ORDER : T. Rajani, J. 1. This petition is filed seeking for quash of the proceedings against the petitioner, who is accused No. 4, in Crime No. 4(A) of 2018 on the file of the CBI, Visakhapatnam. The offences alleged are under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 read with 471 IPC. 2. Heard the Counsel for the petitioner and the Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 3. The crime was registered based on a written report received from one Prafulla Kumar, working as General Manager and Senior Regional Head, IDBI Bank Ltd., Visakhapatnam, alleging large scale fraud in IDBI Bank Limited, in the matter of processing and sanctioning of Loans under Kisan Credit Cards/short term loans for construction of ponds/tanks by Al, the then CGM, and A2, the then DGM, and other unknown bank officials. Criminal conspiracy was alleged between A1 and A2 and A3 to A10. It is stated in the complaint that in furtherance of the conspiracy, KCC loans were sanctioned to an extent of Rs. 159.24 crores in the name of 226 borrowers deceitfully arranged by aforesaid eight aggregators on the basis of fake documents in respect of the lease deeds. In furtherance of the conspiracy, A1 dishonestly enhanced the limit to Rs. 5 crores although the maximum limit of KCC loans was only Rs. 25 lakhs, without knowledge of and approval from competent authority and circulated an email to the branch. Al and A2 directed the Branch level officers involved in processing and recommendation of loan and submitting positive reports in respect of 226 borrowers arranged by aforesaid eight aggregators, A3 to A10 and subsequently after sanction of loans the branch officials were instructed to disburse the total loan proceeds to Savings Account of beneficiaries without ensuring the end use. The loans so disbursed were diverted from the beneficiaries account by the accused and later misappropriated. As per the procedure laid down for sanction of KCC Loans the maximum limit with regard to the operation of primary activity/fish tank activity is 50 Kms., from the branch location. However, A1 instructed the Branch to ignore the condition. Hence, the complaint is filed, alleging the offences under Section 120-B read with 420, 468 read with 471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act. The FIR was registered for the same offences. 4. Heard the Counsel for the petitioner and the Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. However, A1 instructed the Branch to ignore the condition. Hence, the complaint is filed, alleging the offences under Section 120-B read with 420, 468 read with 471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act. The FIR was registered for the same offences. 4. Heard the Counsel for the petitioner and the Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 5. The relief of quash is mainly based on the one time settlement that was arrived at between the accused and the IDBI Bank. On the basis of the said settlement, the Counsel for the petitioner contends that there remains no grievance of the bank against the petitioner and hence, the continuation of proceedings would only be an abuse of process of law. In that regard, she relies on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1) CBI v. Narendra Lal Jain, (2014) 5 SCC 364 and (2) Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, 2008 (2) ALD (Crl.) 591 (SC). 6. In CBI's case (supra), the offences alleged were under Sections 420 and 120-BIPC. The facts of the case dealt with by the Apex Court are similar to the facts of this case as regards the nature of offences. The accused therein conspired with the Bank officials and had projected inflated figures of the creditworthiness of the companies represented by them and in that manner, had secured more advances/loans from the bank than they were entitled to. There was a settlement between the bank and the accused in the said case also. The Court, referring to one of the terms of settlement, which reads as follows: “Agreed and declared that the disputes between the parties thereto were purely and simply of civil nature and on payment mentioned as aforesaid made by the respondent, the appellants have no grievance of whatsoever nature, including the CBI complaint against the respondents.” held that no subsisting grievance of the Bank has been brought to the notice of the Court. It applied the ratio laid down in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 842 (SC) and Nikhil Merchant v. CBI (supra), to the facts of the case and upheld the order of the High Court therein quashing the proceedings against the accused therein. It applied the ratio laid down in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 842 (SC) and Nikhil Merchant v. CBI (supra), to the facts of the case and upheld the order of the High Court therein quashing the proceedings against the accused therein. It also observed that the observation in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , at Paragraph 61 of the said judgment, will not be attracted in the said case in view of the offences alleged i.e., Sections 420 and 120-B IPC. 7. However, the above cited ruling is primarily based on the consideration that the relevant clause of the agreement on the basis of which the consent decree was passed in the Civil Court, is to the effect that the appellants therein did not have any grievance whatsoever, including the CBI complaint against the respondent. In this case, the terms of settlement show that it is categorically stated in clause 5, that there shall not be any prejudice to the ongoing criminal investigation initiated by the CBI/Enforcement Directorate. Relevant clause of the said agreement read as follows: “4. Bank shall not in any manner affect or impair or prejudice the criminal proceedings already initiated/likely to be initiated by CBI, Enforcement Directorate or any other agencies whether on a cause of action already known to the Bank or under investigation against the Borrowers, Aggregators, Director, Promoter, Guarantor or any other person. 