JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner, who was a Scale-II Officer of Odisha Gramya Bank, has filed this writ application to quash the order of his termination dated 18.10.2013 in Annexure-9 and consequential order of rejection of his appeal by the appellate authority dated 30.06.2016 in Annexure-10, which was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing and compliance of principles of natural justice. 2. The brief facts of the case in hand is that the petitioner belongs to Scheduled Caste community. On being duly selected for the post of Officer Scale-I, on 29.09.2008 he was posted as Probationary Officer in the Oriental Bank of Commerce at Dhamtari in the State of Chhatishgarh, where he continued as an officer till 11.01.2012. After completion of probation period, as is evident from the certificate issued by Oriental Bank of Commerce dated 11.01.2012 in Annexure-1, while the petitioner was so working, he came across an advertisement issued by the Neelachal Gramya Bank, Bhubaneswar (after merger with Baitarani Gramya Bank renamed as “Odisha Gramya Bank”) for filling up the post of ‘Officer MMGS-II’. Being desirous to work in the State of Odisha, he applied for the said post and appeared in the written test held on 12.06.2011. On being successful in the written test, he appeared in viva voce test and was selected. Consequentially, vide order dated 12.01.2012, he was appointed as Manager in Talcher Branch in the scale of pay of Rs.19,400/-. 2.1. While the petitioner was continuing as Manager at Talcher, he passed Junior Associate Indian Institute of Banking (JAIIB) on 26.11.2012. As a consequence of which, he got one increment and his basic pay became Rs.20,100/-. Thereafter, he was transferred to Unit-I Branch at Bhubaneswar on 05.06.2012 and again to Unit-IV Branch on 31.12.2012. Due to his satisfactory service he got an increment and his basic pay became Rs.20,900/- on 30.01.2013. The petitioner, on 29.04.2013, passed Certified Associate Indian Institute of Banking (CAIIB) for which he got another increment and his basic salary became Rs.21,700/-. On 21.07.2013, he was transferred to Kendrapara Branch, which is a Regional Branch, where he joined on 31.07.2013, and opposite party no.3-Regional Manager posted him at Jajpur, where the petitioner joined on the same day, i.e., 31.07.2013. 2.2. On 21.07.2013, he was transferred to Kendrapara Branch, which is a Regional Branch, where he joined on 31.07.2013, and opposite party no.3-Regional Manager posted him at Jajpur, where the petitioner joined on the same day, i.e., 31.07.2013. 2.2. After joining at Jajpur Branch, the petitioner faced a lot of problems to the extent that opposite party no.4-Branch Manager asked the petitioner to grant indiscriminate agricultural loans under Kissan Credit Card (KCC) even without “no due certificate” to which the petitioner refused. Consequentially, the Branch Manager took the same amiss and instigated opposite party no.3 against the petitioner to oust him from the bank. On instigation of opposite party no.4, opposite party no.3 wrote letter to the petitioner alleging that he was remaining unauthorized absent from the Branch and cautioned him to be attentive and regular in duties. This letter was fabricated just to create an adverse document during his probation period though he was not absent in the Branch even in a single day from the date of his joining. 2.3. On 05.09.2013, Kartika Chandra Nayak, applied for agricultural loan under KCC to opposite party no.4-Branch Manager, who forwarded the said application to the petitioner, without “no due certificate”, and told him to process the loan and open the account, to which the petitioner refused. As the Branch Manager-opposite party no.4 pressurized the petitioner to disburse loan without “no due certificate”, the petitioner wrote letter to opposite party no.3-Regional Manager on 23.09.2013 seeking his guidance. Opposite party no.3, instead of giving guidance, sought explanation from the petitioner on 20.09.2013 regarding his absence from the Branch on 17.09.2013, and moving at Regional Branch, Chandikhol at 5.30 P.M., alleging the same to be gross indiscipline. Before giving reply to the aforesaid notice, opposite party no.3 again on 16.10.2013 issued notice to show cause within seven days from the date of receipt of the letter as to why disciplinary action shall not be initiated against him for submitting loan proposals on 11.10.2013, instead of 10.10.2013, thereby harassing valuable customers of the bank. Before the petitioner submitted reply to aforesaid notice of show-cause, he was terminated from service by opposite party no.1-Chairman just after two days of issuance of notice to show-cause, i.e. on 18.10.2013. Against the said order of termination dated 18.10.2013, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority which was also rejected on 30.06.2016. Hence this application. 3. Mr. Before the petitioner submitted reply to aforesaid notice of show-cause, he was terminated from service by opposite party no.1-Chairman just after two days of issuance of notice to show-cause, i.e. on 18.10.2013. Against the said order of termination dated 18.10.2013, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority which was also rejected on 30.06.2016. Hence this application. 