has been found that the departmental enquiry was quite in order and the findings of the Enquiry Officer is based on evidences on record. There is no doubt that the charges levelled against the party charged are grave in nature which have been proved well in the departmental enquiry." (Emphasis Mine). Part-VII 26. Now the satisfaction of the respondent No. 2 (i.e. the IG) to issue the second show cause notice dated 21.09.2017 without explaining the reason to ignore the objections raised by himself earlier is required to be looked into as has been noted by the Hon'ble Division Bench in its order dated 17.11.2017. 27. Part-VII 26. Now the satisfaction of the respondent No. 2 (i.e. the IG) to issue the second show cause notice dated 21.09.2017 without explaining the reason to ignore the objections raised by himself earlier is required to be looked into as has been noted by the Hon'ble Division Bench in its order dated 17.11.2017. 27. To do so the charges as mentioned in the statement of charge against the petitioner are to be considered. 28. The charges are as follows: (i) He is Central Govt. Servant holding the supervisory post had given illegal order to 04 (four) on duty staff like as Sri D.R. Rao, Head Const-, Sri G.Sethi, Const-9241, Sir P.K. Panda, Const-9425 and Sri M.P. Behera, Const-9549 to apprehend two private lorry drivers from local area without informing police as well as having no case reference relating to RPF. (ii) Both the drivers were illegally detained at RPF post/BLS from 05.30hrs. of 22.11.2013 to 08.45hrs. of 23.11.2013 without making any D.E. personal search or entry in Hazat Register i.e. unlawful detention. Their Vehicle documents was also kept under custody of IPF/K. Pathak. (iii) He has failed to observe and maintain the Directive of DG/RPF/Railway Board's No. 97/SCC/ (CRIME)/45/75 dated 18.06.1997 in regards to interrogation of detention. (iv) No such information either verbally or in written has passed to his superiors or Divl. Control Room by Sri K. Pathak, Inspector in regards to such apprehension and detention during the date of occurrence." 29. On a reading of the above four charges framed against the petitioner and the letter of the IG dated 10.05.2016 and the reply thereto by the said Commissioner through his letter dated 17/19.12.2016 it is evident that while writing the letter dated 10.05.2016 the IG failed to take note of the above four charges against the charged officer and thus misdirected himself in raising the seven points which were not relevant so far as the four charges are concerned. I take note of the fact that the proceeding against the petitioner was neither started on the basis of the allegation either by the Manager of the Transport Company whose vehicles were intercepted by the petitioner, nor by CBI who arrested the petitioner, nor by the two drivers of the vehicles who were illegally detained by the petitioner's order. I take note of the fact that the proceeding against the petitioner was neither started on the basis of the allegation either by the Manager of the Transport Company whose vehicles were intercepted by the petitioner, nor by CBI who arrested the petitioner, nor by the two drivers of the vehicles who were illegally detained by the petitioner's order. The whole proceeding was initiated on the basis of preliminary report after arrest of the petitioner by CBI from the Police post itself. For proving the four charges framed there was no requirement for taking evidence of the said Manager of the Transport Company or any CBI official or any of the drivers. The IG while writing his letter dated 10.05.2016 even failed to consider that the matter of arrest by CBI etc. given in the first sub-paragraph of the statement of charge was only the backdrop of the incident and those were not the charges. The charges framed against the petitioners were different. This first sub-paragraph under the heading "statement of charge" was not a charge of any of the four charges which have been described in four different paragraphs below the said first sub-paragraph. The Commissioner by his reply letter elaborately clarified the charges, the witnesses required to be examined (who were cross-examined also by the petitioner) to prove the charges and a very important aspect of service jurisprudence so far as disciplinary proceeding are concerned by mentioning, inter alia, that the degree of proof which is necessary to record an order of conviction is different from the degree of proof which is necessary to record the Commission of a delinquency and also referred to Rule 153.14 of RPF Rules 1987. The Commissioner has also clarified why the evidence of the CBI Officer or the Manager of the Transport Company who made the complaint before CBI or the two drivers of the two detained vehicles were considered redundant to prove the four charges framed against the charged officer i.e. the petitioner. The said Commissioner in his reply letter also in several places mentioned, as was held by the Enquiry Officer, that the charges against the petitioners were established beyond any reasonable doubt. This was established by examining the witnesses and after their cross-examination. 30. The said Commissioner in his reply letter also in several places mentioned, as was held by the Enquiry Officer, that the charges against the petitioners were established beyond any reasonable doubt. This was established by examining the witnesses and after their cross-examination. 