JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. N. Deka, the learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. A. Ikbal, the learned advocate for the respondent. 2. By this revision filed under Section 115 C.P.C., the petitioner has challenged the order dated 29.03.2018, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Dhubri in Misc. (J) Case No. 5/2018, arising in T.S. No. 34/2016, thereby refusing the prayer for rejection of plaint. 3. The respondent herein is the plaintiff in TS 34/2016. The suit is filed against thirteen main defendants and sixteen proforma defendants. The suit was for declaration of right, title and interest of the respondent over the suit land and for recovery of khas possession by removing the defendants and demolishing the structures, for cancellation of Agreement dated 17.04.2007 and Lease Agreement dated 06.11.2018. In the plaint, the case projected by the respondent is that she had inherited a plot of land from her father which is referred to as “Schedule-A land”. The suit land, referred to as Schedule-B land is measuring 1B-3K-0.43L, forming part of Schedule-A land. It is claimed that till 2012, the respondent was in possession of the suit land and that M/s. Galaxy Service Station, defendant No.5 started the work in 2013 and opened a petrol and diesel outlet on 28.03.2014. It was stated that one Indadul Haque, defendant No.7, by influencing her and by deceitful means, obtained a registered Power of Attorney in respect of 2B-1K-8L, out of Schedule-A land, bearing Deed No. 87 dated 17.04.2007. On the same date, the defendant No. 7 also made an agreement with the respondent for sharing monthly rent received in respect of the said land, bearing registered Deed No. 1471 dated 17.04.2007. Subsequently, on 05.07.2007, a rectification deed was made in respect of Deed No. 1471 dated 17.04.2007. It was stated that by misinfluencing and misguided the respondent, the defendant No.7 obtained a registered lease agreement, bearing Deed No. 178 dated 06.11.2008 in favour of the petitioner, namely, Numaligarh Refinery Limited for restoration of petrol and diesel pump on the suit land. It was alleged that the lease agreement was not made in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties, projecting that the lease ought to be for three year term. It was alleged that the lease agreement was not made in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties, projecting that the lease ought to be for three year term. It was further stated that the lease was registered without obtaining permission from the concerned authority and the retail outlet was illegally sublet to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, defendant No.4. it was also stated that one Ganesh Daimary, defendant No.3 had sublet the said retail outlet, the suit property to the defendant No.4 and that one Ramakanta Sharma, defendant No.8 started construction work on the suit land for installation of petrol and diesel pumps and made certain other constructions and the petrol/diesel pump was opened on 28.03.2014 with licence bearing the name of defendant No.3 in the name of defendant No.4. It is stated that the respondent had not made any agreement with the defendant No.2 in his own name to defendant No.9 in respect of the suit property, but the defendant No.5 deposited monthly rent of Rs.4,300/- in her account, which was paid by defendant No.8 and that the defendant No.7, on the basis of deed No. 1471 dated 17.04.2013, receipt 50 per cent share of totally monthly rent. It was further stated that after expiry of three years, when the plaintiff asked the defendants No. 1, 2 and 7 for renewal of agreement dated 06.11.2008, they avoided and on 12.03.2013, the respondent obtained a certified copy of the lease agreement dated 06.11.2008 and came to know about the illegality of illegally registering a thirty year lease. Hence, the suit was filed, projecting that the agreement was false and was made on a blank signed paper. Later on, on coming to understand, the respondent had cancelled the said General Power of Attorney on 11.04.2013 and had informed the defendant No.7 about the same. The cause of action for the suit was stated to be 17.04.2007, 05.07.2007, 06.11.2008, January to December, 2012, 27.03.2013, 11.04.2013, January to February, 2014, 28.03.2014, 11.10.2015, January to July, 2016. 4. The petitioner had filed a petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The same was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 5/2018. The respondent contested the said application by filing written objection. 4. The petitioner had filed a petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The same was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 5/2018. The respondent contested the said application by filing written objection. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the contesting parties, the learned trial court had rejected the said Misc. (J) Case No. 5/2018. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that on the basis of statements made in the plaint and the documents filed along with the plaint, the admitted case of the respondent was that the lease agreement was registered on 06.11.2008, which came to the notice of the respondent on 12.03.2013 and therefore, as per the own showing of the respondent, the suit filed on 05.10.2016 was barred by limitation. It is also submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that as the lease was created by way of registered instrument, there is a general presumption that the lease was validly executed and, as such, it is not open for the petitioner to feign ignorance of the contents of the registered lease deed dated 06.11.2008 and in support of this contention, the learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain Vs. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo, (2009) 5 SCC 460. It is submitted that the plea of ignorance of contents of lease deed was just a plea and a ploy for the petitioner to question the said document. It is also submitted that as per the version of the respondent, the copy of the lease deed was provided to her on 12.03.2013, which contained power to lease or sub-lease, as such, there was no way that the said lease deed could be vitiated by fraud. It is submitted that by clever drafting of the plaint, the real issue of cancelling the lease agreement was camouflaged and several other prayers were added in the plaint to overcome the fact that the suit for cancellation of the said registered lease agreement on ground of fraud was barred by limitation. In support of his submissions, justifying his prayer for rejection of the plaint, the learned advocate for the petitioner relies on the case of Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. Vs. Hede And Company, (2007) 5 SCC 614 , and N.V. Srinivasa Murthy & Ors. Vs. In support of his submissions, justifying his prayer for rejection of the plaint, the learned advocate for the petitioner relies on the case of Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. Vs. Hede And Company, (2007) 5 SCC 614 , and N.V. Srinivasa Murthy & Ors. Vs. Mariyamma (Dead) by proposed LRs. & Ors., (2005) 5 SCC 548 . 6. Per contra, the learned advocate for the respondent has referred to the statements made in the plaint, especially paragraphs 13 and 26 thereof to canvass the point that there was a continued cause of action on various dates, which had extended the period of limitation for institution of the suit. It is also submitted that the date of knowledge of fraud was on 11.10.2015, from the RTI reply received by the respondent. Moreover, it is submitted that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and, as such, only after trial it can be conclusively held whether the reliefs claimed in the suit was barred by limitation or not, as such, this issue cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. It is submitted that the respondent had a good case on merit and, as such, the petitioner having knowledge of fraud perpetrated on the respondent was anxious of getting the plaint rejected on flimsy grounds, which had the effect of otherwise delaying early trial of the suit. In support of his submissions, the learned advocate for the respondent has placed reliance on the case of (i) C. Natrajan Vs. Ashim Bai & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 363 , (ii) Popat And Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 , and (iii) Smt. Limasenla Ao & Anr. Vs. Shri Arun Mehta & Anr., (2017) 6 GLJ 470: (2018) 1 GLR 2. 7. It is seen that the case projected by the respondent/plaintiff in paragraph 12 of the plaint is that in January, 2012 she had asked the defendants No.1, 2 and 7 for renewal of the said agreement dated 06.11.2008, but as the said defendants had avoided, the respondent obtained certified copy of the lease agreement dated 06.11.2008 on 12.03.2013 and then she could know that the defendants No.2 and 7 had very illegally prepared the said lease deed. Moreover, it is deemed fit to extract the statements made in paragraph 26 of the plaint herein below:- “That, the cause of action for the suit arose on 17.04.2007 when the false, forged and illegal Regd. General Power of Attorney, Vide Deed No. 87, dated 17.04.2007 was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant No. 7 in respect of her 2 Bighas 1 Katha 8 Lechas of land covered by Dag No. 234 under Patta No. 45 out of her total land described in the Schedule ‘A’ below and regd. Agreement, Vide Deed No. 1471, dtd. 14.04.2007 was made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 7 in respect of her 2 Bighas 1 Katha 8 Lechas of land out of her total land mentioned in the Schedule ‘A’ below for division of 50% monthly rents of the suit land between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 7 and Regd. Rectification deed, dated 05.07.2007 made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 7 in respect of the deed no. 1471 dated 17.04.2007, on 06.11.2008 when the false, fictitious and forged Regd. Lease Agreement, Vide Deed No. 178, dtd. 06.11.2008 was made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 from January to December, 2012 when the plaintiff asked the defendant nos. 1, 2 and 7 for renewal of the agreement, dated 06.11.2008 and they by this or that way avoided, on 27.03.2013 when the defendant nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 made agreement for granting of Licence by the defendant No. 4 to the defendant no. 3 and dispensing of Petrol and Diesel Pump and Tanks etc. by the defendant no. 5 on the suit land, on 11.04.2013 when the plaintiff by a regd. Deed cancelled the said General Power of Attorney, dated 17.04.2007 of the defendant no. 7, from January/2013 to February/2014 when the defendant no. 5 started works and constructions on the suit land and on 28.03.2014 hen the defendant no. 5 started its business on the suit land and opened its Petrol and Diesel Pump etc. on 11.10.2015 when the plaintiff got information from the authority concerned under the provision of the RTI Act, 2005 and thereafter asked the said defendants about their