3. Mr. Asok Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of termination passed on 18.10.2013 by opposite party no.1-Chairman, Odisha Gramya Bank smacks mala fide. As such, vide letter dated 16.10.2013, opposite party no.3 had issued notice to show-cause within seven days from the date of receipt of the letter for initiation of disciplinary action against the petitioner and just after two days of issuance of the aforesaid letter, i.e., 18.10.2013, opposite party no.1-Chairman of the Bank, who claims to be the appointing authority, passed the order of termination without giving opportunity of hearing to him. It is further contended that though the petitioner was continuing as a probationer, he was granted three increments from the date of joining, i.e., 12.01.2012 till his joining at Jajpur Branch on 31.07.2013 in quick succession because of his performance. But, how he became unfit within two months of service at Jajpur Branch because he was pressurized by the Branch Manager, Jajpur Branch to do some illegalities and grant KCC loan without any no due certificate. It is further contended that the order of termination suffers from vice of mala fide and non-compliance of principles of natural justice. More particularly, the allegation of indiscipline conduct casts stigma on the career of the petitioner and termination of service, without giving opportunity of hearing, is a nullity. It is further contended that without application of mind, the appellate authority has rejected his appeal by not assigning any reason thereof. Therefore, the order of termination dated 18.10.2013 in Annexure-9 and consequential rejection of appeal on 30.06.2016 in Annexure-10 are liable to be quashed, particularly when the same have been passed while petitioner was on probation. It is further contended that during probation period, when termination order was effected, which is prima facie a non-stigmatic one, but the Court can lift the veil and examine whether in the garb of termination simpliciter, the employer has, in fact, punished the employee for an act of misconduct. It is further contended that during probation period, when termination order was effected, which is prima facie a non-stigmatic one, but the Court can lift the veil and examine whether in the garb of termination simpliciter, the employer has, in fact, punished the employee for an act of misconduct. If that be so, the termination order so passed by the authority cannot sustain in the eye of law. It is further contended that dismissal from service on the ground of misconduct is stigmatic and therefore, there should be compliance of principles of natural justice. For non-compliance thereof, the order of termination cannot sustain in the eye of law. To substantiate his contentions, he has relied upon State Bank of India V. Palak Modi, (2013) 3 SCC 607 ; Ajit Singh V. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 217 ; Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, Lucknow, U.P., V. Prakash Chandra Saxena, (1994) 5 SCC 177 ; Radheshyam Gupta V. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 21 : AIR 1999 SC 609 ; and State of Uttar Pradesh V. Kausal Kishore Sukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 . 4. Per contra, Mr. K.C. Kanungo, learned counsel for the opposite parties argued with vehemence stating that the probationer has no right to the post and, as such, the order of termination has been passed in compliance with the terms and conditions of the appointment letter. The service condition of the petitioner is regulated by Neelachal Gramya Bank Officers’ and Employees Service Regulation, 2010. Under Regulation-8, an officer directly appointed in Group-A post shall be on probation for a period of two years, which may be extended by the appointing authority for a period not exceeding one year. As per sub-regulation (b)(ii) of Regulation-10, if termination is required, one month notice to the officer or employee, who is on probation, is to be given. The petitioner, being a probationer and belonged to officer category, the competent authority is justified in passing the impugned order, which does not require interference of this Court at this stage. It is further contended that the impugned order of termination has been passed as work of the petitioner was not satisfactory, and not under stigmatic ground. The petitioner, being a probationer and belonged to officer category, the competent authority is justified in passing the impugned order, which does not require interference of this Court at this stage. It is further contended that the impugned order of termination has been passed as work of the petitioner was not satisfactory, and not under stigmatic ground. The unsatisfactory work can be referred from the letters issued to the petitioner dated 20.09.2013 and 16.10.2013, which indicate untimely departure from the Branch Office, moving at Regional Office, Chandikhol at 5.30 P.M., disobedience of office order and harassment of valuable customers. The appointing authority, finding the performance and duties discharged by the petitioner, during probation period, to be unsatisfactory, terminated him from service in terms of the letter of appointment. Thereby, no illegality or irregularity has been committed by the authority so as to warrant interference of this Court. It is further contended that the order of termination is not a stigmatic one rather it is in consonance with the terms of appointment, thereby it cannot be said that any illegality or irregularity has been committed by issuing such order. Against such order of termination when the petitioner preferred appeal he had expressed his apprehension that he may not get another job, but at present he is serving in one of the nationalized banks and posted at Amravati. Therefore, the apprehension is unfounded, and as such, the order of termination cannot be said to be stigmatic one. Rather due to unsatisfactory performance, the termination simpliciter was passed by the competent authority, which was challenged in W.P.