30. A point which creates an apparent impression of irregularity in the disciplinary proceeding is that a statement of one of the drivers was recorded by Sri S. Arfin ASC/OL/KPG which was exhibited as exhibit - 20 but the said driver was not examined and cross-examined. In this regard I hold, after perusal of all papers and documents on record, that the Enquiry Officer's finding is not based on Exhibit - 20, and therefore non-examination has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner. 31. It is important to note that the IG in his letter dated 10.05.2016 had raised some points and not objections against the proceeding. Thus the IG did not raise any objection against the proceeding. The IG gave the concerned Officer of RPF (Sr. DSC/ADA) an opportunity to have a fresh look at the case and to take appropriate measure as per extant Rules in the larger interest of fair play and justice (vide last paragraph of the said letter of IG dated 10.05.2016). The concerned authority accordingly took a fresh look. Clarified the points. Referred the extant Rules like Rule 153.14 of RPF Rules 1987 showing Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and Indian Evidence Act 1872 is not applicable to the departmental proceeding and gave clarificatory reply to the IG. 32. The IG after going through the said reply letter of the Commissioner clarifying all relevant points came to the conclusion that the "the departmental enquiry was quite in order" and the findings of the Enquiry Officer is based on evidence recorded and the charges against the party charged (i.e. the petitioner) have been proved well in the departmental enquiry. 33. If the IG becomes satisfied after getting the clarification nobody can say that the IG should not have been satisfied. 33. If the IG becomes satisfied after getting the clarification nobody can say that the IG should not have been satisfied. While pursuing the letter of IG, the four charges, the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reply letter of the Commissioner I have found that the seven points raised by the IG in his letter dated 10.05.2016 had very little or no connection with the four charges framed against the petitioner and the very little connection, if any, at all, had been elaborately clarified by the Commissioner by his reply letter dated 17/19.12.2016 and I hold that because of the satisfaction of the IG, this Court is not at all surprised. On the contrary, I, after examining the contents of the relevant documents, hold that there was enough clarification for the IG's satisfaction. 34. On the basis of the above discussion I hold that the observation of the IG i.e. "departmental enquiry was quite in order" was based on reasons where for the IG himself ignored the points which he himself had raised earlier. The reason has not been mentioned in so many words in the second show cause notice (issued by the IG dated 21.09.2017) but it has been categorically recorded (vide 3rd paragraph in the 2nd page of the said second show cause notice) that the case file was resubmitted with necessary clarification on the specific issues by letter dated 17/19.12.2016 (i.e. the letter of the Commissioner) which was enclosed with the said second show cause notice dated 21.09.2017. (The petitioner has not enclosed the said reply letter in the second show cause of which the reply was an important part of the second show cause notice). Thus, the material containing the reasons for satisfaction of the IG was disclosed to the petitioner and it was supplied to him. 35. The letters of the IG dated 10.05.2016 and the Commissioner dated 17/19.12.2016 have been considered by the appeal Court and it did not find any procedural irregularity in writing the said two letters. On the contrary the appeal Court's order has been passed recognising the said two letters as valid, legal and without any impropriety - otherwise the appeal Court could interfere with the procedure adopted in writing of the letter by IG and its reply by the Commissioner. The petitioner also accepted the order of the appeal Court dated 17.11.2017. On the contrary the appeal Court's order has been passed recognising the said two letters as valid, legal and without any impropriety - otherwise the appeal Court could interfere with the procedure adopted in writing of the letter by IG and its reply by the Commissioner. The petitioner also accepted the order of the appeal Court dated 17.11.2017. Therefore, writing the said letter by the IG to the Commissioner and its reply letter written by the Commissioner clarifying the points raised by the IG cannot be alleged by any person as procedurally incorrect or improper; on the contrary the outcome of such letter of the IG and the reply letter of the said Commissioner is that, the apprehensions of the IG as to the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was clarified which in my view reflects fairness, of the respondents. Part-VIII 36. The appeal Court by its order dated 17.11.2017 directed the respondent (RPF) to file affidavit-in-opposition and to file affidavit in reply thereto, if any, which have been filed. Therefore, it is evident that, apart from the above discussion made in compliance with the appeal court's order as to reason of the IG in respect his observation that "departmental enquiry was quite in order", the other points as mentioned in the writ application, in the affidavit-in-opposition and in the affidavit-in reply are required to be adjudicated by this Court. This is being done now. 37. In respect of writ application against a disciplinary proceedings the first thing which the writ Court must keep in mind is that it must not approach the case as an appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority. 38. Here, the disciplinary authority has hold him guilty. 39. The settled legal position, in respect of dealing with such departmental proceeding by a writ court is, if there is some legal evidence on which the findings of the disciplinary authority can be based then adequacy or even reliability of such evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ application. 40. When in a disciplinary proceeding the evidences are accepted and conclusion receives support therefrom, disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent employee is guilty of the charge. The Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. 