such illegal acts and playing fraud on her and from January/2016 to July/2016 when the defendant nos. 5 started its business on the suit land and opened its Petrol and Diesel Pump etc. on 11.10.2015 when the plaintiff got information from the authority concerned under the provision of the RTI Act, 2005 and thereafter asked the said defendants about their such illegal acts and playing fraud on her and from January/2016 to July/2016 when the defendant nos. 2 to 9 were arranging to construct heavy permanent structures and multi stored R.C.C. building on the suit land so that the plaintiff cannot evict them from the suit land and now are threatening the plaintiff and her sons not to prevent and obstruct them in their proposed works on the suit land and else they will have to suffer its dire consequences and thereafter each and every date arose within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble court.” 8. The following prayers are made in the plaint:- (I) That, the plaintiff’s right, title and interest over the suit land described in the schedule ‘B’ below be declared and decreed, (II) That, for a declaration that the present suit land is the part and parcel of the total land described in the Schedule ‘A’ below, (III) That, for a decree of khas possession of the suit land described in the Schedule ‘B’ below and put the plaintiff in vacant position of the suit land by removing the defendants from the suit land and also by demolishing and removing their structures standing on the suit land, (IV) (a) The Regd. Agreement, Vide Deed No. 1471, dtd. 17.04.2007 made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 7 in respect of her 2 Bighas 1 Katha 8 Lechas of land out of her total land mentioned in the Schedule ‘A’ below for division of 50% monthly rents of the suit land between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 7 is illegal, null and void, not effective, cancel and also not binding upon the plaintiff, and (b) the Regd. Rectification deed, dated 05.07.2007 made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 7 in respect of the regd. Deed No. 1471 dated 17.04.2007 is illegal, null and void, not effective, cancel and also not binding upon the plaintiff, and (c) the Lease Agreement, vide Deed No. 178, dtd. 06.11.2008 made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. Rectification deed, dated 05.07.2007 made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 7 in respect of the regd. Deed No. 1471 dated 17.04.2007 is illegal, null and void, not effective, cancel and also not binding upon the plaintiff, and (c) the Lease Agreement, vide Deed No. 178, dtd. 06.11.2008 made between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 in respect of the suit property described in the Schedule ‘B’ below and any other deed/deeds if any, subsequently, made between the plaintiff and any other defendant/defendants in respect of the suit land is illegal, null and void, not effective, cancel and also not binding upon the plaintiff, (V) That, an ad-interim temporary injunction be granted against the defendant nos. 2 to 9 restraining them and their men/agents from erecting/constructing any pucca structure of permanent nature and any R.C.C. building on the suit land during the pendency of the suit and the suit property may be preserved in the same position as it is now on the day of filling the suit in the court under the provision of law under the order of the Hon’ble Court. (VI) That the permanent injunction may be granted against the defendant nos. 2 to 9 of the suit restraining them and their men/agents from erecting/constructing any structure either permanent or temporary and multi stored structure either permanent or temporary and multi stored R.C.C. building on the suit land after putting the plaintiff on the suit land in vacant position and further restraining them all from into the suit land and interfering in any way in the peaceful possession of the suit land by the plaintiff and her sons. (VII) That, the cost of the suit be awarded in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants. (VIII) Any other relief/reliefs which the plaintiff is entitled to under law and equity. 9. On appreciating the materials on record, it is seen that assuming the plea of relief claimed in respect of lease agreement dated 06.11.2008 is held to be barred by limitation, then also as the paramount title of the suit land would remain vested with the respondent, still, there is no impediment for the Court to grant a decree in terms of prayer (I) and (II) for declaration that the respondent has the right, title and interest over the suit land and that the suit land is the part and parcel of Schedule-A land. 10. 10. In the case of Sejal Glass Ltd. Vs. Navilan Merchants Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2017 SC 4477 : (2017) 0 Supreme(SC) 1029, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that it is not a rule of law that once a part of a plaint cannot proceed, the other part also cannot proceed, and the plaint as a whole must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Thus, it appears that if the plaint survives either against certain defendants or against certain properties, Order VII Rule 11 CPC will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial. The relevant paragraphs 10 to 13 thereof is quoted below:- “(10) We are afraid that this is a misreading of the Madras High Court judgment. It was only on the peculiar facts of that case that want of Section 80 CPC against one defendant led to the rejection of the plaint as a whole, as no cause of action would remain against the other defendants. This cannot elevate itself into a rule of law, that once a part of a plaint cannot proceed, the other part also cannot proceed, and the plaint as a whole must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. In all such cases, if the plaint survives against certain defendants and/or properties, Order VII Rule 11 will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial. (11) If only a portion of the plaint, as opposed to the plaint as a whole is to be struck out, Order VI Rule 16 of the CPC would apply. Order VI Rule 16 states as follows: “16. Striking out pleadings.