(C) No. 26152 of 2013 and while disposing of the said writ petition, this Court vide order dated 04.05.2016 directed the opposite party-Bank to extend personal hearing. In obedience to such direction, the petitioner was advised to be present before the Board on 24.06.2016 and considering the relevant records vis-à-vis the appeal so preferred, the same was rejected. Thereby, the order of termination passed by the authority on 18.10.2013 in Annexure-9 and consequential order of rejection of appeal on 30.06.2016 in Annexure-10 are well justified. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon Director Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences (ARIES) V. Devendra Joshi, (2018) 2 SCC (L & S) 760. 5. This Court heard Mr. A. Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon Director Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences (ARIES) V. Devendra Joshi, (2018) 2 SCC (L & S) 760. 5. This Court heard Mr. A. Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. K.C. Kanungo, learned counsel for the opposite parties. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is being disposed of at the stage of admission. 6. The admitted fact is that while the petitioner was continuing as a probationer, his services were terminated on 18.10.2013. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred appeal, which was also rejected vide order dated 30.06.2016. As has been admitted by the opposite parties in Annexure-A, the offer of appointment in Officer Scale-II Cadre issued by the Chairman and Appointing Authority on 05.11.2011 is applicable to the petitioner. For the purpose of proper adjudication of the case, Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 12(i) of offer of appointment are quoted below: “1. PROBATION: You will be on probation for a period of two year. 2. EXTENTION OF PROBATION PERIOD: The period of two year probation may be extended for a further period of one year, if your service during the probation period is not found satisfactory in the opinion of the Appointing Authority. 3. CONFIRMATION: On satisfactory completion of probation, including the period of extension of probation, if any, you will be confirmed in the Bank’s service in OFFICER SCALE-II CADRE subject to obtention of police verification report. 4. TERMINATION OF SERVICE: (a) Where during the period of probation, including the period of extension of probation, if any, the Appointing Authority is of the opinion that you are not fit for confirmation in the said post, you may be terminated after giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof; (b) Your services are liable to be terminated if your work and conduct are found unsatisfactory and if the certificates produced by you are found to be forged, tampered with particulars furnished in this regard are misrepresented, even after the expiry of the probation period, with one month’s notice or on payment of a month’s pay and allowances in lieu of notice. 5. 5. TERMINATION OF SERVICE by notice: (a) No employee shall leave or discontinue his service in the Bank without first giving notice in writing to the Appointing Authority of his intention to leave or discontinue his service in the Bank without first giving notice in writing to the Appointing authority of his intention to leave or discontinue his service or resign; (b) The period of notice required shall be,- (i) Three months, in the case of confirmed employee (ii) One month, in the case of employee who is on probation. In case of breach of clause 5 above, you are required to give to the Bank as compensation a sum equal to your pay for the period of notice required. xxx xxx xxx 10. PERFORMANCE REVIEW: Your performance during the probation period will be reviewed periodically. xxx xxx xxx 12. OTHER CONDITIONS: (I) On appointment you will be governed by Neelachal Gramya Bank Officers’ and Employees’ Service Regulation 2010, which may be revised, altered or amended from time to time by the Bank. 7. Above being the provisions of law governing the field to be followed by terms of the offer of appointment in Officer Scale-II Cadre in Annexure-A dated 05.11.2011, the petitioner was posted at Talcher Branch on 12.01.2012 with basic pay of Rs.19,400/-Thereafter, he was transferred to Unit-1 Branch, Bhubaneswar on 05.06.2012. On passing of Junior Associate Indian Institute of Banking (JAIIB), he got one increment and his basic pay became Rs.20,100/-. He was transferred to Unit-IV Branch on 31.12.2012. Due to his satisfactory performance in service, he got another increment and his basic pay became Rs.20,900/-. Thereafter, he passed Certified Associate Indian Institute of Banking (CAIIB), for which he got another increment on 29.04.2013, and his basic salary became Rs.21,700/-. Therefore, the petitioner during his probation period was allowed three increments successively. 8. The petitioner was transferred to Kendrapara Branch on 31.07.2013, which is a Regional Branch, where he joined on the very same day. The fact of receiving three increments by the petitioner from the date of his joining till his transfer to Kendrapara Branch, during probation period, has not been disputed. 