41. 40. When in a disciplinary proceeding the evidences are accepted and conclusion receives support therefrom, disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent employee is guilty of the charge. The Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. 41. Further as judicial review being a review of the manner in which the decision is made, it is to be seen by a Court in writ application, whether the individual has received fair treatment and whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. 42. Interference with the decision of disciplinary authority can be permitted in the following situations: (a)When the disciplinary authority has held the proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice ; or (b) When it has been held in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry; or (c) If the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; or (d) If the conclusion made by the disciplinary authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion; or (e) Grounds very similar to the above 43. On reading the writ application it is found that the petitioner has alleged that the observation of the Enquiry Officer is perverse; nothing has been proved against him in respect of the charges and the findings of the Enquiry Officer were also vitiated in law for procedural illegalities and irregularities and for non compliance of principles of natural justice; the complainant namely Ajoykumar kishendev Chechi (Manager of the Transport Company) was not examined and material and important witness in support of the allegation against the writ petitioner were not produced in the enquiry proceeding; the findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on extraneous consideration and on surmise and conjecture; the Enquiry Officer ignored the grounds of the petitioner as contained in his written defence statement; the Enquiry Officer failed to apply the statutory Rule being Rule 153.16 of RPF Rules and there is serious miscarriage of justice as the Enquiry Officer did not consider copy of the original complaint made by the said Manager of the Transport Company; the IG-Cum General Security Commissioner, RPF, S.E. Railway came to the conclusion that the purported findings of the Enquiry Officer is vitiated in law due to procedural illegalities, non compliance of principles of natural justice and deviation from decision making process and the case file was returned back to the disciplinary authority to remove the said defect and to give the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and to take appropriate remedial measure as per extant Rules in the larger interest of fair play and justice but the Senior Divisional Security commissioner, RPF, S.E. Railway, without considering findings of the IG, without removing the said defect and procedural illegalities and irregularities of the findings of the Enquiry Officer confirmed the earlier findings dated 18.04.2015 and referred the matter back to the said IG for awarding severe punishment; the aforesaid Commissioner became bias against the petitioner; the exhibit P-20 and P-20A by the petitioner in the enquiry proceeding as his defence documents were not considered by the Enquiry Officer. 44. The above is the gist of the allegations made in the writ application. 45. On perusal of the records of the disciplinary proceeding I have found that all of the above allegations are without any merit and baseless. 46. 44. The above is the gist of the allegations made in the writ application. 45. On perusal of the records of the disciplinary proceeding I have found that all of the above allegations are without any merit and baseless. 46. In respect of the allegation as to the return of the case file by the IG to the Commissioner and resending of the file by the Commissioner to the IG I hold that the allegation of the petitioner that the said IG came to the conclusion that 'the findings of the Enquiry Officer is vitiated in law due to procedural illegalities and irregularities, non compliance of principles of natural justice and deviation from decision making process' is wholly untrue. The letter of the said IG dated 10.05.2016 does not say any such thing as to procedural illegalities and irregularities and non compliance of principles of natural justice. Detailed discussion as to the letter of the IG and its reply by the Commissioner has been made above in part- V of this judgment. 47. Apart from the above the other allegations of the petitioner are also baseless. The Enquiry Officer on the basis of evidence came to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner were proved. Such allegations have been denied by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition. 48. There is no material in the writ application which can justify interference with the decision of disciplinary authority on any of the grounds mentioned hereinabove. 49. In the written notes of argument the petitioner has made a submission that the whole departmental proceeding is vitiated in law as the Senior Divisional Security Commissioner of RPF had no jurisdiction to issue charge-sheet to the petitioner as the said Senior Divisional Security Commissioner was not the appointing authority. Such allegation has not been made by the petitioner either in his writ application or in the affidavit-in-reply or in his written defence dated 08.05.2014 (which is annexure P-2 of the writ application) or in his reply to show cause notice dated 26.07.2014 (which is annexure P-5 of the writ application). This is a wholly new submission without necessary pleadings. Such submission beside being baseless cannot also be taken into account as it was never made during the disciplinary proceeding. This is a wholly new submission without necessary pleadings. Such submission beside being baseless cannot also be taken into account as it was never made during the disciplinary proceeding. For this reason the judgment relied upon by the petitioner reported in (Union of India and others -versus- B.V. Gopinath, (2014) AIR SC 88) is not at all applicable in this case as here, there is no factual to the Gopinath's case as there said Gopinath etc. was not given copy of the articles of charges, submission of the substance of imputation of misconduct etc. The petitioner was given all papers and documents. CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 is also not applicable to the petitioner which was applicable to Gopinath and others. 