-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading- (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.” It is clear that Order VI Rule 16 would not apply in the facts of the present case. There is no plea or averment to the effect that, as against the Directors, pleadings should be struck out on the ground that they are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or that they may otherwise tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit or that it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. (12) In contrast to the above provisions, which apply on a demurrer, the provisions of Order XIV Rule 2, read as follows; “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.- (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.” (13) The Court is vested with a discretion under this order to deal with an issue of law, which it may try as a preliminary issue if it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court, or is a bar to the suit created for the time being in force. Obviously, this provision would apply after issues are struck i.e. after a written statement is filed. This provision again cannot come to the rescue of learned counsel for the respondent.” 11. The case of Popat And Kotecha Properties (supra) was also decided similar to the decision in the above referred case of Sejal Glass Ltd. (supra). Thus, in this present case in hand as several reliefs have been prayed for in the plaint, merely because some of the prayers might be barred by limitation, having seen the prayers made in the plaint, as extracted above, it cannot be conclusively said that the suit is barred by any law. 12. Thus, in this present case in hand as several reliefs have been prayed for in the plaint, merely because some of the prayers might be barred by limitation, having seen the prayers made in the plaint, as extracted above, it cannot be conclusively said that the suit is barred by any law. 12. On the plea of clever drafting of plaint as raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, for which he has relied on the case of Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. (supra), and N.V. Srinivasa Murthy (supra). The facts involved in the said case of Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. (supra) was that appellants therein was seeking injunction for enforcement of negative covenant in the purportedly renewed agreement almost four years after the respondents had categorically denied the said renewal. Under such fact situation, the learned trial Court and the High Court had held that the suit was not merely for injunction as prayed for in the plaint, but was for specific performance of renewal of agreement and hence, the suit was dismissed on being barred by limitation. The facts in the case of N.V. Srinivasa Murthy was that the case projected in the suit was that the registered sale deed dated 05.05.1953 was only a loan transaction executed to secure the sum borrowed and, as such, it was held that the relief of declaring that registered sale deed was loan transaction and the second relief of specific performance of oral agreement or re-conveyance of the property by registered instrument ought to have been claimed in the suit. However, in the present case in hand, as already indicated above, the prayer (I) and (II) for declaration that the respondent has the right, title and interest over the suit land and that the suit land is the part and parcel of Schedule-A land cannot be held to be barred by limitation without the parties leading evidence on the issue, as such, the learned trial Court has not committed any jurisdictional error by not rejecting the plaint. However, it is one thing to say that whether all the reliefs as prayed for in the plaint apart from prayer (I) and (II) can be granted or not after evidence are led by the parties, but it is another thing to hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected on the ground that the relief for cancellation of Agreement dated 17.04.2007 and Lease Agreement dated 06.11.2018 are barred by any law. 13. The jurisdiction of this Court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to see if the learned Court below has committed any jurisdictional error and unless the judgment is vitiated by jurisdictional error, this Court cannot substitute the decision by the learned Court with its own view. Therefore, in view of the discussions above, this Court, this Court does not find that the learned trial Court has committed any jurisdictional error and, as such, this revision stands dismissed without cost. 14. No observations made herein shall prejudice any of the parties while deciding the suit on merit by the learned trial Court. 15. The parties, who are duly represented by their learned counsel, shall appear before the learned trial Court on 28.01.2019 without any further notice of appearance and seek further instructions from the said learned Court.