8. The petitioner was transferred to Kendrapara Branch on 31.07.2013, which is a Regional Branch, where he joined on the very same day. The fact of receiving three increments by the petitioner from the date of his joining till his transfer to Kendrapara Branch, during probation period, has not been disputed. But, fact remains action has been taken against the petitioner on the allegation of regularly irregular in attending his duties which hampers the business growth of the Branch and the Branch in question is a District Headquarter Branch, the disbursement of loans is affected due to his unauthorized absence from duty. This contention has been fortified vide letter dated 20.09.2013 in Annexure-7 on the allegation of untimely departure from the Branch, moving at Regional Office, Chandikhol at 5.30 P.M and subsequent letter dated 16.10.2013 with regard to disobedience of office order and harassment of valuable customers. Though the petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation pursuant to letter dated 16.10.2013 in Annexure-8, within seven days, before expiry of such period the order of termination was issued on 18.10.2013 stating that: “But it is disheartening to note that your work performance and conduct during the probation period are found to be unsatisfactory. Being your Appointing Authority, I am of the opinion that you are not fit for confirmation in the said post and not fit to continue in bank’s job. Hence, your services from our bank is terminated with immediate effect on payment of one month’s pay and allowances, as per the terms and conditions of appointment letter.” This clearly indicates that when in one hand the Regional Manager calls for explanation on 16.10.2013 in Annexure-8 within seven days from the petitioner, but within two days thereafter the Chairman & Appointing Authority has taken drastic step of termination from service on 18.10.2013 in Annexure-9. 9. Mr. K.C. Kanungo, learned counsel for the opposite parties emphatically submitted that the employer has every right to terminate the services of the petitioner, being a probationer, if his performance is unsatisfactory. To that, Mr. A. Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that this is not a termination simplicitor, rather the order of termination, having been passed with mala fide intention for unsuitability, stigmatic or misconduct, the Court would/should lift the veil and find out the nature of order itself. To that, Mr. A. Mohanty, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that this is not a termination simplicitor, rather the order of termination, having been passed with mala fide intention for unsuitability, stigmatic or misconduct, the Court would/should lift the veil and find out the nature of order itself. Therefore, abrupt termination from service on the ground of unsatisfactory performance is to be examined whether it is stigmatic or not. Further, declaring an employee’s performance unsatisfactory may amount to unsuitable or misconduct with a mala fide intention to deprive him to continue in service. There is no dispute on the factual matrix of the case, in hand, that from the date of joining, i.e., 12.01.2012 till 31.07.2013, he was granted three increments. This grant of increments shows that the petitioner’s performance was satisfactory. 10. In State of Kerala V. P.N. Neelkandan Nair, (2005) 5 SCC 561 : AIR 2005 SC 3066 , the apex Court held as follows: “Increment has a definite concept in service laws. It is conceptually different from revision of pay scale. It is an increase or addition in a fixed scale. It is a regular increase in salary on such a scale.” Therefore, the increase of salary successfully during period of probation is attached to the performance of the employee concerned. 11. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite parties is that because of acquisition of qualification by passing the examination the increments have been granted, that cannot be substantiated in view of law laid down by the apex Court. In State of Haryana V. Kamal Singh Saharwat, (1999) 8 SCC 44 : AIR 1999 SC 3775 , the apex Court held that mere acquisition of educational qualifications for a post will not result in entitlement to the higher pay scale applicable to that post without being appointed to that post. 12. It is the consistent plea of the opposite parties that the petitioner is a probationer. As his performance was not satisfactory, he was terminated from service and the said termination is termination simplicitor. Now, it is to be seen what the meaning of “probation”. “Probation” means testing of a person’s capacity, conduct or character especially before he is admitted to regular employment. As his performance was not satisfactory, he was terminated from service and the said termination is termination simplicitor. Now, it is to be seen what the meaning of “probation”. “Probation” means testing of a person’s capacity, conduct or character especially before he is admitted to regular employment. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. V. State of Orissa, (1977) 1 LL.J 1 3-4 (SC), the apex Court held as follows: “‘Probation’ means ‘trial’ and a probationer is an employee who has been provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy and whose probation, i.e., fitness for the post, has not been confirmed or declared. The concept of ‘fitness for the post’ includes three main ingredients, viz, performance or productivity, discipline or conduct and attendance.” In Ajit Singh V. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 494 : (1983) 2 SCC 217 , the reason as to why a period of probation is prescribed and how such period has been understood in service jurisprudence has been elaborately discussed by the Supreme Court. The apex Court explained that the concept of probation acquired importance in the developing master servant relationship in public service where it became difficult for the employer to dispense with the services of an employee without following certain procedural safeguards like natural justice, etc. it was further observed that in order that an incompetent or inefficient servant is not foisted upon an employer because the charge of incompetence or inefficiency is easy to make but difficult to prove, the concept of probation was devised to the following effect: “To guard against errors of human judgment in selecting suitable personnel for service, the new recruit was put on test for a period before he is absorbed in service or gets a right to take post. Period of probation gave a sort of locus poenitentiae to the employer to observe the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserved a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period which is styled as period of probation”. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra vrs. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra vrs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , the concept has been enunciated in these words: “An appointment to a permanent post in Government Service on probation means, as in the case of a personnel appointed by a private employer, that the servant so appointed is taken on trial.” 13. In view of the above judicial pronouncements, there is no iota of doubt that the probationer has no right to the post. As such, a probationer does not acquire any substantive right to the post and cannot complain if his service is terminated at any time during the probationary period i.e. before confirmation. It is the admitted case that the petitioner’s service has not been confirmed and action has been taken for termination during the probation period by the opposite parties. But looking at the materials available on record, this cannot be construed that it is a termination simplicitor. Rather the documents which have been annexed in Annexure-4 dated 19.08.2013, Annexure-7 dated 29.09.2013 and consequence thereof the show-cause which was issued on 16.10.2013 clearly indicate that termination order has been issued by way of punishment. The services of a probationer can be lawfully brought to an end before the expiry of the period of probation by way of simplicitor termination. But the termination will be illegal if it was really brought about to punish the employee for misconduct or the termination casts a stigma on him. The documents which have been annexed to the writ petition clearly justify the factum that on the allegation of misconduct, negligence and inefficiency, the action has been taken against the petitioner. 14. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra, (supra), the apex Court observed that such a termination for misconduct etc. “puts an indelible stigma on the Officer affecting his future career”. In Allahabad Bank Officers’ Association V. Allahabad Bank, (1996) 4 SCC 504 : AIR 1996 SC 2030 , the apex Court observed as follows: “Stigma, according to the dictionary meaning, is something that detracts from the character or reputation of a person, a mark, sign etc. indicating that something is not considered normal or standard. It is a blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or shame and mark or label indicating deviation from a norm. indicating that something is not considered normal or standard. It is a blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or shame and mark or label indicating deviation from a norm. in the context of an order of termination or compulsory retirement of a government servant stigma would mean a statement in the order indicating his misconduct or lack of integrity.” (Emphasis supplied) The topic was again extensively reviewed by the Supreme Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee V. Satyendra Nath Bose, National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, (1999) 3 SCC 60 : AIR 1999 SC 983 and the principles in Radhey Shyam Gupta (supra) were reiterated. It was further pointed out that stigma might be inferred from the references quoted in the termination order although the order itself might not contain anything offensive. In Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja V. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, (2007) 10 SCC 71 : AIR 2008 SC 15 , the apex Court held that where there is a discharge from service after prescribed probation period was over and the discharge order contained allegations against him and surrounding circumstances also showed that discharge was not based solely on assessment of the employee’s work and conduct during probation, the termination was held to be stigmatic and punitive. The distinction between “motive” or “foundation” is thin and overlapping and that ultimately the question as to whether or termination is simplicitor or punitive is to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. This approach is far more satisfactory than the confusing test of ‘motive’ of ‘foundation’. 