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2019 DIGILAW 440 (UTT)

UMA DUTT NAUTIYAL v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

2019-08-08

ALOK KUMAR VERMA, RAMESH RANGANATHAN

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JUDGMENT Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J. (Oral) Heard Mr. R.C. Tamta, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. C.S. Rawat, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand. 2. The application seeking condonation of the delay of 06 days, in preferring this Appeal, is not opposed by Mr. C.S. Rawat, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand, and the delay is, therefore, condoned. Delay Condonation Application No. 10845 of 2019 stands disposed of. 3. This appeal is preferred by the appellant against the order passed by learned Single Judge in WPMS No. 1839 of 2019 dated 26.06.2019. The appellant herein filed WPMS No. 1839 of 2019 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 14.05.2019 passed by Director, Rehabilitation, Tehri Dam Project; and a writ of mandamus directing and commanding the Director, Rehabilitation, Tehri Dam Project to grant the benefits of rehabilitation as per the 1998 Rehabilitation Policy. 4. By the impugned order dated 14.05.2019, the petitioner was informed that the subject land was in possession of Shri Baisakhu ever since 1959, and he was declared a Bhumidhar; the lands were acquired for the purpose of the project from Shahib Singh and Gulab Singh, children of Shri Baisakhu; and the petitioner's claim was not justified. 5. 4. By the impugned order dated 14.05.2019, the petitioner was informed that the subject land was in possession of Shri Baisakhu ever since 1959, and he was declared a Bhumidhar; the lands were acquired for the purpose of the project from Shahib Singh and Gulab Singh, children of Shri Baisakhu; and the petitioner's claim was not justified. 5. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner's claim was to be the tenure holder of agricultural land of Hatwal Gaon village, Tehri Garhwal; they had preferred WPMS No. 3750 of 2018 seeking rehabilitation benefits; the said writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge, by his order dated 15.12.2018, directing the Director, Rehabilitation/District Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal to decide the petitioner's application; consequently, the order dated 14.05.2019 was passed wherein it was stated that the petitioner had claimed that the land belonged to Late Shri Hansram and was, thereafter, recorded in the name of his sons Jogeshwar and Dasrath who died in the year 1981 and 1975; land acquisition proceedings were initiated, and it was found that Baisakhu s/o Matbaru was in possession of the said land; he was given the benefits of the Rehabilitation Scheme as he was in possession of the land; he was initially declared the ‘Shirdar', and then a ‘Bhumidhar', the Bhumidhari right on the said land was given to the family of Baisakhu; they were granted such benefits under the law, there was nothing on record to suggest that the petitioners' name was either in the public records or they were on the possession of the property; and, therefore, the petitioners' claim has rightly been rejected. 6. The Learned Single Judge further observed that the order, impugned in the writ petition, is a well considered speaking order; the petitioners' claim was highly belated, and was extremely weak, as there was nothing to show that there they were in actual possession of the said land, and were, therefore, liable to be given the benefit. 7. The subject land was acquired for the purpose of Tehri Project in the year 1980; and as Mr. Baisakhu's name was recorded in the records, as being in possession of the land, he was paid compensation, and was extended the benefits under the Rehabilitation Scheme. 7. The subject land was acquired for the purpose of Tehri Project in the year 1980; and as Mr. Baisakhu's name was recorded in the records, as being in possession of the land, he was paid compensation, and was extended the benefits under the Rehabilitation Scheme. Despite the land having been acquired in the year 1980, the petitioner kept quiet for nearly four decades thereafter till they filed WPMS No. 3750 of 2018. As held by Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal : (1986) 4 SCC 566 . “..... Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent of the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction......" (emphasis supplied) 8. Since the writ petition has been filed nearly four decades after an award was passed; the subject land was acquired in 1980, and the rehabilitation benefits have already been paid to the legal heirs of Shri Baisakhu several decades earlier, the Learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the writ petition is unduly belated, and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In an intra-Court appeal, interference is justified only if the order under appeal suffers from a patent illegality. We find no such infirmity in the order under appeal. 9. The Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.