5. Further the Settlement (OTS) is being entered into without prejudice to the ongoing criminal investigations initiated by CBI/Enforcement Directorate/other investigation agencies.” 8. The intention of the bank, is obvious and evident from the above two clauses, that they did not want the criminal proceedings to terminate, as a consequence of the onetime settlement between the parties. Hence, the judgment relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner does not help the petitioner. The judgment in Nickel Merchant's case (supra), also dealt with the same aspect. In the said case, the facts are that the charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with 120-B IPC. The company 'N' was granted financial assistance by the bank 'A' under various facilities. The judgment in Nickel Merchant's case (supra), also dealt with the same aspect. In the said case, the facts are that the charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with 120-B IPC. The company 'N' was granted financial assistance by the bank 'A' under various facilities. On account of default in repayment of the loans, on the report filed by the GM and the Chief Vigilance Officer of the Bank, investigations were undertaken by CBI, which filed charge-sheet in the Court. The allegations under the charge-sheet indicated that the accused persons conspired with each other in fraudulently diverting the funds of the Bank. The suit between the Company and the Bank, to which the appellant herein was also a party, was disposed of, on a compromise arrived at between the parties, which was reduced into writing and was filed into the Court. The compromise therein was to the effect that the parties shall withdraw all the allegations and counter allegations made against each other. In that context, the Supreme Court, holding that since the Bank did not have any claim against the company, quashed the proceedings. But in this case, the terms of settlement are very clear that the bank intended to continue the criminal proceedings and the allegations in toto are not withdrawn against the petitioner. 9. The Counsel for the respondents relies on the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Crl.A. No. 349 of 2019 rendered by three Judges. The contention of the Counsel appearing for the State was recorded in the judgment which is that in all cases where the complainant has compromised or entered into a settlement with the accused, that need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording conviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise of futility and that in a given case, despite the complainant may not support in future and in the trial in view of the settlement and compromise with the accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against the accused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any, and/or on the basis of the medical evidence and/or other evidence/material. The Court relied on the judgment in Gian Singh's case (supra) and extracted Paragraph 61 of the ruling, which reads as under: “The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus; the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court for compounding the offence under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz., (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of ouch power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoit, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims' family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing the criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavor stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly, the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc., or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 10. The Court held that the High Court therein has exercised the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. solely on the basis of the compromise between the complainant and the accused. The High Court, as was held by the Supreme Court, has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged are not compoundable offences as per Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social impact. It is very clear that compromise between the parties shall not alone be the basis for quashing the criminal proceedings involving the heinous offences, which are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. In this case, there is every possibility of the petitioner being convicted, as the bank has specifically mentioned in the settlement terms that there shall be no prejudice caused to the criminal proceedings, which indicates that the bank would come forward with testifying all the allegations that were made in the complaint given by the Bank. Mere repayment of the amount would not exonerate the petitioner from the criminal liability and the quash of the proceedings. Cases of this sort would have serious ramifications and impact on the society. 11. In view of the above, this Court opines that this is not a fit case for quash of the proceedings. 12. Mere repayment of the amount would not exonerate the petitioner from the criminal liability and the quash of the proceedings. Cases of this sort would have serious ramifications and impact on the society. 11. In view of the above, this Court opines that this is not a fit case for quash of the proceedings. 12. With the above observations, the criminal petition is dismissed. Interim order, dated 27.2.2019, if any, shall stand vacated. 13. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.