50. Next case relied upon by the petitioner, (Hardwarilal -versus- State of UP,2000 AIR SC 2) has no factual resemblance with the case of the petitioner as in the cited case the complainant and the Inspector to whom the complaint was made were not examined before holding the petitioner guilty in the disciplinary proceeding. Here in this case, the complaint was not made to the RPF authority by the Manager of the transport Company or the detained drivers. The complaint was made to CBI by the said Manager of transport Company. CBI arrested the petitioner. The criminal case filed against the petitioner was pending, The Manager of the transport company or the drivers were never the complainant before the RPF against the petitioner and they were not required to be examined. Here, after the arrest of the petitioner by CBI and after making one preliminary enquiry against the petitioner by RPF authority the disciplinary proceeding was initiated. Therefore, the cited case of Hardwali Lal is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 51. The third judgment relied upon by the petitioner is reported in (Anil Kumar -versus- presiding officer and others, (1985) AIR SC 1121). Here the Supreme Court's observation was that the disciplinary enquiry was to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the report must be a reasoned one. I have already found on reading of the pleading and other documents annexed to the pleadings that there was no violation at all of natural justice and the order of the Enquiry Officer contains reason based on evidence adduced and recorded. I have already found on reading of the pleading and other documents annexed to the pleadings that there was no violation at all of natural justice and the order of the Enquiry Officer contains reason based on evidence adduced and recorded. This case, cited by the petitioner does not support the case made out in the writ application. 52. The next case cited by the petitioner is Nirmala J. Jhala -versus- State of Gujarat and another, (2013) 4 SLR 127 Supreme Court). Here the findings of the disciplinary authority was set aside as the evidence recorded in preliminary enquiry was used in regular enquiry when the delinquent was not associated with it and opportunity to cross-examine the person examined in such enquiry was not given and therefore, using such evidence was held to be violative of the principles of natural justice. In the present case there is no allegation that the evidence recorded in preliminary enquiry was used in regular enquiry and the petitioner was denied opportunity to cross-examine any of the witnesses in the disciplinary proceeding. The charge of illegal detention of the drivers has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt, as held by the Enquiry Officer, from the evidence of other witnesses. Therefore, this judgment of Nirmala J. Jhala is also not applicable in the present case as here no similar situation prevails i.e. giving importance to preliminary enquiry. 53. In the matter, the judgment of Kuldip Singh -versus-Commissioner of Police and others,1998 2 SCC 10 has been relied upon by the petitioner which is also not applicable in this case as here the findings of the Enquiry Officer is not based on no evidence, on the contrary the decision of the Enquiry Officer is based on evidence. As the petitioner has not been able to show any perversity of the Enquiry Officer to the effect that the decision could not be reached by ordinary prudent man or otherwise this cited judgment is also not applicable here. The present case is not a case where copy of the statement of the witness was not supplied to the petitioner and it is also not the case that he was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. In this respect also the judgment of Kuldip Singh is not applicable. 54. The present case is not a case where copy of the statement of the witness was not supplied to the petitioner and it is also not the case that he was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. In this respect also the judgment of Kuldip Singh is not applicable. 54. The last case cited by the petitioner is a case reported in (Chamoli Disctrict Co-operative Bank Limited and another -versus- Raguhnath Singh Rana and others, (2016) AIR SC 2510). This case is wholly distinguishable on facts from the present case. The cited case is a matter where, after a first charge-sheet an enquiry report was submitted but without proceeding thereon, a second charge-sheet was issued to an employee wherein ultimately a dismissal order was passed. This cited case has no resemblance with the present one. In the Chamoli case dismissal order was passed without holding enquiry and without due observation of principles of natural justice. None of such illegaliies are present in the present writ application. Therefore, this case of Chomali District Co-operative Bank Limited is also not applicable. 55. In the facts and circumstances discussed above I hold that there is no merit in the writ application. 56. The writ application is dismissed. 57. Now, the respondent authority is free to proceed further on the basis of the second show cause notice dated September 21, 2017 as the writ application has been dismissed. No costs.