15. In Palak Modi (supra), the apex Court held in para-36 as follows: “36. There is a marked distinction between the concepts of satisfactory completion of probation and successful passing of the training/test held during or at the end of the period of probation, which are sine qua non for confirmation of a probationer and the Bank’s right to punish a probationer for any defined misconduct, misbehaviour or misdemeanour. There is a marked distinction between the concepts of satisfactory completion of probation and successful passing of the training/test held during or at the end of the period of probation, which are sine qua non for confirmation of a probationer and the Bank’s right to punish a probationer for any defined misconduct, misbehaviour or misdemeanour. In a given case, the competent authority may, while deciding the issue of suitability of the probationer to be confirmed, ignore the act(s) of misconduct and terminate his service without casting any aspersion or stigma which may adversely affect his future prospects but, if the misconduct/misdemeanour constitutes the basis of the final decision taken by the competent authority to dispense with the service of the probationer albeit by a non-stigmatic order, the Court can lift the veil and declare that in the garb of termination simpliciter, the employer has punished the employee for an act of misconduct.” Therefore, on consideration of the law laid down by the apex Court, after lifting the veil relying upon the judgments in Prakash Saxena, Radheshyam Gupta and Kausal Kishore Sukla (supra), the termination of the petitioner from service is because of misconduct alleged against him, which is apparent from the nature of order passed by the opposite party in Annexure-9. 16. To examine the nature of the order of termination dated 18.10.2013 in Annexure-9 passed by the Chairman-cum-Appointing Authority, this Court directed vide order dated 22.02.2019 to the following effect:- “Let Mr. K.C. Kanungo, learned counsel for opposite parties produce the record to find out the conduct of the petitioner as has been stated in the order of termination of service dated 18.10.2013 in Annexure-9.” In compliance of the said order, the opposite parties produced the relevant file, along with an affidavit, in sealed cover on 25.06.2019, duly sworn in by opposite party no.2, containing 85 pages. This Court, when examined the purport of the order on perusal of the document itself in Annexure-9, on the face of it, was not inclined to open the sealed cover and examine the records submitted before this Court. Therefore, the documents, which were submitted in a sealed cover, are returned to Mr. K.C. Kanungo, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties. 17. Therefore, the documents, which were submitted in a sealed cover, are returned to Mr. K.C. Kanungo, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties. 17. In Director Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences (supra), the apex Court, while considering the order of termination issued on 31.12.2008, observed that it is an innocuous order terminating the services of respondent No.1 at the end of the probation period. As no allegations of misconduct are made in the order, there is no stigma. Even the High Court is of the opinion that there is no stigma. The fact remains that there was a preliminary inquiry conducted by the Management in which there was a prima facie finding recorded against the respondent No.1 of his involvement in an act of misconduct. The appellants decided not to proceed further and hold a detailed inquiry to prove the misconduct of respondent No.1. However, the service of respondent No.1 was terminated at the end of the period of probation which cannot be said to be punitive. Therefore, the order dated 31.12.2008 is an order of termination simpliciter. In view of the above, it cannot be said that misconduct was the foundation for the order of termination. The factual matrix of the case in Director Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences mentioned supra is absolutely different than that of the present one, which has also been discussed in preceding paragraph. As such, the order of termination precedes by the letter dated 20.09.2013, calling for explanation, speaks about untimely departure from the Branch, moving at Regional Office, Chandikhol and subsequent show-cause notice dated 16.10.2013 on the basis of an alleged misconduct, disobedience of order and harassment to valuable customers. Once show-cause notices were issued calling upon the petitioner to explain his conduct on the aforesaid allegations within seven days, two days thereafter, on 18.10.2013 the termination order has been issued on the ground of his unsatisfactory performance and conduct during the period of probation, though during the probation period, the petitioner was granted three increments. It casts a stigma to such termination dated 18.10.2013 and as such, the termination has been effected as punitive one, and if that is so, then compliance of principles of natural justice is a must. Having not complied with the same, the order of termination cannot sustain. 18. It casts a stigma to such termination dated 18.10.2013 and as such, the termination has been effected as punitive one, and if that is so, then compliance of principles of natural justice is a must. Having not complied with the same, the order of termination cannot sustain. 18. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the law discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that during probation period since the order of termination dated 18.10.2013 in Annexure-9, which is stigmatic and punitive, was issued, and consequential order in Annexure-10 dated 30.06.2006 rejecting the appeal, cannot sustain in the eye of law and are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the same are hereby quashed. 19. The writ petition is thus allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.